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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the experiences and impact of wartime mobilization in the county 
of Devon. It argues that a crucial role was played by the county’s elites who became the 
self-appointed intermediaries of the war experience on a local level and who took an 
explicitly exhortative role, attempting to educate Devonians in the codes of ideal 
conduct in wartime. These armchair patriots, defined by the local commentator Stephen 
Reynolds as ‘provincial patriots’, superintended the patriotism of Devon’s population, 
evaluating that patriotism against the strength of their own. Through a critical 
exploration of Reynolds’ definition of Devon’s elite as the police-men and women of 
patriotism, this thesis reveals the ambiguities, constraints and complexities surrounding 
mobilization and remobilization in Devon. The evidence from Devon reveals the 
autonomy of Devon’s citizens as they attempted to navigate the different challenges of 
the war while they weighed-up individual and local interests against the 
competing requests that the ‘provincial patriots’ prescribed for them. In many cases, 
their responses to the appeals and prescriptions from Devon’s elite were informed by 
what they considered to be an appropriate contribution to the war effort. Therefore, the 
choice to participate in the measures introduced in the name of war effort in Devon was 
not a binary one. A tension between individual survival and national survival in the 
county was apparent in the encounters between Devon’s elite as agents of mobilization 
and the county’s populace during the war. Through various campaigns of 
superintendence in order to police the patriotism of Devon’s people, the ‘provincial 
patriots’ attempted to navigate through the terrain of these competing priorities and 
resolve this tension. In their endeavours to mobilize Devon’s populace, the authority of 
Devon’s elite was criticised and they faced constant negotiation between individual 
priorities and those of the nation. This analysis of the complexity of the Devonian 
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experience of the First World War is sceptical about the ‘total’ nature of the First World 
War because the war to some Devonians was not the pre-eminent issue and did not 
absorb all of the county’s efforts. Rather, a significant part of Devon’s population was 
primarily concerned with individual priorities and that of the county throughout the war 
years. 
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Introduction 
  
This thesis examines the experiences and impact of wartime mobilization in the county 
of Devon. It argues that a crucial role was played by the county’s elites who became the 
self-appointed intermediaries of the war experience on a local level and who took an 
explicitly exhortative role, attempting to educate Devonians in the codes of ideal 
conduct in wartime. The nature of the relationship in Devon from both above and below 
was in numerous instances a cause of friction as many Devonians placed individual 
priorities above obvious service to the nation. Hence, Devon’s elite became more than 
solely intermediaries of the war experience but sought to undertake other activities in 
wartime. Through these actions, the local notables of the county became perceived as 
the ‘provincial patriots’ - the superintendents of patriotism. Their assorted campaigns of 
vigilance and superintendence in controlling the nature of what constituted patriotism 
across the county were met with varied degrees of success. They sought to educate and 
adjudicate the social morality of wartime throughout the administrative boundaries of 
Devon. Arguably, Devon’s elite attempted to resolve the tension between individual 
priorities and nation ones. At the same time, it was clear to the county’s local elite that 
some Devonians were hesitant and ambivalent towards such appeals for self-
mobilization and remobilization. Between 1914 and 1918, the county’s populace faced 
the continuing predicament throughout the war of how to engage with the escalating 
demands of the war effort. In fact, when faced with the continued exhortations for 
mobilization from Devon notable figures, many Devonians placed their own needs and 
those of their respective local communities above those of the nation. 
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Historiographies of the First World War 
Jay Winter and Antoine Prost suggest that the historiography of civilian life during the 
First World War has developed significantly since the 1960s.
1
 It now encompasses how 
the masses and classes of the belligerent populations engaged with the war effort, in 
conjunction with the emergence of various war cultures across the belligerents which 
provided the ideological understanding of and support for the war effort.
2
 Through 
comparative analysis, the experiences of the British population from 1914 to 1918 have 
been positioned within a wider international context.
3
 These socio-cultural histories of 
the belligerent nations have analysed a number of different aspects of the civilian 
experience and reflected on the nature of wartime mobilization. Therefore, the 
historiography of the Home Fronts of the First World War has grown in an attempt to 
encompass the diversity and complexity of the wartime experiences of civilians across 
Europe. These include the support that the masses of the belligerent nations invested 
into the war effort, and how the efforts of various groups of civilians (e.g. farmers, 
fishermen, women and children) constituted the wartime Home Fronts.
4
  
                                                 
1
 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the 
Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 152.  
2
 Ibid., John Williams, The Home Fronts: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1918 (London: Constable, 
1972), Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), Jurgen Kocka, Facing Total War: German Society, 1914-1918, trans. by 
Barbara Weinberger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), Jean-Jacques Becker, The Great 
War and the French People, trans. by Arnold Pomerans (Providence: Berg, 1985), Bernard Waites, A 
Class Society at War: England, 1914-18 (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers Limited, 1987), John N. 
Horne, Labour at war: France and Britain, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), Stéphane 
Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War, trans. by Catherine 
Temerson (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002). 
3
 Jay Winter, ‘Recent Trends in the Historiography of Britain and the First World War: Cultural History, 
Comparative History, Public History’ in in H. Berghoff and R von Friedeburg eds., Change and Inertia: 
Britain under the Impact of the Great War (Bodenheim: Philo, 1998) pp. 94-97.  
4
 Arthur Marwick, Women at War, 1914-1918 (London: Fontana, 1975), Trevor Wilson, The Myriad 
Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), Richard Wall and 
Jay Winter eds., The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), Gail Braybon, Women workers in the First World War (London: 
Routledge, 1989), P. J. Flood, France, 1914-18: Public Opinion and the War Effort (Basingstoke: The 
Macmillan Press, 1990), Patrick Fridenson ed., The French Home Front, 1914-1918 (Providence: Berg, 
1992), Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee eds., Authority, Identity and the Social History of the 
Great War (Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1995), Gerard J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the 
Great War (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1996), Ute Daniel, The War from within: German 
Working-Class Women in the First World War, trans. by Margaret Ries (Oxford: Berg, 1997), John Horne 
ed., State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Another important shift in the flourishing historiography of the civilian experience of 
the Great War is the consideration of the processes of mobilization. John Horne defines 
and explores mobilization as the ‘engagement of the different belligerent nations in their 
war efforts both imaginatively, through collective representations and the belief and 
value systems giving rise to these, and organizationally, through the state and civil 
society’.5 Thus, the mobilization of the belligerent nations was ‘an essentially political 
and cultural process’.6 The mobilization efforts and work of civilians in these societies 
constituted ‘a front (albeit a secondary one) that supported or complemented the 
[military] front’.7 The secondary front that emerged in the belligerent nations became 
defined as the ‘Home Front’. According to Pierre Purseigle, the word ‘home front’ first 
appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1917.
8
 He argues that the ‘emergence of 
the notion of “home front” … merely illustrated the acceleration of an ongoing process 
that the Second World War was to radicalize’.9 In the German language, Celia 
Applegate suggests that the term of Heimat (Home or Homeland) in many instances 
                                                                                                                                               
University Press, 1997), Deborah Thom, Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I 
(London: I. B Tauris, 1998), Susan R. Grayzel, Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and 
Politics in Britain and France during the First World War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999), Margaret H. Darrow, French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the Home 
Front (Oxford: Berg, 2000), Nicoletta F. Gullace, “The Blood of Our Sons”: Men, Women and the 
Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 
George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), Leonard V. Smith, 
Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, France and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), David Bilton, The Home Front in the Great War: Aspects of the 
conflict, 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003) pp. 195-201, Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and 
the Great War, 1914-1918, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Maureen Healy, 
Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 211-
299, Rebecca Gill, ‘Calculating Compassion in War: The “New Humanitarian” Ethos in Britain, 1870-
1918’, University of Manchester, PhD Thesis, 2005, Rosalind Joan Sarah Kennedy, ‘The Children’s War: 
British children’s experience of the Great War’, PhD Thesis, University of London, 2006, David Parker, 
Hertfordshire Children in War and Peace, 1914-1939 (Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2007), 
Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008),Tammy M. Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918 (New York: New 
York University Press, 2010), Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak 
of the First World War in Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
5
 John Horne, ‘Introduction: mobilizing for “total war”, 1914-1918’ in J. Horne ed., State, Society and 
Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 3.  
6
 Ibid., p. 1. 
7
 Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World 
War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 5. 
8
 Pierre Purseigle, ‘Violence and solidarity. Urban experiences of the First World War’, 27 September 
2012, <http://www.pierrepurseigle.info/violence-and-solidarity-urban-experiences-of-the-first-world-
war> [Accessed 20 February 2013]  
9
 Ibid. 
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during the war became a ‘counterweight necessary to the balance the new concept – and 
place: the front’.10 Yet, Purseigle references Alexander Seyferth’s study of the wars of 
German unification which emphasizes that ‘the Franco-Prussian war in particular’ had 
meant that the word Heimatfront (Home Front) was given a ‘wide currency in the newly 
unified Germany’.11 Equally, despite the evocation of home as an emotional 
counterbalance to the military front, Susan R. Grayzel indicates that in Britain and 
France whilst the First World War had ‘created the concept of the “Home Front,”’ the 
conflict did not stabilize the boundaries that separated the ‘war from home’.12 Indeed, 
Maureen Healy points out that in all of these terms which describe the civilian front of 
the First World War, there was an assumption that the ‘violence of war was located 
someplace else other than “home”’.13 
 
For Purseigle, the meaning of wartime mobilization ‘shifted from its original military 
definition to encompass the contribution of civil society, whose resources were also 
expected to directly support the armed forces in the field’.14 Additionally, Horne 
suggests that Britain, France and Germany appear to ‘share a common pattern of 
national mobilization in which the first two years of the war were strongly characterized 
by persuasion rather than coercion, and by a high degree of “self-mobilization” in civil 
society’.15 However, it is clear that despite the successes of the languages of national 
mobilization which encouraged individuals to engage in the activities and processes 
which constituted self-mobilization. At the same time, they can through the powerful 
                                                 
10
 Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990) p. 115. 
11
 Purseigle, ‘Violence and solidarity’, Alexander Seyferth, Die Heimatfront 1870/71. Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft im deutsch-französischen Krieg (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 2007). 
12
 Susan R. Grayzel, Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France 
during the First World War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999) p. 7. 
13
 Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire, p. 5. 
14
 Purseigle, ‘Violence and solidarity’. 
15
 Horne, ‘Introduction’, p. 5. 
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agents of class and nation unintentionally create vocabularies of counter mobilization.
16
 
Similarly, Winter notes that class-consciousness was an important factor in the 
mobilization process because industrial conflict during the war revealed that patriotism 
itself was a contested term.
17
 Whereas, Healy is sceptical about the success of 
mobilization in Vienna during the war because in the city there were ‘no mechanisms by 
which to call up “society,” no institutions (such as the military) to impose order and 
discipline on the process, no hierarchical means of resolving conflicts that arose when 
an ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically heterogeneous population was asked 
to cooperate in a cause larger than itself’.18 Consequently, Healy suggests that the 
outcome of the attempts which constituted this ‘so-called mobilization of Vienna was 
communal disintegration’.19  
 
At the same time, the historiography of the First World War has witnessed an expansion 
of comparative studies which have broadened the consideration of war experiences 
across the globe and analysed the conflict as a trans-national phenomenon.
20
 Hew 
Strachan asserts that within three months after the declaration of war, the third Balkan 
war was transformed through the mobilization of European powers and their global 
empires to the extent that it ‘embroiled the bulk of the world’s three most populous 
continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia’.21 Recent studies have sought to appraise the 
historical understanding of the conflict with the wider experiences of a trans-national 
world war and to comprehend the conflict beyond the contours established in the 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., p. 12. 
17
 Jay Winter, ‘Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919: capital cities at war’ in J. Winter and J-L. Robert eds., 
Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
p. 17. 
18
 Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire, p. 4. 
19
 Ibid., p. 4. 
20
 Pierre Purseigle, ‘Introduction, Warfare and Belligerence: Approaches to the First World War’ in P. 
Purseigle ed., Warfare and Belligerence: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Lieden: Brill, 2005), 
p. 3. 
21
 Hew Strachan, The First World War: Volume 1, To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 
1114, Hew Strachan, ‘The First World War as a global war’, First World War Studies, Vol. 1, 1 (March 
2010) pp. 3-14. 
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traditional historiography.
22
 It can be ventured that the emergence of this more inclusive 
trans-national historiography of the Great War helps to present a global perspective of 
the conflict. Indeed, the studies which scrutinise the First World War’s global 
dimensions can be considered as examples of macro-history. Rather than focus a history 
within the boundaries of the nation state, macro-history is the study of larger 
administrative frameworks such as the British Empire. The approach of macro-history 
towards the study of world history intends to discover the ‘threads that link peoples, 
times and cultures together’.23 Across the globe, the wartime experiences of 
mobilization and sacrifice were two such threads that connected indigenous and 
colonised populations of the European Empires across during the Great War.
24
 
 
Concurrently, these developments have been supplemented by examinations which 
venture beyond and below the administrative framework of the nation state to scrutinise 
the wartime experiences of specific localities. The histories of localities such as London, 
                                                 
22
 Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995), Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), Tan Tai-Young, ‘An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab 
and the First World War’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, 2 (April 2000) pp. 371-410, Keith 
Jeffrey, Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Joshua A. Sanborn, 
Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2002), Adrian Gregory and Senia Pašeta eds., Ireland and the Great 
War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), Olivier Compagnon,‘1914-18: The Death Throes 
of Civilization. The Elites of Latin-America Face the Great War’ in J. Macleod and P. Purseigle eds., 
Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2004) pp. 279-295, Peter 
Gattrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 
2005), Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and 
Internationalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), John Crawford and Ian McGibbon 
eds., New Zealand’s Great War: New Zealand, the Allies and the First World War (Auckland, NZ: 
Exisle, 2007), Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the 
Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Xu Guoqi, Strangers on the 
Western Front: Chinese Workers in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
Eric Lohr, ‘Russia’ in J. Horne ed., A Companion to World War I (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) pp. 
479-493, Adrian Gregory, ‘Britain and Ireland’ in J. Horne ed., A Companion to World War I (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) pp. 403-417, Phillip Payton, Regional Australia and the Great War: ‘the boys 
from Old Kio’ (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2012) 
23
 Ludmilla Jordanova, History in Practice, 2nd edn (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006) p. 186. 
24
 John H. Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History (New York: Routledge, 2004), Richard Smith, 
Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War: Race, masculinity and the development of national 
consciousness (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the 
Trenches: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006), Timothy C. 
Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), Robert Aldrich and Christopher Hilliard, ‘The French and British 
Empires’ in J. Horne ed., A Companion to World War I (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) pp. 524-539. 
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Paris, Berlin, Bélziers and Northampton challenge and redress the analytical focus in the 
historiography of the Home Fronts of the First World War which have, typically, 
concentrated on the analytical framework of the nation state.
25
 In fact, Winter suggests 
that to ‘penetrate behind the illusory veil of a unitary “national experience”” is to 
describe the character of community life in wartime’.26 Accordingly, Keith Grieves 
proposes that these local histories comprise a ‘new’ cultural history of the Great War in 
that it is informed from below because there is a greater ‘emphasis on the effects of war 
on local communities in their distinctive settings’.27 These studies of the everyday 
wartime experiences in individual locations such as a hamlet, village, town or city 
during the Great War are also instances of microhistory. According to Giovanni Levi, 
microhistory is principally ‘based on the reduction of scale of observation, on a 
microscopic analysis and an intensive study of the documentary material’.28 Based upon 
this directive, microhistory studies are undertaken with the conviction that detailed 
observation and analysis will ‘uncover unknown complexities and reveal “new 
meanings” in structures, processes, belief systems and human interaction’.29 It is 
important to note how historians have employed a variety of approaches in their study 
                                                 
25
 Jay Winter, ‘Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919: capital cities at war’, in J. Winter and J-L. Robert eds., 
Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
pp. 3-24, Jean-Louis Robert and Jay Winter, ‘Conclusions: towards a social history of capital cities at 
war’ in J. Winter and J-L. Robert eds., Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 527-554, Pierre Purseigle, ‘Beyond and Below the 
Nations: Towards a Comparative History of Local Communities at War’ in J. Macleod and P. Purseigle 
eds., Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2004) pp. 95-123, Stefan 
Goebel, ‘Forging The Industrial Home Front: Iron-Nail Memorials in the Ruhr’ in J. Macleod and P. 
Purseigle eds., Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2004) pp. 159-
178, Jay Winter , ‘The practices of metropolitan life in wartime’ in J. Winter and J-L Robert eds., Capital 
Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919, Volume 2: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) pp. 1-20, Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, ‘Conclusion’ in J. Winter and J-L 
Robert eds., Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919, Volume 2: A Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 468-481 
26
 Winter, ‘Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919’, p. 3. 
27
 Keith Grieves, ‘The quiet of the country and the restless excitement of the towns: rural perspectives on 
the home front, 1914-1918’ in M. Tebbutt ed., Rural and Urban Encounters in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries: Regional Perspectives (Manchester: Conference of Regional and Local Historians, 
2004) p. 80. 
28
 Giovanni Levi, ‘On Microhistory’, in P. Burke ed., New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) p. 99. 
29
 Barry Reay, Microhistories: demography, society and culture in rural England, 1800-1930 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 260. 
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of the local and regional experiences of the war.
30
 One example of this is Mark 
Connelly’s investigation of the county of Kent through the study of not only Kent’s 
regiment, known as the Buffs, but also of the region’s communities from which the 
soldiers had volunteered.
31
 Microhistories in their respective microscopic analytical 
frames of reference also entail a scrutiny of other themes including the ‘attention to 
reception and narrative, a specific definition of context and the rejection of relativism’.32 
Consequently, microhistories do not ‘sacrifice knowledge of individual elements to 
wider generalization … [but also] … accentuate(s) individual lives and events’.33  
 
It could be suggested that since these works of microhistory are aware of the complexity 
of the local context, they also have the opportunity to provide a comprehensive picture 
of local life. Roger Chickering proclaimed that his study of the German city of Freiburg 
is a response to the legitimate intention that the study of total war requires total 
history.
34
 However, Chickering reveals that it is important to be aware of the practical 
and methodological challenges in the daunting attempt to provide a total history.
35
 
Nonetheless, despite the limitations of microhistories, it is valid to argue that these 
examinations of individual localities have made significant contributions as the ‘local is 
the site for exploring significant social change and for teasing out important 
historiographical issues’.36 McCartney suggests that it is undeniably significant for 
historians to consider Britain on a local level because in 1914 ‘the horizons of her 
                                                 
30
 Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorial’s in the First World War (Cambridge: 
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citizens were profoundly local’.37 This meant that city, town, rural, urban and parish 
communities within the administrative framework and construct of a county felt a 
distinct sense of attachment to their respective local settings.
38
 This is true of Devon as 
there were individuals who did feel a distinct sense of attachment to the characteristic 
landscapes of their localities.
39
 One example of this from Devon was the attachment of 
some Devonians to the fertile ‘Red Soil’, otherwise known as the red earth, present in 
some districts of the county. Moreover, local history (the heroism of Sir Francis Drake) 
and folklore (the legend of Drake’s drum) became evoked alongside local landscapes in 
narratives of local county exceptionalism in a bid to integrate local identities in the 
processes of mobilization and to stimulate both local patriotism and a county identity in 
Devon.
40
 
 
By 1914, local identity possessed a continued significance and microhistories have 
revealed the pertinence of local identities against the forces of modernisation and 
centralisation in the belligerent nations.
41
 Winter suggested that for individuals who 
lived in specific localities, their notion of ‘England’ was ‘envisioned as a very local and 
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particular place, bounded in many cases by the streets they knew, and the daily lives 
they led’.42 Accordingly, Winter points out that ‘identity is local in character … [and] 
… Metropolitan identities rested on a sense of place’.43 This strong association with 
local landscapes, local identity and local patriotism is also true of Devon. Some 
contemporaries presented Devon as an evocation of an idealised England in which many 
Devonians envisioned the county, with Devon’s distinctive settings, as their England. It 
is clear that the distinctive features of local landscapes on a county level were used in 
the construct and expression of a county identity.
44
 Similarly, in Germany, the idea of 
Heimat (Home) was defined on a local level because it was a ‘fundamental vehicle for 
internalizing the impersonal nation by placing it within the familiar local world’.45 The 
distinctiveness of local identity in Devon during the war will be discussed in this thesis. 
Yet, the attachment of a local sense of belonging became part of a collective imagined 
national community and how individuals defined the nation within the context of a 
specific local setting.
46
 Therefore, in this microhistory of Devon during the First World 
War, it is vital to understand the importance of locality, local identity and local 
patriotism because they were all integral features in the discourses and rhetoric of the 
county’s elite to encourage Devonians to participate in the processes of mobilization.  
 
In light of the particularity and perspectives offered by local evidence, microhistory 
examinations can provide an enquiry and a new reflection to larger historiographical 
issues of the Home Fronts of the belligerent nations during the Great War. These local 
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studies seek to explore the nature of the solidarities, discrimination and the processes of 
mobilisation at work between 1914 and 1918, and uncover the relationships that were 
established in specific localities between the military’s requirements and the needs of 
civilians.
47
 Two examples of this critical assessment of local societies in wartime can be 
found in both volumes of the Capital Cities at War. These two studies have presented 
an unprecedented critical assessment of various aspects of urban life in London, Paris 
and Berlin from 1914 to 1918.
48
 Accordingly, the microhistories of everyday life in the 
Great War have revealed how individuals in particular localities adapted physically, 
mentally and emotionally to the circumstances of wartime. Ultimately, these 
microhistory examinations of the First World War have reinforced the importance of 
locality, localism and local identity. 
 
The majority of the microhistory examinations of the Great War have mostly focused 
their analysis on urban localities and the experiences of mobilization in urban settings.
49
 
There are exceptions to this rule for Britain and the United States.
50
 Additionally, there 
are a number of studies which have centred their analysis on the experiences of rural 
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Germany during the First World War.
51
 Indeed, Chickering gives some insight into the 
relationship between Freiburg’s urban communities and the rural communities 
surrounding the city.
52
 Nonetheless, it is still the case that the experiences of rural 
communities have been largely overshadowed by the growth of histories which consider 
the urban societies during wartime.
 
Grieves has advocated the examination of the rural 
Home Front during the Great War as a counterpoint to these urban examinations. In his 
view, the persistence of ‘local distinctiveness of the form and fabric of settlements and 
their context mattered’ because it is clear that the ‘proximity to, and remoteness from, 
“nerve centres” was a significant variable’.53 The reason for this is that the patterns of 
‘self-mobilization, supply, resilience and protest were affected by the relational 
perceptions of town and country in wartime’.54 In fact, despite the importance of rural 
communities to the war effort, many writers in rural communities during the war 
‘periodically expressed a peripheral, rather than core, relationship to the decisions and 
events in wartime Britain’.55 Accordingly, there is a sharp contrast noted in these writers 
accounts between the attention that they give to the ‘otherness’ of rural society during 
the war and the illuminated changes and developments that they witnessed taking place 
in their visits to the towns.
56
 Likewise, Benjamin Ziemann has noted in his analysis of 
rural Bavaria that there was a perceived ‘civilizational distinction’ between town and 
country as peasants experienced stigmatisation by urban populations.
57
 However, the 
experiences of wartime had meant that urban communities had to court the favour of 
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farmers and peasantry for food supplies. Nonetheless, Ziemann shows that this 
stigmatisation left some peasants embittered and resentful against city dwellers ‘as a 
result of their civilisational backwardness of their working lives and life-world’.58  
 
Yet, Grieves has stressed that the notion of sacrifice did not ‘demarcate country from 
town on the home front’.59 The experiences of ‘emergent total war on the home front 
were not complete and universal that one monolithic historical narrative can serve the 
nuances of differences, which inhabited contemporary “lived” representations of the 
nation at war’.60 Accordingly, local societies are not necessarily a precise miniature 
reflection of a national society in wartime. During the war, Grieves stresses that 
‘different social and physical worlds were inhabited, whose effects need fuller treatment 
in the literature of the home front, especially from rural perspectives’.61 Due to the fact 
that the British nation state was not a monolithic structure and the experiences of 
wartime varied across the United Kingdom, Grieves proposes that further ‘histories of 
local and regional communities in wartime are necessary’.62 Furthermore, Winter and 
Prost reinforce the validity of rural studies because they stress that ‘there was a different 
coloration to wartime culture in its rural setting than its urban setting’.63 Equally, just as 
the studies of urban localities in wartime were a challenge to the histories of Home 
Fronts using the framework of the nation state, the analytical balance needs to consider 
the wartime experiences of both rural and urban communities in a regional setting.  
 
Across the United Kingdom, rural and urban populations shared the ‘experiences of 
mobilisation and regulation, endurance and exhaustion, destruction and dislocation, and 
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sacrifice and mourning’.64 The examination of various different settlement types across 
the rich and diverse socio-economic fabric within an administrative unit such as a 
county provides the historian with an opportunity to cross-reference and develop the 
research advanced in the historiographies of the Home Fronts in urban and rural 
localities. Rather than solely examine rural or urban localities in isolation, a study 
within a county can provide an opportunity to examine the interdependence and 
relationship between rural and urban localities. These regional studies create a balanced 
critical assessment on the diverse nature of the experiences of wartime. Microhistories 
of particular counties during the war are part of this shift towards a balanced critical 
analysis of rural and urban communities.
65
 Previously, the county of Devon during 1914 
to 1918 has been examined by Bonnie White.
66
  
 
Specifically, White has investigated the Home Front in Devon through an assessment of 
the themes of state intervention, agriculture, recruitment efforts and denominational 
responses to the war. Based upon her research, she suggests that the support of Devon’s 
population in the British war effort was ‘provisional and based on the perception of 
“equality of sacrifice”’.67 This was, in White’s definition, the ‘expectation that the 
burdens of war would be shared equally throughout the county and across all elements 
of society’.68 Accordingly, Devonians across the county were generally willing to 
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accept the sacrifices introduced in wartime on the condition that these sacrifices were 
part of a ubiquitous and equally assigned system of sacrifices.
69
 At the same time, 
White asserts that the war had aggravated rural and urban tensions in the county which 
‘highlighted the social and economic divisions that characterized relations between the 
communities of northern and southern Devon, and led to frequent and public criticisms 
of the government’s management of the war’.70 It is evident that her thesis on Devon 
during 1914 to 1918 has made a significant contribution to our knowledge of the 
experiences of the Great War in the South West.
71
 
 
In the light of existing microhistories of counties during the conflict and previous 
examinations of Devon from 1914 to 1918, how will this thesis of Devon during the 
First World War sit in relation to these other county studies and differentiate itself from 
White’s research? This thesis reveals that there remains much more to be said about the 
Devonian experience during the war. It is argued here that White’s claim surrounding 
the ‘equality of sacrifice’ does not allow for the substantial regional differences inside 
Devon. There is evidence from Devon which stresses that there were Devonians who 
were hesitant to accept sacrifices in the name of the war effort and were more concerned 
with their own survival. This is particularly pertinent in the areas and sources that have 
been analysed in this thesis and which she has not examined in her work. The records 
relating to Devon’s holiday industry from 1914 to 1918 and the subject of Devon’s 
fishing industry during the Great War are two such areas that reveal how the survival of 
their respective industries was of the utmost importance. The effectiveness of Devon’s 
elite to administer upon the way in which the county’s residents understood the war and 
its sacrifices were not universally successful. The prevalence of individual priorities in 
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the responses from Devonians towards the calls for sacrifice, strengthens the idea that 
the war effort was not a unifying principle. It is also the case that there needs to be 
further scrutiny of the effectiveness of how the notion of the sacrifice was enforced on a 
local level across Devon. Therefore, this thesis provides a sustained analysis of the role 
of Devon’s elites during the war. Yet, the analysis presented here is not solely an 
examination of the wartime experiences of Devon’s elites. Instead, the study of Devon’s 
elite offers a critical reflection between the county’s population and Devon’s elites. 
Indeed, the scope of the critical investigation presented here brings forward a sceptical 
light to the influence and effectiveness of Devon’s elites on the intermediation of the 
wartime behaviour of the county’s population. Hence, this is a new perspective and 
interpretation of the Devonian experience of the First World War as it emphasizes the 
complexity of the war years for both Devon’s elite and the county’s population.  
 
It could also be argued that White’s research does not provide a complete picture of the 
Devonian experience of the Great War. This thesis takes into account the interactions of 
Devon’s elite with the county’s population and vice-versa to produce a more 
comprehensive survey of the effectiveness of mobilization on a local level within 
Devon. Grieves has argued that the relationship between local affinity and national 
purpose is in need of more detailed enquiry.
72
 This will be achieved with a more 
comprehensive analysis of the processes of mobilization in Devon during the First 
World War and through a deeper consideration of the relationship between Devon’s 
elite and the county’s population during the conflict. Through a sustained analysis of the 
key role of Devon’s elite in wartime, this thesis will produce a more detailed enquiry 
exploring how the county’s populace attempted to balance local priorities with national 
ones from 1914 to 1918. Therefore, this study of Devon during the First World War will 
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provide a more detailed insight into the relationship between local affinity and national 
purpose. As the fourth largest county of England, this examination of the experiences 
and impact of wartime mobilization in Devon makes an important contribution to 
deepening the understanding of the effectiveness and constraints of mobilization 
between the core and the periphery in Great Britain.  
 
The local elite as the Intermediaries and Superintendents of the Home Front 
Purseigle has suggested in his comparative examination of two small sized towns, 
Bélziers in France and Northampton in Britain, that the ‘local elite was the critical 
group’.73 The reason for this is that it was the local elite who reflected and shaped the 
mediation of the war experience on the Home Front at a local level.
74
 In Devon, the 
evidence from the county’s archives and the local press reveals how Devon’s elite were 
also intermediaries of the war effort on a local level from which they shaped and 
mediated the war experience.
75
 Notable figures such as Lord Fortescue and the Mayor 
of Exeter had existing roles in areas such as welfare and education in Devon. They held 
institutional posts within these organisations, which possessed differing degrees of 
autonomy and power. As members on the various wartime committees and 
organisations and responsibilities, Devon’s notables accepted and occupied new and 
different roles during wartime. This is confirmed in Peter Martin’s study of the wartime 
experiences of the Irish nobility. Martin proposes that the conflict had affected Ireland’s 
peers ‘indirectly through their involvement with the people of the locality’.76 In fact, the 
participation of Ireland’s nobles in the various activities which comprised the war effort 
was a natural ‘extension of their traditional role as landlords and patrons of charitable 
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societies’.77 Moreover, Martin suggests that their engagement with wartime initiatives 
may also ‘indicate a popular belief that they retained some political influence with the 
administration in London or Dublin’.78  
 
The authority inherent in the role as an intermediary is also suggested by Belinda J. 
Davies in relation to Berlin’s police force as well as other organisations and sites in the 
city which ‘acted as intermediates between state and society on the eve of war’.79 It 
should be noted that Germany’s local elite who were members of local government 
entities such as ‘provincial, metropolitan, municipal, and communal governments, too, 
acted as important mediums of exchange between the state and broader society, 
particularly through the parliament of cities (Städtetag), represented the nations urban 
strength’.80 Despite the wartime growth of the apparatus and intervention of the state in 
both Britain and France, local civil society were not stripped of their mediating role.
81
 
The same intermediary status could be said to apply to the voluntary associations and 
organisations that were part of the civil societies of the belligerent nations.
82
 On a local 
level, civil society was critically important in the processes of mobilization because the 
‘war cultures’ were disseminated by local elites. Theda Skocpol, Ziad Munson, Andrew 
Karch, and Bayliss Camp have suggested that across the United States of America the 
‘local chapters of all kinds of voluntary membership federations became crucial nodes 
in war mobilization drives’.83 The connection of these crucial nodes across the 
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framework of the nation state was vital to achieve the widespread success of 
mobilization initiatives. In the case of the local elite, the effectiveness of the 
contribution that they could make in these various undertakings to intermediate the war 
experience on a local level was critical. According to Purseigle, the discourses and 
iconography of wartime that are evident in the materials produced by ‘civic authorities, 
newspapers and voluntary organizations show how local elites used the main symbols 
of local identity to stress that victory would belong to the urban community as well as to 
the nation’.84  
 
In the case of the Tsarist war effort, Peter Gatrell suggests that Russia’s rural ‘landed 
elite could not be counted upon to underpin an effective propaganda offensive in the 
countryside’.85 According to Gatrell, Russia’s landowners perceived that the war was a 
time of trial and Russia’s commercial middle class were divided because the ‘regional 
and ethnic differences remained too deeply entrenched’.86 The fact that Russia’s rural 
elite were ineffective intermediaries of the war experience undermined their efforts to 
convince Russia’s rural populace to mobilize for war. Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
local elite as intermediaries in their localities was instrumental to gain the support of 
their respective local communities in the war effort. Consequently, Purseigle advocates 
that the historian should study the experiences of the members of the local elite because 
a critical inquiry of them ‘enables the historian to deal comprehensively with both the 
local commitment to the national mobilization and the mental imagery which allowed 
the transcendence of the war experience’.87  
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At the same time, Horne suggests that there existed a more negative ‘Home Front’ in 
the minds of contemporaries which consisted of ‘shirkers, profiteers and armchair 
patriots’.88 The Inspector for the South West Fisheries during the war, Stephen 
Reynolds touched upon this negative Home Front when he commented on the nature of 
Devon’s local elite. In a letter to civil servant Henry Maurice dated 8 December 1917, 
Reynolds defined the individuals who were members of Devon’s civil society as the 
‘provincial patriots whose patriotism, while they are on the safe side of military age, 
consists in superintending the patriotism of those aren’t [exempt from military 
service]’.89 This satirical description of these individuals as the self-appointed 
superintendents of patriotism is intriguing because it invokes connotations that the 
‘provincial patriots’ were in fact ‘armchair patriots’. The expression implies that these 
‘patriots’ who sat in relative comfort of their armchairs were self-appointed figures of 
authority but they were also individuals who were negatively characterised as 
inexperienced, judgmental and hypocritical. Devon’s ‘provincial patriots’ were similar 
to the American Protective League (APL) which was a vigilance organisation 
comprising ‘professional men, typically above draft age or otherwise exempt’.90 The 
volunteers of this group were dedicated in their vigilance of the American Home Front 
and claimed to possess a jurisdiction in regulating the wartime behaviour of American 
citizens. However, these volunteers were citizens who participated in the vigilance of 
citizens in the attempt to enforce 100 per cent Americanism which included 
‘investigations of the character and loyalty of citizens and aliens, the circulation of 
seditious material’.91 In fact, Capozzola emphasizes that ‘vigilance organizations gained 
force and authority as they spoke in the name of the wartime state, but their new 
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position also exposed them to criticism by those who denied their legitimacy’.92 
Similarly, it could be argued that Devon’s notables, as arbitrators of the war experience, 
conducted campaigns of superintendence of the loyalty and patriotism of Devonians 
across the county. 
 
Edward Madigan suggests that the role of the British clergy was as self-appointed moral 
arbiters in wartime British society and that this was reflected in the wartime rhetoric that 
they used in their commentaries.
93
 An example of this in Devon is from Reynolds who 
described the vicar of the East Devon town of Sidmouth as an unco guid.
94
 This Scottish 
derogatory term refers to an individual who is a narrow-minded, excessively and 
‘professedly strict in matters of morals and religion’.95 Reynolds observed that this 
rigidly self-righteous reverend was ‘kicking up a moralistic dust, and making a fuss 
over maidens and soldiers, and things hard for girls who get into trouble’.96 This 
commentary reveals the fears that this clergyman expressed concerning the phenomenon 
of khaki fever. Khaki fever was the fear of young women’s sexual behaviour where they 
would become so entranced by men in military uniform to the extent that they would 
‘behave in immodest and even dangerous ways’.97 Angela Woollacott argues that the 
discourse surrounding khaki fever was ‘conducted by military and police authorities, 
feminists, other reformers and social commentators showed the first world war as a 
climactic time of concern about young women’s social and sexual behaviour’.98 The 
concerns over women’s behaviour ‘sparked a movement to control the sexual behaviour 
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of young women which became a feature of life on the homefront’.99 These attempts to 
control the patriotic behaviour of women were enacted by self-appointed individuals 
and entities which included the Women’s Police Service, Bishops, politicians and social 
reformers.
100
 In Devon, Lord Fortescue wrote to his deputy, Sir William Acland on 28 
October 1914, to convey his concerns about the sexual behaviour of some women in 
Exeter. Fortescue revealed that Exeter’s High Street was like Piccadilly Circus because 
‘every loose woman in the town is placing herself gratis of any man in uniform’.101 
Fortescue’s moral consternation meant that he expressed his hope to Acland that ‘rescue 
workers and “other good women” would be able to direct these women back onto a 
moral path’.102 However, it can be ventured that this surveillance and policing of the 
social morality of wartime extended beyond the behaviour of women to encompass all 
members of Devon’s communities.  
 
The members of Devon’s civil society attempted to enforce this social morality of 
wartime, and monitor and control the discourses of patriotism. Their status as self-
appointed figures of civil society gave them another avenue by which they could 
attempt to police the patriotism of others and use their position to exert their influence. 
Purseigle suggests that civil society in the belligerent nations through various activities 
‘contributed to the monitoring and censoring of public opinion’.103 He also references 
the perspective of civil society put forward by Antonio Gramsci in that civil society 
operated with a semi-autonomous modus-operandi. Through various behaviours and 
means, civil society was able to exert a collective pressure to instigate an ‘evolution of 
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customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc’.104 Indeed, Purseigle proposes that 
historians adapt Gramsci’s perspective on how civil society operates on a local level 
because it may ‘beneficially inform our analysis of belligerence in the First World War, 
insofar as it stresses both the autonomy of social agents and their position within 
systems of domination’.105 In Devon, the local elite were agents who broadcasted, 
reflected upon, and policed the nature of sacrifice and the social morality of wartime in 
the county. However, this should not be understood in a conspiratorial context because 
the ability of the ‘provincial patriots’ to mediate and convince was not universally 
effective. Purseigle points out that to adopt Gramsci’s perspective on civil society above 
all suggests that the ‘“war cultures” most forcefully articulated by the elites were neither 
uncritically endorsed by the masses, nor merely imposed from above through the state 
ideological apparatus’.106 As Winter suggests, when ‘common sense on the popular 
level diverged from state propaganda, the official message turned hollow or simply 
vanished’.107 It would, therefore, be wrong to imagine that the ‘provincial patriots’ were 
always an effective and cohesive group because, to enforce this social morality in the 
county it was dependent on the efforts of individual members of Devon’s civil society. 
Moreover, it is clear based on the evidence from Devon that there were also women 
who undertook this superintendence of patriotism. 
 
Horne proposes that the war also ‘generated a specifically wartime “social morality” – 
or set of reciprocal moral judgements on the contributions of different groups to the 
national effort’.108 The framework of meaning inherent in this social morality of 
wartime was evident in both urban and rural communities as the notions of ‘shirker’ and 
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‘profiteer’ tapped into the immoral characteristics of greed and selfishness: ‘It was not 
just that urban consumers rediscovered the “ever increasing greed of the merchants and 
the rural producers” but that this apparent greed directly contravened the equality of 
sacrifice, and thus the uniform moral yardstick of civilian action in relation to the 
war’.109 Devon’s elite attempted to police this moral yardstick of civilian action on a 
local level. This microhistory examination of Devon will further our understanding of 
the role of the county’s elite as the police-men and women of patriotism in wartime. In 
their exhortations disseminated through various formal and informal channels, i.e. the 
local press, speeches and meetings, they sought to control the ways to which the themes 
of sacrifice and patriotism were understood. They attempted to enforce the social 
morality of wartime in Devon. Horne suggests the propaganda campaign in France was 
a ‘paradigm of the effort by the state and social élites to translate an idealised civilian 
identity into action, with committees of local notables seeking to stump up 
subscriptions’.110 Similar patterns can be seen in Devon and the United Kingdom more 
generally. 
 
There were some of Devon’s elite who did attempt to police the patriotism of 
Devonians but their efforts were the subject of criticism and hostility. As social changes 
of wartime took place in Devon as a consequence of the processes of mobilization it 
became clear that not only did it dissolve the barriers of what constituted civilians and 
combatants, there was also a blurring of authority and jurisdiction. Similar tensions 
were expressed by Vienna’s population towards the role and authority of the city’s 
Police in wartime.
111
 Devon’s elite had to continually negotiate and navigate through 
the ambiguity in some responses from Devonians towards the appeals for mobilization 
                                                 
109
 John Horne, ‘Social Identity in War: France, 1914-1918’ in T. G. Fraser and K. Jeffrey eds., Men, 
Women and War (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1993) p. 130. 
110
 Ibid., p. 127. 
111
 Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 79-80. 
34 
 
and the tension between individual priorities and national ones. This was further 
complicated by the differences in that some of the responsibilities and roles that 
Devon’s elite held in wartime possessed the authority and power over life or death. For 
example, the notables who comprised Devon’s tribunal panels in effect possessed the 
power of life and death over Devon’s men-folk in their respective localities. In addition, 
as intermediaries of wartime committees, Devon’s elite also possessed a distinct agency 
in wartime to which they possessed an exhorting role. It was intended that these roles 
would enhance the effectiveness of their policing of patriotism and wartime behaviour 
on a local level. The idea that Devon’s elite possessed an explicitly exhortative role fits 
into the proposal established in this thesis that they were self-appointed arbiters and 
superintendents of the social morality of wartime.  
 
Accordingly, the critical exploration of the local elite in Devon will allow this thesis to 
provide additional depth of analysis on the sometimes frictional relationship between 
Devon’s elite and the county’s populace. This will, therefore, clarify the degree to 
which the county’s residents were expected to behave towards the aspirations of ideal 
civilian codes of conduct which were promoted by the local notables and the ways they 
behaved in response to their appeals. It was noted that Sir James Owen, the Mayor of 
Exeter, had attracted inevitable criticism during the war ‘notably when official orders 
and regulations had to be enforced upon a public which was inclined to resent what was 
regarded as an infringement of long accustomed liberties’.112 Nevertheless, he remained 
steadfast and did not deflect from ‘the strict view he took of the responsibilities placed 
upon him, and subsequent events completely justified his actions’.113 According to the 
Devon and Exeter Gazette, Owen had taken the ‘lead in every effort to stimulate 
patriotism whether in connection with the recruiting campaign, war savings, food 
                                                 
112
 Devon and Exeter Gazette, 14 July 1939, p. 14. 
113
 Ibid. 
35 
 
economy, or other essential activities’.114 Furthermore, both Ziemann and Chickering 
have shown that in Germany, there were tensions between urban and rural communities 
because rural communities had different priorities in wartime as they were primarily 
concerned with their own needs.
115
 
 
In Horne’s view, the virtue of considering mobilization as a process or a ‘totalizing 
logic’ rather than an achieved result, is that it not only ‘encourages analysis of its form 
and evolution but also of its constraints and limitations’.116 Horne describes that 
mobilization should be understood as a ‘totalizing logic, or potential, of which 
contemporaries were acutely aware and which appeared profoundly new. This dizzying 
escalation occurred in different spheres’.117 However, just as this thesis is sceptical of a 
single monolithic war culture, so it questions whether there was an escalating and all-
encompassing ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. Ziemann has revealed that the people 
of rural Bavaria were moulded by rural society. He argues using a reference to a study 
of the Second World War, which despite the experiences of the First World War, the 
inhabitants of rural Bavaria were still moulded by rural society and were ‘at least 
partially resistant to the logic of modern industrial war’.118 It can be argued that 
Devonians during the First World War were also partially resistant to the logic of 
modern industrial war and that many were more concerned with individual priorities to 
ensure their survival through the war. In fact, in Devon from 1914 to 1918 there were 
multiple logics of mobilization which were also contested in a variety of ways by parts 
of the population, who often developed their own rationalisations for abstaining from 
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the behaviours that the ‘provincial patriots’ prescribed for them. Similarly, the evidence 
from Devon seems to show a sceptical light upon the notion of ‘Total War’ in which 
during the ‘1914-18 conflict, all were mobilized; all were transformed’.119 Instead, the 
experiences of Devonians suggest that ‘Total War’ was more of a rhetorical construct 
rather than a literal term due to the fact that the war did not involve or affect every 
member of county society.
120
 Ian F. W. Beckett argues that in practice ‘Total War’, akin 
to Clausewitz’s absolute war, was still a relative concept for the belligerent nations and 
that wartime ‘mobilization, like “universal conscription”, is always necessarily 
partial’.121 To some Devonians, the war was not the pre-eminent issue and did not 
absorb all of the county’s efforts.122 Ziemann has shown that the war in rural Bavaria 
‘did not entail a comprehensive modernisation of rural behavioural models or norms’.123 
He concludes that for these rural communities, despite the ‘upheaval of war and 
inflation, continuity outweighed change’.124 Likewise, this thesis is sceptical of the 
totality of the war in Devon as it is doubtful that all of the social changes ushered in 
reached all corners of the county. It could be argued that some contemporaries viewed 
idyllic Devon as a county that was out of place with regard to changing trends and 
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modernization.
125
 In fact, based on the evidence of some commentators from the war 
years, there were some in Devon who were oblivious to the war and the importance of 
the conflict.
126
 Whilst Devon’s elite advocated and supported changes on a local level 
for the national interest, these were not necessarily accepted and adopted whole-
heartedly by many of the county’s population who were more concerned with self-
interest and individual priorities. 
 
According to Horne, the relationship between Home Front and Fighting Front was ‘at 
root concerned with the material and moral well-being of loved ones and with 
individual survival’.127 However, in Devon during the First World War, individual 
priorities were arguably more powerful impulses than national priorities. It is difficult to 
gauge the blurring line between individual priorities and national survival as the nature 
of where public and private interest merged or diverged is a topic for historical debate. 
Adrian Gregory acknowledges this dilemma when discussing the significance of the 
‘blunt figures of the “Tank Loan” [as they] do suggest something important and 
counter-intuitive about the popular mood in early 1918’.128 Indeed, Gregory notes that it 
is difficult to gauge the reasons why contemporaries purchased these Tank Loans 
because whilst the mixture of patriotism and self-interest was unmistakeable the 
arguments of self-interest were complicated by the ‘degree of willingness of individuals 
to merge self and public interest’.129 Similar wartime tensions arose with the 
relationship between national survival and industrial production that were expressed by 
manufacturers.
130
 However, many civilians in Essex were ‘prepared to place their own 
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self-interest above the cause of patriotism in order to enjoy a more comfortable war’.131 
Accordingly, this thesis presents a critical assessment of how Devon’s elite navigated 
through the tension between individual and national survival, and offer a deeper 
analysis of these superintendents of patriotism and how this changes our understanding 
of the role of the local elite in wartime 
 
Sources and Methodology 
To understand the relationship between Devon’s elite and the county’s population 
during the First World War, it is important to consider the sources that this thesis will 
utilize. It will employ primary source material from the three archive repositories of 
Devon: the Devon Heritage Centre, the North Devon record office and the Plymouth 
and West Devon record office. These archives contain a wide range of material and 
sources which include personal diaries and journals, letters and other forms of 
correspondence, the records of local government bodies, and other sources which can 
illuminate life in Devon between 1914 and 1918. Evidence from other archives in 
Britain including the National Archives, the Museum of English Rural Life, the 
Imperial War Museum, STEAM (the museum of the Great Western Railway), and 
Tiverton Museum will be used to complement the evidence from the Devon archives. 
Alongside these materials, the debates of the various branches of the Devon Farmers 
Union as well as the National Farmers Union will provide valuable insights into the 
views of Devon’s farmers during the war. Moreover, when these testimonies are 
examined alongside the statistics for agriculture, in terms of output and agricultural 
labour, it will provide a deeper understanding of the productivity and response of 
farmers to wartime initiatives. Based on this analysis, it is clear that the county’s 
farmers were concerned with the survival of their individual businesses as family 
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concerns. However, in Devon’s agricultural industry, women were employed on a small 
scale when compared to the number of soldiers and prisoners of war who worked on the 
farms as they were deemed to be seasonal replacement labour.
132
  
 
Another vital source is national and local newspapers from the county which include the 
Western Morning News, the Devon and Exeter Gazette, the Western Times, and the 
North Devon Journal. In particular, local newspapers published in their pages editorials, 
articles, poems and letters from Devon’s notables and the county’s citizens. Despite the 
fact that newspapers can contain inaccuracies and factual errors, they can also offer a 
valuable perspective on life beyond the material left from Devon’s elite and reveal the 
diverse range of individual reactions from the county’s population towards the war 
effort from 1914 to 1918. The newspapers, both from a county level and a national 
level, are important media to understand individual voices not just those from above but 
also those from below. Equally, local poems published in the local press will be used as 
key items of evidence because they provide a reflection of the Devonian experience of 
the First World War. In Devon, it has been established that local newspapers were a key 
communicative form for the dissemination of local identity.
133
 It is important to 
remember that both the Mayors’ of Tiverton and Exeter, Alfred T. Gregory and James 
Owen respectively, were also newspaper proprietors and editors. Gregory was 
proprietor and editor of the Tiverton Gazette whilst Owen had a notable career in the 
newspaper world. Indeed, Owen was editor and managing director of the Western 
Times Ltd. which included under its administration a number of local newspapers 
including the Western Times, the Bideford Gazette, the Daily Western Times, and the 
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Express and Echo.
134
 This meant that these two men, Owen in particular, had the ability 
to control which news stories were published and how they were presented in their 
newspapers. Furthermore, as newspaper editors, Owen and Gregory could also police 
the definition of patriotism through the editorial columns of these papers and this would 
further help to disseminate their superintendence of patriotism. Letters and other forms 
of public and private correspondence can reveal the priorities of Devon’s elite and the 
nature of the discussions between members of the county’s civil society. In addition, 
letters from Devon’s population can provide an insight into how Devonians lived with 
the wartime challenges on the Home Front. Similarly, the correspondence of Stephen 
Reynolds provides unparalleled observations in Devon to the events during the Great 
War because not only did he write about his own experiences as resident fisheries’ 
inspector but also his writings provide a noteworthy reflection of the activities of 
Devon’s elite in wartime. Reynolds’s biographer Christopher Scoble contends that 
Reynolds was a unique social explorer because ‘he was not driven by motives of class 
guilt or the desire for quick journalistic copy, academic reputation, or political solutions 
… he made his whole life with the poor and wrote from the inside looking out’.135 
 
Yet, when examining the records deposited in Devon’s archives, it is important to raise 
an awareness of the nature and limitations of the material. For instance, the description 
of the events and the meetings of local government entities in Devon were reliant on the 
individual documenting these proceedings. The minutes for Barnstaple Town Council 
were more organised when compared to the other records from other local government 
authorities including Honiton Rural District Council and West Alvington Parish 
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Council.
136
 Roderick Heathcoat-Amory’s Reminiscences is a valuable source because it 
contains his memories of life at Knightshayes court during the war and the role that his 
father, Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory, played from 1914 to 1918. However, as he is writing 
about his family Roderick’s account does not necessarily provide an impartial 
interpretation of his father and it includes a number of factual discrepancies surrounding 
the family’s textile factory in Tiverton during the war.137 Hence, it is important to cross-
examine his account alongside the Heathcoat-Amory factory logbook during the First 
World War. Through consultations with these sources as well as the local press, it is 
possible to not only shine a light upon the wartime operations of the textile factory but 
also to reveal how the factory’s management attempted to resolve the crises and 
tensions that emerged as a result of the war. Similarly, this scrutiny will be applied to 
the sources deposited by Lord Fortescue, since his memoirs for the war years need to be 
examined against the diaries that he kept from 1914 to 1918. Although it is important to 
be wary of the pitfalls that surround memoirs and autobiographies created by 
individuals from Devon’s civil society after the war, nevertheless, Roderick Heathcoat-
Amory’s account and Fortescue’s memoirs still have great merit as sources for this 
study. Similar merit can also be found in the retrospective oral recollections from 
Devonians employed in the analysis presented in this thesis. Despite the limitations 
inherent in these sources, they can shed light on attitudes and events in Devon during 
the Great War.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge the other limitations of the evidence, in particular 
the evidence that has not survived. An example of this is the material produced by the 
network of Military Service Tribunals. In 1921, the files of the 1,800 appeal tribunals 
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across the United Kingdom were destroyed on the command from the Ministry of 
Health.
138
 The destruction of this evidence has meant historians’ knowledge on the 
system of conscription during the war is pieced together from newspaper reports and 
other materials that have survived.
139
 In Devon, there are some pieces of evidence 
which have escaped this destruction. The minute books for Brixham Tribunal have 
survived in the Devon Heritage Centre. These records provide an administrative 
overview of the deliberations that Brixham’s Tribunal undertook from 1915 to 1918.140 
In addition, the consultation of the newspaper reports on these tribunals provides the 
opportunity for this thesis to gain a deeper and wider understanding of the tribunal 
system and the tribunalists in the county. This is complemented with the scrap book of 
newspaper cuttings from barrister Carl Ludwig Stirling which compiled the work of the 
Devon Appeal Tribunal. Through a compilation of the fragmented pieces of evidence 
related to conscription, this thesis will gain understanding of how the conscription 
system was perceived in Devon and how the county’s residents responded to the judicial 
authority of the county’s local elite as tribunalists. Another example of the limitations of 
the source material is related to recruitment for the Navy in Devon. The belief in the 
naval tradition of the county actually hindered the success of recruitment efforts for the 
Army in Devon throughout 1914 to 1916 and the efficacy of conscription from 1916 to 
1918. This is reflected in the testimony of William Stone who recalled that in his family 
there was a great naval tradition to which it was designated that William and his elder 
brothers should join the Navy.
141
 In reality, recruitment for the Navy continued 
throughout the war. This meant that questions continued to be asked in Parliament by 
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Devon’s local Members of Parliament (MP) about how many men had been recruited 
into the Navy.
142
 However, from 1914 to 1918, Devon’s elite and these MP’s were 
hesitant as to the number of county’s men-folk who had joined the Navy. Indeed, when 
they discussed this subject, these local figures continued to be reluctant to pin point an 
exact number and instead gave repeated rough estimates of the number of Devon men in 
the Navy during the war.
143
 
 
The local civil histories of the 1914-1918 conflict created after the war are an example 
of how the local elite celebrated specific achievements of certain localities in these 
chronicles, at the expense of other forms of mobilization. For instance, in the local civic 
history of Swindon from 1914 to 1918, the author emphasized that ‘local authority 
teachers had an impressive teaching record, sufficiently so to be recorded in the civic 
history’.144 In Devon, these local civic histories that emerged after the war were 
intended to document the experience of the war years for specific localities. The authors 
chronicled and reflected upon the accomplishments and ingenuity of their respective 
localities. At the same time, successful endeavours were woven into these celebratory 
civic narratives of local exceptionalism during the war. One of the themes emphasized 
in these accounts of local exceptionalism from Devon are the humanitarian 
achievements of the county.
145
 For instance, the account of Tavistock during the First 
World War promoted a collection of public-spirited achievements which included the 
collection of around 8,536 eggs and £45 11 s. 5d was raised for the purchase of eggs 
across the district.
146
 A similar accomplishment was recorded for Princetown where the 
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women of the town accumulated 3,215 sacks of Sphagnum Moss.
147
 On 8 November 
1918, the President of the Devon branch of the British Red Cross, Lady Fortescue 
revealed that the Devon branch was very successful because it had raised £6,300 15 s. 7 
d. which exceeded ‘by over £900 the collection of any other County’.148 This led Lady 
Fortescue to applaud that this was ‘another of the many proofs of Devon’s unbounded 
generosity which has been unfailing for every good object during the stress of the last 4 
½ years’.149 Furthermore, Mr Lloyd Parry, the Town Clerk of Exeter, revealed that in 
respect to the War Saving’s Movement ‘Exeter can claim to be well in the forefront, as 
not long after the close of the war, it was found that local subscriptions to War Savings 
Certificates were in comparison with the population – 75 per cent more than the average 
of the whole country’.150 These examples reaffirm the strength of the humanitarian 
nature of Devon’s patriotism and emphasized the accomplishments that Devon’s 
population had achieved in various philanthropic activities. The evidence that has 
survived from 1914 to 1918 will provide valuable insights into how Devon’s elite 
attempted to negotiate and overcome the tension between individual and national 
survival. It will also provide insight into pertinent nature of individual and local 
priorities on the Home Front in Devon for not only the members of the county’s local 
elite but also for Devonians.  
 
Structure 
This thesis is organised chronologically in four chapters. Each chapter considers a 
single year of the First World War, with the exception of Chapter 4 which covers the 
final two years of the conflict. Chapter 1 examines 1914, Chapter 2 will convey a 
critical reflection of 1915, Chapter 3 will create an analysis of 1916 and Chapter 4 will 
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provide an observation of both 1917 and 1918. The chronological structure reveals the 
evolutions in responsibilities and jurisdictions of Devon’s elite. Moreover, the 
chronological structure will help to validate the argument of the changing nature of the 
superintendence of the social morality of wartime by Devon’s elite through the war. It 
should also show how the changing nature of the Home Front and the nature of 
citizenship altered the nature of the policing responsibility of the county’s notables.  
 
Chapter 1 analyses how Devon’s elite and the county’s population adjusted to the 
transition from peacetime to wartime. The outbreak of war brought forward a number of 
diverse reactions to the news. However, the members of Devon’s civil society attempted 
to mediate and channel the ways in which Devonians responded to the declaration of 
war. This influence was also noted in the way in which Devon’s elite attempted to 
intermediate upon recruitment efforts in the county. Yet, in their exhortations and 
appeals to promote voluntary recruitment across the county, Devon’s notables 
encountered hesitation and indifference. Their attempts to navigate through the terrain 
to reconcile individual priorities and those of the nation did not achieve universal 
success. At the same time, other forms of mobilization such as philanthropy found 
significant popularity in Devon. Indeed, the great flowering of charities related to the 
war effort reveals that voluntary aid found more resonance with the humanitarian 
sensibilities of the county’s population. Therefore, these initial experiences of self-
mobilization in Devon were met with mixed success. 
 
Chapter 2 considers how Devon’s elites reflected on the lacklustre experiences of 1914 
and attempted to correct the indifferent responses from the county’s population from the 
processes of self-mobilization. In terms of the lacklustre recruitment results, Devon’s 
notables intended to recover the patriotic reputation of the county. Accordingly, various 
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members of Devon’s civil society during 1915 conducted an intensified campaign of 
recruitment marches and meetings across the county to promote voluntary recruitment 
and educate Devon’s men-folk of the necessity of military service. Despite some 
instances in Devon of increased recruitment rates, the campaign was not wholly 
successful throughout the county. By contrast, charities and philanthropic organisations 
continued to be well supported by Devonians as their involvement was a means to claim 
‘moral’ citizenship in the wartime community. However, charitable efforts in the case of 
the Belgian Refugees in the county evoked instances of upper class tribalism. At the 
same time, the organisation of Devon’s rural economy in 1915 for the war effort 
revealed the tension manifested in the responses of Devon’s farmers and fishermen who 
were torn between the survival of their individual livelihoods and the demands made by 
the war effort in the name of national survival. Similarly, Devon’s tourism industry 
struggled to adapt to the challenging conditions of wartime in 1915. An example of this 
is in the North Devon seaside town of Ilfracombe, where the tourism businesses 
attempted to navigate through the challenges of the 1915 holiday season. However, due 
to the social morality of the British war culture, the requisitioning of the railways and 
the austerity of wartime, Ilfracombe’s holiday industry suffered greatly. Against this 
backdrop, Ilfracombe Urban District Council were concerned for the fortunes of their 
suffering holiday industry and attempted, but failed, to claim compensation to offset for 
the losses incurred as a result of the war. Meanwhile, the South Devon coastal resorts in 
1915 were more ideally placed to adapt to the circumstances of wartime and the 
commercial opportunities wartime presented. 
 
Chapter 3 evaluates conscription in Devon and the changed dynamics of citizenship on 
the Home Front which were heralded by the network of Military Service Tribunals 
across the county. Devon notables who constituted the tribunal panels became self-
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appointed agents who adjudicated upon the individual applications for appeal from the 
county’s men-folk. Through the arbitration of these appeals, the tribunalists on Devon’s 
tribunals had to negotiate through the tension present in these applications for 
exemption between individual priorities and national ones. Devon’s local and Appeal 
Tribunals gave the ‘provincial patriots’ an opportunity to arbitrate upon the patriotism 
presented before them in the appeals for exemption from conscription and provided 
them with a platform to broadcast their views on patriotism. Moreover, the tribunals 
allowed the provincial patriots to extend their campaigns of superintendence of the 
wartime behaviour of Devon’s population. Despite the pleas from Devon’s notables that 
the conscription of the county’s men was vital for national survival, many of Devon’s 
population understood the consequences of conscription upon the survival of their 
businesses and industries. This was also evident in the John Heathcoat & Company 
textile factory where Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory faced a continuous struggle during 1916 
in his negotiations with the male lace workers to introduce female labour into the 
factory’s lace manufacturing operations. However, Heathcoat-Amory faced a conflict of 
interest to fulfil his obligations not only to work with his employees as an enlightened 
employer but also to the requests from the wartime authorities. Subsequently, the 
introduction of the War Charities Act of 1916 was intended to regulate charities and 
stop cases of fraud. However, this did little to dampen the support of Devonians in 
philanthropic efforts. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the period that has been defined by Horne as ‘remobilization’. This 
second wave of mobilization entailed the recognition of sacrifices which were 
previously deemed unacceptable to guarantee the prospect of victory. In Devon, the 
interventionist measures of mobilization in the county’s rural economy that were 
introduced, such as the Corn Production Act of 1917, were intended to undertake this 
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remobilization for victory. The National War Aims Committee intended to fight against 
the instances of war weariness present in Devon and convince the county’s population 
to continue to support the war. With the requirements of remobilization, Devon’s 
notables on tribunal panels had to enforce the ever changing requirements surrounding 
what were reserved occupations in the county. At the same time, this increased the 
amount of criticism against Devon’s tribunals, the decisions of the tribunals and the 
authority of the tribunalists. These escalated demands also influenced how local 
government and welfare entities in Devon attempted to navigate through the challenges 
of the last two years of the war.  
 
The main analytical thread that runs through this thesis is how the members of Devon’s 
civic society became the police-men and women of patriotism. As intermediaries of 
wartime, they extended their jurisdiction and responsibility to exhort and attempt to 
enforce the social morality of wartime across the county. The way that Devon’s elite 
attempted to negotiate through not only the challenges of wartime but also the 
competing interests of individual priorities and national ones is an important theme that 
transcends the chapters of this thesis. In Devon, patriotism was contested by multiple 
parties because it was not solely rooted in a lexicon of military endeavour. This meant 
that vocabularies of mobilization were unintentionally interpreted in a number of 
different ways by Devon’s population. Some saw the necessity of volunteering to 
defend the nation whilst others interpreted the languages of mobilization to provide a 
justification to stay in Devon in order to continue to farm the land. By understanding 
mobilization as a system of processes and projects, the evidence from Devon reveals the 
uncoordinated nature of the diverse responses to wartime mobilization. This thesis will 
suggest that since the war effort was not a unifying principle in Devon, the same can be 
said of the languages which expressed national mobilization as they did not unify the 
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county’s population. The fact that patriotism was contested by many parties made it a 
more challenging concept for Devon’s elite to superintend. This thesis will argue that 
Devon’s elite became active proponents and self-appointed police-men and women of 
the social morality of wartime. Through these revelations, this study of the Home Front 
in Devon will add to the knowledge of the effectiveness of the logics of mobilization in 
Britain and further our understanding of the war effort as a non-unifying phenomenon 
on a local level. Moreover, this study can be used as an example of how local 
populations engaged with the demands exhorted by the local elite and how these 
demands were rationalized by the local population, producing a frictional relationship 
between Devon’s elites as superintendents of the social morality of wartime and the 
county’s population. 
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Chapter 1: 
Mobilizing for war 
August 1914 to December 1914 
 
Introduction 
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian terrorists on 28 June 1914 
instigated a diplomatic impasse between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This 
subsequently resulted in the deterioration of relations between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia on 27 July, due to Serbia’s acceptance of the forty-eight hour ultimatum and 
‘Austria-Hungary’s immediate dismissal of the conciliatory Serbia’s response’.1 
Consequently, this chain of events set in motion a crisis which enveloped the nations of 
Europe and ultimately became a global conflict.
2
 In Britain, the European crisis 
overshadowed the British population’s domestic concerns and fears of a civil war in 
Ireland.
3
 This was reflected in a letter written by Sidmouth inhabitant Stephen Reynolds 
to his Aunt Jane Reynolds on 1 August 1914. In his letter, he expressed his expectation 
that she was ‘very startled and worried over these threatenings of war. It has hit us very 
hard here, for the British mobilisation – newspapers to the contrary – is undoubtedly 
very complete … The suspense is sickening’.4 Yet, despite the suspense that 
accompanied how the crisis would develop, Reynolds was under the impression that the 
crisis of the summer of 1914 would blow over leaving ‘Europe all the better for this 
glimpse into her mad idiocy of armaments’.5 However, in his sermon on 2 August 1914, 
the Reverend R. J. E. Beggis of St Mary Magdalene church in Barnstaple observed that 
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the ‘minds of well-nigh all Englishmen have been occupied – gravely occupied – by one 
all absorbing anxiety … world-wide crisis’.6 Indeed, the escalation of the crisis into the 
declaration of war amongst the nations of Europe and their global empires had, in turn, 
heightened the anxieties of the British population. The editor of the North Devon 
Journal compared the outbreak of war to the arrival of a troubling storm, stating that 
‘the dreaded war cloud has burst’.7 Accordingly, he felt that the result of this thundering 
downpour meant that the greatest military and naval struggle known in history was 
being waged.
8
 As his commentary reveals, many in Devon saw the magnitude of this 
war cloud on the horizon and were deeply anxious about the gravity of the conflict that 
Britain and her empire had entered into.
9
 
 
Yet, in the historiographies of this conflict, it was previously argued that the British, 
French and German populations welcomed the declaration of war, with mass 
enthusiasm and patriotic zeal.
10
 This interpretation was primarily based upon the 
evidence of the recollections and images of crowds in London, Paris and Berlin 
receiving the news of the war with energetic jubilation.
11
 The pictures of exhilarated 
crowds accompanying departing troops to German railway stations became the key 
evidence in the interpretation of ‘a Germany united in enthusiasm’.12 In fact, the 
reactions of people from metropolitan communities had been transposed to include how 
the national populations of Britain, France and Germany experienced a collective wave 
of enthusiasm and were euphoric about the war.
13
 As a result, Arthur Marwick came to 
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the conclusion that ‘British society in 1914 was strongly jingoistic and showed marked 
enthusiasm at the outbreak of war’.14 However, recent studies have dispelled the myth 
that enthusiasm for war was universally shared amongst the populations of France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom in their reactions to the outbreak of war.
15
 Adrian 
Gregory posits that the simplistic generalisations of a common, widespread war 
enthusiasm have ironed out the complexities of society and glossed over the complexity 
of individual responses to the declaration of war.
16
 The move beyond the monolithic 
interpretation that the outbreak of war produced mass jingoistic fervour for war has 
been achieved by shifting attention away from the responses of the capital cities of 
London, Paris and Berlin towards the examination of the reactions to the war on a local 
level.
17
 Instead, these studies have revealed that French, German and British societies 
experienced an intricate range of diverse responses to the declaration of war in 1914.
18
  
 
Equally, these studies have extended their focus to scrutinize the reactions of 
populations and communities to the outbreak of war in specific regions, districts, cities, 
towns, villages and hamlets. The results of these inquiries have added further doubt as 
to whether a complex phenomenon such as a national society can respond to an event in 
a united fashion. Simultaneously, these studies have also investigated how the 
populations of the belligerent nations adapted to the transition from peace to war with 
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the mechanisms of national mobilization. Horne has stressed that national mobilization 
was ‘an essentially political and cultural process’.19 In Horne’s view, the virtue of 
considering mobilization as a process or a ‘totalizing logic’ rather than an achieved 
result, is that it not only ‘encourages analysis of its form and evolution but also of its 
constraints and limitations’.20 It is also clear that the mobilization of the national 
community in 1914 behind the lines in France and the other belligerent nations 
produced cultures of wartime.
21
  
 
Stéphane Audion-Rouzeau and Annette Becker define this complex war culture of 
1914-18 as a ‘collection of representations of the conflict that crystallised into a system 
of thought which gave the war its deep significance’.22 They both also stress that this 
war culture led to the emergence of a powerful hatred of the enemy.
23
 In his study on 
the image of the profiteer, Jean-Louis Robert pointed out that these wartime depictions 
were vital in order to construct how ‘contemporaries envisioned and represented the 
system of social relations in which they lived’ from 1914 to 1918.24 These 
representations provided civilians and combatants with a ‘framework of meaning for 
sacrifice, for material hardships and the redistribution of wealth’.25 On a local level, 
Pierre Purseigle has revealed in his study of British and French communities during the 
war that local elites were important intermediaries for the war effort by disseminating 
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these wartime frameworks of meaning to their local communities.
26
 The employment of 
these national representations and the connection to this wider war culture were evident 
in the reactions of the local elites of Northampton and Bélziers to the fate of Belgium 
and prisoners of war.
27
 It is clear that this vision of the war which was transmitted and 
mediated by the local elite to their respective communities ‘fell into line with the 
national mobilization whose “totalizing logic” enlisted the cultural, moral, and 
ideological commitment of each nation to fight an uncivilised enemy to its total 
destruction, lest its victory should lead to the end of one’s culture, identity and way of 
life’.28 This meant that the elites of a local community became essential intermediaries 
and campaigners for the arbitration of the war effort on a local level and for the 
mobilization of the local populations for war. The complex cultures of war that emerged 
in 1914 with their distinct depictions of sacrifice, patriotism and duty were vital in the 
study of the British Home Front during the First World War. This is because these war 
cultures provided a means for individuals, communities and societies across the 
belligerent nations to understand and participate in the war.  
 
This chapter will examine the county of Devon from 1 August 1914 until 31 December 
1914. Firstly, there will be a survey of the socio-economic composition of Devon and 
the nature of Devon’s elite in 1914. Secondly, there will be an assessment of the 
reactions of Devonians to news of the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914. It will take 
into account the developments in the historiography of the responses to war in Britain, 
the revision of the trans-national historiography towards the outbreak of war and how 
the analysis of these can help in understanding the nature of responses to war in Devon. 
This consideration will take into account the reactions to the war in Devon across the 
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different sections of society in the county with equal reflection of the responses from 
both Devon’s urban and rural communities. In addition, how the Diocese of Exeter 
responded to the outbreak of war will be also be included in this discussion. Thirdly, 
there will be a critical exploration of recruitment efforts in the county for the Army and 
the Navy from August 1914 to December 1914. This will help to clarify how 
recruitment for the Army and Navy was an integral process of mobilization for 
communities on a local level. It will also consider the difference between the ideal 
projection by Devon’s elite of what recruitment efforts should have yielded in the 
county and the stark reality of what recruitment efforts did achieve from some districts 
within Devon. Fourthly, this chapter will investigate and scrutinize these mobilization 
efforts in Devon during 1914. This investigation will specifically focus on and consider 
the cultural/political and economic processes of mobilization. Through an exploration of 
mobilization in these two contexts, the analysis presented in this section will strengthen 
the argument that Devon’s patriotism was similar to Cornwall’s in that it was not of a 
militaristic nature but more of a humanitarian one.  
 
The reason for dedicating a chapter to the study of 1914 is that it provides an important 
starting point for the analysis of efforts which Horne defines as ‘self-mobilization’ for 
the war effort and the emergence of the Home Front in the county of Devon.
29
 Stuart 
Dalley’s investigation of Cornwall after the outbreak of war has shown that it is 
important not to forget how specific localities differed in their responses and adaption to 
the processes of mobilization.
30
 To examine the year 1914 on its own merits presents 
the opportunity to cross examine the ideas of the trans-national historiography of early 
mobilization against the evidence from the county of Devon. It is important to construct 
a study of the Home Front in a chronological manner because it provides the 
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opportunity for a more comprehensive understanding of the processes of the early 
mobilization efforts at a local level. Horne has suggested that the ‘study of wartime 
mobilization is partly about the ideal projections of military and civilian planners; but 
also about the lived relationship of a variety of different groups (intellectuals, school 
teachers, children, soldiers and many more) to the war and to its meaning’.31 1914 was 
the year when Devon’s elite broadcast their intentions of how they hoped the county’s 
population would respond to the war’s calls for sacrifice and become involved in the 
processes of mobilization. The dualism between the plans for mobilization in the county 
and the reality of the mobilization efforts in Devon during 1914 helps to reveal the 
tension that the ‘provincial patriots’ had between individual and national priorities. 
Consequently, the central aspect of this chapter is the beginning of Devon’s elite 
engagement in the war effort. 
 
Stephen Reynolds, the Inspector for the South West Fisheries (ISWF) during the war, 
labelled Devon’s elite as the ‘provincial patriots’.32 These civic figures in Devon were 
important not only to the war effort but also to stability in the county. It can also be seen 
that local notable figures such as Lord Fortescue and the Mayors of Barnstaple and 
Exeter felt their role was to relay a sense of calm in order to allay people’s fears in the 
midst of a crisis. At the same time, they sought to police mobilization efforts in Devon 
and believed that they should superintend the ‘patriotism of those who are not [exempt 
from military service]’.33 Hence, through the process of weighing the patriotism of 
Devonians against the strength of their own patriotism, the ‘provincial patriots’ 
attempted to establish their authority amongst the county’s population over the criteria 
of wartime participation. This chapter will also consider the early efforts of the 
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‘provincial patriots’ to mobilize Devon’s citizens alongside their attempts to police 
mobilization efforts in the county. In Devon, the ‘provincial patriots’ hoped to shape 
and monitor the arbitration of the war experience. Nevertheless, the evidence from 
Devon’s archives will reveal that the efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ to mobilize 
districts across the county were not entirely successful.  
 
During the opening months of the war, the individual concerns of Devonians continued 
to linger despite the calls for sacrifice and recruitment efforts in the county. Bonnie 
White suggested that the lack of centralized recruiting agencies in Devon meant that it 
‘took considerably more time to organize recruitment efforts in the county than in the 
large urban centres [of Britain]’.34 There was a distinct discrepancy between the 
responses to recruitment efforts in Devon’s urban centres and those living in the rural 
districts of the county.
35
 In particular, she identifies that in the remote north west of 
Devon the ‘recruitment campaign failed to convey the true gravity of the country’s 
position and residents were sluggish in responding to the war effort’.36 Yet, this chapter 
will build upon the argument and suggest that the indifferent and sluggish responses to 
the war were even more widespread across Devon than White suggests. In fact, the 
evidence from across Devon reinforces the idea that the war effort was not perceived to 
be an all-encompassing phenomenon. This meant that the tension and constant 
negotiation between individual priorities and national ones was unmistakeable in some 
of the Devonian responses to the war. Alongside the early mobilization efforts and the 
emergence of a war culture in 1914, Devon’s population as well as those of Britain and 
France faced what Horne has described as the ‘choice of 1914’.37 The ‘choice of 1914’ 
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revealed not only a straight forward choice between the decision to participate in the 
war effort or not but also a concern on the part of the residents of the county as to how 
to engage with the war effort. This anxiety as to what the war would mean in their lives 
was particularly evident in the responses from Devonians to the outbreak of war.  
 
Devon and its local elite in 1914 
By the twentieth century, Devon was the fourth largest county in England with a 
population of around 700,000 people.
38
 The majority of the county’s population was 
primarily centred in the three recently amalgamated towns of Plymouth, East 
Stonehouse and Devonport, which contained the Royal Navy port to create ‘a greater 
Plymouth’.39 In 1914, these three towns became the city of Plymouth with a populace of 
more than 200,000.
40
 In comparison, Exeter, the capital city of Devon, had around 
50,000 people.
41
 The remainder of Devon’s population was spread across the county’s 
various districts with Barnstaple, the largest town in North Devon, having a population 
of 12,231, whilst the West Devon town of Tavistock had fewer than 5,000 people.
42
 The 
growth of the railways in Devon during the nineteenth century had improved access to 
all regions of the county, which in turn had strengthened the rise of the tourism industry 
in the towns and villages along both of Devon’s coastlines.43 Hence, tourism had by 
1914 grown to be Devon’s largest industry employing a domestic labour force of 55,000 
people.
44
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Nonetheless, despite these developments, communication between North and South 
Devon was still slow and inconvenient.
45
 Devon was primarily a rural county despite 
the urbanisation that had taken place as a result of the railways. The strength of Devon’s 
rural economy was reflected in the fact that farming was the county’s second most 
important industry.
46
 There were around 11,000 farmers and 21,000 labourers working 
on farms that were mainly family run businesses with less than 100 acres.
47
 In total, 
farming provided a living for about 48,000 people in Devon.
48
 The rural economy was 
also supported by other occupations such as carpenters and blacksmiths. The statistics 
of the 1911 census reveal that Devon had 4,183 Carpenters, 1,806 Blacksmiths and 
Forge Workers, 335 Saddlers and Harness-makers, and 737 Wheel-wrights and 
Cartwrights.
49
 Yet, Devon’s economy also included businesses which provided 
alternative choices for employment to the county’s rural populace. The growth of the 
railways and other modes of transportation meant that transport employed 23,000 
people in Devon. Consequently, transport established itself as the county’s third largest 
sector of employment.
50
  It must also be noted that it was believed that Devon possessed 
a distinct naval tradition.
51
 In fact, it was recognised in 1912 official return that Devon 
and Cornwall had more men in the Navy than the whole of Wales and Scotland.
52
 
Therefore, by 1914, Devon was a traditional recruiting ground for the Navy and some 
contemporaries had called the county the ‘Shire of the Sea Kings’ as a result of Devon’s 
Naval past.
53
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At the apex of Devon’s civil society were the county’s landowners, its manufacturers, 
civic figures, clerics and other local notables. The most important of these figures in 
Devon was Lord Hugh Fortescue, the fourth Earl Fortescue and a British peer.
54
 As the 
Lord Lieutenant of Devon from 1904 to 1928, Hugh Fortescue was the representative of 
King George V in Devon and was able to exert a considerable influence upon county 
life. Fortescue was also involved in a multitude of public activities and entities in 
Devon. He was the Chairman of Devon County Council (DCC) from 1904 to 1916, a 
Prominent Freemason, the Devon Quarter Sessions Chairman, and Master of the Devon 
and Somerset Stag Hounds.
55
 Moreover, as the King’s Representative for Devon he also 
participated in the ‘extra duties of necessity’ during the war.56 Meanwhile, Lady 
Fortescue also held similar authority over several local societies with female 
membership, including the Women’s Institute and the Devon Nursing Association.57 
Another prominent social figure who was able to wield significant influence in Devon 
was Tiverton industrialist Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory who became the second baronet 
Heathcoat-Amory of Knightshayes Court on 29 May 1914.
58
 Heathcoat-Amory 
managed the family’s textile manufacturing business, John Heathcoat & Company 
(JHC), and the operations of their lace factory in Tiverton.
59
 As his family were 
enlightened employers, he worked with his workforce in an attempt to provide a 
harmonious and benevolent relationship between employer and employee. In addition, 
both the Mayor of Tiverton and the recorder for Tiverton, Alfred T. Gregory and Sir 
Trehawke Kekewich respectively, were civic worthies who were not only notable 
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personages of local life in the mid-Devon town but also in the public, political and 
social life in Devon.
60
  
 
Similarly, the Mayor and Mayoress of Exeter, Sir James and Lady Owen 
correspondingly, were important dignitaries in the city.
61
 It also must be observed that 
both Sir James Owen and Alfred T. Gregory were significant figures in Devon due to 
the fact that they were also editors of several local newspapers which included the 
Western Times, the Devon and Exeter Gazette, the Express and Echo, the South Molton 
Gazette and the Tiverton Gazette.
62
 During the war, the Diocese of Exeter was under the 
authority of two Bishops. Archibald Robinson was the Bishop of Exeter from 1903 to 
1916.
63
 The office was then taken over by Lord William Cecil in 1916 who remained as 
Bishop until 1936.
64
 Another local civic figure of a rather different type was Stephen 
Reynolds, a Sidmouth resident and man of letters. As author of the Poor Man’s House 
and Seems So!, Reynolds was a keen advocate of social reform and for the fishing 
communities of Devon and Cornwall.
65
 Christopher Scoble suggests that it was ‘through 
his membership of the [Cecil] Harmsworth committee of 1913 and the inshore fisheries 
committee of 1914 [that] he secured almost single-handed a revolution in longshore 
fisheries policy’.66 This included co-operation in marketing, the utilisation of motor 
power for fishing vessels and new systems of insurance for fishermen.
67
 By 1914, 
Reynolds was able to implement these reforms in the fisheries in the South-West when 
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he became fisheries advisor to the Development Commission.
68
 However, despite his 
accomplishments, Reynolds viewed himself as an outsider to Devon’s civil society due 
to the fact that ‘he went to live with the poor because he disliked the cold sterility of 
middle-class culture’.69 In the transition from peace to war during the summer of 1914, 
Devon’s elite witnessed how Devonians adapted to the circumstances of wartime. At the 
same time, it is clear that the county’s notables attempted to mediate and control the 
events that accompanied this dramatic shift. 
 
Reactions to war in Devon and the transition from peace to wartime 
The news of the crisis that engulfed Europe from 23 July 1914 until 4 August 1914, 
caught the attention of the British public. According to Catriona Pennell, it was clear 
that in the days and weeks before the declaration of war on 4 August 1914 the British 
people were curious about how the crisis would unfold.
70
 Indeed, the ‘uncertainty, and 
anxiety to discover the latest news formed one of the principal motives of spontaneous 
gatherings, where the national press arrived, were logical meeting points’.71 It became a 
common-place occurrence across the United Kingdom in the days before 4 August 1914 
to see throngs of people waiting outside newspaper offices and railway stations to either 
read or hear the latest news.
72
 According to an anonymous correspondent for the 
Western Times, it was evident that the streets of Exeter on 3 August 1914 wore an 
‘animated appearance’, where crowds of people ‘read with eager interest the various 
messages which from time to time were posted in the windows of the office of this 
journal’.73 It is also clear this phenomenon was not restricted to Exeter. In Barnstaple, 
eager crowds of people had gathered outside the offices of the Western Times to wait ‘in 
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the hope of hearing some fresh news’.74 Similar scenes were documented in Torquay 
and Newton Abbot through the night of 3 August 1914.
75
 In his study of German public 
opinion, Jeffrey Verhey observes that the sight of what he describes as curious crowds 
of people waiting through the afternoon and evening of 3 August 1914 in public squares 
or outside newspaper offices for news was also present in German towns and cities.
76
 
Verhey argues that these crowds were anxiously waiting in curious suspense and some 
individuals in these curious crowds devoured every up-to-date scrap of news that they 
could lay their hands on.
77
  
 
The appetite for news was also present at Exmouth railway station where the newsboys, 
who supplied the Express and Echo in the resort, found themselves throughout the 3 
August swamped by large numbers of Exonians and tourists eager for the latest 
developments.
78
 This was especially apparent after the 2.25pm train from Exeter had 
brought to the newsboys their copies of the newspaper.
79
 A few minutes after they had 
received these supplies, crowds at Exmouth railway station eagerly snapped up all the 
latest copies of the paper.
80
 Among the crowd, there were a ‘large number of 
Territorials, who were on leave from the Woodbury Camp, and who were not the least 
eager to learn the latest news’.81 It is important to consider that these Territorials 
probably wanted to enjoy their holidays with their families and loved ones in the South 
Devon resort rather than face the prospect of mobilizing for active service. It is clear 
that in Exmouth, the serious nature of the news had to a degree dampened the holiday 
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spirit for many people in the resort: ‘No one apparently thought or talked of anything 
else but the war, and of the chance of Great Britain being dragged into conflict’.82  
 
Despite the fact that the 3 August 1914 was the August bank holiday, one of the busiest 
and most important holidays of the year for Devon’s tourism industry, it was obvious to 
the columnist of the Western Times that the ‘gloom of war was everywhere apparent … 
[and] … there was a marked absence of the customary holiday spirit’.83 Indeed, Alfred 
T. Gregory confessed that due to the gloomy prospect of war, 3 August was ‘no time for 
pleasure-trips or fetes’ despite the fact that it was a public holiday.84 The absence of the 
typical holiday spirit was also reflected in the significantly reduced number of holiday 
makers who visited the resort for the Bank Holiday. It was calculated that only 1,500 
holiday makers had passed through Exmouth Railway Station by 3 August which 
represented around ‘half the usual bookings for a normal August Bank Holiday’.85 
However, the reduced number of excursionists who travelled to Exmouth railway 
station needs to be considered in light of the practicalities of the situation. The 
newspaper argued that it would be counterproductive for large numbers of excursionists 
to crowd railway stations when it ‘might be necessary at any moment to keep the line 
clear for the conveyance of troops’.86 When faced with the possibility of Britain 
becoming embroiled in war, sensible people in the resort ‘had no inclination to indulge 
in frivolity’. 87 In fact, the newspaper went on to stress that this serious reaction towards 
the crisis was present amongst the higher quarters of society, the middle and upper 
middle class holidaymakers.
88
 At the same time, in the faces of some of the 
holidaymakers across the resort there was evidence of a ‘subdued, but tense, 
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excitement’.89 It is important to identify and analyse the exact nature of this subdued, 
but tense, excitement present in some of the reactions from Devon’s population to the 
prospect of war.  
 
Pennell suggested the news of the crisis provided for some individuals the most 
interesting piece of news and gossip. In Torrington, the rumours of war in the first days 
of August had caused ‘great excitement in the town, as in other parts of the country’.90 
This is also evident in the diary of Albert Best, a plumber in Teignmouth, where he 
noted on 2 August that the escalation of the crisis to the possibility of war had created 
great excitement in Teignmouth because of the mobilization of the ‘Naval reservists 
being called up and hurrying away by train throughout the day’.91 Accordingly, the 
proximity to military centres was an important factor which helped to influence the 
reaction of some communities in the county towards the outbreak of the war. However, 
when Best heard about the outbreak of war he recorded a distinctly neutral response: 
‘Unfavourable reply last night to ultimatum so that war is declared’.92 Jean-Jacques 
Becker has argued that it is important to clarify exactly the nature of the sentiments that 
were expressed in response to the outbreak of war, the first announcement of 
mobilization and the actual departure of troops.
93
 Therefore, through this examination of 
the nature of these sentiments, there is a striking difference in Best’s reaction from the 
excitement of the mobilization of the Naval Reserves to the transformation of war ‘from 
a prospect into a fact’.94  
 
                                                 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 North Devon Journal, 31 December 1914, p. 7. 
91
 Albert Best, The Diaries of Albert Best: A resident of Teignmouth: Part 3, 1st January 1914 to 9th 
September 1920, ed. by Alan Best (Torquay: Alan Best, 2009) 2 August 1914, p. 9. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Becker, ‘“That’s The Death Knell Of Our Boys…”’, pp. 34-35. 
94
 Roger Chickering, ‘“War Enthusiasm?” Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War in 1914’ in H. 
Afflerbach and D. Stevenson eds., An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European 
Culture before 1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007) p. 202. 
66 
 
Yet, it is evident that the anxiety, nervous excitement and urgent need for news in 
Exmouth and other localities in Devon adds weight to the argument that the ‘serious 
nature of the news [had] made a deep impression’ in the county.95 By 4 August 1914, 
Reynolds wrote to his Aunt Jane with more certainty that to him ‘War seems almost 
inevitable, but I gather that when the scare settles down to business the financial 
situation will improve’.96 As the Reverend Beggis preached in his sermon on 2 August 
at St Mary Magdalene church in Barnstaple, it was clear that the Devon population’s 
interest in the crisis had ‘given place to apprehension and apprehension has grown into 
anxiety, and anxiety has developed into alarm’.97 This interest had continued to fuel the 
eagerness for news that continued on 4 August 1914. Pennell notes that outside the 
offices of the Devon and Exeter Gazette, the eager Exeter crowds were ‘marked by their 
“placidity” and “sobriety”’.98 Moreover, a crowd of many hundreds similarly waited to 
read with ‘avidity every item of news as it was posted in the windows’ of the Western 
Times offices in Exeter.
99
 After the British Government’s demand for the withdrawal of 
the German Army from Belgium had expired on the 4 August 1914 at 11 pm, Britain 
declared war on Germany.
100
 The news that war had been declared spread to Devon, as 
mentioned previously, through the national and local press. However, it is also 
important to bear in mind that communication between the North and the South of 
Devon in 1914 was slow and inconvenient.
101
 In the North Devon village of West 
Buckland, a woman recalled that it was the postman who had brought news of the 
outbreak of war to the village. Throughout the day, she saw the village’s men-folk ‘all 
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congregated round the postman’s hut to hear the news’.102 In Plymouth, Marjorie 
Laxton remembered that on 4 August 1914 she heard soldiers running through the city’s 
streets ‘shouting “War Declared, War Declared”’.103 In her recollection, she indicated 
that these men were not rejoicing at the news of the war by shouting in Plymouth’s 
streets. Instead, they were running to deliver the poignant news to people of one of the 
key events of their lifetime. The astonishment in the way that some Devonians received 
the news of war was recorded by A. H. Rousham, who observed that in the village of 
Exwick the declaration of war had arrived ‘like a bomb to break the peace and quietness 
of village life’.104 
 
The nature of the responses in Britain’s villages, towns and cities to the news of war has 
provided an interesting point for historical analyses of the outbreak of war. Verhey 
argues that the 4 August crowds present in Germany’s cities and towns are an 
‘especially rich text’ in the study of public opinion.105 This is also true of the crowds in 
Exeter. According to the correspondent for the Western Times, once Exeter’s crowds 
had received the news that Britain had declared war against Germany the throng of 
people ‘moved to an impressive outburst’.106 The newspaper went on to describe this 
sight as a scene of tremendous enthusiasm as the declaration of war was a confirmed 
fact: ‘A tremendous cheer was raised, and then all heads were bared while by general 
impulse the National Anthem was sung. This was followed by a general hand 
shaking’.107 After this the ‘King’s inspiring message to his Navy had just previously 
been posted and his Majesty’s confidence was reflected in his Ever Faithful subjects in 
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Exeter’.108 A similar patriotic response was found in Cardiff where the crowds reached a 
‘high pitch of intensity’ after hearing the news.109 Pennell reflects that this incident was 
similar to a kettle that had reached boiling point, the ‘crowds sang patriotic songs and 
cheered in a sense of relief once the declaration of war had been declared’.110  
 
An anonymous columnist for another local newspaper Devon and Exeter Gazette 
reported that Exeter’s main streets were ‘full of bustle and excitement’ after they had 
heard the news.
111
 However, it is important to clarify the nature of excitement and what 
the label of excitement carries with it. Can excitement represent an enthusiasm for war? 
The very definition of what enthusiasm constituted needs further investigation because 
as Pennell argues the sight of a crowd cheering at the ‘moment of announcement was 
not necessarily an indication of enthusiasm for war but a release of tension, a climax to 
a week of not knowing’.112 Equally, Holger Herwig suspects that the euphoria present in 
the reactions of Vienna’s population in August 1914 may have been what he describes 
as ‘cognitive dissonance’.113 This was, in Herwig’s view, a joyous release of relief after 
weeks of uncertainty and anxiety.
114
 However, David Monger is only partially 
convinced by Pennell’s explanation that the singing and cheering of the crowds on 4 
August may have been a release of built-up public tension.
115
 It is not entirely clear in 
this reading of these emotions as a release of tension why a ‘great cheer rather than, say, 
a great moan or wail, would be the reaction’.116 Verhey has gone on to stress that the 
enthusiasm present in crowds in Germany can ‘scarcely be cited as evidence of “war” 
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enthusiasm’.117 In his essay on war enthusiasm, Roger Chickering references Thomas 
Raithel’s analysis of urban attitudes in Germany which states that “war enthusiasm” 
depends on how you define the term.
118
 Raithel found examples of enthusiasm as 
‘passionate fervour’ or ‘diffuse joyful excitement’.119 Therefore in light of the evidence 
from Exeter’s crowds, it is vital to clarify that the descriptions of enthusiasm or 
excitement as used by the correspondents does not necessarily denote an ecstatic desire 
for war present amongst the multitude of people. Instead, they seem to convey that the 
enthusiasm of Exeter’s crowds was a presentation of their patriotism and a resolute 
declaration of support for Britain’s intervention. This is also true of the sentiment of 
approval. The correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette wrote that ‘Exonians 
were determined was proved by the audible signs of approval with which the news that 
Great Britain had given Germany until midnight to declare her intentions in regard to 
Belgium neutrality was received’.120 It could be interpreted that the senses of approval 
and enthusiasm felt by the crowds of Exeter were informed by a sense of the moral 
position of Britain’s cause. Nevertheless, the use of these descriptions by particular 
correspondents to define the reaction of Exeter’s crowds does raise important questions 
as to what these observations signify in our understanding of the reactions to the war on 
a local level. 
 
The specific nature of a crowd meant that it possessed its own distinct response to the 
outbreak of war: ‘the crowds of 4 August 1914, in London and elsewhere, possessed 
many emotions’.121 The application of specific descriptions by observers to define how 
individuals and crowds responded to the war can help to understand the significance of 
these responses. It is important to reflect how the language used to define the reactions 
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in these crowds and how these expressions of enthusiasm, excitement and approval 
were ideologically loaded descriptions. For instance, a columnist for the Devon and 
Exeter Gazette observed after he had witnessed the behaviour of Exonians who 
participated in the farewell celebrations for the troops on 4 August that enthusiasm was 
‘but a weak word to use in describing the scene, but it is sufficient’.122 Based upon the 
conduct of the citizens of Exeter, he went on to claim that the ‘average Britisher takes 
some time to arouse for his patriotism is not the kind that is on the surface. But it is 
there all the same and although he dislikes a scene, when once he is aroused there is no 
doubt about his patriotism’.123 Accordingly, the patriotism exhibited by Exonians on 4 
August led the columnist to proclaim that Exeter was ‘British to the back-bone, and 
during the past few anxious days has kept her feelings well under control, but last night 
she gave way to a patriotic outburst’.124 An anonymous correspondent for the Western 
Times came to the conclusion after viewing Exeter’s crowds that the city had ‘fully 
lived up to the character of the centre of the patriotic West’.125 To correspondents who 
witnessed these Exeter crowds, they observed that they were, in their opinion, reacting 
enthusiastically to the news of war and this enthusiasm was motivated by patriotism. 
This display of patriotism did not go unnoticed by Lord Fortescue who recorded in his 
diary for 4
 
August that in Exeter the ‘attitude & behaviours of [the] men & [the] people 
[was] quite satisfactory’.126 He later explained in his memoirs for the war years that this 
was his reaction in relation to how both the men and the city’s population had 
responded to outbreak of war and the orders for mobilization.
127
 It is evident that the 
patriotic manner in which Exeter’s citizens responded to the outbreak of war and the 
mobilization was deemed to be appropriate.  
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In stark opposition were the rejoicings of Mafeking Night on 18 May 1900 which was 
an event that celebrated the relief of a small British garrison town from the Boer forces. 
However, the reports of these festivities in later years were transformed into depictions 
of patriotic riots and demonstrations celebrating the victory and Britain’s empire.128 In 
her section which discusses the legacy of Mafeking Night upon Edwardian Britain, 
Pennell suggests that the memory of the event was burned into the public 
consciousness, which was used as a ‘cultural yardstick to remind the British public of 
the limits of acceptable behaviour’.129 Sir Francis Acland, the Liberal MP for 
Camborne, wrote to the editor of The Cornubian on 11 August 1914 from the Foreign 
Office about the very matter of Mafeking Night. As a Civil Servant during the Boer 
War, Acland had observed how London’s population had reacted during Mafeking 
Night and he had also seen how they had responded to the outbreak of war on 4 August 
1914. Based upon what he had witnessed on both occasions, he argued that there was a 
‘great contrast between that time and this. There is very little “Mafeking” this time’.130 
Conversely, in light of the declaration of war in 1914, the hysteria of Mafeking Night 
was to be ‘avoided at all costs’.131 Pennell does touch upon the idea that the descriptions 
of Mafeking Night acted as a warning. Hence, ‘crowd behaviour in 1914 was not 
allowed to get out of control’.132 As a consequence, this meant that the ‘descriptions of 
crowd reactions to the outbreak of war in 1914 were therefore not neutral’.133 In this 
sense, she argues that the reports were ‘ideologically loaded interventions in a debate 
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about how people might and should behave’.134 However, according to Chickering, the 
responses of crowds to the outbreak of war should be ‘understood in the light of their 
own political and cultural dynamics’.135 Chickering references Christian Geinitz’s study 
of attitudes during the opening phases of the war in the German city of Freiburg to 
emphasise and explain the ‘apparent contradictions in collective attitudes, the 
simultaneity of enthusiasm and excitement about the war’.136 Questions remain as to 
whether the attitudes of the crowds in Britain’s cities, as they were chronicled in 
newspaper reports ‘indicate mental dispositions or fleeting reactions? Could one be 
“anxiously patriotic” or “vigorously consternated” about the war?’137 Through the 
descriptions of approval and patriotism, it is clear that some of Exeter’s crowds 
responded to the outbreak of war in a patriotic manner. The enthusiasm and patriotism 
described in the newspaper coverage of the responses of some crowds in Exeter is too 
important to ignore. Consequently, the choice of the specific wording used by 
contemporaries to describe these events should not be overlooked in favour of historians 
prescribing a label to bring together a wide range of responses to the outbreak of war. 
 
Yet, in order to truly gauge how the British population reacted to the outbreak of war, it 
is vital to look beyond the crowds on 4 August 1914. Pennell observes that the nature of 
individual and collective reactions could vary from city to city, town to town, street to 
street.
138
 Consequently, in order to measure the reactions of the county’s population to 
the outbreak of war, it is important to consider Exeter’s crowds as well as the reactions 
of Devonians across the county. There were individuals in Devon who were deeply 
anxious about what the declaration of war would mean. On 5 August 1914, Dorothy 
Holman noticed this when she visited a hospital in Exeter and the head district nurse 
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informed Dorothy that they were ‘frightfully busy with premature babies caused by the 
shock of the war’.139 As mentioned previously, the anxiety surrounding the prospect of 
war dampened the holiday season in Exmouth. Subsequently, the outbreak of war had a 
dramatic impact upon the holiday industry in some Devon resorts. It was also apparent 
that large numbers of visitors were anxious at the prospect and decided to cancel their 
‘rooms at the various hotels and boarding-houses at Ilfracombe, and several visitors 
have already received telegrams calling them away’.140 The North Devon Journal 
observed later in 1914 that the declaration of the war had undeniably ruined the most 
important month in the holiday season for which ‘the total loss to the town must have 
been many thousands of pounds’.141 Similar scenes were also noted in Newquay on 7 
August where since the outbreak of war there had been an ‘absence of gaiety’.142 The 
holiday atmosphere of the August Bank holiday in the Cornish seaside resort had been 
ruined because the ‘people did not feel like amusement’.143 Whilst the declaration of 
war had spoilt the holiday atmosphere for some individuals, there were some who 
simply oblivious of its presence. Gregory points out an example of ‘Miss E. Barkworth 
in Devon barely mentions it in her diary and spent August going to the beach and 
reading Dickens’.144 He uses this as an example of the widespread phenomenon of ‘war 
indifference’. 
 
James Thomas Rogers, a preacher from Plymouth, confided in his journal entry for 6 
August 1914 that he was similarly concerned about the war and hoped through the 
power of prayer that God would ensure Great Britain’s survival through the conflict: 
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‘What is before us God only knows, we are in his hands, it is too terrible for words, God 
grant that the contest may speedily be ended and bring our beloved country safely 
through’.145 The sentiments of distress were felt by Ruth Whitaker in the East Devon 
village of Broadclyst as a result of the anxiety created by the war. She remembered that 
on the weekend after the outbreak of war a very old woman from the village said to her 
in conversation about the war: ‘Oh, how exciting’.146 Ruth replied that ‘I’m not in the 
least excited … [I am] horribly frightened!’147 In fact, it was reported by one 
correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette that the crowds he had met in some 
streets of Exeter ‘during the earlier part of the day were grave’.148 Yet, from a review of 
these crowds he was adamant that in the faces of all the people he could ‘read signs of 
sheer determination to see England through’.149 Verhey argues that these sentiments of 
kinship were also apparent in Germany in the days before the declaration of war in that 
‘although there was little “enthusiasm” in these curious crowds, there was a sense of 
“community,” of a shared fate’.150 The population of France believed that they held a 
shared fate to defend France from German aggression under the imagined alliance of a 
sacred union of all French peoples otherwise known as the Union Sacrée.
151
  
 
In some of the reactions from Devonians, there were present sentiments of relief to the 
news that war had been declared. Similarly, more than one reader outside the offices of 
the Devon and Exeter Gazette expressed relief after reading the news of the outbreak of 
war.
152
 It can be argued that these reactions should be understood in the context that 
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these individuals felt relief due to the fact that the uncertainty surrounding the European 
crisis had finally come to an end. These sentiments of relief were also felt by some 
Devonians away from the crowds. John Tindall, a sergeant signaller of the later named 
Sidmouth Volunteer Defence Regiment remembered that upon reading the declaration 
of war posted up in Fore Street, Sidmouth he bowed his head and said ‘Thank God’.153 
Yet, despite the different sentiments in responses to the outbreak of war, civic figures 
and local authorities were deeply concerned about how the county’s populace would 
respond to the news of war.  
 
Arthur J. Reavell, the deputy Mayor of Barnstaple, appealed to the inhabitants of the 
town and the surrounding borough for calm: ‘In a time of great excitement like the 
present, it behoves every citizen to keep cool and free from panic’.154 In particular, 
Reavell stressed that Barumites and the district’s population should not harbour food 
supplies: ‘A great injustice may be done to the poor, who are only able to purchase in 
small quantities, if the well-to-do section of the community make abnormal demands on 
the local supply of provisions’.155 Indeed, in the lead up to the outbreak of war, the price 
of certain food supplies had dramatically increased. This situation was used to the 
advantage of the quarry workers of Trusham who were on strike. Their spokesman, Mr 
W. A. Bond used the steep rise in food prices in Plymouth to provide the strikers with 
the opportunity to vocalise their opposition to the prospect of war.
156
 However, there 
were Devonians who did panic buy large quantities of food and coal, at which some 
shopkeepers admitted that the rushed frenzy for supplies was more profitable than the 
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‘Christmas trade’.157 Therefore, when war was declared on 4 August 1914, local 
authorities in Devon were concerned about how the county’s populace would react to 
the news. As a result, their fears were to an extent validated because across all of Britain 
the news of the outbreak of war prompted the panic buying of food supplies. 
Subsequently, in the hope of alleviating this crisis, Devon’s elite used their influence to 
exhort to the county’s population to curtail the panic buying of food. At the same time, 
they attempted to use this opportunity to intermediate upon the uncertainty which 
accompanied the transition from peacetime to wartime and prescribe how the people of 
Devon should react to the news of the war. Sir James Owen pleaded with Exeter’s 
population that as they entered into the ‘unknown, our word to our fellow-citizens and 
fellow-Devonians is: Be steadfast; unafraid’.158 Similar appeals were made by local 
authorities across Devon for the county’s population to consider the national interest 
and not hoard food supplies. The Vice-Chairman of Newton Abbot Urban District 
Council advocated that it should be ‘their endeavour to sink all personal selfishness in 
the great crisis, and all help one another’.159 On the same day, Budleigh Salterton Urban 
District Council launched a similar appeal for co-ordinated restraint on panic buying of 
food supplies.
160
 According to a correspondent for the Western Times, the food situation 
in Exeter by 6 August 1914 was ‘becoming serious’.161  
 
At a special meeting of Exeter City Council on 4 August 1914, Owen argued that 
Exeter’s citizens needed to bear in mind that ‘it is not each for himself, but each for all, 
and that any disposition to alarm or panic may inflict hardships on our poorer brethren. I 
am quite sure that in appealing to the citizens in this way I do not appeal in vain, and 
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that, with a calm form, and a united form’.162 The concern at how the declaration of war 
would be received by the city’s population was felt by the Exeter Constabulary. As a 
precaution against any disturbances that could arise from the responses to the outbreak 
of war, the city’s police force issued six of their officers with firearms.163 Meanwhile, it 
is interesting to note that there were individuals who sought to exploit the city’s crowds 
waiting for news. During the 4 August, the Exeter Constabulary received eight cases of 
pick pocketing from persons in the crowd waiting in Exeter’s High Street.164  
 
Yet, the civic figures in Exeter believed that it was their responsibility to reassure and 
provide a sense of direction to people after the declaration of war. Owen proclaimed to 
all the members at the council meeting that they were ‘passing through the most anxious 
crisis in the history of this country, and one that has fallen on us with appalling 
suddenness. The past history of this city shows that it has never been wanting - nay 
more it has been conspicuous - every duty that lay to its hand when national need 
arose’.165 Owen clearly appealed to their identities as citizens of Exeter to encourage 
them to place national interest before self-interest. He was confident that every citizen 
of Exeter would ‘cheerfully undergo the sacrifices’ that the war would require.166 As 
guardians of civil order, the ‘provincial patriots’ attempted to restore calm in a time of 
deep crisis. At the same time, they sought to cement their influence upon the processes 
of mobilization. Indeed, Owen was clear that the mobilization process would entwine 
local and national identities in that they would prove themselves ‘citizens of our great 
heritage, our King and our country’.167  
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The military towns of Devon and the naval port of Plymouth did experience more 
concentrated activity as a consequence of the mobilization of troops.
168
 According to 
Dalley, after the declaration of war ‘thousands of fishermen and other seafarers across 
Cornwall were soon issued with their call up papers and told to report immediately to 
Devonport’.169 This was also the case for Devon’s fishermen and other seafarers based 
in Brixham and other fishing towns in the county. Plymouth resident, F. Ashe Lincoln 
remembered the arrival of the Naval Reserves into the city as they joined the Naval 
Reserves who were called up from Plymouth. In his recollection of 4 August 1914, he 
saw these ‘men flocking to report at Devonport Barracks, mostly accompanied by their 
tearful wives, hundreds of them, flocking down the streets’.170 Similarly, Reynolds 
recorded that it was a gloomy experience for him to watch the local Naval Reserves 
depart at Sidmouth Railway Station on 4 August. He described that amongst the crowd 
at the station he as well as those of the Reservist families ‘were the saddest – Lord, how 
sad we are’.171 In addition, another reason why Reynolds felt dejected at the sight of the 
mobilization of the Naval Reserves was that it was accompanied with a recognition to 
him that probably all of his ‘fishery works of years [would be] smashed, probably by 
this accursed international insanity’.172 When Lincoln was asked by the interviewer 
about the mood of the men in Plymouth on the 4 August 1914, he replied that they 
seemed ‘really quite chirpy and cheerful’.173 He explained that the reason for their 
cheerful mood was that most of them were ‘going off to the Navy which they knew; 
they were either Naval reserves, or fishermen, or pilots’.174 This personal experience 
helps to confirm Dalley’s observation as paraphrased by Pennell that these communities 
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were ‘used to sending their men away as reservists at times of national emergency, 
responded to the outbreak of war in 1914 more calmly as regular contact with the Army 
and Navy had instilled in them a readiness and willingness to fight when war came’.175  
 
The mobilization of troops and the Naval Reserves in Plymouth would help to explain 
the response of J. S. Wellington to the outbreak of war. In his diary entry for 4 August 
1914, Wellington argues that based on his observations in Plymouth and Devonport 
there was ‘war fever everywhere’.176 As a draughtsman for Devonport Dockyard, 
Wellington would have noticed a buzz of activity with the build-up of anticipation for 
the conflict in Plymouth, which was a key port for the Navy. However, it is important to 
clarify such a statement as it can be misleading, particularly as the term ‘war fever’ can 
be defined to describe those who were experiencing an ‘outbreak of irrationality’ where 
the war had overridden civilian concerns.
177
 Yet, as the analysis of the descriptions of 
excitement and enthusiasm previously emphasized, it is important to remember how 
contemporaries defined and used these descriptive observations. The term ‘war fever’ 
can also be used to describe the how individuals had become involved in the hurried 
processes of mobilization that were taking place in the port before Wellington’s eyes. 
This was the case with the crowds in Exeter’s High Street where ‘war fever had taken 
hold of the people, who could be heard on all bands discussing the telegrams with the 
latest phase of the crisis’.178 Reynolds also used the expression of ‘war fever’ to 
describe the behaviour of how some individuals in Sidmouth responded to the outbreak 
of war to which they would ‘get the war fever, see red, and are happy’.179 In his opinion, 
the reason why these individuals got the ‘war fever’ was due to the fact that they were 
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fortunate not to have the ‘faculty of seeing too far in front’.180 Therefore, the term ‘war 
fever’ is as ideologically loaded as the expression ‘War Enthusiasm’, in that it is 
important to understand the different connotations behind the description. 
 
Yet, from examining Lincoln’s recollection it is also clear that the wives of the men 
were tearful at the sight of watching their husbands go off to war. This emotional 
display is important to consider alongside the cheerful send-off of troops in Devon on 4 
August as part of the reactions to the outbreak of war and the consequential responses to 
an integral process of wartime mobilization. According to the North Devon Journal’s 
review of 1914, the most enthusiastic event of the year in South Molton was the send-
off of the Yeomanry in which ‘many hundreds of townsfolk assembled in the Square, 
and a large number accompanied them to the railway station to bid them God-speed’.181 
Similarly, the reception of the mobilization orders on 4 August was met with approval 
by Exeter’s crowds where the Devonshire regiment marched through the city on their 
way from Woodbury Camp to Exeter St David’s railway station. The Western Times 
recorded that thousands of Exonians in Exeter’s High Street gave the Territorials a great 
farewell celebration which produced a spectacle of national patriotism and local 
patriotism: ‘As the battalion (5th Devons) entered Queen-street the cry of “Good old 
Devon” was raised, and the men yelled response bespeaking of a hearty optimism’.182 
Later that day during the procession of the 4th Territorial Battalion of the Devonshire 
Regiment through Exeter, it was recorded that the ‘excitement was intense, both in the 
ranks of the marching companies, and in the crowds lining the streets’.183 
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As Gregory has pointed out, the presence of large crowds at railway stations to cheer on 
the departing troops was a display of enthusiasm which had ‘little to do with a real 
war’.184 Indeed, Pennell argues that the departure of troops at railway stations were 
‘often described as enthusiastic, but many people were simply trying to give the soldiers 
a good send-off’.185 At Exeter St. David’s railway station this was apparent as spectators 
rushed to the station ‘as the men went into the station patriotic songs were sung. “Are 
we downhearted?” was the query often raised, and the men chimed in with great gusto. 
“No!”’.186 Likewise, Tiverton’s Mayor recorded on 5 August that it was a ‘thrilling 
scene’ to watch Tiverton’s population give a jubilant send-off to the Army and Navy 
Reservists at Tiverton railway station.
187
 To give these reservist troops a good send-off 
proved to be a valuable opportunity for the ‘provincial patriots’ to extend and cement 
their influence. As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the mobilization 
of troops and recruitment efforts became an important opportunity for the ‘provincial 
patriots’ to superintend the patriotism of the county’s population against their own 
patriotism. For instance, at the send-off of a company of 150 of the North Devon 
Hussars in Torrington on 4 August 1914, it was reported in the local news that the send-
off was as a great demonstration with admirable addresses from Torrington’s Mayor 
and the local vicar.
188
 In Ilfracombe, the Reverend H. M. Johnson preached to the 
departing Territorials to wish them God speed as they ‘represented the forces of Empire, 
and every man, woman and child in Ilfracombe would unite in giving them the heartiest 
send-off’.189 However, at the same time as these ‘provincial patriots’ extended their 
influence upon the send-off of reservists in August 1914, there were other civic figures 
in the county who were concerned about the imagined fear of invasion. 
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The outbreak of war brought an escalation of fears that Germany would attempt an 
invasion of Britain. As a result of the growth of German imperialism, the fears of 
invasion had permeated into Edwardian culture. These were reflected in the novels of 
William Le Queux and Erskine Childers.
190
 Similarly, in specific regions of Britain that 
were close to the French coast such as Kent, Sussex and Essex, these fears of invasion 
were even more heightened. In her article on invasion fears in South-East England in 
the autumn and winter of 1914, Pennell argues that the fear of an invasion on the Essex 
coast had become an ‘imagined reality in the form of detailed plans, evacuation routes 
and home defence measures’.191 Similarly, Grieves reveals that the precautions against a 
German invasion were also considered by local government authorities in the county of 
Sussex.
192
 These microhistory examinations have revealed that for people living on the 
South East Coast a German invasion was such a distinct fear that it seemed to be only a 
matter of time.
193
 In Devon, these concerns were also felt by the county’s government 
authorities who proposed to mobilise Devon’s defences for such an attack. This 
included the use of boy scouts to watch the coastline and the enforcement of lighting 
restrictions in certain localities on Devon’s coastline.194 On 10 August 1914, DCC 
announced that Devonians should take the necessary precautions to dim their lights in 
the evening. Correspondingly, in Plymouth in 1914, because of the fact that it was one 
of the key ports for the Navy, the windows of houses in the port were screened and any 
lights extinguished. On 8 August W. Eaves, a Plymouth resident described that he had 
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seen how trenches were being dug ‘all along the coastlines ... and this evening I was 
confronted by a barbed wire entanglement and a redoubt of sandbags’.195  
 
Consequently, the concerns and fears of attack and invasion had also brewed up a tense 
atmosphere of suspicion throughout Britain resulting in the need for its coastline to be 
safeguarded against any threat.
196
 According to Panikos Panayi, this climate of Anti-
German sentiment meant that the Germans living in the United Kingdom were alleged 
to be internal enemies.
197
 It was this environment of suspicion and “anti-alienism” that 
meant that all Germans were enemy secret agents, which meant that ‘spy fever’ became 
a widespread phenomenon across the country.
198
 Indeed, this spy fever and concern 
surrounding the presence of German nationals manifested itself in Devon. It was 
reported in Ilfracombe that some individuals had flung stones at the hotels in the North 
Devon seaside town that employed German waiters.
199
 Furthermore, Pennell reveals 
that Tremar resident Edrica de la Pole recorded in her diary from 8 August until 17 
August that she had been told about ‘three different spies being caught in a remote area 
of East Devon’.200 At the same time, the fear of enemy spies had made some of Devon’s 
population raise questions about the Catholic communities in the county. On 7 
September 1914, the Devon and Cornwall Presbyterian Union voiced these concerns in 
a letter published in The Exeter Flying Post. This declared that ‘the Catholic churches in 
the Westcountry through their commitment and allegiance to the Pope are aiding our 
enemies, the Catholic nations of Germany and Austria, and seek to undermine Britain’s 
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war effort’.201 As a consequence of the supra-national authority of the Catholic Church 
across the nations of Europe, it was questioned whether the Catholic communities of 
Devon were loyal to the Protestant nation of Great Britain. However, Devon’s Catholics 
were quick to respond to these allegations. The Blessed Sacrament in Exeter and The 
Sacred Heart in Paignton immediately published a rebuttal to these claims in several 
newspapers throughout the county. They emphasised that the Catholic Church in Devon 
had ‘encouraged its parishioners to join in the defence of their nation and to spare 
neither effort nor blood for the protection of their beliefs’.202   
 
These worries over spies and enemy sabotage escalated to fever pitch when these 
individuals were accused of crimes such as ‘reconnoitring likely invasion areas or 
sabotaging telephone lines’ and ‘signalling from the coast to enemy ships’.203 For Lord 
Fortescue, the most pressing concern after the outbreak of war was the protection of 
vulnerable points within Devon. In his memoirs, Fortescue noted that the railway from 
Exeter to Plymouth was of vital importance to the war effort as it was used in the 
transportation of troops and material. Accordingly, Fortescue went to great efforts to 
find individuals such as special constables and in one instance a Rector with his party of 
Boy Scouts to protect and patrol particular places, including viaducts and tunnels along 
the Exeter to Plymouth railway line.
204
 Nonetheless, in response to Fortescue’s efforts 
the military said that ‘they cared little if the railways into Plymouth were interfered with 
as they had got all the troops they wanted into the fortress and could supply them by 
sea’.205 Therefore, despite Fortescue’s concerns to safeguard these vulnerable points in 
Devon, it was clear that the military had prepared for the possible sabotage of the 
railway line from Exeter to Plymouth. Yet, Fortescue’s concern reveals how seriously 
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he had considered the vulnerable points in Devon with his attempts to superintend the 
efforts to protect these susceptible locations. This perceived threat to the county from 
German aliens was an important circumstance for anxiety. Panayi revealed on 25 
November that Alexander Forbes-Leith, Lord Leith of Fyvie had raised his deep 
concerns in the House of Lords about the protection of the entire British coastline.
206
 
Leith argued that the entire county of Devon with its two coasts opposite the English 
Channel and Bristol Channel respectively should become a prohibited area.
207
 In his 
defence, Leith referenced that a mass meeting which took place in Torquay had passed a 
resolution for the county to become a prohibited area.
208
 Moreover, to reinforce how 
this was a perceived threat to national security he told the members of the chamber that 
the Chief Constable of Devon had arrested a large number of Germans in Torquay and 
the surrounding district.
209
   
 
In his research on Anglican Chaplains during the Great War, Edward Madigan has 
suggested that the outbreak of the war was perceived by many religious figures to be a 
great opportunity for the Church of England to combat against the perceived decline in 
religious observance.
210
 As the crisis escalated in early August, the Bishop of Exeter put 
forward a plea in the local press to all Devonians to ask the clergy of the Diocese to 
‘urge, and the clergy and laity alike to offer, earnest and persevering prayer, both public 
and private, to God to avert, or at least mitigate, so appalling a calamity to mankind’.211 
After 4 August 1914, the Bishop of Exeter described the outbreak of war to Devonians 
as the arrival of a tragedy. In his letter published in the Exeter Diocesan Gazette on 28 
August 1914, Robinson was under no illusion that the war would bring great challenges 
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which required prayer on an unprecedented scale to bring about ‘a speedy and 
honourable issue from the strife, and for lasting and solid peace amongst the nations’.212 
The call to prayer was also promoted by other members of the clergy within the Diocese 
of Exeter.  
 
In his sermon in Exeter Cathedral on 9 August, the Archdeacon said that now was not 
the time to attempt ‘anything stirring, sentimental, or dramatic; it was not the place for 
patriotic appeal. But it was the time, and it was the place especially for humble, quiet, 
yet confident and trustful prayer’.213 Reverend H. Avery of Holy Trinity Church in 
Barnstaple argued in his sermon on 9 August that to the Devonians who knew how to 
face facts, and who had imagination, the mere suggestion of war on a large scale was 
terrible: ‘Surely as such a time for earnest Christian people the call is for prayer’.214 
Indeed, as a consequence of the declaration of war, Devonians did turn to the Diocese of 
Exeter for spiritual guidance upon hearing the news that Britain had declared war on 
Germany. Throughout August, there were large congregations reported in several 
parishes within the county including Exmouth, Exeter and Barnstaple.
215
 In Otterton, it 
was reported that the services for 9 August were very impressive ‘owing to the heavy 
cloud of war hovering over us’.216 In his evening sermon, the Reverend A. G. Seymour 
proclaimed that this was ‘a time of testing for England – a time for all to show what 
manner of men they were’ and that it was also ‘a call to prayer for all those left at 
home’.217 In Barnstaple, the Reverend F. Streey spoke to a crowded Barnstaple Parish 
Church with a large number of Territorials. He preached a more militaristic sermon, 
when he said that they: ‘Should pray to God to strengthen their hands for War, and their 
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fingers for the fight, to scatter the nation that delighted in blood, and that they might 
return home crowned with glory and honour’.218 Like the Bishop of Exeter, the Bishop 
of Bristol in October had also issued an encouragement to the clergy in his Diocese to 
use the declaration of war as an opportunity to foster a religious spirit. He believed that 
the ministry should harness this time of stress and to shepherd anxious individuals back 
to the Church because these individuals would be looking for ‘strength greater than their 
own. The Church holds the answer. It is Christ. Brethren, preach him as you have never 
done before’.219  Correspondingly, in both France and Germany, it was recorded during 
August that there were an increased number of individuals who turned to religious 
institutions to seek a spiritual reflection upon the outbreak of war through the 
commentaries disseminated by the Protestant and Catholic churches.
220
 
 
Through the preaching of sermons, the clergy of the Church of England, the Roman 
Catholic Church and other denominations of Christianity reinforced how religion could 
act as a vital intermediary of the war experience.
221
 According to Gregory, it was hoped 
that the war would awaken a revelation of ‘Christian’ instinct amongst the British 
people in order to usher in a better nature and ‘an altruistic willingness to sacrifice 
oneself for the cause of righteousness’.222 The Bishop of London, Arthur Winnington-
Ingram, characterised the Great War as a crusade to reinforce that the conflict possessed 
an undeniable spiritual dimension. To further this interpretation, he believed that the 
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Church of England could ‘best help the nation first of all by making it realise that is 
engaged in a Holy War, and not be afraid in saying so’.223 The rhetoric of Holy War was 
also promoted by the Bishop of Truro who argued that the ‘War was forced upon us but 
we could hardly doubt that God was chastising us for our sins … We were resolute to 
fight for our country, our freedom, our Empire, and our lives, until … we came through 
to the end’.224 It is also important to emphasize how the religious character of the war 
was defined through these sermons. 
 
The Archdeacon of Exeter on 9 August reminded the congregation that the daily papers 
had said that nothing but a miracle would save the British population from civil war in 
Ireland. Yet, he argued that the outbreak of war was a miracle in which the danger of 
civil war had passed and that it was example of how God had moved in a mysterious 
way.
225
 Devonians, in his view, should not forget this and there should be thanksgiving: 
‘thanksgiving that they were confident, thanksgiving for unexcited, cool-headed 
common sense, than which there was no greater gift in the time of emergency’.226 These 
comments were echoed by Reverend R. J. E. Beggis of St Mary Magdalene Church in 
Barnstaple as he believed that the peoples of Britain and Ireland were now ‘united 
together in agreement, to promote the common good of the whole community’.227 
However, to accentuate a sense of British exceptionalism for which the ‘Britisher’ 
should be congratulated, Beggis continued by saying: ‘with his more phlegmatic and 
less excitable nature is viewing this peril with greater equanimity than is the case with 
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some other nationalities’.228 He also went to great lengths to stress that the people were 
not misguided about how they should respond to the news of war: 
  
We realise the danger; we do not for one moment disregard the terrible prospect 
of a mighty war, with its awful death-tolls, and its shattering of fortunes; but we 
English are neither carried away by an excited and unreasonable jingoism, which 
thirsts for battle without counting the costs; nor do we suffer from the 
unrestrained and unpatriotic outbursts of anarchist or socialist demonstrations, 
which threaten to hamper, if not to defeat, the efforts of law and order - there is 
no need to confine Englishmen to their own homes after dark by application of 
Martial Law to our nation.
229
 
 
It could be argued that Reverend Beggis’s comments were similar to the responses and 
reactions of many of the county’s residents towards the declaration of war. It can be 
seen that the Bishop of Exeter emphasised that the war was in fact a time of great trials 
and tribulations. These challenges required extra sacrifices from Devonians but the 
Bishop’s comments emphasized the importance of resolve and responsibility during the 
war. Indeed, the Archdeacon of Exeter preached that it was a ‘sense of the justice of the 
cause that alone could be inspiring the quiet, dignified, sober, determined spirit of our 
people’.230 The morality of Britain’s position upon hearing the declaration of war had 
meant that ‘once war was declared and the initial shock had worn off, the majority 
accepted that Britain’s cause was “the Cause of the Right against Wrong”’.231  
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To characterise the reactions of the societies of Europe as unanimously welcoming the 
war with enthusiasm is an oversimplification.
 232
 The societies of Britain, France and 
Germany were complex phenomena. Communities within a specific localised 
microcosm such as a hamlet, village, town, city or county, are complex and how 
individuals react to the declaration of war was dependent on a multitude of factors. 
Even a population of a county is a complex phenomenon which is a multifaceted 
interconnected framework of agencies. From examining the reactions to the county’s 
population to the outbreak of war, it is apparent that there were a multitude of responses 
other than solely excitement. As Pennell posits in her research, the reactions to the 
outbreak of war were dependent on multiple factors.
233
 In wishing to emphasise the 
similarities with Devon, Dalley considered the reactions to the outbreak of the First 
World War in Cornwall. Dalley concludes that there were ‘no nationalistic throngs of 
people greeting [the] news of the war in Cornwall's main towns’.234 Reynolds also 
thought that it was incredible that a ‘war can be on at all in this peaceful and beautiful 
Cornwall’.235 It could be similarly argued that some of the Devon population felt a lack 
of interest in a war which was being fought overseas, because of the geographical 
location of Devon within the British Isles and the sense of its remote tranquillity. De la 
Pole recorded her frustration with the indifference amongst the population of Tremar in 
her diary on 8 September, that in the ‘face of such utter indifference as people here 
show it is hard to believe there is such a thing as a war going on anywhere’.236 
However, in light of the evidence from Devon’s population, it appears that some of the 
population of the county reacted to the outbreak of war in a serious light and a mature 
manner. Equally, Connelly’s assessment of the reactions to the war in Kent reveals that 
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the views of the population of a county were a complex phenomenon as they did not 
respond to the news of war in a universal fashion.
237
 Therefore, it is apparent that an 
important reason as to why this study should consider the responses to the war on a 
county level is to reinforce that a county is not a monolithic structure.  
 
How many Devonians responded to the war throughout the month of August was in a 
constant state of flux, dependent upon their feelings on any individual days. An example 
of this is in the diary of Teignmouth resident Dorothy Holman who recorded a 
multitude of different sentiments in how she reacted to the news of war and the presence 
of war in her life. For instance, on 3 August she recorded in her diary that she 
experienced grief towards the prospect of war, whilst on the 5 August 1914 she 
chronicled her feelings of excitement towards the conflict.
238
 Yet, Holman revealed in 
her diary on 25 August that she felt a sense of depression towards the war.
239
 Whereas, 
W. Eaves perceived that the war was about national honour and prestige which would 
bind the Empire together to defeat a common enemy. On 8 August, in a letter which to a 
friend, Eaves expressed a sentiment of resolve towards the war and saw the benefits of 
the conflict to the country: ‘Whether it be long or short, both you and I rejoice to have 
lived so long to witness the traditional esprit de corps of England thrust into life anew 
and to mark the impenetrability of the bonds which bind the Empire together. The old 
spirit lives, as we have always insisted and our prestige ... will now be ensured for 
another century at least’.240 On 11 August 1914, an anonymous correspondent wrote in 
similar sentiments of determination that the presence of troops in Exeter had reminded 
him of a ‘similar gathering which was held in the same building at the commencement 
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of the South African war’.241 Yet, later in August, a correspondent for the South 
Carolina newspaper, The State, recorded a different response from the people of Devon 
towards the realities of war. Based upon the reactions of the people that he had met 
whilst visiting North Devon on 31 August, he came to the wider conclusion that the 
English were solemn and unemotional towards the war: ‘Truly the English are a 
wonderful people in their quiet assurance and unemotional acceptance of what is 
inevitable. Everyone is very grave and silent’.242 Like Best’s and Holman’s diary 
entries, the evidence from Devon reveals how the Devonian population went through a 
multitude of responses in adapting to the news and the reality of the outbreak of war. 
Within Devon, this challenging process of adaptation to the war was evident in 
recruitment efforts inside the county which were complicated by a distinct combination 
of factors. 
 
Volunteering in Devon 
After the declaration of war, the task to convince and sell the war to the British public 
began in earnest.
243
 This was evident in the volunteering and recruiting efforts that were 
generated across the British Isles.
244
 Keith Grieves argued that once war was declared 
the local elite in Sussex seized the opportunity to mobilize the county’s resources: 
 
In August 1914 the landowning social and economic elite of Sussex envisaged a 
central role in the county’s preparations for war … predicated on the belief that 
the paternalistic model of social relations had a relevance beyond the bonding of 
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rural society – involving notions of privilege, duty and responsibility – to the 
process of transforming Sussex into a county at arms’.245  
 
Like their Sussex counterparts, Devon’s landowning social and economic elite, 
otherwise known as the ‘provincial patriots’, had similar intentions for turning Devon 
into a county at arms and to increase their authority in wartime. They envisaged 
themselves as holding a central role in the county’s preparations for war and this was 
evident in the ‘provincial patriots’ involvement in recruitment efforts. The Mayor of 
Barnstaple, F. A. Jewell, spoke to the crowd at a recruiting meeting that he was 
confident that ‘you men will uphold the fair name of Barnstaple, and that we shall all 
feel doubly proud of your achievements’.246 After Jewell’s speech, the call for 
volunteers was sent out and in response ‘upwards of 100 men of all classes at once 
came forward for enlistment in the National Reserve’.247 According to the North Devon 
Journal, this enlistment of 100 men was ‘a fine example of Barnstaple’s patriotism’.248  
 
The Mayor of Tiverton recorded in his war memoirs that himself, the mayors of other 
towns in the district and many others through the autumn of 1914 and the greater part of 
1915 were ‘kept busy recruiting’.249 Gregory recalled that these open air recruiting 
meetings throughout the towns and villages of the district were ‘full of enthusiasm’.250 
He noted that one successful appeal to the men of these villages was modelled on the 
plea used by Garibaldi in the struggle for Italian independence in 1860 in order to 
convince the men of Italy to volunteer. Gregory proposed that he would offer ‘not pay, 
or plunder, not even fame: you will have to face hardship, peril, possibly wounds, and 
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perhaps even death. It is the test of your manhood. Will you come’.251 According to the 
Mayor’s account, this appeal was very successful as he had convinced many of the best 
men in the country-side to volunteer. These comments from Tiverton’s Mayor underline 
the validity of Adrian Gregory’s argument that these recruiting meetings embodied both 
spectatorship and participation in which the ‘cheering crowd was a vital part of the 
dynamic’ of an individual’s choice to enlist.252 In his memoirs for the war years, Lord 
Fortescue, recorded that recruitment in Devon ‘at first presented no difficulties’.253 
However, there was some trouble in the matter of recruiting in the beginning weeks of 
the war in that ‘men came in much faster than either accommodation or bedding or 
clothing or arms could be provided, and neither examining doctors nor the clerical staff 
could keep pace with the demands on their time’.254 Indeed, it was reported that many 
recruiting offices had become bottlenecks of recruitment after they had been swamped 
by floods of volunteers.
255
 Fortescue argued that for the first few weeks of August 
recruiting was as brisk in Devon ‘as it was everywhere else’.256 Nevertheless, despite 
the high hopes of the ‘provincial patriots’ for Devon to excel in volunteering and set a 
fine patriotic example for other counties in England, the reality of recruitment efforts 
did not reach their high expectations. 
 
At a meeting in Tiverton on 1 December 1914, Fortescue revealed that after a review of 
recruiting results for Devon since the 4 August, the county’s contribution to Kitchener’s 
New Army was indeed disappointing: ‘our totals at the end of two months compared 
badly with those of our neighbours’.257 He continued with a comparison to the larger 
population of Devon ‘Somerset and Dorset together are nearly 100,000 fewer in 
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population than we are: but where we raised 4,000 recruits they raised 6,000’.258 
According to Fortescue’s statistics, 1.4 per cent of the Devon populace had volunteered 
for military service. This was by no means a high proportion when compared to other 
counties: ‘the recruits for the Regular Army alone amounted to 4.07 per cent in 
Warwickshire, and 1.44 in Dorset, for the period from August 4 [1914] to October 10 
[1914]’.259 Fortescue revealed that the local press through 1914 had pointed out that 
‘Devon’s percentage per the population in Kitchener’s recruits worked out at about .6, 
whereas Gloucester’s was double that, Birmingham’s five times more, and Warwick’s 
six times’.260 The statistics of recruitment figures in the South West up to the 10 
October 1914 confirm that Devon’s recruitment’s rates were significantly lower and 
compared ‘unfavourably with many other counties’.261 
 
Table 1: 
Analysis of Recruiting by War Office up to 10/10/1914.
262
 
 
Area Population Recruits Raised Percentage 
11th Area (Devon) 701,944 4,414 0.62 
39th Area (Dorset) 223,266 3,219 1.44 
32nd Area (Cornwall) 328,098 922 0.28 
13th Area (Somerset) 388,847 3,194 0.82 
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This use of comparison with recruitment rates in other counties was an important 
feature in the narrative of Devon’s poor recruitment record. Devon’s local press used 
these statistics as an important point in their criticism of Devon’s recruitment efforts. A 
correspondent for the Exeter Flying Post on 5 September  argued that based on these 
poor recruitment figures ‘Devon had not woken up to its responsibilities so quickly as 
did the metropolis’.263 In light of evidence from the archive, there is great validity to the 
narrative that Devonians in 1914 had not woken up to their responsibilities of 
recruitment efforts for the war effort. On 8 December, Sir Trehawke Kekewich put 
forward the accusation that recruiting was not a priority in Devon and instead the 
county had its eyes on another prize: ‘In Devonshire they had not done their duty; they 
beat Somerset at games but Somerset was beating them in the “war game.” ’.264 He went 
on to reference a legend within the county folklore of Devon in order to reinforce 
through this comparison the lacklustre response of Devon’s men: ‘an old tradition that 
when England was in difficulty or danger old Drake was heard beating his drum. He 
never was beating it so furiously as now; one could imagine him on the Hoe, calling the 
young men to come’.265  
 
Yet, behind the figures for recruitment from the county, there needs to be a 
consideration of how recruitment worked on a local level inside Devon’s parishes and 
districts. To gain a better picture of the recruitment rate in individual parishes of Devon, 
the tally for the separate areas will be examined and compared in order to gauge this 
against the collective recruiting figures for Devon. In the autumn of 1914, DCC passed 
a resolution for Lord Fortescue to send out a circular to the Mayor or Chairman of every 
city, town or parish within Devon to ask for the recruitment returns within their 
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respective areas.
266
 By 7 November, Fortescue had received returns from 298 places 
which represented two thirds of the county.
267
 These returns revealed that the patterns of 
recruitment varied distinctly from district to district and from parish to parish. There 
were 149 parishes and other centres, which included the larger places of population, 
which had not sent in returns. Out of the 298 that had sent returns to Fortescue, there 
were 185 places where the number of men serving with the colours was pretty 
satisfactory.
268
 The total in which the proportion was small was 114.
269
 Some centres in 
Devon had done very well, and there were places from which something like 10 per cent 
of the population had enlisted.
270
 For instance, despite its small population, the East 
Devon parish of Rousden had done significantly better than other small parishes and 
nearly 35 per cent of its population had enlisted.
271
 In comparison, under a half per cent 
of the population had enlisted in the West Devon parish of Broadwood Kelly. Other 
localities in the county had 3 per cent, 7 per cent, 9 per cent or nearly 10 per cent of 
their populations under arms. To accentuate this, Fortescue stressed the example of a 
single family from Barnstaple that had sent six brothers to join the colours. There were 
also similar instances recorded from families in Filleigh, Iddlesleigh, and Morchard 
Bishop.
272
 According to Gregory, the families who had more than one son who had 
enlisted became exhorted examples of ideal duty. These instances were promoted as an 
integral part of the system of voluntary recruitment. Gregory stresses that the publicity 
of these families as ‘patriotic’ examples was an integral part of the system of voluntary 
recruitment which was intended to shame families whose sons had not volunteered.
273
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In Devon, Fortescue used these examples not only to shame these ‘unpatriotic’ families 
but also to embarrass the parishes of the county with low recruitment rates. 
 
Nevertheless, there were some parishes of Devon where Fortescue argued that the 
‘returns were by no means so satisfactory’.274 Fortescue revealed with a sinking heart 
that the number of parishes in the county where the ‘proportion is under 4 per cent is, I 
am sorry to say, more than a third of the whole [county]’.275 In point of fact, the 
parishes in Devon whose returns had shown that less than 4 per cent of their populations 
had volunteered, were named and shamed in the pages of the local press, where they 
were branded as ‘backward places’ or ‘black sheep parishes’.276 It is vital for this 
microhistory examination of Devon during the Great War to emphasize the importance 
of how individual parishes made up a larger picture of recruitment in the county. 
Connelly has also shown in Kent that inside a specific county there was social and 
cultural complexity which influenced recruitment efforts. Connelly has suggested that 
within Kent, the men in the northern industrial districts enlisted at a quicker rate than 
men in the southern agricultural districts.
277
 In order to identify the distinct nature of 
how individual parishes and districts within Devon contributed a specific number of 
recruits it is important to examine the recruitment efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’. 
During a public meeting in Dartmouth on 28 August 1914, the vicar of Saint Petrox, the 
Reverend A. E. Moys, said that from reading the Devon newspapers he believed that 
Dartmouth had not done enough to do their part in the war effort. He warned that if the 
‘constituted authorities of this borough make a move very quickly some of us will take 
it upon ourselves to endeavour to save the good name of the town from disgrace’.278 In 
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response to this, the Mayor of Dartmouth, Alderman W. Peck, denied that ‘Dartmouth 
was likely to prove a disgrace, and said that the town had contributed largely to the 
forces engaged in the war’.279 Other speakers at the meeting disagreed with Moy’s 
comments and deprecated his remarks. At the same time, the Mayor proposed that the 
authorities in the town should request for a recruiting agent to be sent to Dartmouth.  
 
Frustrated with recruiting efforts at the South Devon resort of Dawlish in the autumn of 
1914, Major-General Laye launched an attack on the tourism industry and the county’s 
population at a recruiting rally in Dawlish. He observed that ‘Devonians are too content 
away from the war in the sunshine’.280 Similarly, Pennell reveals that in late August, 
Lord Fortescue voiced his scepticism about the loyalty of the men from the North 
Devon town of Bideford. He said that it was his belief that ‘the traditions in the area 
were “all against war and anything connected with it”’.281 Subsequently, Lord Fortescue 
received a letter from Stanley Jackson, from Oakleigh, Torrington, on 18 October in 
which Jackson had to regretfully admit that despite gaining 147 recruits for the regular 
army and Territorials after nine weeks recruiting, there were ‘hundreds still in this 
district that will not do their duty’.282 This was also the case in Exeter.  
 
On 14 December 1914, the Mayor of Exeter intended to raise a “Pals’” Battalion of 
Exeter men within the Devonshire Regiment. During that week, he and other ‘provincial 
patriots’ in the city tried to stimulate the martial spirit of Exeter and induce men 
between 18 and 35 to enlist in this special company, which became entitled ‘Exeter’s 
Own’. Owen beckoned the men of the city to ‘do their duty as Englishmen and as 
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Britishers and Exonians to join “Exeter’s Own”’.283 This was a branching appeal to a 
multitude of different identities: ‘England wanted men; she wanted Exeter men’.284 
However, the result of Owen’s endeavours was more than disappointing. The 
correspondent of the Western Times, who witnessed Owen’s address, noted that the 
Mayor felt somewhat ashamed when he had to inform the crowd of the results of this 
call for recruits. They had hoped to recruit 250 men but only 8 had signed up.
285
 After 
hearing this disappointing result, one member of the audience shouted out to the Mayor, 
the damning accusation of ‘Shame’.286 In response, Owen retorted to the crowd that: 
‘Yes it was a shame’.287 Like a father disappointed in his son’s efforts, the Mayor had 
hoped that by speaking to the men in the audience, they might reconsider and ‘during 
the coming week they would think the matter over, and would decide to do their 
duty’.288 Peter Simkins reveals that the creation of individual town and city “Pals’” 
battalions’, like ‘Bristol’s Own’, took longer to raise than had been initially expected 
due to the fact that they faced competition from larger neighbours.
289
 In order to clarify 
to his audience the problems that he and others had encountered in Exeter, Owen 
referenced one example of the lethargy that was present amongst the men-folk of the 
city. After reading the ‘Your country needs you’ poster in the Mayor’s office window, 
the man said ‘ “Let the ---’s want” ’.290 Owen was in absolute disbelief over such apathy 
in this man’s attitude towards military service: ‘That was an Englishman! He probably 
had a very disordered idea as to what was at stake. He seemed to think that the country 
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was something that belonged to the Government, or to the rich people, and in which he 
was not concerned’.291  
 
The Western Times reported that despite the fact only eight of Exeter’s men had enlisted 
that day there were ‘still hundreds of eligible young men in Exeter whose ties and 
responsibilities are not sufficient excuse for their holding back’.292 This incident in 
Exeter prompted the anonymous reporter to ask his readership: ‘Is it that the young men 
of Exeter who are still holding aloof, do not possess the pluck and grit that is 
characteristic of Devon’s sons, or is it that they do not, even yet, appreciate the 
seriousness of the situation of the position for their country and their homes, and the 
urgency of their help?’293 Yet, this was not the only incident of indifference amongst 
Devon’s men-folk towards recruitment efforts in the county. Another example of the 
lack of interest from Devon’s men in recruitment efforts was from de la Pole when she 
initiated a recruitment campaign in the South Devon village of Kingston. In order to 
increase recruitment rates from the village, she promised to induce every man with five 
shilling bounties if they enlisted into the armed forces before 7 September 1914. Yet, 
despite her best efforts, Kingston’s men remained unconvinced of the necessity to 
volunteer. She confided in her diary on 1 September 1914 that ‘the people have not the 
remotest conception of what their War is or signifies’.294 According to the local 
constable, it was clear that ‘nothing short of conscription’ would bring the men of 
Kingston forward to join the colours.
295
 For the ‘provincial patriots’ including Fortescue 
and de la Pole, who were deeply invested in recruitment efforts, scenes such as this 
across Devon were humiliating.  
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It can be argued that the prestige of Devon’s history added to the high standards that 
were expected of the county’s population in 1914. At a recruiting meeting in Ilfracombe 
on 17 December 1914, Sir Eric Soares, the former Liberal MP for Barnstaple, argued, 
using a discourse which evoked Devon’s patriotism, that the ‘county of Raleigh, Drake, 
Grenville and Buller – (loud cheers) – would not be backward when the vital interests of 
the nation are concerned’.296 Soares also revealed to the audience that he had been 
informed by some people that Devon had not done its share in terms of recruitment. He 
remained sceptical of this suggestion until he had made enquiries and he could hardly 
believe that it was true of Devon.
 297
 Yet, despite the promotion of this illustrious 
heritage, the reality of recruitment efforts for the Army in Devon told a very different 
story. On 24 November 1914, Devon was given a damning verdict in the pages of the 
Western Times for its lack of participation in the processes of recruitment:  
 
This county claimed to have taken not an inglorious share in building up the 
empire and it would be an everlasting reproach to Devon, if, when the history of 
this war came to be written their name appeared low down on the list among 
those who had made a contribution to the needs of this nation’.298  
 
Yet, as Fortescue’s survey suggests, there were some ‘provincial patriots’ who were 
successful in recruitment efforts in some districts of Devon. Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory, 
the owner of the JHC textile factory in Tiverton, also attended the meeting and added 
that he was glad that Tiverton ‘had come out fairly well in recruiting … [and] … was 
proud of the fact that at his home every eligible man had gone’.299 Indeed, his textile 
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factory had released forty five men for the services since the 4 August and ‘many others 
wished to go, but they had been obliged out of consideration for other work people - 
women and children - who were dependent upon their work to ask them to remain at 
home’.300 For some ‘provincial patriots’, the choice whether or not to enlist in 
Kitchener’s army was obvious. According to John Wallop, he knew of no person in 
Devon who ‘did not look upon this war as a righteous war, and they were determined to 
bring it to a successful conclusion. This was essential to the well-being of the nation’.301 
However, Devon’s elite did struggle to convince all of the county’s population that this 
war was everybody’s war.302 
 
In light of the low recruitment numbers and the apathetic responses from Devon’s men-
folk, it was clear that there needed to be an explanation for why Devon’s recruitment 
rates were so low compared to other areas. The Chairman of the Barnstaple Recruiting 
Committee told his superiors on 9 November that recruiting levels were low in the area 
because ‘there has been a want of appreciation of the true situation, due to ignorance, al 
lack of loyalty and patriotism, and a disposition not to recruit unless it pays them 
well’.303 In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, the recruiting officer for North Devon, 
reported to the Town Clerk of Okehampton that he had faced considerable difficulty in 
putting up posters in the town and in ‘some instances after they had been affixed they 
had been torn down’.304 This vandalism of recruitment posters does add weight to the 
argument whether the low levels of recruitment in rural areas of county were a 
‘symptom of opposition to the war’.305 Grieves proposes that incidents such as this early 
in the war were a ‘sign of otherness of the English countryside’ in that the removal of 
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what were deemed to be ‘unsightly recruitment posters’ was done in the ‘belief that 
their display was more appropriate on the London underground’.306 Alexander also 
revealed that he was shocked that some shop-keepers in Okehampton had asked for a 
small fee to put up recruitment posters in their shop windows: ‘It is difficult to believe, 
but apparently patriotism is not free in Devon’.307 Alexander’s experience also reveals 
that some Devonians sought to use the opportunities of recruitment efforts to their own 
benefit and individual survival.  
 
Despite their best attempts to police the discourses of patriotism in Devon, the 
‘provincial patriots’ in the county had to continually combat against the constant tension 
expressed by many Devonians between individual survival and national survival. On 8 
December 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander wrote to Barnstaple Town Council to 
request them to appeal to the men aged between 19 and 38 who worked on the roads, to 
join the New Armies because the repairs and maintenance of the roads could be done by 
older men.
308
 One of the council members, Mr Andrew asked if the inducements were 
sufficient for young unmarried men to enlist?
309
 The Chairman replied that there were 
the ‘inducements of patriotism, if nothing else’.310 Mr Andrew argued that he did not 
quite see that patriotism was enough of an inducement. In response to Andrew’s 
statement, the Chairman was stunned and said, ‘thankful the rest of England was not of 
the view of Mr Andrew. If there was no patriotism we should soon get the Germans 
over here’.311 Andrew’s comments were interpreted as anti-patriotic and suggested that 
he sought excuses for others not join to military service. In fact, his comments were 
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based on his attempt to seek the best interests of the potential volunteers. Andrew went 
to great pains to emphasize that he was not anti-patriotic but that the men who 
volunteered ‘should not be left, as formerly, to the mercy of the Poor Law, but be well 
provided for. We should get plenty of men if they were offered better terms. They did 
not see the force of coming forward without provision, in case of incapacity, being 
made for them in after life’.312 Yet, the commentary of the meeting by the Western 
Times argued that Andrew was making excuses for the men not to enlist. The Council 
members expressed their disbelief towards Andrew’s comments that there should be 
more inducements to enlist than just patriotism and argued that his comments were 
unpatriotic. The Reverend Dene could not understand why Mr. Andrew, or any 
Englishman for that matter, should speak in this way about military service: ‘The 
present war was a matter of life or death for us; the Germans had told us both in their 
books and speeches, that they meant to conquer England’.313 Many of Dene’s friends 
and family had volunteered and there was scarcely anyone not doing something for their 
country ‘Many of them had thrown up good businesses, and several had either been 
killed or wounded. Let them think of their country, and their children’.314 There were 
provisions in place for those who were wounded and killed but in Dene’s opinion, 
‘everyone should come forward who was really able’.315 
 
In a frustrating climate of low recruitment rates, Dene misinterpreted Andrew’s 
concerns for Devon’s men-folk to enlist without consideration of the consequences. 
Andrew’s comments were clearly misconstrued as giving a licence for those who 
wanted to shirk from military service and were condemned as unpatriotic. Nevertheless, 
this prompts an important question as to whether the low recruitment rates in Devon and 
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the apathetic responses are indicators that the county’s population were opposed to the 
war. Another example of what could be misconstrued as anti-patriotic conduct was from 
Richard Miles, a road contractor from Barnstaple. On 9 December 1914, it was alleged 
that Miles had used obscene language against local recruiting officer, Sergeant H. 
Williman, who had attempted to convince his three eligible sons to enlist. It is clear 
from Williman’s testimony that Miles sought to protect his three sons from the prospect 
of volunteering, since after he had refused Williman’s request to see his sons, Miles 
became erratic. According to Williman, after he had left Miles’s cottage, Miles chased 
after him down the road and threatened to assault him with a large stick. He said that 
Miles began to ‘rave again, thrashing the wall with his stick remarking “That is how I 
will serve you if you come near my door again”’.316 A witness who corroborated 
Williman’s testimony heard Miles say that if any recruiting officer came to his house 
‘molesting him he would turn him outside the door’.317 
 
Pennell has probed the question as to whether the apathy in rural areas of the county 
was in fact an indicator of opposition to the war.
318
 In de la Pole’s opinion, the men in 
of Kingston were not reluctant to undertake military service because of opposition to the 
war but were ignorant of the situation. Sir Thomas Acland echoed these sentiments of 
obliviousness with the war when he had asked several men in the county if they would 
serve their country: ‘I will go if I am wanted’.319 According to Acland, they ‘did not 
seem to realise the necessities of the case, and things must be made clear to them’.320 
The Reverend Dr. John T. Trelawny-Ross, a resident of Ham near Devonport and a 
former vicar of Paignton, proposed that these responses were indicative of a feeling of 
unreality which was fostered in many of the localities across the county. According to 
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Ross, there were a large number of Devon’s men-folk who were reluctant to join until 
they were compelled because they thought ‘that sooner or later they will have to go’.321 
There is a significant amount of evidence from Devon’s archives to reinforce the 
argument that the low recruitment figures in Devon did not signify opposition to war, 
but that Devon’s men-folk were not well informed about the war or were indifferent to 
joining the colours. Certainly, Trewlany-Ross suggested that due to the prevalence of 
such ignorance in Devon did the county’s men-folk, ‘God Forbid!’, require a raid or 
raids on the East coast of Britain or ‘a bad reverse on sea or land, to make the meaning 
of the war understood?’322 A reason to explain this logic is that the war was not 
perceived by some Devonians to be a life or death struggle for Britain or the Empire. 
White suggests that Devon’s men were not ‘unsympathetic to the needs of the military 
but did not realise the severity of the war’.323 This meant that the ‘reality of the situation 
in rural areas tended to be more nucleated where the connection to national interests was 
often overshadowed by local needs’.324 This then brings to light the ineffectiveness of 
the rhetoric and discourses used by ‘provincial patriots’ in their attempts to negotiate 
and placate the tension between individual and national survival. 
 
Conversely, a social group that was characterised to hold the balance in increasing 
recruitment numbers in Devon were the county’s women. White discussed the role of 
Devon’s women in recruitment efforts through the efforts of the White Feather 
Brigade.
325
 She came to the conclusion that despite the county’s elite lending their 
authority to their campaign, the organisation found only limited support amongst 
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Devon’s population.326 Yet, the role of Devon’s women in the county’s recruitment 
efforts was more substantial than White suggests. Violet Clutton recorded in her diary 
on 3 November 1914 that the county’s women and girls could ‘serve their country best 
by leading quiet lives, thus setting a good example of self-restraint and uprightness at 
home’.327 Yet, there were other women in Devon who proposed that women should take 
a more active role in recruitment efforts and the war effort. At a meeting of the Devon 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (DPRC) on 2 December 1914, Lady Amory 
argued that if Devon’s women realised the importance of the war and the need for men 
to enlist in the armed services ‘there would not be a single Devonshire woman who 
would keep her man from going’.328 Meanwhile, the county’s women were also accused 
of sheltering their husbands and their sons away from military service. At a recruiting 
meeting in Ilfracombe on 11 December 1914, Sir Eric Soares believed that the reason 
for the county’s poor recruitment figures in a few cases was because some mothers in 
North Devon were not willing to allow their sons to volunteer. Soares contended that 
whilst these sons can ‘save all honour of a mother’s love it was not for the welfare of 
the son: better a glorious death than a life of shameful ease’.329  
 
The role of the Devonian mother was a crucial factor in alerting their sons to the fact 
that if they were to be killed it could mean the end of the family business. If they did not 
release their male shop-keepers into the services, their business would suffer. This case 
was proven when de la Pole noted in her diary on 1 September 1914 that she had 
decided to close an account with a Devonian shopkeeper because she had forced her son 
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to stay at home.
330
 As a result of this, she decided to buy goods from a woman who had 
a son that was serving in the armed forces.
331
 Women, who were involved in family run 
businesses such as farming, understood that if their sons were to join up, the future of 
the family business would be in jeopardy. In his article ‘Local Patriotism and 
Organisation in 1803’, Trelawny-Ross argued that Devon’s men-folk in 1803 had made 
a glorious response compared to the lacklustre one by the generation of 1914. He argued 
that a feeling of unreality had been fostered amongst the county’s men about the 
significance of the war. This unreality was ‘inseparable from speeches by prominent 
men’ who had not been ashamed that ‘all their previous efforts have been against 
preparation for war’.332 To which the ‘easy descent of the fence, compulsory sudden 
conversion, and torrents of eloquence cannot of themselves inspire conviction [for men 
to enlist]’.333 It must be acknowledged that there were some Devonians who did 
sacrifice self-interest for the national interest and joined the military. However, there 
were Devonians who did not see the importance of the war and there was a distinct 
tension between individual and national survival. At the same recruiting meeting at 
Ilfracombe on 11 December, Major Thomas argued that women were in a difficult 
position although they saw the necessity of sending their men-folk off to fight. He 
revealed that he had searched through Ilfracombe and found both ‘mothers and wives 
saying “we don’t want them to go but we won’t keep them back”’.334 He did not know 
whether the reason for their hesitation was ‘love of ease, or lack of definite aim, and 
some said they would go when compelled, but not before’.335 Moreover, Dorothy 
Holman was in a similar predicament. Upon hearing that her brother Tommy Holman, a 
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pre-war soldier, would be sent to the front in August 1914, both she and her mother 
became so deeply distressed that they burst into tears.
336
  
 
Another social group in Devon who were accused in recruitment efforts of placing self-
interest before national interest were the county’s farmers. As a county without any 
large urban centres and a high percentage of rural workers, Devon’s farmers represented 
a significant amount of the county’s manpower.337 This meant that the ‘provincial 
patriots’ attempted to harness this source of manpower to bolster recruitment rates for 
the county. At a meeting of the Devon Branch of the National Farmers Union (NFU) on 
2 September 1914 in Exeter, Lord Fortescue argued that if the war continued, many 
more recruits from agriculture would join the armed forces if ‘they were sure that their 
wives and families would be well cared for whilst they were away’.338 Yet, during the 
autumn of 1914 with Devon’s poor recruitment rates compared with other counties, it 
was clear that the ‘provincial patriots’ used the county’s farmers as a scapegoat for this. 
As Gregory has suggested for contemporaries in London, Paris and Berlin the ‘image of 
the urban “shirker” was, therefore, an exaggeration, which arose out of the relatively 
low rate of enlistment of young workers’.339 This was also true of the representation of 
the rural shirker present in the coverage of farmers in the local press in Devon and in 
speeches by ‘provincial patriots’. 
 
In Tiverton on 1 December 1914, Fortescue expressed his frustration with the county’s 
farmers making excuses: ‘My farmer friends can plead and plead with the truth that they 
have already made sacrifices. In various cases their sons have gone, many of their 
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horses have gone, many of their men are gone’.340 He explained that his farmer friends 
had insisted that they were engaged with both the war effort and food production: ‘I do 
not suppose there is a farmer in the county who has not subscribed according to his 
means to one or more of the War Funds. Many a farmer, too, was taking his share of the 
extra public work imposed on most of them by the war. Yet, they asked how if the land 
was to be cultivated, and if business was to go on as usual, could they spare more 
labour, whether it were that of their sons or their labourers?’341 Nonetheless, Fortescue 
angrily declared that arable farmers should ‘leave the wheat’ and warned agriculturalists 
that they could not ignore the war because it was more important than meat.
342
 He 
stressed the magnitude of the war in that ‘if we cannot get men without injury to 
business, the business must be let go’.343 Fortescue also employed similar rhetoric in his 
prediction that if the farmers of Devon did not get their act together then the 
consequences of their procrastination would be extremely severe: ‘Unless we find 
enough men and find them quickly we shall not win, and if we fail to win our fate will 
be the same as that of Belgium, businesses will disappear, there will be no farms to till 
and many a family now in comfortable circumstances will be wandering homeless and 
ruined, suppliant for food and shelter’.344 Fortescue was not the only Lord Lieutenant to 
express his frustrations with farmers by conveying to them the nightmare of a German 
invasion upon Britain. The Lord Lieutenant of Kent, Lord Harris, struggled with how to 
convey the importance of the war to Kent’s farmers. At a recruiting meeting in 
Canterbury in early September, he pressed to them a scenario of life in Kent after an 
invasion: ‘Was there anything so terrible to imagine than all the peaceful occupation of 
harvest being carried on with interruption, and the smiling dales and hills that made 
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Kent so beautiful, being tarnished by the horrors of invasion’.345 However, some 
farmers in Devon protested against the similar accusation that they were shirkers from 
their ‘true’ patriotic duty to serve in the military. 
 
According to R. B. Sanders at a meeting of the Barnstaple branch of the NFU, North 
Devon farmers were experiencing a shortage of labour by 7 November 1914 due to 
‘farmer’s sons and agricultural labourers being called up’.346 They suggested that the 
recruitment drive in the districts surrounding Barnstaple had been too successful in 
some cases which had left them without any help to work on the farms. However, this 
problem similarly seemed to occur in several districts across Devon, including Tiverton 
and Barnstaple. At a meeting of the Tiverton branch of the NFU, the chairman J. G. 
Pedlar had said that ‘as far as the country districts were concerned farmers’ sons had 
responded patriotically’.347 Moreover, he advocated that farmers respond to the 
allegations of shirking that were levelled against them. Pedlar proposed that they should 
form an association in Tiverton to assist with recruiting in the district. He declared to 
the meeting’s audience that he strongly opposed conscription in principle but he 
believed that if young men had some form of compulsory training they ‘would sooner 
attain their present object of trouncing the area-bully of Europe’.348 Conversely, a fellow 
member of the Tiverton branch, Mr. Lewis Mackenzie, wanted to avoid the allegations 
that farmers were shirkers and he declared that he was not ‘prepared to admit that 
farmers had made greater sacrifices than other classes of people’.349 The responses of 
Devon’s farmers’ confirms Gregory’s argument that contrary to the conservative 
mythology of “deep England”, the rural population was ‘generally unmoved by an 
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impulse to volunteer: the archetypical urban activity of omnibus transport had doubled 
the volunteering rate of agricultural workers’.350  
 
Nevertheless, in their defence, some Devon farmers said that they had kept their sons to 
help them bring in the harvest, despite appeals for their sons to volunteer into the armed 
forces. The priority of the harvest was evident in the responses of French farming 
families who were also concerned as to how the mobilization process would influence 
their business practices.
351
 Moreover, German farmers were similarly anxious about 
how the loss of manpower and the purchase of their horses for the Army would impact 
the harvest of 1914.
352
 Pedlar emphasised that Devon’s agriculturalists were in a 
‘difficult and invidious position, having done all they could to meet the requirements of 
the country in allowing their horses, men and sons to go, and at the same time doing 
their best to increase the acreage of wheat in the county’.353 This, consequently, meant 
that patriotism in Devon was not limited to one single discourse of military service. In 
the eyes of farmers, their attitudes towards food production fed into a discourse of 
patriotism which justified their exemption from the military. At the same time, it also 
provided them with the means to continue their peacetime occupations, undertake their 
patriotic role in wartime and ensure the survival of their farms during the war. One 
example of this which Pennell references is from the Devon and Exeter Gazette on 11 
December, where a farmer informed his son that if he enlisted he would have to sell the 
cattle. Placed in this difficult position, the newspaper argued that food production for 
the nation during the war could be interpreted as a patriotic act.
354
 Consequently, in 
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Devon there were multiple discourses of patriotism which went beyond a jingoistic 
application with a militaristic lexicon.  
 
Pedlar believed it was not Devon’s country districts that were to blame for low 
recruiting figures. Instead, it was the thousands of men in the urban centres of Britain 
who were to blame because they had disregarded the war to watch big football matches 
which should have really had ‘pressure brought down on them’.355 Consequently, this 
tension between the contributions made by the town and the country is evident within 
recruitment efforts in Devon. At a meeting of the Newton Abbot branch of the NFU 
held on 3 December 1914. The Newton Abbot branch chairman argued that there should 
be no further call for recruits from the agricultural districts because the ‘world could not 
go on, nor could the troops be supplied, without the man behind the plough’.356 Yet, 
despite the importance of food production, Fortescue believed that in Devon there 
should be a ‘generous emulation between us all as to which shall show the best example 
of self-sacrifice and patriotism and let us make haste to fill up the ranks of our County 
Regiment’.357   
 
Fortescue had received criticism from farmers who argued that they had engaged with 
the war effort. At the same time, they questioned how they could continue farming the 
land without their sons and agricultural labourers. Nevertheless, within Fortescue’s 
public addresses at the recruitment rallies and other civic events, he insisted that the 
sacrifices made by farmers were simply not enough. Fortescue believed that the only 
economy that the farmers were concerned about was their own businesses. Therefore, 
for rural areas, the ‘provincial patriots’ faced significant trouble to convince Devon’s 
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farmers of the importance of serving their country overseas. Yet, there needs to be a 
consideration of whether the low recruitment figures in Devon for the New Army, 
instead reveals a willingness of the county’s population to join the Navy. 
  
In his examination of recruiting in Cornwall in 1914, Dalley reveals that Cornwall’s 
farmers were hesitant to join the Army but were more willing to join the Navy.
358
 The 
Cornish newspaper the West Briton reported that there were places in Cornwall in which 
the calls for the army were ‘unheeded by youths and young men who are really anxious 
to join the Navy’.359 It could be argued that the strength of the naval tradition in 
Cornwall was also true of Devon. In many instances, Devon’s military patriotism was 
defined through its naval past with figures such as Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter 
Raleigh to epitomise the heroism of Devon’s men-folk. This was also evident at a 
recruiting meeting at Ilfracombe on 17 December 1914 where Councillor C. P. Filling 
from Bristol expressed a hope to the men in the audience that they as ‘men of Devon 
would keep up the old traditions of the county’.360 Consequently, recruitment campaigns 
for both the Navy and Army in Devon ‘turned naturally to their civilian roots and 
regional history for a tradition to inspire loyalty’.361 In certain localities on the Devon 
coast, this was also true.  
 
In the South Devon fishing town of Brixham, the recruitment campaign for Kitchener’s 
Army and the Territorial Forces had been good. However, the correspondent for the 
Western Times argued that it was the Navy for which ‘Brixham would do the greater 
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recruiting’.362 This inclination to join the Navy rather than the Army was shown on 19 
November 1914 when the Western Times carried the story that the recruiting drive for 
the Royal Naval Reserve in Brixham had been very brisk to the extent that the young 
fishermen of the town had responded with ‘exceptional fervour’.363 This had led to a 
shortage of fishermen, which the fishing industry claimed would result in them 
suffering and that ‘many smacks being compulsorily kept on the moorings’.364 In fact, 
the attempts to convince Devonians to join the Army did face severe competition from 
the recruitment efforts of the Navy and Marines.
365
 This is confirmed in the Western 
Times which reported in late November 1914 that enrolling for the Navy in Devon was 
‘progressing steadily’. 366 This report was informed by the Navy and Marines Recruiting 
Office (NMRO) in Exeter which proudly proclaimed that it had received an average of 
twenty-five recruits per week since the outbreak of war.
367
 This meant that from 4 
August until the 30 November, Exeter’s NMRO recorded a total of 425 recruits. The 
strength of the naval tradition in both Cornwall and Devon led many to believe that this 
could explain why both counties had low recruitment figures for the Army.
368
 It was the 
perception of this naval tradition in Cornwall which led many to believe that the number 
of recruits from Cornwall into the Navy surpassed that of ‘any other county in the 
United Kingdom in proportion to its population’. 369 Indeed, due to the perception of this 
strong naval tradition in both Cornwall and Devon, it was believed that ‘the two 
counties had supplied more men to the Navy than the whole of the rest of England’.370  
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Yet, this patriotic boast was not based on the reality of recruitment in both of these 
counties. Lord Fortescue wished that this belief for both counties was true but he did not 
agree that this suggestion was accurate for either Cornwall or Devon.
371
 At a recruiting 
meeting in Tavistock on 4 December 1914, Fortescue announced that an unspecified 
London newspaper had published an article on recruitment which contained a section on 
recruiting in Devon and Cornwall. He argued that the reflection cast upon Devon and 
Cornwall in this anonymous paper was ‘outrageously unjust’.372 Fortescue revealed that 
both counties had found 500 men and boys for the Navy since the beginning of the war 
which was to him ‘a respectable contribution’.373 Yet, notwithstanding this respectable 
contribution to the Navy, Fortescue believed that it was ‘simply nonsense’ to claim that 
Devon and Cornwall had found more men for the Navy than the rest of England.
 374
 He 
disputed this suggestion in more damning terms by declaring that to make this argument 
for both Devon and Cornwall was a ‘perversion of the facts’.375  
 
It appeared to Fortescue that to use this line of argument to explain the reason for the 
low recruitment figures in Devon or Cornwall was in fact ‘only an excuse for their not 
having done better in general recruiting’.376 However, it is difficult to pin point the 
exact number of recruits into the Navy for the period from 4 August until 30 December 
1914. In the majority of the newspaper reporting for recruiting in Devon, it is clear that 
the recruitment figures are combined for the Army, the Navy and Territorials. An 
example of this was when Lord Fortescue spoke on 23 November 1914 that Devon had 
recruited another ‘5000 for the regular army and navy’.377 He does not provide a 
distinction between how many were recruited for the Army or for the Navy. Fortescue 
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admits on several occasions during 1914 that he found it very difficult to gain the 
recruitment statistics for the Navy in Devon. Another example of this difficulty is 
evident in his review of recruiting for 1914 in which Fortescue states the recruitment 
rates for the Navy were more of a rough guess rather than a definitive figure: ‘for the 
Navy say 197 (at Devonport only 141)’.378 Therefore this suggestion has merit, in light 
of the fact that it is difficult to clarify the exact number of recruits from Devon into the 
Navy since August 1914. Yet, despite this, it is clear that low recruitment figures had 
significantly damaged Devon’s patriotic reputation. At the same time as considering 
recruitment, it is also important to consider the other forms of mobilization taking place 
in the county during 1914. 
 
The Cultural/Political and Economic Mobilization of Devon 
From the onset of war, the ‘provincial patriots’ sought to encourage the Devon populace 
to assist in the processes of mobilization and to emphasize participation this in their 
broadcasted discourses of patriotism. Lord Fortescue in his public speeches revealed 
that he had to argue strongly with Devonians against the catchword of ‘business as 
usual’. To him, all the connotations associated with that term had been detrimental to 
the war effort.
379
At a meeting at Castle Hill in Exeter on 23 November 1914, Fortescue 
suggested that if more farmers’ sons and shopkeeper’s sons would enlist the processes 
of mobilization would be more successful: 
 
He should like to also see more farmers’ sons come forward. It was 
said that the call was to get more land providing food, and therefore 
tilled, and that hands were wanted for this, but the circumstances had 
somewhat altered since such a call was first raised. Tradesmen and 
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shopkeepers’ sons ought too, to come forward in larger numbers, and 
he believed both in regard to these callings and the land, they might 
avail themselves more to women labour and the labour of older boys 
so that men could be released.
380
   
 
Another example of cultural/political mobilization can be seen in the employment of the 
language of sacrifice which was based on a religious lexicon. This was evident on 28 
September 1914 when the Bishop reaffirmed the sentiments of fidelity, solemnity and 
endurance: ‘The war comes to us all as a call to extra sacrifice which must be faced … 
It is my belief that this time of anxiety is awakening far and wide a new spirit of 
helpfulness and self sacrifice’.381 The Anglican clergy in Devon argued that the war 
required great prayer and a new spirit of helpfulness to overcome its great challenges.
382
 
This language of sacrifice was applied alongside patriotic sentiments by public figures 
in their speeches, including Fortescue: ‘it is by sacrifice only that our ends can be 
obtained: sacrifices in which we must all join, which no selfishness must tempt us to 
shirk; sacrifices in which those have influence must set an example’.383 This example 
from a local speech adds authority to Gregory’s proposition that during the Great War 
there were economies and languages of sacrifice. However, as Gregory argues the 
problem with this economy was the ‘practical arbitrariness of the expenditure of the 
central currency in that economy: blood’.384 By understanding the war in financial 
terms, this economy of sacrifice should have been a proportionate and balanced one. 
Anyone who avoided their fair contribution towards the economic system within this 
war culture was deemed in the same terms as being a shirker of tax. In theory, by 
suggesting a practical economy of sacrifice, it was intended that this should be a 
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‘universal tax upon the population; [however] in practice it was potentially divisive in 
terms of region, class and occupation’.385 Along with the cultural/political mobilization 
of Devon, it is important to consider the economic mobilization of the county in 1914. 
 
An important form of economic mobilization in 1914 was the creation of charities 
related to the war effort. The British population was in fact, more involved in 
philanthropic activities than recruitment efforts.
386
 Dalley suggests that in Cornwall 
there was a ‘real willingness among Cornish people to help the war effort in many other 
ways than volunteering to fight’.387 He concludes that Cornwall’s patriotism was more 
humanitarian than militaristic: 
 
Belgian refugees were taken in to be looked after; funds to raise 
money for the families of soldiers and sailors were set up and 
raised considerable sums of money, whilst women were often quick 
to form themselves into local committees to produce items of 
clothing for soldiers at the front.
388
 
 
This was also the case in Devon. In 1914, there was a great flourishing of charities 
because fund-raising and charitable relief were important activities amongst individuals 
and communities in the county.
389
 Local committees and organisations were created on 
the initiative of Devon’s notables such as Lord and Lady Fortescue and the Mayor and 
Mayoress of Exeter to demonstrate their involvement with the war effort. The 
                                                 
385
 Ibid. 
386
 Ian Beckett, Home Front, 1914-1918: How Britain Survived the Great War (Kew: The National 
Archives, 2006) pp. 108-110, Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 
1914-1918 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) pp. 158-159, 774-775.  
387
 Dalley, ‘The Response in Cornwall to the outbreak of the First World War’, p. 106. 
388
 Ibid. 
389
 Ralph Richardson, Through war to peace, 1914-1918: Being a short account of the part played by 
Tavistock and Neighbourhood in the Great War (Tavistock: Jolliffe & Son, 1919) pp. 82-95, Wasley, 
Devon in the Great War, pp. 70-71. 
121 
 
mobilization of women into activities and charitable efforts related to the war effort was 
of vital significance to the county’s elite were noteworthy examples of what Paul Ward 
defines as ‘prominent patriotism’. According to Ward, ‘prominent patriotism’ was an 
evident component in the involvement of women in charitable efforts during the war. 
As a consequence of this, their engagement with charitable efforts provided a distinct 
‘recognition of citizenship emerging from their patriotism’.390 This was also evident in 
the section of Fortescue’s memoirs dedicated to the role of women during the beginning 
months of the war. He references the Queen’s appeal for the women of England to knit 
socks and belts for servicemen in the armed forces: ‘This was a wise move for though 
many socks were [so] badly made that they were useless except to put over the breech 
action of the rifles as [a] mud guard it gave occupation to numberless restless women: 
5000 pairs of socks and 1500 body belts were sent to Lady Fortescue in six weeks’.391 
Christopher Capozzola argues that knitting was an important part of the processes of 
mobilization.
392
 This was because of the fact that it was publically lauded as an 
‘inclusive form of volunteerism that all women could undertake and the knitting woman 
provided a powerful image of a female citizen fulfilling her wartime obligations’.393 
Similarly, knitting was also understood in France as a form of feminine mobilization. 
Indeed, the women and girls of France took to knitting as ‘an act of patriotic 
sacrifice’.394 This was also true of children who were encouraged to fulfil their wartime 
obligations through knitting. The children of Hunshaw Church of England National 
School in Barnstaple sent a parcel on 16 December which contained ‘“sixteen pairs of 
socks, five long mufflers and eight pairs of mittens together with cigarettes to the value 
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of ten shillings” to the soldiers of the Devonshire Regiment, via the Mayoress of 
Exeter’.395  
 
The significant increase in the number of charities and fundraising activities during the 
war reflected the popularity of philanthropy as a form of social mobilisation which 
produced significant consequences for social relations.
396
 Philanthropy was perceived 
by families and individuals on the Home Fronts of the belligerents to be an appropriate 
response to the calls for sacrifice and support the war effort.
397
 It was also a poignant 
connection to combatants serving overseas.
398
 It must be considered that the ‘provincial 
patriots’ saw the opportunity of how charitable activities could provide a means to 
declare their patriotism. Within the conditions on the Home Front, fundraising helped to 
reinforce a sense of community identity amongst like-minded individuals whatever their 
background in society (farmers, public officials, factory workers and civilians generally) 
as they felt that they were contributing to a greater cause.
399
 In that respect, local 
charitable groups, whatever their focus, created a ‘nexus of activity for the war effort 
that tied civilian volunteers imaginatively to the war itself’.400 Consequently, charitable 
activities were motivated by both local and national levels of patriotism. An example of 
this was the Devonshire Patriotic Fund also known as the Devon Patriotic Fund (DPF) 
which was a manifestation of county identity, county patriotism and county 
humanitarianism. Created on 8 August 1914 under the initiative of Earl Fortescue, the 
highly popular DPF was formed to manage the relief and assistance of the wives and 
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families of the Regulars of the Army, the Navy, the ‘Reservists and Territorials 
belonging to the County of Devon, and of the sick and wounded’.401 In light of the 
popularity of this charity along with several others in Devon it is clear that the county’s 
patriotism had a strong humanitarian dimension. Moreover, Rebecca Gill argues that 
humanitarian politics with the notion of ‘moral’ citizenship was ‘based upon voluntary 
action was now elevated to the level of national politics and equated with patriotic 
service’.402 Hence, charity was an important form of economic and political 
mobilization which held an important significance to both religious and secular people.  
 
This was evident in the first urgent opportunity for private philanthropy was the arrival 
of over a hundred thousand Belgian refugees seeking sanctuary in Britain in the autumn 
of 1914.
403
 In the South West, the care of the Belgian refugees was first undertaken by a 
committee which was created in September 1914 who appealed to the public for funds 
and offers of accommodation. The following month a woman representative from 
Exeter was sent to London, returning to Exeter with 120 Belgians.
404
 According to 
Fortescue’s memoirs, the appeal for the Belgian Refugee’s had produced £450 within a 
fortnight of the Committee’s creation, with ‘offers of many homes and a Miss Andrew 
sister of a solicitor in the city was sent to London. She was energetic and kindhearted, 
though lacking ballast. She returned with 150 refugees who were promptly placed with 
benevolent people and by the end of October the numbers had risen to 800’.405   
 
Another example of the strength of fund-raising in 1914 is that it recognised and 
encouraged the participation of children on the Home Front. In his study of 
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Hertfordshire children during the First World War, David Parker demonstrates that the 
involvement of schools with wartime charities ‘represented a new attitude towards 
community affairs’.406 As the war continued, ‘charities began to recognise that children 
were particularly effective publicity agents and fund-raisers’.407 Pennell reveals that 
children became active participants in the ‘war effort, not only through education and 
the singing of patriotic songs in assembly but by the variety of relief efforts’.408 Pennell 
suggests there were other activities that local schools in Devon could participate in the 
war effort. For instance, the boys of the Holy Trinity School in Barnstaple on 4 
September 1914 collected ‘blackberries to make jam to send to the “Jam Committee” of 
their local Distress Fund’.409 These also engaged in which included ‘writing letters to 
wounded soldiers, holding sales and concerts in school premises, and even closing the 
school completely to allow the billeting of soldiers’.410  
 
Conclusion 
The reactions to the outbreak of hostilities on 4 August 1914 in Devon were no less 
complex than they were in other parts of the country. However, Devon’s population 
based in specific localities within the county reacted to the news of war with different 
responses and emotions, which largely reinforces the validity of the arguments that 
Pennell has suggested in her work. However, the findings of this chapter do not entirely 
support the proposal put forward by Pennell concerning the reason behind the 
enthusiastic reactions of 4 August in some crowds across the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. The enthusiasm and excitement present in the Exeter crowds were not 
necessarily joyful releases of relief. These descriptions of enthusiastic reactions from 
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Exeter are evidence of neither a bloodthirsty desire for war nor an enthusiasm for war in 
a jingoistic sense. Instead, the enthusiasm present in the coverage of the correspondents 
who had witnessed the enthusiastic reactions from some Exeter crowds during 4 August 
1914 defined these responses as manifestations of the crowds’ patriotism to support 
Britain during a time of uncertainty. A crowd is not a cohesive phenomenon as there 
will be individuals who will express their own specific reaction to the news of war 
rather than follow the example of others in the crowd. Yet, the description of ‘war 
fever’ in Plymouth has become synonymous with ‘war enthusiasm’ and has not been 
analyzed on its own merits. ‘War fever’ can carry other meanings than the jingoism and 
naivety that is associated with the term ‘war enthusiasm’. The evidence from Devon has 
reinforced the apparent contradiction of responses present in Exeter’s crowds and the 
ideologically loaded nature of the descriptions of ‘war fever’, patriotic enthusiasm and 
excitement cannot be ignored. Chickering emphasizes that despite the progress of most 
recent substantial works on reactions to the war there is still an ‘air of hesitancy and 
inconclusiveness [that] hovers over the question of popular responses in Germany and 
elsewhere to the outbreak of war’.411 To try to pinpoint British popular responses to the 
outbreak of war raises more questions than it answers. Instead, Chickering argues that 
such a range of sentiments that ‘seemed contradictory – war enthusiasm, anxiety, and 
panic – could not be parts of a single volatile complex of reactions’.412 Therefore, it is 
important to remember that the reactions to the declaration of war in Devon, both 
collectively and individually, were part of a diverse tableau of evolving emotions and 
sentiments in response to the outbreak of war.  
 
The Anglican Church in Devon received the news of war in 1914 in a serious manner 
but also saw the opportunity to extend its influence by claiming the war possessed a 
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religious character. The research from Devon’s rural districts has confirmed the 
suggestion made by Pamela Horn in that rural communities greeted the declaration of 
war with ‘a mixture of relief that the long weeks of rumour were at an end and nervous 
apprehension as to what lay ahead’.413 At the same time as the declaration of war, the 
mobilization of the Army and Naval reserves in Devon helped to give a release to the 
uncertainty of the crisis. Crowds and individuals who had anxiously waited could 
respond in a patriotic way to the send-off of the county’s regiment to war. On 4 August 
1914, in Exeter several members of the crowd shouted as the 4th Devon Regiment 
passed with ‘Up with the cream and down with the sausage!’414 By 1914, Devon was 
renowned for its dairy industry and its dairy products like Devonshire cream. By 
defining Devon’s patriotism through the distinctly local product of Devon cream against 
the German sausage helped to define the war on a local level. Therefore, local identities 
ran at the core of the mobilization process. It is clear through the application of these 
local cultural codes, which are specifically linked to Devon, to stress that ‘Victory 
would belong to the local community as well as the Nation’.415  
 
Devon’s elite, otherwise described as the ‘provincial patriots’, sought to use these main 
symbols of local identity to mobilize the county. Like the Sussex elite, the ‘provincial 
patriots’ sought to transform Devon into a county under arms. Notwithstanding some 
early successes with enlistment, recruitment efforts in Devon were not entirely 
successful. Despite the intention of the ‘provincial patriots’ for Devon to excel at 
recruiting, the results from the various parishes across the county were mixed, ranging 
from a commendable contribution of manpower to an extremely poor contribution. This 
meant that authorities on both ‘local and national level were concerned about Devon’s 
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recruitment returns’.416 In light of national developments, Devon’s recruitment record 
was similar to that of Leicestershire, which was a ‘serious civic embarrassment’.417 In a 
letter to the Western Morning News in the autumn of 1914 written under the synonym of 
Devonian, one resident pointed out that whilst ‘we all sing and shout “Glorious Devon” 
but is it not humiliating to know, so far that not one in every hundred of the population 
in the county have volunteered their services’.418 Moreover, Kent was stigmatised like 
Devon in the local and national press for the ‘poor contribution which she had made to 
Kitchener’s army’.419  
 
It was clear in the minds of Devon’s ‘provincial patriots’ that the apathy and general 
lack of interest in the war in certain regions of the county was an embarrassment to their 
reputations. Yet, White revealed in her research that there was a distinct discrepancy 
between the responses to recruitment efforts between the rural and urban areas of the 
county. However, the evidence has shown that there were indifferent responses to 
recruitment efforts in urban areas of the county such as Exeter and Plymouth as well as 
in Devon’s rural districts. Devon men-folk were failing in their duty to enlist and the 
consequence of the low enlistment rates from the county was reflected in the 
demography of the battalions of the Devonshire Regiment. By April 1915, the rural 9th 
Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment comprised of only ‘eighty local men and was 
forced to fill up with Londoners and Midlanders’.420 This also occurred in Kent for 
although the 1st Buffs regiment from Kent overwhelming comprised of men from Kent 
in 1914, the statistics for the 8th Buffs reveal that ‘it was as much a London, and 
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particularly Surrey, unit as a Kent one’.421 By 1915, Simkins revealed that the ‘four 
counties of South West England (Devon, Dorset, Cornwall and Somerset) provided only 
eleven battalions between them’ when compared to the counties of Yorkshire and 
Lancashire which had raised twenty five and thirty three Service battalions 
respectively.
422
 
 
Nonetheless, Devon’s elite struggled to convince all of the county’s population that the 
war was everybody’s war.423 The constant negotiation that the ‘provincial patriots’ had 
to endure in recruitment efforts throughout Devon created frustration. It is clear that the 
rhetoric of paternalism rang hollow to such a high degree that many Devonians did not 
have any conception of what the war was. By looking beyond the White Feather 
Brigade, it is clear that Devon’s women were active participants in the volunteering 
process. Furthermore, there are examples of women who hindered the recruitment 
process in the county. However, the concerns of local businesses and families 
overshadowed the mobilization processes for war. Individual survival for family and 
local businesses was more important than national survival. Yet, this argument pervaded 
among the responses of Devon’s population and the ‘provincial patriots’ faced an uphill 
battle in their attempts to convince Devonians of the importance of national survival.  
 
Nevertheless, the frustrations of ‘provincial patriots’ who levelled accusations of 
shirking against these individuals do not reflect a lack of patriotism in Devon. Through 
the discourses of ‘self-mobilization’ disseminated by Devon’s elite, it was hoped to 
control how the population should behave and clarify to them their roles in wartime. 
However, the discourses of patriotism, ‘self-mobilization’, and sacrifice broadcast by 
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the ‘provincial patriots’ rang hollow for many Devonians and in some cases failed to 
address the tension between individual priorities and national ones. It has been 
demonstrated in this chapter and will be shown in the other chapters of this thesis that 
there were multiple discourses of patriotism and sacrifice in Devon which were not 
purely driven by militaristic sentiment. This was revealed in the other mobilization 
efforts in the county where charities experienced great success and individuals outside 
of the requirements of military service contributed to the war. 
 
Looking back at the end of 1914, it was clear that the tension between individual 
survival and national survival was not resolved by the ‘provincial patriots’ and this 
proved to be detrimental for some forms of mobilization. Based on the low recruitment 
figures and the sceptical responses from some of the county’s male population in 1914, 
Fortescue was afraid that ‘Devon had nothing to be proud of … in the matter of 
recruiting and it was time they applied themselves to a new effort to make up for their 
shortcomings of the past’.424 It was under this ethos that the ‘provincial patriots’ 
attempted to apply themselves to reinvigorate their role in recruitment efforts and the 
mobilization of consent in all of Devon’s districts and parishes. On 24 November 1914, 
Colonel Moore Stevens hoped through the work of the DPRC that ‘Devon would rise 
again to that position that she had occupied in the past, and to show that they could do 
in the present what they had done before’.425 Similar sentiments were echoed by 
Fortescue who hoped that recruitment efforts across Devon in 1915 would ‘be pushed 
more diligently, for more men are badly wanted.
426
 Yet, Devon’s elite remained hopeful 
that the situation about recruitment would improve in 1915 which corresponds to the 
intensification of the conflict for Britain and other belligerent nations. 
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Chapter 2: 
The totalization of the conflict? 
1915 
 
Introduction 
By the winter of 1914-1915, the war of military movement had ended in failure and on 
the battlefields of Western Europe and Eastern Europe the armies of all the belligerent 
nations became locked in a stalemate.
1
 Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia ‘faced with the problem of how to regain the initiative and to maintain a 
commitment to the principle of attack when confronting the terrifying reality of decisive 
firepower’.2 This led to the military forces of all the belligerents applying ‘rising levels 
of violence yet failing to try to terminate the impasse’.3 It was the escalation of violence 
that helped to create a further intensification and totalization of the conflict. Reflecting 
upon the raid by German Zeppelins on the seaside town of Yarmouth and the sinking of 
the battleship HMS Formidable off the Devon coast in Lyme Bay in January 1915, 
Plymouth preacher James Thomas Rogers noted in his journal on 19 January 1915 that 
these attacks ‘may be described as fiendish murder as they have no effect upon the 
operations of the war’.4 As part of the ‘totalizing’ dynamic of the war, along with the 
frustrating lack of progress in the war on the land and pressure from radical nationalists, 
the German government ‘declared in February 1915 that the waters around the British 
Isles were a “war zone” in which all ships would be sunk without warning’.5 This 
escalation culminated in the sinking of the cruise liner RMS Lusitania off the coast of 
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Ireland on 7 May 1915, which added significant credibility to the accusations and 
representations put forward in the atrocity propaganda perpetuated by the Allied 
powers.
6
 The news of the sinking prompted Tremar resident Edrica de la Pole to write 
in her diary on 8 May that ‘Everyday this War becomes more hideous’.7 Furthermore, 
when Albert Best of Teignmouth had gained more information about the Lusitania’s 
fate, he wrote in his diary on 10 May that the news was ‘very distressing’ to him.8 The 
sinking of the Lusitania also heightened the anger towards German communities in 
Great Britain and led to rioting in some of Britain’s cities against German and Jewish 
communities.
9
 John Horne and Alan Kramer note that atrocity accusations were a 
central feature of the war cultures in all the belligerent societies that emerged in 1914-
15.
10
 Indeed, they suggest that perhaps the ‘most important of the war cultures was to 
polarize collective identities between the positive, communal identity of each nation 
(and its allies) and the demonized enemy’.11 Events such as the bombardment of the 
seaside holiday town of Scarborough in 1914 and the sinking of the Lusitania were 
focal points along with the ‘horrific accounts of rape and sadistic violence’ in the 
narratives of atrocity propaganda.
12
 Hence, atrocity propaganda reached its intensity in 
1915 as these depictions ‘began to spread more widely’.13 In particular, Adrian Gregory 
emphasizes that German atrocities against British civilians possessed ‘more resonance, 
and had received more intense and detailed press coverage’ than atrocities in Belgium.14 
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Both the escalation of violence in 1915 and the stalemate on the battlefield had 
immediate ramifications for the civilian populations of Britain, France, Germany and 
the other belligerent nations. 
 
The stalemate on the battlefield ‘quickly triggered the basic mechanism that drove 
home-front mobilization’.15 However, Roger Chickering points out that due to the 
unprecedented nature of the conflict both civilian and military leaders in Britain and 
Germany found themselves in an environment of great disorientation and uncertainty.
16
 
Through solutions which emerged from improvisation, the existing productive 
capabilities of the belligerent economies reorganized and responded to the 
intensification of the conflict and the prospect of prolonged conflict.
17
 Yet, there was a 
discrepancy in the results of the initial processes of ‘self-mobilization’ which relied on 
conviction and self-persuasion to convince individuals to participate in the war effort. 
This was true in Devon. Earl Fortescue, the Lord Lieutenant of Devon, suggested, in a 
speech on 13 February 1915, that Devonians ‘might bestir themselves a little more in 
some quarters’ to adapt and re-organise themselves to the needs of war effort. 18 At a 
meeting of the Recruiting Committee for South Devon in Newton Abbot on 18 March 
1915, Fortescue stressed to Devon’s elite that they should intensify their efforts in order 
to persuade the county’s population to the call of self-mobilization. In his view, this 
could only be achieved by abandoning the policy that the business of the nation could 
continue as usual: ‘Business as Usual was all right in the early stages of the war, but 
what one wanted to realise now that the present business of the nation was the war and 
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that everything else must give place to it’.19 Indeed, Fortescue believed that some of the 
responsibility for the weakness of recruitment efforts in certain quarters could be 
blamed on the individuals, who ‘in the early days of the war gave the recommendation 
of “Business as Usual”’.20 However, the signs of the ‘totalizing logic’ of the conflict 
were becoming ever more apparent to Devonians. This was reflected in the sermons of 
the Anglican clergy in the Diocese of Exeter.  
 
In his letter for Lent on 22 February 1915, the Bishop of Exeter said that Devon’s 
populace were ‘already at every point in touch with peril, loss, bereavement and public 
solitude’.21 These comments were later echoed in his Easter Day address on 5 May 1915 
when he remarked that there was no escape from the shadow of war.
22
 Yet, the Anglican 
clergy in Devon used the war to extend their influence on the county’s population ‘at a 
time when, due to the extraordinary circumstances of war, they would be especially 
open to spiritual guidance and religious ministration’.23 At the same time, it was 
reported in the local press that the JHC textile factory had celebrated the completion of 
its first 18 pound shell on 23 July 1915.
24
 Consequently, the company adapted its 
production line to commence mass production of these shells on 14 August 1915.
25
 As a 
result of this successful transition to munitions production for the war effort, an 
anonymous local man felt such a sense of local pride in the industrial mobilization of 
the JHC textile factory that he wrote in the Tiverton Gazette that it was ‘a great 
satisfaction to many non-combatants [like himself] to feel that Tiverton is thus 
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helping’.26 The escalation was also evident in the other efforts of the ‘provincial 
patriots’ during 1915. However, it is important to question, in light of the experiences of 
self-mobilization in 1914, as to whether the intensification of the processes of self-
mobilization in 1915 in Devon was successful.  
 
This chapter covers the year 1915. Firstly, there will be an exploration of the changing 
strategies in Devon towards recruitment efforts. This will take into account the 
recruiting marches, otherwise known as route-marches, organised by recruiting 
authorities and Devon’s elite. These marches reveal not only the effectiveness of 
recruitment efforts on a local level they also present the complex relationship 
concerning Devon’s population in particular localities and the reception of the 
‘provincial patriots’ appeals. The promotion of national and county unity was an 
important aspect in the recruiting speeches of the ‘provincial patriots’ to convince 
Devonians to fight for their local communities. Nevertheless, the stark contrast between 
the rhetoric of county unity and the inconsistent reality of recruitment efforts in Devon 
continued to linger in 1915. This shows that there were limits to the success of self-
mobilization in the volunteering ethos of recruitment in Devon. At the same time, there 
will also be a reflection on recruitment efforts for the Royal Navy.  
 
Furthermore, there will be a consideration of the charities and philanthropic efforts in 
the county during 1915. This will be split between the experiences of war charities and 
the charities that existed before 1914 in the county, which were dedicated to local 
causes. Behind the success of certain war charities in Devon, it became clear that some 
charitable efforts facilitated upper class tribalism amongst some of Devon’s elite. Yet, 
this section will reveal that this process of self-mobilization found great success across 
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the county. The ingenuity and simplicity of some forms of charitable donation resonated 
with the humanitarian sensibilities of many Devonians and this added to the popularity 
of these forms of participation with the war effort. It can be argued that Devonians 
outside the requirements of military service viewed that charitable work became linked 
to notions of patriotism and duty. This form of humanitarian politics provided a means 
for some Devonians on the Home Front to claim ‘moral’ citizenship in the wartime 
community.
27
   
 
Additionally, the organisation of Devon’s rural economy to accommodate the needs of 
the war effort will be investigated. This will include the introduction of local war 
agricultural committees across the United Kingdom. There will be a critical reflection of 
the debates by Devon’s farmers surrounding manpower and food production in 1915. 
The county’s fishermen faced the same debates along wartime restrictions in some areas 
of Devon’s coastline and their compensation case against the Admiralty. Finally, 
Devon’s tourism industry during 1915 will be scrutinized. In light of the emergence of a 
discourse of wartime morality, the idea of taking a holiday was deemed to be a counter-
productive, amoral and unpatriotic activity. Nevertheless, the businesses which made up 
Devon’s holiday industry took to heart the motto that business could continue as usual 
despite the existence of war. Yet, the 1915 season for the holiday industry brought great 
trials with some businesses being more concerned with their own survival than the 
survival of the nation.  
 
To look at 1915 is important because it is widely thought to correspond to the 
totalization of the conflict amongst Britain, France, Germany and the other belligerent 
nations. For a local examination, it provides an opportunity to apply further scrutiny to 
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the success of this intensification of ‘self-mobilization’ in the county and the application 
of this in the processes of mobilization by the ‘provincial patriots’. It also gives us a 
valuable insight into the nature of how individuals in Devon responded and participated 
in the processes of totalization on the Home Front. This chapter continues to question 
the effectiveness of some of the languages which expressed mobilization in the county 
and the constraints of self-mobilization in Devon. During 1915, recruitment drives in 
Devon were stepped up because the year symbolised a chance to begin efforts anew and 
more intensively within the voluntary system of recruitment by Devon’s elite. 
Conversely, a study of Devon’s unique holiday industry in 1915 presents a counter-
point to these examinations and provides a better understanding of an industry that was 
deeply troubled by what the war would represent towards the survival of their 
businesses. Similarly, farmers and fishermen were hesitant about the intensification of 
the ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. Therefore, the tension between individual 
priorities and national ones continued to haunt the efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ in 
1915. Despite continuous attempts by them to reconcile this tension, it is clear that the 
languages which expressed self-mobilization could not reconcile this dilemma. The 
responses of some Devonians to the appeals from recruitment officers, ‘provincial 
patriots’, the Admiralty and other authorities reveal how pertinent a factor individual 
survival was to them. The calls to self-mobilization were simply not answered by all 
Devonians and drastic action had to be taken in 1915 to combat the indifference towards 
recruitment efforts in Devon. 
 
Recruitment 
At the beginning of 1915, the authorities responsible for recruiting in Devon reflected 
upon the varied success of volunteering efforts across the county since the outbreak of 
war. When compared to other regions of Great Britain, recruitment efforts in Devon 
137 
 
since August 1914 failed to live up to the high patriotic expectations of the ‘provincial 
patriots’. This was illustrated by the dismal attempt to raise a Pals’ Battalion in Exeter 
called ‘Exeter’s Own’. The correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette was certain 
that there was no excuse for this failure.
28
 It was believed that in Exeter the men who 
had decided to shirk far-outnumbered those who had volunteered to serve in the armed 
forces. They would only enlist when they were compelled to serve because they 
preferred the ‘feather bed of the craven to the hero’s reward of the battlefield’.29 The 
‘provincial patriots’, local recruiting sergeants and other patriotic individuals hoped that 
1915 would usher in a more successful year for recruitment efforts in Devon; yet, 
despite the fact that the recruiting figures for the county had increased since the 
beginning of the year, Fortescue said in February that he was not satisfied that the 
‘results up to date had been quite commensurate with the work done’ by recruiting 
agents and the ‘provincial patriots’ across Devon.30 This meant that the DPRC decided 
on 12 January 1915 that they would approach the ‘question of recruiting with great 
zeal’.31 Indeed, when Fortescue was asked about his stance towards the prospect of 
conscription on 27 February, his response revealed that if conscription ‘were ordered by 
the wisdom of Parliament, he would do his best to make compulsory service a 
success’.32 However, he was certain that unless compulsory service was ordered he 
would have to do ‘his best to make the voluntary system a success’.33 Keith Grieves 
suggests that Sussex’s local elite had to change their recruiting techniques so that by 
April 1915 the ‘language and imagery of recruitment had shifted significantly from the 
controlling presumptions of August 1914’.34 This was also true for Devon’s elite. 
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Through new dedication and collaboration, the ‘provincial patriots’ could approach the 
question of recruitment with new strategies and more convincing appeals to enlist such 
as Recruitment marches.
35
 A recruitment march or a route-march would involve units 
within the Devonshire Regiment travelling along a specific route with local recruiting 
sergeants and local ‘provincial patriots’, through the towns, villages and hamlets. It was 
intended that these marches would raise ‘public awareness and advertised well in 
advance to enable the population to come out and see the local battalion’.36 Indeed, 
Helen Townsley argues that when route-marches in the city of Hull are analysed within 
the framework of Anssi Passi’s research on regional identity, they can be viewed ‘not 
only as an expression of “regional consciousness”, but also as a means through which 
the civic authorities perpetuated the “ideal” imagery of the community to the residents 
of the city’.37 It was anticipated that the presence of local troops, along with the appeals 
from the local elite, would encourage this sense of a regional consciousness in Devon 
and help to win over the hearts and minds of Devon men who were reluctant to 
volunteer. To demonstrate their support for these campaigns, the county’s elite also 
subscribed private money to help finance the route-marches and the ‘military authorities 
readily co-operated’ to organise them.38 According to Fortescue’s memoirs, under the 
energetic management of the clerk to the Lieutenancy, Mr H. Ford, the route-marches 
began in earnest across Devon.
39
   
 
The first route-march in Devon took place from the 12 January until the 15 January 
1915. A small party of the 3rd Battalion of the Devon Regiment left from Exeter bound 
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for the town of South Molton. From South Molton, the Regiment and local recruiting 
authorities visited all the hamlets and other habitations en route to the village of 
Witheridge.
40
 According to the correspondent for the Western Times, it was evident that 
everywhere on the route-march the ‘presence of the soldiers excited great interest, and 
they had an enthusiastic reception from the inhabitants, who gave them refreshments 
and wished them good luck’.41 Fortescue revealed that this route-march achieved a 
certain amount of success and that the soldiers received a very cordial reception 
amongst the local populations.
42
 In reality, Fortescue noted in his diary for the 15 
January that the route-march had produced around 48 to 60 recruits.
43
 It is important to 
emphasize that, like the first recruitment march in Devon, many of the route-marches 
that followed prompted the residents of specific localities to support the troops in a 
humanitarian way with generous hospitality. Instead of encouraging their men-folk to 
enlist, the villages of the county provided ‘endless food [to the troops], but few recruits 
presented themselves’ on these marches.44 Yet, despite the intention of the recruitment 
marches to change and shape public understanding of the war across Devon, it became 
clear that the route-marches were more revealing about the depth of indifference present 
in some of the county’s men-folk towards enlistment.  
 
At a meeting of the Honiton Division Parliamentary Recruiting Committee held in 
Exeter on 26 February 1915, Fortescue revealed to the representatives of the Committee 
that a route-march that passed through North-West Devon had exposed in some 
localities of the county a ‘certain amount of apathy and indifference to the seriousness 
of the position prevailed’.45 Indeed, in an article on the progress of the recruiting 
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marches in North Devon, a correspondent for the Western Morning News was disgusted 
at the indifferent responses from some of the young men from the region towards the 
prospect of volunteering. One such response from a farmer’s son confirms this sense of 
indifference towards the war with his declaration that he and his friends as ‘farmers’ 
sons-be going to stay home and look after the grub and the money’.46 This prompted 
one seasoned Tommy to laughingly remark to the correspondent about his frustration to 
convince North Devon’s men to even remotely consider volunteering: ‘How I should 
like to come round here with orders to compel the beggars to come’.47 This idea taps 
into the idea that the only way to which some of Devon’s men would fight in the Army 
was through the introduction of a system of compulsion rather than with appeals to join. 
Another recruitment march which confirms the presence of this indifference towards the 
seriousness of volunteering and the war occurred in the West Devon village of 
Bridestowe on 20 February. Army representative Mr Millman urged the men of 
Bridestowe to join the army and the answer he received to his appeals was that ‘“We’ve 
got no time for that rummage. Let someone else do it if they like”’.48 The correspondent 
then includes Millman’s “patriotic” reply to the people of village that he hoped ‘such 
cowards will receive nothing but contempt from their more patriotic fellows’.49  
 
During the same recruiting march, the Devonshire Regiment passed through the West 
Devon village of Sourton, and the Vicar, the Reverend W. J. Whitwell, welcomed the 
party to the locality. According to Whitwell, the village was labelled a ‘black sheep’ 
parish in the local press because of the fact that ‘only 8 out of the population of 350 are 
serving’.50 The correspondent from the Devon and Exeter Gazette suggested that the 
absence of young men in the crowd to welcome the Devonshire Regiment spoke 
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volumes about how they were evidently ashamed of the low recruitment numbers from 
the village.
51
 Similarly, Edrica de la Pole observed during a recruitment meeting on 22 
April at the South Hams town of Modbury that the ‘eligible men [of the town] were 
conspicuous by their absence’.52 As a consequence of this absence, a local recruitment 
canvasser Mr J. Coyle revealed to de la Pole that they managed to secure 4 recruits ‘but 
that was all’.53 A correspondent from the Western Express and Torrington Chronicle 
who accompanied another recruiting march in North Devon noted that the apathy in the 
county districts was, ‘in many cases, almost unbelievable’.54 In a similar turn of events, 
the men of the West Devon village of Chelston were branded as cowards when a 
recruitment march passed through on 20 February 1915, because they too ‘remained out 
of sight until the danger was past’.55  As a result of their nonattendance, the army 
representative Mr F. Howard addressed the crowd and criticised the apathy of these 
young men ‘in terms which should have made them squirm had they plucked up 
sufficient courage to be present’.56  
 
During a route-march in the North Devon village of Buckland Brewer on 18 February 
1915, a young farmer told a Western Morning News correspondent that he would not 
join up but instead he would stay at home to work on the farm. Mr Millman, a 
representative from Tavistock Urban District Council, pointed to the soldiers and 
interrogated the agriculturalist: ‘He has been to the front and done his share. Won’t you 
join and help the others’.57 The farmer cockily replied that he had never requested the 
man to go and uttered in a decisive tone of defiance in the interrogation that ‘I won’t 
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join; so there’.58  After this, the correspondent noted that Millman proclaimed that the 
farmer ‘“ought to be kicked!”’59 In a similar tone of impudence, another member of the 
crowd replied to Millman’s request that ‘“When the Germans come, we’ll join the 
Army”’.60 A correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette who witnessed responses 
such as these came to the conclusion that it was of ‘no use to explain to such laggards 
that by that time it would be too late; it was merely a waste of breath’.61 A similar 
response of frustration was expressed at a later recruitment march in Okehampton where 
Millman expressed to the crowd his frustration with the men he had encountered during 
the march: ‘I have the most utter and profound contempt for the man who can enlist and 
will not. God help England if she has to rely on such nerveless, brainless, and cowardly 
fellows as some we have met this week”’.62  
 
It is clear that other ‘provincial patriots’, like Millman, were frustrated that their appeals 
could not change the reluctance of some of Devon’s men towards the prospect of 
military service. During a route-march of the Devonshire Regiment on 20 February 
1915 which passed through the North Devon village of Bradworthy, Army recruiter 
Colonel Griffen became so frustrated with the subdued response from the men of the 
village that he demanded of the men in the crowd: ‘Will none of you make any self 
sacrifice? You are content to die and have a decent funeral and you think that you will 
get into heaven’.63 The path to heaven was, according to Griffen, through sacrifice and 
it was clear that men of Bradworthy were reluctant to participate in the most important 
sacrifice to the men-folk of Britain: the sacrifice of blood through military service. In 
disbelief, Griffen went to great pains to shame the men of the village in order to make 
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them re-evaluate their apathy: ‘Good God, men of Bradworthy, are you content to stop 
here and let others do your fighting?’64 By considering such responses to the appeals to 
enlist, it was perceived in the local press that the appeals of the ‘provincial patriots’ and 
local army recruiters seemed, at times, to ‘fall on heedless ears’.65  
 
These responses from some of Devon’s men-folk are evidence of their defiance towards 
the appeals of the ‘provincial patriots’. The rhetorical framing of the debates 
surrounding recruitment reveal that there was a great divide between those who 
prioritised their own survival over that of the nation. This also aids to confirm the 
mentality of these men who thought that if the war was as serious as the ‘provincial 
patriots’ claimed then a system of compulsory service would need to be introduced. 
This was the case in Leicester where according to F. B. Armitage there were still 60,000 
men of military age in Leicestershire and Rutland who had not volunteered by the 
summer of 1915. He argues that the reason for this was a widespread passivity ‘an 
understanding amongst men that they would go when they are called’.66 Likewise, it 
was reported in the West Briton on 20 May 1915 that in Cornwall due to the ‘fact that 
[rural communities] are so far from the centre of things the people do not realise the 
tremendous issues at stake’.67 The indifference exhibited by some of Devon’s men-folk 
in some North Devon villages did not go unnoticed by the region’s women. Previously 
in September 1914, de la Pole had tried, in vain, to convince the men of Kingston to 
enlist. One such man who she could not persuade to enlist was Ernest Freeman, the son 
of the landlord of a public house in Kingston. When she saw him in Kingston on 3 
January 1915, his mother Mary Freeman revealed to her that instead of volunteering her 
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son was instead trying to join the police.
68
 Mary Freeman also told de la Pole that once 
her son had informed her of de la Pole’s attempts to convince him to enlist his mother 
‘expressed the wish to “see the lady”.69 It is clear that some Devonians resented the 
efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ as intermediaries of the war effort as they signified 
their actions to be the meddling and interference of Devon’s notables in their lives. 
 
According to the correspondent of the Western Morning News, it became apparent to 
him during a route-march on 18 February 1915 that the ‘young men of the villages of 
North Devon must have experienced some feelings of shame when they saw the 
contempt of the girls at their refusal’.70 However, he was astounded by the generosity 
and patriotism of the region’s women. In a side note, he puts forward an interesting 
suggestion that ‘not the slightest difficulty would have been experienced in enrolling a 
whole regiment of the fair sex’.71 At another recruiting march which passed through the 
North Devon village of High Bickington on 16 February 1915, one woman in the crowd 
exclaimed ‘why don’t they get up a regiment for women’.72 A seasoned soldier looked 
on and commented that ‘the women have far more pluck than the men’.73 Indeed, when 
the same route-march passed through the village of Burrington it was observed that the 
most cordial welcome given to the Devonshire Regiment was from the women and the 
old men of the locality.
74
 These instances suggest that Devon’s women cannot be 
conceptualised as simply observers in the masculine system of recruitment, as their role 
in recruitment efforts were more complex. Bonnie White observes that these spectacles 
were attempts by women to ‘shame men into enlisting by calling into question their 
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masculinity’.75 These were deeply symbolic actions because the sight of women 
‘offering to enlist, or calling men cowards were explicit attacks on their patriotism’.76 
 
In Devon, the nature of patriotism in specific localities was understood through its 
recruitment figures, which were perceived to reflect the state of patriotism in a 
particular community. The ‘provincial patriots’ tried to combat the bad recruitment rates 
in districts and parishes of Devon such as Whitwell through the promotion of localities 
in the county who had good enlistment figures. According to Fortescue, some parishes 
in Devon had done as ‘admirably as Exmouth and showed an enlightened appreciation 
of the national crisis’.77 This use of the language of the enlightenment was intended to 
clarify to Devonians a distinct dichotomy between those who were enlightened as to the 
importance of recruitment efforts and individuals who were unenlightened and ignorant 
towards the significance of the war. Indeed, Exmouth was later celebrated in the pages 
of The Observer on 25 April 1915. The article suggested that the town possessed a 
patriotic record because over 1,100 men out of a male population of 4,700 had enlisted 
since the war began.
78
 Similarly, it was reported on 18 June 1915 that 55 men from the 
East Devon villages of Colyton and Colyford had volunteered into the Army since the 
outbreak of war.
79
 According to the Devon and Exeter Gazette, 41 of these volunteers 
were recruited by local Police Constable Hurford who was the district’s recruiting 
officer.
80
 Therefore, not only were individual districts of Devon praised for their 
recruiting results but also the efforts of individual recruiters were extoled in the hope 
that fellow Devonians would follow their example. This campaign of commendation 
also applied to recruitment results for the Navy because the South Devon village of 
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Shaldon boasted that out of a population of about a thousand there were ‘152 men in the 
Forces, including about fifty in the Navy’.81 Charles Sprague, one of the secretaries of 
the Tavistock Division of the DPRC, hoped that a good proportion of the male 
population of the district had volunteered for military service. This was evident when 
wrote to J. J. Newcombe, the town clerk. In his letter, Sprague reveals that he could not 
gain a clear idea about the recruitment rates for the West Devon town of Tavistock up to 
August 1914 but he was certain that ‘our loyal and ancient Borough should not be 
behind other places in recording the patriotism and devotion of its sons’.82 Fortescue 
appealed to Devon elites that they had to get a little more from the willing to ‘bring the 
backward places up to the level of those who had done better’.83 Through this sense of 
competition in recruitment figures between districts, it was hoped that the combined 
results for voluntary recruitment across the county would improve. 
 
Route-marches were an important wartime spectacle for specific localities as they were 
also ‘designed to be entertainment events, to attract an audience and hold its attention 
long enough to get the main message across’.84 Indeed, the purpose of these marches 
was to educate Devon’s men-folk of their responsibilities as British citizens to defend 
Britain and the Empire in this time of great crisis. Adrian Gregory notes that there was a 
similarity to a religious revival in aspects of the recruiting meetings throughout 1914 
and 1915:  
 
platforms were set up from which a speaker appealed to the conscience of the 
listener, laying out in great detail the terrible consequences, literally “hellish”, of 
Germany victory. Men were then asked to “attest”; those who did so would be 
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applauded by the crowd. Those who came forward would then encourage others 
to do so.
85
  
 
Similarly, Nicoletta F. Gullace also points out that to contemporary theorists the sight of 
men who chose to volunteer revealed that they had undergone a conversion, an ‘inner 
transformation, one that enlightened him to the duties of citizenship and grounded his 
defence of the nation in moral conviction rather than physical force’.86 Like the open air 
recruiting meetings in specific localities during 1914, ‘provincial patriots’ invested 
significant meaning into the recruitment marches which took place in the county during 
1915. Thus, local identities and county unity became important aspects of the sermons 
delivered by the ‘provincial patriots’ during the route-marches in Devon during 1915. 
Recruitment efforts across the British Isles were rooted in a strong identification with 
specific localities. Helen McCartney argues that to most Lancastrians, a ‘strong 
identification with their home town or city could also be accompanied by pride in their 
county’.87 The same can be said about other localities because regional identities, 
county pride and local homogeneity were very powerful notions which were employed 
in the rhetoric of recruitment efforts on a local level.
88
 Indeed, Catriona Pennell 
suggests that ‘by playing on regional identities of potential recruits, the moral 
foundations of the war were made more accessible’.89 In Devon, this was evident in 
Dudley Clark’s poem For Dartymoor which was published in Punch. It should be noted 
that this poem was written in the linguistic style of the South Devonian accent, which 
was intended to ensure that its employment of local identity resonated with Dartmoor’s 
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men-folk to stress the validity of volunteering for this particular Devon locality: ‘An I 
must fight wi’ Devon men Vur Dartymoor, our dartymoor’.90 The notion of a cohesive 
county identity was also framed by an application of local history in specific localities. 
In Lancashire, the representations of Lancashire’s history, in particular the role that the 
region played during the Wars of the Roses, were important features in the framework 
of recruitment efforts in Lancashire.
91
 Within England, local recruiting authorities also 
used what Nicholas Mansfield labels local ‘historical military exemplars’ which added 
to the authenticity of local appeals to enlist and protect their communities.
92
 For 
instance, both the figures of Admiral Horatio Nelson and Lord Protector Oliver 
Cromwell were used as patriotic examples in recruiting efforts in the counties of 
Norfolk and Cambridgeshire respectively.
93
 This was also the case in Scotland as 
Scottish patriotism was promoted and ‘imbued deeply with an imagined warrior past’.94  
 
The promotion of regional historical figures and heroes in the rhetoric of recruitment 
efforts also helped to construct a narrative of heroic obligation to specific local 
populations. Alfred T. Gregory suggested that Devon’s historical heroes had passed 
onto their descendants the privileges and freedoms that they had fought for and to which 
‘it was up to the present generation to see that freedom was preserved unimpaired’.95 
This style of narrative can also be seen in a pamphlet published by the DPRC on 1 
February 1915 entitled The War: An Appeal to Devon Men and Women. In particular, 
the pamphlet focused on the famous Devonian Elizabethan privateer, Sir Francis Drake 
as both a local and national icon. Within the pamphlet, Drake was made both the 
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prominent figurehead and the progenitor of Devon’s discourse of heroism. This meant 
that it was the duty of Devon’s men to follow in Drake’s courageous footsteps. A 
distinct sense of county pride in Devon became entwined with a historical sense of 
obligation, which was elevated beyond the county in order to encompass the role of past 
Devonians in the defence of Britain and the Empire: 
 
In past time, England has often called to her men for help, and the men of Devon 
have never been deaf to her call. They sailed with Drake against the Armada; 
they went with Marlborough into Flanders, with Wellington to the Peninsula and 
Waterloo, with Roberts to Afghanistan, and with Buller to Africa. Wherever in 
the world their country has wanted them, [the] Men of Devon have ever been to 
the fore.
96
 
 
The employment of local heroes in recruitment efforts represented specific ‘sites of 
memory’ for local and national populations which were ‘invested with meanings just as 
revelatory about the culture which constructs and represents them’.97 An example of this 
was during a route-march in the North Devon village of Parkham on 20 February 1915. 
One resident of the village, Mr Howard appealed to the village’s men-folk to enlist. In 
his defence, Howard urged them to join up in the name of Drake because they should 
not ‘let “Drake’s Drum” beat in vain’.98 This is in reference to a legend in county 
folklore that should England be threatened with danger, the sound of Drake’s beating 
drum would ‘recall his spirit to defeat the enemy’ and that it was audible to all the sea-
folk of Devon.
99
 This was similarly apparent in Percy Hazelden’s poem Devon Men on 
7 July 1915 which praised the professed innate courage of Devon’s men and linked the 
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picturesque landscape of Devon, in particular Bideford and Appledore, with the spirit of 
Drake as a local and national hero.
100
 In fact, it was claimed that either the ghost of 
Drake haunted Admiral John Jellicoe or that Drake’s spirit was reincarnated in 
Jellicoe.
101
 It is important to recognise how this local cultural code was used to reinforce 
specific localities as being patriotic because they had higher recruitment rates. For 
instance, the Devon and Exeter Gazette stated that Drake’s spirit had spoken to the men 
of the South Devon town of Exmouth. Indeed, the newspaper claimed that over a 
thousand Exmouthians may ‘be counted among those who have finished their games 
and are beating the Germans too’.102 This statement references another legend of Devon 
folklore in which Drake boasted whilst playing bowls on Plymouth Hoe that they could 
defeat the Spanish Armada and win the game too.  
 
At the same time, the narrative of heroic obligation could easily be used as a damning 
criticism to further underline the lacklustre response of some of Devon’s men to the 
recruitment efforts. The vicar of the South Devon village of Alfington, Reverend Gerald 
M. L. Reade used Devon’s heroic past to further illustrate the poor response of Devon’s 
men-folk to calls to serve in 1915. In his poem England’s Call, the Empire’s Response - 
Duty of Devonians, Reade crafts a striking juxtaposition between the valiant Devonians 
of the past who were descendants of ‘Drake, Grenville, Hawkins - countless heroes 
bold’, and the disappointing generation of 1914 who were selfish and too ‘poor in spirit 
for the brave man’s part’.103 A similar patriotic poem was B. Reed’s Wanted: Not 
Conscription – Volunteers which offered a similar appeal to the gallant sons of Devon. 
It says that should enlist to support voluntary recruitment in the hope that this would 
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halt the introduction of conscription.
104
 Indeed, Reed argued that if Devon’s sons’ did 
enlist, it would never be said that ‘Devonia lacked in Patriotic fame’ rather it would be 
known that ‘Devonshire Dumplings’ could ‘procure the “clotted cream”’.105 The 
publication of local patriotic poems such as these in the local press were an integral part 
of the war culture of 1914 to 1918 as they intended to ‘shape public opinion, to 
embarrass those who were hanging back and to work on the psyche of the 
undecided’.106 However, these appeals to local patriotism and community affiliation did 
not always convince potential recruits or guarantee an increase in recruitment rates.
 107
 
 
In the route-marches and other recruitment efforts during 1915, Devon elites invested 
significant meaning into locally raised regiments to make them the ‘centre of county 
identity’.108 According to McCartney, the white rose of Lancashire with its connotations 
of the duty and bravery, as shown in the Wars of the Roses, became linked to the deeds 
and accomplishments of the 55th Division in First World War.
109
 However, the low 
recruitment numbers in Devon meant that the Devonshire Regiment, as a centre of 
county identity, did not entirely comprise of men from Devon. The ‘provincial patriots’ 
were in many cases bitterly disappointed that several divisions of the Devonshire 
Regiment had to be filled up with recruits from other counties, as was the case with the 
9th Division of the Devonshire Regiment. On 3 June 1915, the editor of the Devon and 
Exeter Gazette published an editorial as an attempt to encourage Devon’s men to 
volunteer into the county’s Regiment. If the Devonshire regiment was to retain its 
county character, it was ‘“up to” Devonians to make a determined effort to fill as many 
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of the vacant places as possible’.110 There remained, according to the editor, a large 
number of single men in the legendary ‘“Shire of the Sea Kings,” who have failed to 
respond to the call of King and County’.111 However, he did reveal that Devon was not 
the only county with this problem as what was true of Devon was ‘true of England 
generally’.112 These sentiments were echoed in the North Devon Journal when army 
recruiter Lieutenant Larder admitted with deep regret that they had to go to other 
counties for men to fill the ranks of the Devonshire Regiment. This was, in Larder’s 
view, a dishonourable practice because the other counties in Britain should ‘keep their 
men for their own regiments’ and Devon’s men-folk should fulfil their obligation to 
fight in the county regiment.
113
 Likewise, the Manchester Evening News reported that 
the ‘majority of the men in the Plymouth Battalion of the Naval Division …are 
volunteer recruits from Manchester who enlisted last September’.114 Thus, in a letter 
from Tom W. Ainge to J. Boraston of the National Unionist Association, Ainge reveals 
that in spite of the best efforts, recruitment was still lagging in the naval port. The 
military authorities were, according to Ainge, not at ‘all satisfied with what Plymouth is 
doing’.115    
 
It is clear that the framing of the debates surrounding military service in Devon around 
rural and county iconography, did not always resonate with the county’s population. 
The narrative of heroic obligation in recruitment efforts did not convince some 
Devonians of the importance of military service. The disappointment that the county’s 
men-folk did not live up to the legacy of Devon’s heroes was apparent in a recruitment 
march that passed through the West Devon village of Bridestowe. According to a 
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columnist for the Devon and Exeter Gazette, the indifferent responses from some of the 
young men who remained in Bridestowe had made him question whether these men had 
‘never realised the duties which citizenship of the British Empire carries with it’.116 This 
was also the case in Torquay. As a result of very poor response to recruitment efforts on 
3 September 1915 another correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette wrote that 
readers should remember that Torquay had just over 2,000 men who had enlisted since 
August 1914 and they were ‘helping to sustain the integrity of the Empire’.117 Yet, to 
the men who remained in Torquay, he offered a damning condemnation that they were 
‘quite willing to let their comrades bear the whole of the town’s responsibility in the 
great struggle’.118 During the same month, Brauntonian notable John Yeo Tucker also 
capitalised on this narrative in his talk entitled ‘The War and the Shirkers’. He 
emphasized that the many eligible men left in the North Devon village of Braunton had 
a ‘bounden duty to do their portion for their motherland, and “not hide away in bye-
lanes”’.119  
 
Nonetheless, it became evident that the route-marches in Devon did not change some 
Devonian men’s attitudes to military service. According to an article from the Western 
Times on 2 March 1915, despite the route-marches in the county, recruitment efforts in 
Devon continued to be a characterised as a ‘mixture of ignorance, apathy and 
enlightened patriotism’.120 According to Fortescue there were parishes in Devon which 
seemed to be ‘divided from the first-named by some mysterious indefinable line of 
demarcation, showed only ignorance, apathy and utter want of appreciation of their 
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responsibilities to their county’.121 Similarly, Peter Simkins reveals that the 3rd East 
Yorkshire Regiment experienced similar hardships in persuading men to volunteer 
during a fourteen day recruitment march in late May 1915.
122
 Second Lieutenant T. R. 
H. Smyth wrote in the Regiment’s journal that their arrival to the East Yorkshire village 
of the Holme-on-Spalding-Moor was not well received: ‘We had fifty posters printed 
advertising this and we put most of them on old farmers’ gates and windows and doors, 
so as to attract attention. These may have caused annoyance, because many [of them] 
were pulled down’.123 After a recruiting meeting at the village’s primary school, out of 
the seven men who presented themselves five of them were ineligible.
124
 Ultimately, the 
route-march only managed to gain eight eligible recruits.
125
 This, along with the 
examples of the route-marches in Devon, begs the question as to whether the marches 
were an effective means to increase recruitment numbers in the county.  
 
Yet, sometimes the full impact of the route-marches in Devon took time to become fully 
apparent. For instance, Fortescue revealed in one unnamed parish that three men had 
joined the Army four days after the route-march.
126
 Incidents such as these demonstrate 
that the ‘seeds sown [at route-marches] sometimes bore unexpected results’.127 This 
reaffirms the idea that the efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’, local recruiting sergeants 
and the Devonshire Regiment during these recruitment marches had ‘not fallen on 
barren ground’, as some recruits decided to enlist after the march rather than during the 
event itself.
128
 Therefore, the continuous participation of Devon’s elite was vital if these 
events were to be successful. On 19 March, Fortescue continued to appeal to Devonians 
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present at the meeting to ‘do their best to enlist the sympathy of local speakers and well-
wishers, so that the route march could be a success’.129 This was also the case when 
Fortescue offered an invitation to all the county’s populace ‘to do their best to put the 
work connected with recruiting in Devon on a sound and strong footing, and all parties 
could very well unite in the matter’.130 However, the participation of all Devon’s elite in 
these route-marches was not guaranteed.  
 
On 2 March, the parish council for the East Devon village of Beer refused to appoint a 
recruiting committee. According to Fortescue, the grounds for their refusal was that 
they believed that the ‘time had come to introduce Conscription; that they did not 
believe in civilians pressing men joining the Army; that the pay and allowances were 
insufficient; and that there was no need for a Committee, Beer having done as much as, 
or more, than it could be expected to’.131 Mr Bray added that ‘certain officials in Beer 
had sons of military age not serving, and when the leaders refused the others backed 
out’.132 It was clear that there were distinct limits to self-mobilization of Devon’s men. 
This was further apparent when a route-march which produced a similar disappointing 
result was later noted by Fortescue in his diary on 3 June 1915. As the Devonshire 
Regiment passed through the North Devon villages of Chittlehampton, Swimbridge and 
Landkey, the route-march had produced ‘lots of food, but no men’.133 During the week 
of 14 June 1915 in East Devon, a route-march was well organised by the local elite. 
However, the speeches of both the local Labour and Liberal representatives for the 
District, according to the Devon and Exeter correspondent, failed to appeal amongst all 
of the crowd: ‘Their speeches did carry conviction with the thinking men and with the 
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ladies, but the slackers remained unconvinced’.134 This led the correspondent to 
conclude that despite the efficient organisation of the ‘provincial patriots’ the route-
march was a ‘fiasco’.135 
 
At the same time, the success of a route-march was also dependent on the success of the 
requests made by individual ‘provincial patriots’. One success of this was during a 
route-march in the North Devon town of Barnstaple on 10 June 1915. In a conversation 
with a woman with three children, army representative Mr F. Howard pointed out to her 
that if her husband enlisted into the Army she would get 30 shillings a week for as long 
as the war lasted.
136
 After hearing this information, her attitude towards the prospect of 
her husband joining the forces instantly changed. According to the correspondent of the 
North Devon Journal, her face ‘immediately lit up with the prospect presented, and, as 
though afraid that the War would be brought to too speedy a conclusion, she eagerly 
asked “Do you think it is likely to last long?”’.137 Therefore, it was only when the 
mother was informed she would receive this separation allowance, that her objection 
towards the prospect of her husband joining the Army disappeared. In a comparable 
situation, two local girls had previously decided on 16 January 1915 in the North Devon 
village of Kings Nympton, to take a more active role in recruitment in the locality and 
played the role of recruiting sergeants. Consequently, their efforts were received with 
conspicuous success because they had induced five brothers to volunteer.
138
 Appeals 
from Devon’s elite were not as effective. On 7 August, Charles Sprague revealed how 
bewildered he was in his attempts to persuade the men of Tavistock to enlist. He 
reported to Fortescue that he had ‘spent considerable time trying to understand how to 
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reach the people of Tavistock’.139 Since the war, he had not achieved much success in 
his appeals because ‘apparently no authoritative body can compel these men to come 
forward’.140 When a route-march arrived at the South Devon hamlet of Torre during the 
week of 3 September 1915, the correspondent of the Devon and Exeter Gazette noticed 
that the young men in the crowd ‘waxed sarcastic over the thrilling appeals of the 
speakers, [whilst] others were mildly enthusiastic, but the sentiment was the same in the 
end; they were all determined to remain slackers’.141  
 
During a recruitment march in the mid-Devon village of Kenton on 9 September 1915, 
Sergeant Rendle VC admitted to the crowd that ‘“We are not a Press Gang … although 
we have a press gang with us, so we do not force you, but appeal to you to come 
forward”’.142 It is important to ask whether Devonians did perceive the military units 
present on these route-marches as similar to a press gang. Arguably, to use the idea of a 
press gang reinforces the idea of conscription. In addition, Army recruiter Sergeant 
Seaman revealed to the Devon and Exeter Gazette correspondent that during a recent 
recruiting meeting he had appealed to a couple of young men to volunteer and they said 
that they would think the matter over. However, according to Seaman, these two 
individuals had given him the same answer 13 months before. He emphasized their 
sense of indecision with his declaration that ‘by the time they had settled the matter 
their heads would be so swollen that he doubted if the Army would have a cap to fit 
them’.143 In the local press, there were also reports of Devonians who heckled, criticised 
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and accosted the ‘provincial patriots’ and recruiting Sergeants in 1915.144 One such 
community of men labelled as slackers and whom Fortescue believed were to blame for 
Devon’s low recruitment figures, were Devon’s farmers.  
 
As mentioned previously, stories flooded the local press that represented Devon’s 
farmers’ and their sons as shirkers from military service. Moreover, patriotic poems that 
were published in the local press helped to shape and cement the representation that the 
county’s farmers as unpatriotic slackers and shirkers who made excuses in order to 
escape recruitment into military service.
145
 In his poem entitled England’s Call, the 
Empire’s Response - Duty of Devonians, Gerald L. M. Reade crafted a damning 
condemnation of Devon’s farmers and male shop keepers whom he believed were 
responsible for the county’s recruiting woes.146 Consequently, these allegations helped 
to reinforce the image of Devon’s farmers’ as profiteers and shirkers who, in this new 
wartime morality, were moral pariahs and ‘outside human sympathy’.147 Nevertheless, 
representatives of Devon’s farmers claimed, in their defence, that all of them ‘desired to 
be patriotic but for every man on the farm to drop tools and take up arms against the 
Germans was not the only way in which to show their patriotism’.148 In light of the 
disappointing response from some recruitment efforts in Devon, the ‘provincial patriots’ 
were adamant that military duty was the only discourse of patriotism in the county. This 
meant that they considered that the defence of farmers that food production was an 
important duty in wartime as in fact being unpatriotic. Indeed, Devon’s elite believed 
that the attempts made by farmers’ to protect their sons’ from military service by using 
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the necessity of domestic food production was merely an excuse. The frustration of the 
‘provincial patriots’ with Devon’s farmers was heightened within the reports in the 
pages of the local press who repeatedly exposed the extent of the indifference towards 
military service amongst the county’s agriculturalists. An example of this was at a 
recruiting march on 16 February 1915 in the North Devon village of Burrington. The 
correspondent of the Western Morning News noted that the local ‘farmers and young 
men adopted a critical, and in some cases a superior attitude’ towards the sight of the 
Devonshire regiment in Burrington.
149
 This suggests that farmers and young men were 
seen as arrogant in the manner in which they perceived that food production was more 
important than military service. This attitude helped to inform their apathy towards 
military service. A correspondent from the Western Morning News noted on 16 
February 1915 that across Devon ‘there did seem to be undoubted apathy on the part of 
farmers’.150  Indeed, army recruiters stated to the correspondents of the local press that 
many farmers deliberately held back their sons from recruiting.
151
 On 3 September 
1915, Recruiting Authorities in South Devon complained, ‘in common with those in 
other parts of the county [the] farming community is not producing its fair share of 
recruits’.152 This was still the case in November 1915 when Fortescue had received 
word that members of Devon’s elite who had tried to convince ‘recruits in South Devon, 
especially among the farmers, have been met with the reply: “Why should we make any 
sacrifices whilst so-and-so is amusing himself as usual”’.153 A correspondent for the 
Western Express and Torrington Chronicle stated that undoubtedly ‘much of the blame 
rests with the farmers sons who, if they choose, could set an excellent example to the 
labouring classes’.154  
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In light of this negative coverage in the local press, Devon’s farmers argued that these 
articles in the local press had tarnished them with prejudice which was ‘outside the 
bounds of common sense and justice’.155 However, the indifferent responses from some 
farmers and their sons to the appeals to volunteer had helped create the perception that 
they had prioritised individual priorities over national ones. At a council meeting of the 
Devon Farmers Union (DFU) on 15 October 1915, Mr Willing argued that whilst 
farmers on the whole had accepted great sacrifices for the war, he had heard of a farm 
where a father and five or six sons were still at home. He believed that a parent who 
‘kept all these sons on a farm did not realise the seriousness of the situation’.156 This 
was also the case in Cornwall. In a letter from Gleill Gretton to Fortescue dated 15 July 
1915, Gretton included a report on Recruiting in Cornwall by Major Pike from the Duke 
of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. This report revealed that during the route-marches in 
Cornwall there had been ‘a marked absence of Farmers’ Sons’.157 Pike revealed that, as 
a class, Cornish farmers’ sons had shown little interest in volunteering because they 
were rarely present during route-marches ‘or come into the evening meetings’.158 This 
became a topic of frequent commentary and discussion amongst recruiting officials in 
Cornwall. Moreover, the absence of farmers’ sons at recruiting events in Cornwall had 
influenced other classes in the county and it had provided them with an excuse not to 
volunteer.
159
 Despite these dire circumstances, Pike believed that the creation of a Pals’ 
Battalion which comprised of Cornwall’s farmers and their sons would overcome this 
recruiting dilemma. It was proposed that a farmer’s Pals’ Battalion should be created as 
a way to convince farmers and their sons to enlist. If recruiting officers and Devon’s 
elite who were connected with the Recruiting movement ‘wrote to the Representatives 
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of the Farmers Unions in the various Districts and offered to meet Farmers in a 
conference and discuss the whole position and so perhaps organise the means by which 
the sons of Farmers might be able to enlist without prejudice to the Agricultural 
interests’.160 Indeed, this would ensure that agriculture as an industry could send its 
quota to the army.
161
 
 
By 1915, there were still 5,598 farmers’ sons working on Devon’s farms.162 This would 
be enough to raise a similar Pals’ Battalion comprising Devon’s agriculturalists. Based 
upon this, Fortescue submitted a proposal to create a military unit. The general response 
to Fortescue’s proposal was positive. In a letter dated 12 July 1915, from Witcain 
Campbell of the Southern Command’s Headquarters to Fortescue, Campbell revealed 
that the War Office (WO) recommended that they should postpone the formation of 
such a Pals’ battalion until after the harvest was gathered in. This reveals that there was 
an understanding of the situation by the WO for agriculturalists, as they hoped 
recruitment efforts would be more successful after the harvest. After this event, 
Campbell believed that Devon and Cornwall seemed to ‘offer the best prospect of 
success’.163 In a second letter on 21 July 1915, from Gleill Gretton to Fortescue, Gretton 
attached a letter from Major Champion, the Recruiting Officer for Gloucestershire. 
Champion’s letter was optimistic about the prospect of a Farmers’ Battalion in Devon. 
However, the plan to create this unit was entirely dependent on the condition that the 
Army could establish and maintain good relations with the NFU. Champion was sure 
that if this could be achieved, the scheme for raising a Farmers’ Battalion was ‘well 
worth proceeding with’.164 Yet, notwithstanding all of the positive correspondence that 
Fortescue received about this subject, his proposal was abandoned. In a telegram dated 
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4 September 1915 from General Campbell to Fortescue, he stated that after much 
consideration he had ‘decided to drop the raising of a Farmers Battalion for the 
present’.165 Yet, Campbell does not specify why he dropped his support for the Farmers 
Battalion. Similarly, Launceston Town Council decided to cancel the raising of a local 
Farmers’ Battalion on 20 August 1915. Despite gaining the support of Launceston 
Division Parliamentary Recruiting Committee for the proposal, Colonel Harvey, a local 
recruiting officer, wrote that it was ‘decided not to form a Farmers’ Battalion’.166  
 
In his memoirs, Fortescue reveals that he in fact had limited confidence in the initiative 
as it was not a ‘very hopeful undertaking as the margin of farmer’s sons available for an 
Infantry Battalion with its second line was not large after providing for the Yeomanry 
and its second line’.167 He also recalled that the WO refused the conditions of his 
proposal which was, in his view, just as well because ‘all the good men available of 
farmer class were wanted as officers in the next three years’.168 Despite the fact that the 
Farmers’ Battalion did not amount to anything it was still an important project for the 
‘provincial patriots’ and recruitment efforts in 1915, as it reveals the efforts made by 
Fortescue to try to reverse the perception of Devon’s farmers as shirkers by encouraging 
them to join their own Pals’ Battalion.169 In Shropshire, an effort was made to ‘create 
special farmers’ unit, in response to public criticism of farmers’ lack of patriotism’.170 
Mansfield reveals that like Devon’s proposed Farmers Pals’ Battalion, this project in 
Shropshire was a dismal failure.
171
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On 23 October, Fortescue revealed that for the first six months of 1915, the number of 
recruits from Devon ‘averaged 500 a month for the Regular Forces, and a similar 
number of the Territorials’.172 Indeed, White stresses that by June 1915 recruitment 
numbers in Devon had rebounded.
173
 Based on the rising recruitment statistics in 
Devon, one local notable Hugh Buller proclaimed to Fortescue in June that 
‘Recruitment in the county is finally showing signs of life’.174 However, Fortescue 
revealed that this was a fleeting improvement because since the beginning of July the 
numbers for Devon had shown a ‘grave falling off, only 400 men had been obtained for 
the Regulars and 300 for the Territorials’.175 A reason to explain this development was, 
in Fortescue’s view, the priority timing of the harvest which meant that potential 
recruits were busy on farms reaping the harvest. At the same time, it was reported on 6 
November 1915 that since the outbreak of war some 2,500 men from Devon had joined 
the Navy.
176
 During a special recruiting meeting on 6 July 1915, recruiters for the Navy 
and the Royal Marines expressed their hope that good results would be gained. 
Nevertheless, in light of these frustrations and limitations within the voluntary system, it 
was understandable why contemporaries in Devon discussed the prospect of a 
compulsory scheme of recruitment. During a council meeting of the DFU on 15 October 
1915, Mr Puddicombe expressed that he was ‘sick to death of canvassing’ and he would 
welcome conscription because it was ‘something systematic and definite’.177 Despite the 
recruitment marches and the fact Puddicombe had been ‘run off his legs during the last 
six months in canvassing for recruits’, there were a ‘great many people [who] did not 
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realise that the war was a question of life and death’.178 The implication of the evidence 
from the residents of Devon for totalization is that despite the efforts of the county’s 
elites to educate Devonians as to the seriousness of the war, it would only be through 
the direct intervention of state driven totalization that a ‘total’ and co-ordinated system 
of manpower would be established.  
 
Charities 
The success of charitable efforts was an important indicator of the support and 
popularity that was invested by both the rural and urban populations of Devon into the 
war-effort. Moreover, the success of charities in Devon reflects this form of economic 
and social self-mobilization in the county. An example of a charity that attempted to 
capitalize on the strength of local patriotism in Devon was the DPF. In a memorandum 
from the DPF on Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) Hospitals, Fortescue revealed that 
the cost of equipping the five principal and seventeen minor hospitals in Devon had 
been met by a variety of sources: 
 
The War Office has contributed £2,500 of which sum nearly the whole has been 
spent on the Exeter Hospitals, where in addition considerable private donations 
have been expended on equipment. A Hospital provided at Tiverton under War 
Office Orders, but not utilised, was equipped partly from private funds and 
partly from County Red Cross funds […] The cost of the equipment in the case 
of Torquay is being found as to £211 from Red Cross funds, as to £100 from the 
Devon Patriotic Fund, and the remainder by local subscription.
179
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In an accompanying letter to the memorandum for the VAD hospitals on 30 April 1915, 
Fortescue reveals that since the beginning of the war the DPF had enjoyed great 
success:   
 
The generosity of the public continues, and subscriptions are still coming in, and 
though they do not keep pace with the expenditure, there is still reason to hope 
that there will be a balance - perhaps a considerable one - unexpected on the 
termination of hostilities. It is idle to suggest any scheme for the disposal of this 
yet. All that can usefully be said is that we are confident that at no time will 
there be more need of funds than at the end of the War for supplementing 
Pensions and Grants to those for whom the provision made by the Government 
is in their circumstances inadequate.
180
 
 
The expenditure from the charity was spent on a number of different initiatives which 
included grants to dependents, allowances for materials for local working parties and 
grants to Red Cross and VAD Hospitals.
181
 At the same time, the DPF’s expenditure 
had to also take into account other expenses which included the allowances for printing, 
stationary, advertising and other administrative expenses incurred by local 
committees.
182
 It is interesting to note in the DPF’s accounts from 8 August 1914 to 31 
March 1915 that £14,925 4s. 10d. of the charities funds were invested into Treasury 
Bills and in an account in the Union of London and Smiths Bank.
183
 This means that 
DPF took advantage of saving their donations and gaining the tax-free interest on their 
collected aid, hence increasing its value. Ultimately, it is clear that the DPF succeeded 
as a popular charitable cause and as a business venture.  
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Rebecca Gill argues that the engagement of the British people with the new 
humanitarian ethos is crucial in understanding the success of charities during the First 
World War. In fact, the new humanitarian politics with the notion of ‘moral’ citizenship 
‘based upon voluntary action was now elevated to the level of national politics and 
equated with patriotic service’.184 Charitable work was a ‘form of symbolic enlistment 
for thousands of citizens too old or of the wrong sex to fight’.185 This concept can also 
be applied to individuals who were too young to fight because children and schools 
‘made significant contributions to relief efforts’.186 Pennell suggests that relief work 
during the war could allow the British people to express their loyalty to the nation for a 
variety of reasons.
187
 The appeal of charities transcended across the social hierarchy of 
Edwardian society as non-combatants ‘felt a sense of duty and understood the necessity 
of the situation, even if they were averse to war in general’.188 Stefan Goebel argues that 
in schools, war charities were ‘part and parcel of “war work”’.189 This war-work was a 
deeply symbolic assertion of ‘civic worth [which] represented the civilians’ claim to 
membership in the wartime community’.190 Consequently, people across the United 
Kingdom ‘volunteered for relief work in an effort to make their response to the war 
equal to the soldiers’ sacrifice’.191  
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According to Paul Ward, ‘prominent patriotism’ was an evident component in women’s 
charitable efforts during the war.
192
 An example of this from Devon’s civic society was 
on 2 January 1915, when the Exeter Flying Post published a report which promoted the 
‘splendid record of the useful work … by the Mayoress of Exeter’s war clothing 
depot’.193 For women, charitable efforts provided a distinct recognition and validation 
of citizenship in the wartime community emerging from their patriotism. By engaging 
with these opportunities and publicising their responses, the Mayoress of Exeter and 
other women in Devon were presenting their dedication to the war effort. These fund-
raising and other charitable activities provided a ‘public mark of recognition and 
encouraged others to affirm their knowledge of women’s special service to the 
nation’.194 Margaret H. Darrow reveals that charity work for French women became an 
integral part of the broader mobilization of femininity.
195
 The co-ordination of the 
women’s relief efforts was also apparent in Germany.196 Like the activities of the 
Mayoress of Exeter’s war clothing depot, certain activities to the soldiers ‘seemed to be 
only a modest extension of the care women provided to sons and husbands within the 
household’.197 Indeed, charity was perceived to be the duty of women not only by the 
gender division of labour, but also because ‘women were deemed uniquely suited to its 
tasks’.198 Consequently, it was the social morality attached to philanthropy that enabled 
individuals in Devon, whatever their background or social standing, to participate in 
charitable efforts.  
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Philanthropy rested upon the ‘belief in a firm, finely differentiated social and moral 
universe, in which social and moral hierarchies roughly coincided’.199 The mobilization 
of civil society i.e. the local clergy, notables, aristocrats and the ‘provincial patriots’, 
was crucial in the success of wartime philanthropy. This led to the creation of individual 
public and private charities to assist in several wartime causes including the Belgian 
refugees. Pierre Purseigle argues that the reception of Belgian refugees emphasized the 
‘mechanisms of wartime collective action’.200 This was revealed in the success of public 
appeals which were disseminated and also created by the local newspapers of the 
county. In a letter dated 21 April 1915 from A. Edmund Spencer, the Managing director 
of the Western Morning News, to Clara Andrew of the Devon County War Refugees’ 
Committee (DCWRC): Spencer stated that he was pleased to inform Andrew that the 
Directors of the newspaper had decided to make a grant to the DCWRC of ‘£250 for 
which sum I have pleasure in forwarding a cheque from the “Western Morning News” 
Belgian Relief Fund’.201 The Directors were also interested to know whether their 
committee had ‘given special charge of cases in receipt of relief in Cornwall, as, if such 
should happen I feel sure that they would be likely to increase the grant now made’.202 
 
The successes of the ‘provincial patriots’ in war charities were publicised to 
demonstrate their patriotism and to extend their spheres of influence in the wartime 
community. However, it is clear that tensions arose between war charities and pre-
existing charities. In 1915, the demands of the war took a greater precedence over the 
country’s resources and increased its consumption of the nation’s finances. As a 
consequence of this national development, the Diocese of Exeter had received a budget 
                                                 
199
 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War, p. 503. 
200
 Pierre Purseigle, ‘“A Wave on to Our Shores”: The Exile and Resettlement of Refugees from the 
Western Front, 1914-1918’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 16, 4 (2007) p. 439. 
201
 DHC: 1262M/L117, Bundle correspondence concerning war refugees, Letter from A. Edmund 
Spencer to Miss Andrew, 21 April 1915, item 29. 
202
 Ibid. 
169 
 
from the Treasury of £10,000 to fund all their necessary activities. This reduction of 
£3,000 when compared to the budget of 1914 meant that cuts for the Diocese’s 
charitable activities were suggested. This included the Diocesan Clergy Fund (DCF), 
the Church Building Fund, religious education, general purposes, administration and 
margin.
203
 It was against this uncertainty that these organisations faced the arrival of 
specialised charities whose primary focus was to assist the war effort thereby 
capitalising on the public’s patriotism. Consequently, these war charities had an 
undeniable effect upon the Church’s activities. This is revealed in the report for the 
Diocese’s 1915 Conference in which the DCF had suffered along with other Church 
funds during 1914 because of the ‘competition of War Charities and the effects of 
higher taxation and the increased cost of living’.204 Indeed, it was predicted that these 
organisations would suffer especially during 1915.
205
  
 
The aims of these Edwardian aid organisations within the Church of England were 
focused on peaceful objectives. Both peace-time and war charities were competing for 
compassion and the same financial resources, but a donation to the latter would have 
been perceived to be more fashionable under the conditions of war as it promoted 
dedication for the war effort. The Diocese’s charitable activities and other pre-existing 
charities saw War Charities as competitors that ‘took away erstwhile subscribers’.206 
Hence, under these conditions, some peace-time charities had to work harder to appeal 
to individuals and organisations for precious financial donations and grants. Therefore, 
concerns over the declining membership of these long-standing charities, along with 
escalating operating costs, threatened and jeopardised the Diocese’s pre-existing 
charitable efforts.  
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Frank Prochaska suggests that the war sent out mixed signals to pre-existing charities 
because whilst the conflict offered them fresh opportunities to gain donations it also 
‘tested their resolve and their finances’.207 Indeed, the DCF had experienced a loss of 
over £500 in 1914 when compared to the revenues from 1913. This reduction was also 
evident in the number of grants that the DCF had received: ‘The Committee’s grants 
from the Queen Victoria Clergy Fund were £225 for Endowment and £378 for Annual 
Grants to Benefices as compared with £150 and £405 in 1913’.208 However, it was also 
reported at the conference that the amounts received ‘earmarked for endowment greatly 
exceed[ed] those for annual grants, probably because of the strong appeal of the former 
to the local patriotism of parishioners, and because the result is permanent’.209  
Consequently, if Church fund-raising activities were linked to a cause related to the war 
effort it was perceived that the chances of their financial survival through the war were 
increased. However, some Committee members felt that because of the increased cost of 
living under the war’s conditions, every effort needed to be ‘made to maintain their 
annual grants to benefices, which are of the utmost importance to many of the poorer 
incumbents’.210   
 
Yet, the fears of the DCF’s Committee proved unfounded because 1915 was a 
beneficial year for the Diocese. The Committee’s income from voluntary sources for 
1915 ‘very considerably exceeded that for 1914, and was even larger than that for 1913. 
This was entirely due to the growing preference among subscribers for augmentation of 
endowment for which they gave £1,783 in 1915, as compared with £1,069 in 1914’.211 
In fact, the £10,000 estimate for 1915 considerably exceeded the Diocese’s 
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expectations. The Church had also decided that all benefactions from the DCF since 
July 1915 were to be used as ‘subscriptions to War Loans’.212 This reveals that despite 
the threat that war charities seemed to represent, local philanthropy continued to be well 
supported. This meant that Devonians had not ‘allowed [local charities and institutions] 
materially to suffer’ at the expense of supporting war charities.213 Nevertheless, it would 
appear that discrete tensions existed amongst other charities in Devon including the 
Committee formed to assist the Belgian Refugees in the county. 
 
On 15 March 1915, the DCWRC was formed with the intention to secure housing and 
offer hospitality to the Belgians and other war refugees.
214
 However, an examination of 
the correspondence and the source material from the DCWRC reveals that the 
organisation of the DCWRC was a painstaking process.
215
 Originally in 1914, Earl 
Fortescue and James Owen had formed a committee for the Belgian refugees stationed 
in Devon. However, it would appear that this spirit of co-operation and understanding 
was only temporary. In a letter to Fortescue dated 11 March 1915 from Clara Andrew, 
the Honorary Secretary of the Belgian Refugees’ and Relief Committees for 
Devonshire, she remarked that she had recently written a friendly letter to Mrs Owen, 
the Mayoress of Exeter. However, Clara felt that ‘with the lapse of time, she would not 
believe that I was trying to force myself into the former position against the work of the 
Mayor’.216 Nevertheless, she insisted that she had met Mrs Owens and had received 
with a warm reception: ‘nothing could have been kinder’.217 According to Andrew, even 
after the division of work, the Mayoress suggested that she would be ‘glad & proud to 
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serve with her … in all my capacity’.218 It would appear that the public individuals in 
Devon realised the potential benefits, both in wartime and after the war, to claim the 
opportunities of publicity and patriotism that fundraising activities presented. This 
confirms Peter Cahalan’s observation that charity’s great strength during the First 
World War was that it was ‘an expression of upper class tribalism’.219  Consequently, 
these local civic figures such as Lord Fortescue, the Mayor and Mayoress of Exeter 
competed not only for financial donations for their respective charitable endeavours 
from the public but also for the publicity that their charitable work could achieve. 
 
Conversely, Clara Andrew was sure that there seemed to be an outside influence at 
work to ‘spoil things’ with the DCWRC.220 This outside influence was Owen. She 
revealed that one of the joint treasurers of the organisation, Sidney Andrew was trying 
to get a ‘friendly meeting with the Mayor today: & if we can get some sort of 
“rapprochement”’.221 Internal disagreements proved to be a frequent thorny issue with 
the individuals who worked inside the organisation. In a letter dated 20 May 1915 from 
Owen to Fortescue, Owen informed Fortescue that regretfully his Committee’s proposal 
to divide the funds that were assigned to help the Belgian Refugees was neither 
generous nor equitable. He pointed out that, as Fortescue had said, the ‘only points of 
difference between us are as the intention of Exeter subscribers, and as to the expenses 
fairly chargeable to the City Account and those fairly chargeable to the County 
Account’.222 Owen believed that the Exeter Committee had operated under a double 
purpose from its inception with the several thousand Belgian refugees in the County 
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area.
223
 It had also been charged with the ‘responsibility of placing as many refugees as 
it though desirable in permanent residence within the city boundary’.224  
 
Nevertheless, it could not fairly be argued in Owen’s view that the ‘large number of 
refugees passing through Exeter were ever a city charge, or that they would have been 
accepted here if there had been any idea that they would be regarded as a city 
charge’.225 Owen believed that once separate committees were established, it would 
become ‘necessary for the purpose of dividing funds to go into the accountancy, in 
order to ascertain what proportion of the total expenditure should be debited to the 
County, and what to the City, we must carefully distinguish between the two 
liabilities’.226 In addition, Owen revealed that the animosity between himself and 
Fortescue was rooted in the issue of the DCWRC’s finances. This disagreement 
threatened to divide the DCWRC and produce further irritation in the process. 
Accordingly, Owen disagreed strongly with dividing the county Committee into 
separate organisations:  
 
We say that all expenditure in regard to any receiving and despatching of 
refugees intended for places outside the city area, must be equitably charged to 
the county account, and that only those expenses in regard to, and on behalf of, 
refugees actually domiciled within the city can be charged to the city account.
227
 
 
In a later letter dated 29 May 1915 to Lord Fortescue, Owen adamantly opposed 
Fortescue’s intervention. Owen believed that it was abominable that Fortescue had been 
‘bothered so unnecessarily in this Belgian matter, and that you should be placed in a 
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false position by incorrect information given you from your side’.228 He repeated that 
the arrangement that they had proposed was ‘equitable and generous, and I personally, 
am prepared to take my stand by it’.229  However, Owen admitted within this letter that 
‘if, and when you have spent £1,000, your Committee is still wanting funds to carry on, 
and we have any money at all, I shall use my best endeavours to get my Committee to 
give you a further sum: we want to help the Belgians generally’.230 He revealed that his 
Committee agreed him and resented the effort to drag Fortescue to ‘jockey us into an 
unfair position by means of non-existent agreements and understandings’.231 Although 
the Belgian refugees in Devon provided some public figures with an opportunity and 
means to promote their patriotic credentials, it is clear that this spirit of co-operation 
amongst Devon’s elite towards the Belgians was undermined in 1915 by upper class 
tribalism. 
 
It can be deduced that the success of some charities in Devon was based upon their 
pragmatic approach to support the war effort. This was evident in the collection of eggs 
which was regarded by a significant portion of Devon’s population as an appropriate 
contribution and a practical way to engage with the war effort through the donation of 
produce. The intention of the organisation that collected these eggs from Devon’s 
population, known as National Egg Collection for the Wounded (NECW), was to 
deliver ‘newly laid eggs to wounded soldiers and sailors in base hospitals or collect 
funds to do so’.232 In a letter dated 11 January 1915 from Mr A. Charles of the 
Cavendish Association to Lord Fortescue, Charles sought to further encourage the 
NECW’s activities within Devon. By writing this short letter Charles affectingly wanted 
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Fortescue’s public support, which he believed would help support his organisation’s 
efforts:  
 
The National Egg Collection for our wounded soldiers and sailors has my entire 
sympathy, and I trust that the people of Devonshire will respond to the urgent 
appeal made by the Committee for New Laid Eggs for all who are in a position 
to supply them; and for cash donations, with which eggs may be purchased from 
those who are not in a position to supply eggs to the collection.
233
 
 
If Charles could gain Fortescue’s endorsement, the NECW would have acquired the 
sponsorship of the Fortescue family. This letter confirms that as the Lord Lieutenant of 
Devon, Fortescue’s name and approval carried a great sense of respect and important 
popular currency amongst Devonian society. In response to Charles’ appeal, Fortescue 
found that the donation of fresh eggs was a scheme which did not appeal to his 
sensibilities. He was sceptical whether these items were ‘absolutely necessary’ for the 
sick and the wounded. Fortescue argued that were not ‘bread, milk and other provisions 
not to mention drugs, linen and scores of other things’ more necessary.234 In essence, he 
believed that the basis of the entire proposal was essentially flawed in that unless the 
egg producers were ‘asked to give them gratis I do not see why producers of eggs 
should be asked to give what is virtually a subscription over and above the taxation they 
bear, in order to relieve the general taxpayer of his plain duty’.235 This point about egg 
producers is a valuable one to consider because they needed to continue earning a 
living. To answer the NECW’s call to donate eggs, these egg producers would be going 
beyond their current output. It would also lead them to suffer a severe disadvantage 
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when compared to the general taxpayer. Consequently, this would produce an 
unbalanced subscription system. Yet, despite these criticisms towards this patriotic 
proposal, Fortescue was willing to offer a compromise:  
 
I would gladly however write a letter suggesting to the producers of eggs, who 
are for the most part cottagers, small holders and small farmers that they should 
give the first chance of purchase to any persons authorised to buy on behalf of 
the hospitals.
236
 
 
Notwithstanding the validity of Fortescue’s comments, it would seem that these remarks 
were out of touch when compared to the great popularity of this activity in Devon.
237
 
For instance, during the first week of August 1915 it was reported that in Okehampton 
‘540 eggs were collected’ from the population of the town.238 On first impression, the 
donation of eggs may seem to be a trivial matter but to Devon’s rural and urban 
communities the contribution of eggs for the war effort was a deeply symbolic gesture. 
It is important to note that the egg was also a symbol of hope in the Christian faith. It 
could also be interpreted that eggs acted as a donation which encapsulated an emotional 
form of mutual connection between loved ones in the military or to anonymous 
individuals.
239
 Similarly by writing messages, painting pictures, and pencilling their 
name and address onto these items, they became tokens of communication, as important 
as letters and postcards. This exchange between individuals of common experiences is 
vital in understanding the importance of charities and the concept of donation during the 
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war. The act to donate an egg by its very simplicity resonated amongst the sensibilities 
of Devon’s rural communities and helped to underline its popularity across the county. 
 
The Organisation of the Rural Economy 
The creation of county-based War Agricultural Committees during the summer of 1915 
was a part of the ‘totalizing logic’ of the war. The British Government increased its 
intervention in agriculture because ‘all the resources of the country had to be harnessed 
in the pursuit of victory’.240 The agricultural output of an essentially rural county like 
Devon was vital for the war effort. In turn, the formation of these supervisory 
organisations was a reflection of the importance of county-based agencies. Indeed, they 
worked with local County Councils in order to ‘organise the supply of labour, examine 
food production in their localities and report on shortages of supply’.241 It was intended 
that these county agencies, which comprised of prominent members of the local 
community, would increase co-ordination between local food production and the 
national food supply through the co-operation of farmers. However, despite the 
incentives to increase production, the most important point to farmers was the 
manpower required to collect the harvest. This was evident in the minutes of the Devon 
War Agricultural Committee (DWAC) during 1915 which focused more on the issue of 
labour to bring in the harvest rather than increased food production. Yet, as mentioned 
previously, Devon’s farmers believed that to produce food for the nation was their 
wartime duty.  
 
This aspect was also evident at a dinner held on 9 February 1915 for the Okehampton 
Branch of the NFU when the Liberal MP for Tavistock, John Spear said that he believed 
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that Devon’s farmers would ‘gladly pay their portion of the cost of the war and they 
were not indifferent to their responsibilities in contributing to the food supply’.242 The 
rise in the price of food was a serious matter, and if ‘farmers were not in a position to 
grow food stuffs, owing to their not having the men to harvest the produce, the present 
state of things would be aggravated’.243  It is clear that the assurances that were made by 
farmers at meetings of the NFU in Devon meant that farmers were not ignorant of their 
responsibilities towards the war effort. However, to some ‘provincial patriots’ the 
justification to grow food for the nation to keep their sons at home on the farm seemed 
to be more an excuse than a plausible reason. During a recruiting march in Torrington, 
one farmer whose two sons were serving in the armed forces was critical of the stance 
of his fellow agriculturalists: ‘They won't let their sons go anywhere; they tie them 
down to the farm … One or two of the boys have made a bolt for it, but in most cases 
the father puts his foot down’.244 The reason for the farmers’ insistence on keeping their 
sons was that they were afraid that they would have to pay the remaining labourers a 
higher wage. Indeed, some saw them keeping their sons as their strategy to keep the 
business of the farm running as usual.
245
    
 
The sea fishermen of Devon also experienced similar hardships in respect of manpower 
which had become exacerbated due to the loss of fishermen who had joined the Navy. 
At the meeting of the Devon Sea Fisheries Committee (DSFC) on 7 January 1915, one 
committee member proposed a solution to the problem. The committee member 
suggested that Belgian refugees who had been fishermen could be used as replacement 
labour on Devon’s fishing boats. He reported to the DSFC that they had been formerly 
been used on some of their vessels and the results were satisfactory. However, they had 
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been stopped by the authorities who refused to grant permission for fishing boats to be 
‘manned by other than British hands’.246 After consulting with the Board of Agriculture 
and Fisheries (BAF) on the matter, Dr H. C. Martin, the DSFC’s representative for 
Exmouth, revealed that the BAF could not allow ‘aliens with our fishing fleet’.247 Mr 
Saunders agreed that whilst these precautions were necessary to prevent German spies 
from boarding their vessels, could the Government not ease their restrictions to aliens in 
respect of experienced Belgian fishermen. Saunders repeated the sense of urgency to 
this issue because every week more fishermen were joining the colours. Some of the 
owners, he believed, would be ‘ruined if the vessels remained idle for much longer’.248 
Saunders suggested a compromise which meant that three quarters of all fishing vessels 
should be crewed by Englishmen and the ‘remainder properly certified Belgians’.249 
After considering the matter, the DSFC decided to carry the motion unanimously. 
 
Another proposed alternative was the introduction of motor power. The Government 
had provided ‘£2,000 for experimentation with motor power in trawlers, including 
installation of a motor capstan for each vessel’.250 The fishermen, who were in this 
proposition, were invited to register their interest with the DSFC and to meet Stephen 
Reynolds, the ISWF, to discuss the utilisation of motor engines on their boats.
251
 
However, it was clear in May 1915 that despite the prospect of introducing motor power 
in some fishing vessels, the issue of manpower continued to hamper the fishing industry 
in Brixham as 800 fishermen from the town had enlisted into the Navy.
252
 According to 
a correspondent from the Western Times, there were 25 fishing boats that were idle in 
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the port and that many of the boats that were going to sea were short-handed.
253
 
However, despite these difficulties, the fishermen obtained the same ‘result from their 
labour as they would under normal conditions’.254 Even into the autumn of 1915, 
Reynolds revealed in a letter to H. G. Maurice that fishermen in Devon and the 
Westcountry continued to experience considerable difficulty to get ‘crews for winter 
herrings and mackerel, even for motor boats’.255 In fact, he warned Maurice that if they 
were to lose more fishermen then ‘we shall be in an awful mess’.256  In light of his 
personal experience, Reynolds believed that the ‘fishing community ought to be 
reserved by the admiralty’.257 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fishermen of both Devon 
and Cornwall had volunteered for the Navy. In his opinion, the naval experience of 
these men meant that they were indispensable and he was adamant that fishermen could 
not be easily replaced by ‘suffragettes’.258 Reynolds argued that, unlike work within 
agriculture, women were unable to adapt to the conditions of sea fishing. He also 
stressed that these men were able to produce the only food that did not require 
cultivation and which did not ‘take money out of the country’.259 Indeed, from the 
perspective of Devon’s fishermen, if replacement labour was used on Devon’s fishing 
boats then this would have freed the men up for service in the Navy. 
 
For the fishermen who continued to fish in Devon’s waters during 1915, they had to 
withstand the increased demands for food and the limited fishing zone close to the 
South Devon shoreline established by the admiralty’s restrictions.260 One particular area 
that was prohibited by the Admiralty for Devon’s fishing trawlers before the war was 
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Start Bay. This particular stretch of coastline contained the entrance to the River Dart 
estuary which was in constant use by the Navy’s vessels. However, during the second 
half of 1914, under the conditions of war, Brixham’s fishermen petitioned the 
Admiralty for the restrictions to be revoked. Eventually on 11 March 1915, the BAF 
decided to re-open Start Bay as a trial for the fishermen over two years.
261
 Nonetheless, 
the DSFC pressed to appeal against the Admiralty’s restrictions upon fishing practices 
in the waters of the South Devon coast on 8 July 1915. The reason behind this was that 
many fishermen blamed the Admiralty’s strict regulations for stopping small rowing 
boats from fishing along with the practice of fishing by night, which caused ‘a  great 
deal of destitution among fishermen’.262 Captain Manley argued that if the Admiralty 
would allow ‘small rowing boats to fish for lobsters and crabs, it would be a great boon 
to the men’.263 Mr Windeatt reported that the Civil Distress Committee (CDC) at Totnes 
had recommended that something should be ‘done in cases where Trawlers could not go 
out because of so many men joining the Navy’.264 Mr Sanders believed that the 
suffering of the fishing industry at Brixham arose ‘partly from the Admiralty 
regulations, but largely owing to the number of men who had left for the war’.265 This 
was particularly evident in the Brixham fleet because the restrictions across the whole 
of Start Bay were affecting 150 to 200 vessels.
266
 The chairman suggested that there 
should be representations made in relation to the ‘damage of the crab pots and in regard 
to the stoppage of fishing by night to the Admiralty and the committee of the Prince of 
Wales relief fund’.267 In reply to Captain Willies, the chairman said that this would be 
done, with a view to getting compensation. Mr Vicary remarked that in fact all of 
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Devon’s fishermen were suffering from economic depression and if the fishermen were 
to pick one class for compensation ‘he did not know where they would end and who 
was going to pay it’.268 Subsequently, Mr Perry questioned the wisdom of applying for 
compensation for the loss sustained by the owners of vessels. 
 
The Chairman said that the issue of compensation must be dealt with by ‘private 
pressure and not by establishing a general line’.269 If it were done through a general line, 
he was concerned that this ‘would open the door to a flood of applications for all sorts 
of things’.270 In response to their application on behalf of the owners of fishing vessels, 
the CDC replied that they would not entertain the application and refused to have 
anything to do with substituting property or trade. However, as a compromise, they 
would try to relieve the affected fishermen ‘in regard to personal expenses’.271 At the 
following meeting, after very little success Mr Sander’s moved that the Earl of Morely 
be asked to use his influence with both the BAF and the Admiralty on ‘behalf of the 
men in question to their distress caused by the war’.272 Yet, it is clear in the reports of 
the DSFC that the prospect of compensation was not discussed in the later meetings of 
1915. This suggests that the enquiries about compensation for the Brixham fishermen 
with the Earl of Morley continued to meet with little success. 
 
Tourism in 1915 
The holiday season of 1914 had shown to Devon’s tourism industry how vulnerable the 
industry was to the ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. According to John Walton, the 
seaside resorts in Belgium were the most obvious holiday locations to suffer during the 
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war, due to their proximity to the battlefield.
273
 Devon’s seaside resorts such as 
Ilfracombe and Exmouth had felt the immediate consequences of the outbreak of war 
upon their business practices. The businessmen related to the tourism industry in Devon 
were concerned about what the 1915 holiday season would have in store. The 
apprehensions that they felt about the fortunes of their industry through the war years 
was not unwarranted. Upon reviewing the bad state of finances for the Harbour, 
Ilfracombe Urban District Council (IUDC) voted on 5 January 1915 in a motion carried 
by 9 votes to 3 that Mr Stentiford should be given a ‘notice of discharge for the winter 
months’.274 However, it became clear that there arose a distinct tension between the 
pursuit to preserve a pre-war holiday atmosphere and the escalating ‘totalizing logic’ of 
mobilization. The attempt to preserve this pre-war holiday atmosphere was evident in 
the advertisements published by the resorts.  
 
Advertising was a life-line for continuing interest in Devon’s holiday industry. In 1915, 
advertisers for Ilfracombe attempted to combat this by appealing to a consumer's sense 
of value. One example of this is in the Springtime Resorts brochure, which was 
published by the London and South Western Railway company (LSWR) in 1915. The 
leaflet described Ilfracombe as the ‘Holiday Magnet of Devon’ and claimed that in the 
North Devon town ‘you [will] get more for nothing than any other resort’.275 In 
addition, the LSWR produced the Hints for Holidays booklet which advertised 
Ilfracombe as an ideal location for a holiday under the tagline that North Devon was the 
Fairyland of the West. The pamphlet assured the reader that this enchanted location was 
‘no better place to forget business or home care (not to mention school) whilst enjoying 
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life under its magic health-giving influence’.276 In August 1915, the LSWR also 
published another leaflet which stressed that Ilfracombe was the ‘Holiday Magnet of 
Lovely Devon’ in the hope that this would help the town’s summer holiday season of 
1915.
277
 However, some holiday advertising took to heart the government’s slogan that 
business could continue as usual and as a result were unsuccessful in 1915. By 
practicing this creed, these businesses continued their peacetime advertising campaigns. 
An example of this was a leaflet published by the Great Western Railway Company 
(GWR) that was entitled Yachting in the West. Despite the sinking of the Lusitania and 
the presence of U-Boats in the English Channel, the GWR booklet described the 
‘pleasures to be derived by sailing from Torquay to Penzance’.278 The bombardment of 
the East coast resorts of Scarborough and Whitby by the German Navy in December 
1914 had ‘made the south and east coast [resorts] look like risky destinations’.279 
However, it is clear that the consequences of mobilization made it clear to the holiday 
industry that in 1915 it was not business as usual. 
 
On 2 March 1915, Ilfracombe adopted measures to reduce the amount of lighting that 
was looking out to sea.
280
 However, the introduction of lighting restrictions in 
Ilfracombe is an important factor in the explanation as to of why the urban economy of 
the town suffered during 1915. By passing on the choice of whether to accept these 
restrictions to the Lighting Committee it revealed that the IUDC members were 
uncertain as to how to respond to this proposed wartime measure. It would appear that 
the Lighting Committee did not adapt the lighting restrictions in Ilfracombe. This is 
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evident later in the minutes for the meeting held on 1 June 1915. The IUDC agreed in 
principle that they would douse some lighting which looked outwards towards the 
Bristol Channel. However, they said that was ‘notwithstanding that certain navigation 
lights in the vicinity were kept burning’.281 Nevertheless, White reveals that the lighting 
restrictions across Devon during the conflict were regulated unequally and added to the 
pre-existing tensions in the county.
282
 An example of this is in reference to the seaside 
town of Torquay where one Teignmouth resident wrote to the Teignmouth Post to 
complain that while they sat in ‘darkness, we see other towns along the coast where 
lights are gleaming’.283 It became clear that the pre-existing contrast between the resorts 
on the North and South coast of Devon was heightened as a result of the requisitioning 
of the railway services by the Government.  
 
The plight of the tourism sector was significantly increased by the requisitioning of the 
railway system. This was evident in Scotland’s tourism industry where without reliable 
and affordable train services, the economy of the remote Highlands suffered in 1915. In 
comparison, other areas of Scotland which were less geographically remote, such as 
Dunoon, enjoyed some measure of success and ‘saw a rise in visitor numbers during the 
war’.284 The experiences of Scotland’s tourism confirm the argument that the holiday 
industry during the war was extremely vulnerable without a transport infrastructure to 
support them.
285
 In Devon, the railway companies that operated commercial lines 
through the county had to work with severely limited schedules. Accordingly, the 
limited schedules of train services had meant that the amount of trade that Devon’s 
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holiday industry could access was restricted. In addition, the number of tourists that 
travelled to specific destinations also applied to steamships because of the fact that these 
vessels were requisitioned by the Admiralty for the war effort and the Admiralty also 
imposed restrictions on certain areas of the British coastline. This was the case with the 
Isle of Man where the impact of these measures upon the island’s holiday industry was 
devastating.
286
 Ilfracombe experienced similar problems during the holiday season of 
1915. On 2 September 1915, it was reported that Ilfracombe in August would usually be 
crowded in which its ‘white beaches ought to be black with humanity. The capstone 
ought to be a human ant-hill. Bobbing heads ought very nearly to hide the water in the 
bathing pools’.287 This led a correspondent of the North Devon Journal to confess that 
this was not the Ilfracombe to which he was familiar with and that 1915 had been a 
strange season for the seaside town:    
 
There is no denying that Ilfracombe is not itself. The Welshmen from either side 
of the Bristol Channel are either away at the wars or getting coal for the Navy 
and arguing how much they ought to be paid for doing it; besides which the 
curtailment of the cross-Channel passenger traffic has gone a long way to 
isolating the town.
288
  
 
In light of the new wartime morality with its language of sacrifice and duty, it was 
perceived that to take a holiday in 1915 would be an immoral activity. On 4 August 
1915, Herbert Asquith, the Liberal Prime Minister, launched an attack against the 
holiday industry. In this statement, Asquith proclaimed an end to the policy of 
“Business as Usual” which the government had hoped to continue throughout the 
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duration of the war. As a result, Asquith sent a stark message that their business 
activities could not continue as usual since it meant the ‘division of energy which could 
be better employed in the national interest, either in supplying the needs of our fighting 
forces in the field or in making commodities for export’.289 However, there were 
individuals who believed in the importance of Devon’s holiday industry during the war. 
On 26 June 1915, the Devon and Exeter Gazette published an article entitled ‘Holidays 
in war and peace: Leisured reflections’ by an author under the initials O. S. The article 
emphasized the values of North Devon’s holiday industry. It suggested that there were 
hundreds of families in the North Devon towns ‘whose harvest is provided by the 
holiday maker, who depend for sustenance during the winter on their boarding-house 
earnings in the summer’.290 The use of a farm analogy is important to emphasise 
because it was intended for readers to sympathize with the families who operated 
tourism related businesses in North Devon. Indeed, through this association and the use 
of a distinctly farming analogy i.e. the harvest would convey to a reader that tourism 
was their livelihood rather than an unpatriotic activity: ‘sympathetic folk should not, 
from a mistaken notion that holidays are unpatriotic, withhold the patronage given in 
former years’.291 
 
The author went to great pains to emphasize that the bravery of these families and 
individuals who, despite being hit hard by the effects of the war, continued to operate 
against such misfortune. It was a very anxious time for large hotel owners because the 
idea of abandoning the taking of a holiday would also be bad for British society: ‘We 
need all the optimism we can muster in this great struggle, for it is the cheerfulness and 
confidence which will carry us through’.292 Nonetheless, despite the fact that a holiday 
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in wartime would not offer the same experience as when ‘“dove of peace” spread her 
wings over the smiling countryside’, there were still joy to found in North Devon’s 
‘delightful seascape’. 293 He argued that delights were to be found for a holiday in the 
‘romantic moorland, rambling at will beside rippling stream or ascending heather-clad 
slopes’.294 Indeed, he reaffirmed his appeals with the use of sentiments of nostalgia and 
the power of Devon’s rural iconography which was distinctly associated with the food 
which was synonymous with the county: ‘How perfectly delightful were the typical 
Devonshire teas, to which we returned, how beautifully fresh the Devonshire Cream, 
and how appetising the home-made cakes prepared by our hostess at the farmstead!’.295 
If this failed to convince the readership of the Devon and Exeter Gazette, the author 
pleaded with them to consider the wartime experiences of children: ‘For the sake of 
innocent sufferers through the war we must endeavour to cultivate the holiday spirit, 
and particularly in the interests of children, in whose thoughts dull care should surely 
find no peace’.296 He believed that to keep the children from the seaside during the 
summer of 1915 would ‘not shorten the war by a day, but it may affect the lives of 
thousands of the rising generation. Let us, then, banish pessimism, and have a 
sympathetic thought for those whose very livelihood depends on the holiday maker’.297 
 
Yet, the nationwide mobilization of the armed forces also presented business 
opportunities to the holiday industry. Walton argues that the seaside town of Blackpool 
enjoyed success during the war since it possessed a well-established infrastructure. This 
meant that Blackpool was ideally placed to take advantage of the munitions workers 
who were seeking free time from the industrial areas in the north-west of England, and 
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had money from their war bonuses to spend on the amusements in the resort.
298
 The 
billeting of troops in hotels and the conversion of hotels into convalescence hospitals 
could also explain the reason why both Brighton and Blackpool experienced some 
degree of success during the 1915 holiday season.
299
 Similarly, some hotels were used 
for the billeting of troops and some were transformed into hospitals for the wounded in 
the South Devon resorts of Paignton and Torquay. Moreover, both Exeter and Plymouth 
also benefited from the transportation and billeting of troops. 
 
Conversely, in a Western Morning News article from 16 January 1915, some businesses 
became ruthless in seeking business from military personnel. The correspondent relayed 
the news that an article in the magazine Canada had revealed that Canadian servicemen 
complained that whilst being stationed in Plymouth they were victimised by locals. This 
involved local businesses charging high prices to the Canadian contingent otherwise 
known as ‘fleecing’. This charge against some hostelries was that they had the 
‘impudence to charge the Canadians 6d. and 7d. for a bottle of Bass, for which the 
regular price at that time was 3d.’.300 By 1915, the Tourist Association of the German 
city of Freiburg saw a decrease of two thirds in the number of inquiries from tourists 
who were interested in visiting the city when compared to 1914.
301
 Chickering reveals 
that peacetime patterns of tourism did not disappear altogether because during the 1915 
summer season ‘some of the wealthy resumed their annual pilgrimages from North 
Germany to the resorts of the Black Forest’.302 Furthermore, hotel operators in Freiburg 
adapted to the conditions of wartime tourism where ‘a major portion of the guests 
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comprised friends and relatives’ of soldiers recovering in Freiburg’s hospitals.303 Hence, 
within this environment, military personnel and their families were viewed as wartime 
tourists before they were transferred to the battlefield and as such were a reliable source 
of disposable income. 
 
These were some of the ways in which tourism businesses were able to recuperate their 
wartime losses. The discrepancy between the success of South Devon resorts and those 
situated on North Devon’s coast was further amplified by the fact that the former 
accommodated troops and the latter did not. From a strategic perspective, the railway 
infrastructure in Devon meant that Torquay and other South Devon seaside resorts were 
perfect locations to billet troops, since they were to be transported to the port of 
Plymouth, whereas, billeting troops in the North Devon resorts such as Ilfracombe and 
Bideford would have been more costly and taken more time. Moreover, the risk of 
attack on the resorts of the East coast had, as a consequence, produced a ‘geographical 
concentration of demand on West Coast, South Coast and West of England resorts’.304 
Yet, the fact that troops were not billeted in Ilfracombe was an important factor in why 
IUDC pursued compensation in 1915 with the Board of Trade (BT) for the loss of trade 
as a result of the war. 
 
During a meeting of 2 November 1915, the clerk reported to IUDC that during the last 
meeting of the Executive of the Urban District Council’s Association a ‘resolution was 
submitted to ask the Government to institute an inquiry into the loss and destitution in 
East Coast towns caused by the War with a view to the same being relieved by the 
Imperial Exchequer’.305 Consequently, IUDC took great interest into the prospect of the 
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East Coast towns receiving compensation for their losses. After discussion between 
IUDC members, it was resolved that the resolution should be drafted so that ‘it applied 
to other than East Coast Towns and would thus include Ilfracombe’.306 The clerk also 
drew the IUDC’s attention to the answer recently given by the ‘President of the Local 
Government Board in the House of Commons in which he stated that the scheme for 
alleviation of exceptional distress in watering places would include any town which 
could satisfy him that it had suffered in a peculiar degree from the effects of the war’.307 
It was on this backing that the clerk suggested that IUDC should pass a resolution to ask 
that ‘Ilfracombe might be included in the scheme’.308 The scheme was passed and it was 
resolved that an application should be made to the President of the Local Government 
Board (LGB) which would ‘include Ilfracombe in the list of towns to be relieved’.309 
Yet, it is clear that the suffering of the holiday industry spurred IUDC to submit a claim 
for compensation from the BT on 16 June 1915 for the losses that they claimed were as 
a result of the war.  
 
In the compensation case for Ilfracombe harbour, IUDC members put forward a defence 
that contended that the main factor behind the resort’s misfortunes was that Admiralty 
had commandeered the boats that ran between Ilfracombe and Cardiff.
310
 This had led to 
dramatic reduction in the steamer traffic that Ilfracombe could offer to its 
holidaymakers. IUDC claimed that as a result of this reliance upon passenger traffic, the 
revenue for Ilfracombe harbour had incurred a very serious loss not only to IUDC, ‘but 
also to the town, which is largely dependent on visitors for its support’.311 According to 
IUDC’s claim, 1914 had ‘promised to be a very good year and the receipts for the 
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period April to August showed an increase of £135 over those for the corresponding 
period in 1913’.312 Their claim also declared that the loss of revenue at the harbour had 
taken a larger toll upon the business of the town. It also documented that the receipts for 
the year which ended 31 March 1915 had fallen to ‘£3,586 as compared with £4,406 in 
the previous years leaving the Council with a deficit of £448’.313 IUDC’s claim stressed 
that the outlook for 1916 was ‘even blacker as the estimated receipts from pier tolls, 
which usually amount to about £2,000, one only £65 and the Council have to face a 
probable deficit [of] over £2,800’.314 Indeed, IUDC had to face the question of ‘making 
good the deficit in the harbour revenue out of the general district rate as provided by 
section 99 of their Act of 1905’.315 This would have entailed an ‘addition of 1/3 to the 
rates, which now amount to £10 and 2 shillings’.316 According to IUDC, it was ‘very 
improbable that such a rate could be levied in the present position of things at 
Ilfracombe, which has not been compensated like many other places by the presence of 
Soldiers for the loss of the greater part of its usual visitors’.317  
 
In their response to IUDC’s claim for compensation, W. Roper pointed out that the BT 
had ‘no money with which they could give or lend to the Council’.318  However, the BT 
added the condition that if IUDC could induce their creditors to forgo the payments of 
1915 in respect of their repayment of loans, they would ‘consider favourably an 
application for an extension of the period for the repayment of loans, or if the Council 
could obtain the Sanction of the Treasury an application for a further loan to cover the 
                                                 
312
 Ibid. 
313
 Ibid. 
314
 Ibid. 
315
 Ibid., folio 3. 
316
 Ibid. 
317
 Ibid. 
318
 TNA: MT 10/1838, Harbours: Financial Position of the Pier and Harbour undertaking at Ilfracombe, 
1915, Letter from W. Roper to clerk of Ilfracombe Urban District Council, 15 June 1915, folio 8. 
193 
 
deficit’.319 Roper acknowledged that the position of Ilfracombe’s harbour was indeed 
‘closely bound up with that of the town as a whole [and] that the deputation would do 
well to pay a visit to the  L.G.B. who might be able to give them more assistance than 
the B.T.’.320 The deputation from Ilfracombe decided to pursue the case with W. Ball of 
the LGB. However, the BT was doubtful about IUDC’s chances to claim compensation 
for the loss of trade because it was ‘not alleged that the Council’s financial difficulties 
are due to the interference of the navy and military authorities so there would appear to 
be no case for compensation’.321 The report concluded that the Government could not 
accept the ‘responsibility of extricating harbour authorities from financial 
embarrassments caused by the war even if the authority is in no way responsible and 
could not have avoided their difficulties’.322 
 
For the remainder of 1915, the minutes for IUDC reveal no further reference to the issue 
of compensation. It can be deduced that IUDC received a similar response from the 
LGB and decided not to pursue their case for reimbursement any further. Consequently, 
it is clear that the war did have a more substantial impact upon Ilfracombe’s economy. 
In their reflection on Ilfracombe in 1915, the North Devon Journal revealed that the 
year would be remembered as a ‘disastrous one for the trade of the town. In some 
respects it was much worse than 1914, for in that year the service of boats was 
maintained to the end of July. But no steamers at all came during the past summer’.323 
Hence, the many traders who specifically catered to boat passengers ‘felt the loss very 
severely’.324 Subsequently, the funds for Ilfracombe Pier revealed at the end of the 
financial year that the general ratepayer would have to bear the cost, as they had also 
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suffered a heavy loss.
325
 Undeniably, the lack of excursion fares had made a ‘great 
difference to the number of visitors arriving, although this had not been so noticeable 
during the very few weeks of the holidays called “the height of the season,” as during 
the months before and after that period’.326  It had been hoped, according to the North 
Devon Journal, that the ‘comparative insecurity of some other health resorts would have 
been to the benefit of Ilfracombe, but this expectation was not realised’.327 As a result, 
during the winter of 1915-1916, Morgan reveals that several businesses including hotels 
and over 100 people, the majority of them being boarding house keepers, defaulted on 
rate payments and electricity bills at Barnstaple bankruptcy court.
328
 However, IUDC 
was not the only body to place the preservation of the town’s tourism businesses higher 
than national survival in the attempt to claim compensation.  
 
In 1915, the business activities of the Exmouth Dock Company (EDC) were 
inextricably linked to the fortunes of Exmouth’s tourism industry. Indeed, they owned 
several steamships which operated tours in Lyme Bay and relied on tourists for their 
income. Yet, it was suggested at a meeting of the Local Engineers at Exeter on 8 July 
1915 that the company’s capstan lathe and all the engineering equipment should be 
requisitioned for the manufacture of shells. At the same time, the EDC had entered into 
an agreement with the Admiralty to work on the repairs for their vessels.
329
 In their 
defence, the EDC responded to these appeals with the statement that their lathe was 
indispensable for their work with the Admiralty in order to back up their commitment to 
the war. The EDC offered a compromise in which they were ‘willing to undertake the 
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manufacture of shells at its own works’.330 During the same meeting, the secretary 
reported to the board members that the EDC’s steamship the King Edward had stopped 
running on 26 June 1915 because of the Admiralty’s interference with the timetable of 
the vessel. However, it appears that the King Edward was not the only steamer whose 
schedules had been stopped by the Admiralty, as the management had instructed the 
secretary and chairman to formulate the claim to cover ‘for the loss to [the] Company 
through stoppage of all the steamers’.331  
 
Yet, after the secretary had lodged EDC’s indemnity claim with the Compensation 
Commission, he doubted ‘whether the Commission would make any allowance on the 
grounds that the stoppage was due to a general and not to a particular order’.332 His 
remarks were prophetic, because when their claim for compensation was heard on 4 
November 1915 before the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission (DRLC) it was 
decided that there was ‘no interference with the property or the business of the 
Company in respect of which payment ought to be made to them out of Public funds’.333 
Despite the fact that the DRLC was created to handle compensation cases as a result of 
the war, it was focused on the indemnity cases arising from the disruption caused by the 
Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 (DORA). In his history of Public Requisition, G. R. 
Rubin points out that the DRLC was established under the ‘royal prerogative to disburse 
compensation as appropriate on a ex gratia basis’.334 From its inception, the DRLC 
excluded prospective loss and instead awarded compensation only for the damage or 
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‘direct loss suffered as a result of requisitioning’.335 Since it was only the operation of 
the EDC’s vessels that had been affected by the Admiralty, the EDC had little chance to 
gain compensation.  
 
Conclusion 
The intensification of the processes of ‘self-mobilization’ in recruitment efforts had not 
produced the results that the ‘provincial patriots’ yearned for. The task to reinvigorate 
recruitment efforts in Devon within the limitations of the voluntary system during 1915 
was a challenging one. It was hoped that the ignorance and indifference towards 
recruitment which pervaded some districts of Devon could be combated through the 
efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ to educate Devonians and effectively convey to them 
the importance of military service. However, the spectre of disappointment haunted 
recruitment efforts in Devon during 1915. The recruitment marches were, in reality, of 
only mixed success in stimulating enlistment rates in the county. Nevertheless, the 
‘provincial patriots’ persevered in their attempts to work within the restrictions of 
voluntary recruitment. Fortescue recalls in his memoirs that the route-marches of 1915 
in the ‘other parts [of Devon] though reinforced by bandsmen and chara bancs effected 
little’ change amongst the county’s men-folk.336 In fact, the route-marches produced 
varied results and revealed a vast contrast in the attitudes towards military service in all 
the parishes of Devon. Many of the route-marches further exposed the depth of 
indifference that was felt by some of Devon’s men-folk towards military service. These 
marches also revealed the grave extent of frustration felt by the county’s ‘provincial 
patriots’ and recruiting officials in their endeavours to convince potential recruits. At 
the same time, other districts of Devon were applauded for high recruitment rates. 
Conversely, in many cases, the appeals of the ‘provincial patriots’ on these route-
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marches failed to convince some Devonians to enlist and did not reconcile the tension 
between individual priorities and national ones.  
 
The discourses of recruitment relied upon a strong identification of local and county 
identity, the rhetoric of regional consciousness and the narrative of historical heroic 
obligation which were intended to convince Devon’s men-folk of their responsibilities 
to enlist. The representation of the Devonshire Regiment as a centre for county identity 
was also an important aspect in the discourses of recruitment. Nevertheless, despite 
their best efforts to reinvigorate enlistment rates in Devon, the ‘provincial patriots’ were 
less than fully successful in their campaigns to convince some Devonians to volunteer 
and sacrifice individual survival for national survival. The indifferent responses of 
Devon’s farmers to military service were indicative of how patriotism was not solely 
driven by militaristic sentiment in the county. This led to the idea of forming a farmers 
Pals’ Battalion in the hope that it would convince Devon’s farmers and their sons to 
enlist. However, both the first and second chapter of this thesis reinforce the suggestion 
made by White that the raising of Pals’ Battalions in Devon did not find much success. 
Despite the hope to raise a unit of 250 men, only 17 men had volunteered to join Exeter 
Pals’ Battalion. According to the Devon and Exeter Gazette, around fifty per cent of 
those who volunteered for this Pals’ Battalion came from ‘outside the boundaries of 
Devon’s ancient and loyal capital!’337 It is clear that the low recruitment figures in 1914 
and 1915 had significantly damaged Devon’s patriotic reputation. This was evident 
during a House of Common’s Debate on 29 July 1918. Mr Dillon, the Irish 
Parliamentary Party MP for East Mayo contended that up to the spring of 1915 Ireland 
had participated more enthusiastically in the war than some regions of Great Britain.
338
 
To validate his position, he argued that the people of Ireland’s county districts were 
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‘recruiting far more freely than in Devonshire or Cornwall’.339 He evoked the poor 
response of Devon’s recruitment efforts as a poignant example to construct a stark 
contrast between the patriotism of Ireland’s rural districts with those of Great Britain. 
 
Nonetheless, Devonians found other ways to present their patriotism, such as the 
county’s farmers who emphasised that to enlist in the Army was not the only way to 
present their patriotism. The success of charities reveals how the languages which 
expressed self-mobilization, resonated deeply with Devonians who were outside the 
requirements for military service or who wanted to present their involvement with the 
war effort rather than fight overseas. Charitable work was a means which individuals 
regardless of gender or age could gain moral citizenship in the wartime community of 
the Home Front. Devonians responded in a humanitarian way to the presence of the 
troops during the recruitment marches by showing their patriotism in their emotional 
support of the Devonshire Regiment in particular through the donation of food items. 
For pre-existing philanthropic organisations within the Diocese of Exeter, the war 
provided them with cause for concern since they faced stiff competition for donations 
from war charities. However, their fears proved unfounded as the pre-existing charities 
were supported with donations from Devon’s population. This meant that in 1915, local 
charities and institutions were just as important as war charities. For individuals who 
were part of Devon’s civic society, the philanthropic activities associated with the 
Belgian Refugees created internal divisions. In particular, these divisions were created 
by Earl Fortescue and the Mayor of Exeter, who competed over the jurisdiction of the 
Committee and was the authority over the Belgian Refugees. Yet, the volume of egg 
donations from the county’s populace revealed that this form of self-mobilization 
resonated amongst the different communities of Devon. Despite the fact that the NECW 
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has not received the recognition of other war charities in narratives of the Home Front, 
it was a significant and popular charity to Devonians. 
 
The introduction of the DWAC was a form of intervention into the practices of farming 
in the county. However, the issue of manpower for agriculture was a delicate issue for 
farmers which went to the heart of how patriotism manifested itself in many discourses. 
Instead of the prospect of military service, farmers believed that to produce food for the 
nation was their patriotic duty. Similarly, Devon’s sea fishermen also encountered 
similar problems in the debates surrounding manpower for their industry. The Brixham 
fishermen who continued to fish in 1915 had to work within the restrictions imposed by 
the Admiralty. This, along with the declining number of fishermen in Devon, meant that 
many fishing vessels that went to sea were only half manned or remained idle. The 
concerns over the survival of their livelihoods were paramount in their minds which led 
the Brixham fishermen to make enquires about whether they could claim compensation 
from the Admiralty for the disruption to their trawling and for the losses to their 
livelihoods. Eventually, the fishermen were informed by multiple sources that their 
attempt to claim compensation would be unsuccessful.  
 
The plight of Devon’s tourism industry during the holiday season of 1915 revealed a 
tension between the attempt to preserve a pre-war holiday atmosphere and the demands 
of the escalating ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. In light of the new wartime morality, 
it became clear that the businesses related to the holiday industry had to adapt to the 
business opportunities that mobilization presented. Nevertheless, to the businesses 
related to tourism, the survival of their industry through the uncertainty of the 1915 
holiday season was of the paramount importance. However, South Devon’s resorts 
experienced a more fortunate season in 1915 than those in North Devon. This prompted 
200 
 
IUDC to attempt to claim compensation through the BT. Therefore, IUDC assumed that 
the BT would be more sympathetic towards Ilfracombe’s plight and its claim, rather that 
if the claim had been made through the military authorities. However, IUDC was 
unsuccessful in their attempt to claim compensation. At the same time, the EDC put 
forward a claim with the DRLC for the losses that they had incurred due to the fact that 
the Admiralty had requisitioned their steamships for the war effort. Yet, this attempt 
also failed to convince the DRLC to grant compensation to the EDC. Nevertheless, both 
of these attempts to gain compensation reveal the lengths to which these authorities 
placed the preservation of their business interests over the interests of the nation.  
 
This chapter has revealed that in 1915 whilst there was a tension between individual and 
national survival there was also a tension between state driven totalization and 
voluntarism. Volunteerism in Devon during 1915 manifested itself in other ways than 
recruitment and these were more generally successful. However, in respect of charitable 
efforts, the spirit of volunteerism was successful in the name of the war effort as seen in 
the support of charities to help the Belgian Refugees and the donation of large numbers 
of eggs. Yet, at the same time, the volunteering ethos was unable to convince or 
persuade some Devonians of the necessity of military service. Devon’s elite were 
intermediaries of the war experience but they struggled to educate and convince all of 
the county’s population the importance of not only the war but also the measures which 
represented the totalization of the war effort and were deemed necessary for victory. 
They were agents of the war effort to which they exhorted the measures that attempted 
to push forward this ‘totalizing logic’. However, the desire to achieve a more ‘total’ war 
effort was one matter but to accomplish it was another. The intensification of voluntary 
mobilization as advocated by the county’s elite relied upon moral coercion and 
persuasion. Yet, Devon’s population responded to these measures in an ambiguous 
201 
 
manner which reveals a deeper and complex relationship to the war effort than has 
previously been established. Chickering suggests the schematic analysis which 
emphasizes the logic of warfare’s totalization during the early months of the war was 
not altogether wrong. He proposes the ‘initial processes of mobilization were guided by 
a logic that they [contemporaries] lacked’.340 The idea of a co-ordinated ‘totalizing 
logic’ during the beginning stages of the war ‘simplifies the complex relationships 
between military requirements and economic reorganisation’.341 In Devon, there were 
forms of mobilization that did not necessarily fit into this phenomenon of an all-
encompassing ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. Hence, the forms of mobilization that 
were popular with the county’s populace were not part of this dizzying escalation of 
mobilization. This meant that Devon’s elites were anxious to navigate through the 
ambiguous and complex terrain of self-mobilization that was evident in the responses 
from some Devonians.  
 
The intensification of the processes of self-mobilization struggled to reconcile the 
tension between individual survival and national survival. At a recruiting demonstration 
in Barnstaple on 4 November 1915, Major Leyland, an Army Recruiter, characterised 
the motto of “Business as Usual” as the ‘curse of the Country’.342 It had, according to 
Leyland, provided people with the excuse to stay at home ‘in order to sell 4d. worth of 
something, but they could depend upon it that that was no good’.343 Indeed, Leyland’s 
comments on the depths to which some of Devon’s men-folk continued to make excuses 
against the prospect of military service as some men continued to ask that if they 
volunteered ‘“How will business be done if we go?”’344 The indifferent responses and 
the discrepant results of recruitment in Devon led to speculation by local notables that 
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the limits of the voluntary system of recruiting had been reached.
345
 Similarly, at a 
meeting in Dorchester convened by the Lord Lieutenant of the Dorset, Colonel John 
Mount Batten, several speakers expressed the opinion that the ‘limit of voluntary 
recruiting had been reached, and the Chairman said the only thing to do now was to 
adopt some form of compulsion’.346  
 
At the same time, it was clear that Devon’s population recognised the intensification of 
the war and the “totalizing logic” of mobilization for total war. In their annual report for 
1915, the Baptists of the East Devon town of Bradninch believed that the war was 
taking an emotional toll upon their community: ‘all [of] our thoughts have been 
coloured by the war conditions and most rationally we have been asking ourselves what 
message the church of Christ has for the nations’.347 This emphasizes Annette Becker’s 
point that the fusion of religious and patriotic sentiments continued throughout the 
war.
348
 Moreover, it presents how some Devonians turned to religion as a mediator of 
the war experience.
349
 Indeed, the ‘numerous cultural mobilizations and remobilizations, 
and the various “sacred unions” can be understood as the continuous interaction of the 
political and spiritual’.350 This was evident in some responses from the clergy in Devon 
to the prospect of conscription. In June 1915, Alfred Earle, the Dean of Exeter, 
advocated a stronger position in that if conscription were introduced it would ‘lead the 
way to the higher life’.351 However, Earle’s statement became the subject of irony in a 
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satirical poem by W. N. Ewer entitled The Only Way.
352
 The poem went on to 
emphasize how the Dean had suggested that the war offered spiritual redemption like a 
crusade in which he had found the keys to heaven for the entire nation.
353
 To achieve 
salvation was at hand and all that mankind needed for this was conscription.
354
 After 
Herbert Asquith decided to form a Coalition Government in May 1915, it faced the 
dilemma that the recruitment system was so dilapidated that it could not cope with the 
demands for manpower for the armed forces.
355
 In response to this, the Director-General 
of Recruiting, Lord Derby, introduced the Derby Scheme in October 1915 which was 
the ‘one last effort to uphold the voluntary principle’.356 It was a registration scheme 
where ‘men would “attest” that they were ready to serve if called on, and where single 
men would be taken before married men’.357 It was hoped that the so-called Derby 
Scheme would remedy the faltering voluntary system of recruitment. However, the 
statistics of the Derby Scheme revealed that the appeals for men to attest had been more 
successful amongst married men than single men.
358
 Under the Scheme, 1.35 million 
married men had attested because they believed Asquith’s assurance that single men 
would be called upon to serve first.
359
 At the same time, the figures for male bachelors 
were not as high. Out of the 2.2 million single men of military age that were detailed as 
available on the National Register, just over a million had ignored Derby’s appeal.360 Of 
the 840,000 single men who did attest, more than ‘half a million were employed in 
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reserved occupations and almost 200,000 [men were] rated as unfit for service’.361 
Consequently, the Derby Scheme failed to convince the key male demographic that the 
Government hoped would register for the Scheme. This meant that when Lord Derby 
presented his main report on the Derby Scheme on 20 December 1915, it was clear that 
the hope to uphold the voluntary tradition of recruitment had vanished.
362
 It was this 
report that ‘effectively removed the last major obstacle to compulsory military 
service’.363 After the Derby Scheme’s failure, the Coalition Government replaced the 
voluntary system of recruitment in 1916 with the introduction of conscription in 
England, Wales and Scotland with the Military Service Act. Hence, the demands of the 
war effort necessitated ‘greater co-ordination and centralization of services and 
functions’.364 The Act had ramifications beyond recruitment to dramatically affect 
wartime politics on the Home Front and the very definition of wartime citizenship. 
However, the implementation of conscription in Devon gave the ‘provincial patriots’ a 
means to extend their campaigns of superintending the patriotism of Devon’s men-folk 
as well as a new platform to broadcast and prescribe acceptable codes of wartime 
behaviour to the  county’s population. 
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Chapter 3: 
The changing dynamics of wartime citizenship 
1916 
 
Introduction 
By 1916, the faltering pace of recruitment across Great Britain during 1915 had led 
many politicians and army recruiters to conclude that the existing system of voluntary 
recruitment was inadequate.
1
 According to Adrian Gregory, a popular sense had grown 
across Britain that the voluntary system had become ‘inequitable with the patriotically 
minded, including the fathers of families, being exploited, whilst others shamelessly 
shirked their duty’.2 Notwithstanding the claim that Devon was one of the most loyal 
and patriotic counties in England, recruitment figures from the county since the 
beginning of the conflict were lower than Devon’s neighbouring counties.3 During 
1915, the campaign to reinvigorate the fortunes of voluntary recruitment in Devon had 
been met with decidedly mixed success. Whilst recruitment figures from certain 
districts of Devon were on the rise, there were still many instances where this 
intensified campaign of voluntary recruitment failed to change the minds of Devon’s 
men-folk who, in the view of the recruiters, placed self-interest above national interest 
and their own individual priorities over those of the nation.
4
  
 
This was evident in January 1916 when Tremar resident Edrica de la Pole noted in her 
diary that when Bill, the local blacksmith of the South Devon village of Kingston, had 
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protested against being called up under the Derby Scheme she concluded that the men 
of Kingston ‘all find the War “all right” until it touches them – then they yelp’.5 In the 
case of the village blacksmith, de la Pole reveals that Bill is the last in the line of a 
family of blacksmiths who had continued to support the business for 150 years.
6
 De la 
Pole’s assessment emphasises how some of Devon’s men-folk continued to regard the 
War with indifference and were more concerned with local priorities. This attitude 
remained until the conflict had intruded upon the possibility of their individual survival 
through the war years and once this intrusion was established the county’s men 
painfully protested against it. Hence, the indifference and hesitation exhibited by some 
of Devon’s men-folk towards the appeals to enlist reinforced the challenges that the 
‘provincial patriots’ had to face in their attempts to reconcile the tension between 
individual survival and national survival. The disappointing experiences of voluntary 
recruitment efforts in Devon led many Devonians to conclude that voluntary enlistment 
had reached the limit of what it could achieve in the county. On 11 January 1916, 
Colonel Sir Robert White-Thomson, the Chairman of the Tavistock Division of the 
DPRC, remarked pessimistically that if Devon’s men-folk ‘could not rise to the height 
that the sense of duty should inspire them with, then there was nothing to do but what 
the continental nations did’.7 Indeed, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and other 
belligerents had previously established systems of compulsory military service.
8
 
 
The legislation that introduced conscription in England, Wales and Scotland was the 
Military Service Bill (MSB). Before the Bill received Royal Assent, Earl Fortescue 
attempted to educate the county’s population that the MSB was not a direct continuation 
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of policies established under the Derby Scheme. After witnessing Fortescue’s speech on 
the MSB to a crowd at South Molton on 20 January 1916, the correspondent for the 
Devon and Exeter Gazette hoped that Fortescue’s remarks would ‘perhaps convince 
some men who desire to shirk their national responsibilities that it will not be quite so 
easy to gain their wishes as they imagine’.9 Based upon some of the responses from 
Devon’s men towards appeals to enlist, it could be ventured that Fortescue intended to 
warn shirkers that unlike voluntary recruitment they could not evade conscription. Yet, 
it appeared to the correspondent that conscription would fail to regulate the allocation of 
manpower that Fortescue hoped to achieve because during the meeting he noted that it 
was ‘more or less [in] common talk that local tribunals [in Devon] are going to be very 
lenient with those who come before them’.10 On 10 February 1916, the Military Service 
Act (MSA) came into force thereby inaugurating conscription in England, Wales and 
Scotland but not Ireland.
11
 The Act initially stipulated that conscription would apply 
only to ‘unmarried men, and widowers without children or dependants, between the 
ages of eighteen and forty-one’ and that conscription would not apply to married men or 
to men who were ‘engaged on important war work, the sole supporters of dependants, 
the unfit and approved conscientious objectors’.12 Later in May 1916, a second MSA 
was passed in Parliament which introduced full conscription to extend to all men aged 
from eighteen to forty-one.
13
 However, the system of conscription heralded by the MSA 
necessitated the organisation of a vast network of tribunals across England, Wales and 
Scotland.  
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Previously, in 1915, a system of around two thousand local tribunals had been 
established by the LGB under the Derby Scheme. This was a registration scheme where 
men could attest their willingness to be conscripted when called upon to do so.
14
 Yet, 
this system changed under the MSA as the men who were called up could appeal for 
exemption against the prospect of being drafted into the Army at local tribunals. These 
tribunals comprised notable figures from local civil society who had volunteered to face 
the task of arbitrating upon the appeals for exemption. In addition, the tribunal panels 
also contained a representative from the military and a representative of the BAF who 
represented the interests of farmers and fishermen during the hearings which were 
conducted on both a local and county level. In their judgements of the appeals, the 
members of tribunals had to ascertain whether the individual was indispensable to their 
respective employment and decide whether he should or should not be drafted into the 
Army.
15
 Moreover, the MSA also established a new level of tribunal which served each 
county across England, Wales and Scotland in which ‘applicants [who were] 
dissatisfied with the decisions of their local Tribunals, had the right to appeal’.16 At the 
same time, the Military possessed the right to appeal against the exemptions granted by 
local tribunals. Consequently, this meant that the implementation of the MSA was not a 
centralised process. Instead, these appeals against conscription and the demands from 
the military were adjudicated upon through the efforts of local volunteers and local 
notables from civil society who constituted the panels of local tribunals.
17
 According to 
James McDermott, these tribunals overwhelmingly comprised of men and in some cases 
women who ‘were intended in Walter Long’s words to “command public confidence”’ 
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in the conscription process.
18
 In their consideration of individual appeals, members of 
tribunals had to balance these contending demands between their respective 
communities and those of the military. This meant that the Military Service Tribunals 
(MST) provided ‘a site, where agents of the state pursued military manpower in the face 
of individual opposition and economic interests’.19 Consequently, these panels helped to 
determine the provision of manpower for the British Army from 1916 to 1918.  
 
The MSA had immediate ramifications for the Home Front and the British war effort.
20
 
As a result, the system of conscription heralded by the MSA dramatically affected 
wartime politics on the Home Front and redefined gendered notions of citizenship in the 
wartime community in Britain.
21
 Nicoletta F. Gullace suggests that the introduction of 
conscription brought forth the redefinition of wartime citizenship in Britain.
22
 To some 
of the British population, conscription represented the failure of male citizenship to 
recognise that citizenship was defined through national service.
23
 At the same time, 
Susan R. Grayzel argues that ‘changing notions of women’s wartime civic behaviour in 
Britain and France prompted new debates over the relationship between service and 
citizenship’.24 These debates were especially poignant in Britain after the introduction 
of conscription in 1916 because ‘what constituted citizenship and what qualities and/or 
actions then entitled citizens – including women – to vote became increasingly caught 
up with how military service and patriotic action were to be recognized’.25 In fact, 
women could claim wartime citizenship on the Home Front through endeavours such as 
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charitable activities and constituted claims which became a reflection of the strength of 
their patriotism.
26
 Grayzel also suggests that the transposition of the term of slacker to 
apply to women as well as men helped to define ‘women’s service as not a voluntary 
charity (a luxury) but the fulfilment of an obligation to the country’.27 Indeed, whilst the 
incorporation of female labour into British industries had previously been slow, it 
gained momentum ‘after the introduction of military conscription in 1916’.28 Despite 
the fact that conscription added greater importance and urgency for employers to 
consider the prospect of female labour to replace the vacuum of manpower, it is clear 
that not all contemporaries were convinced of the necessity to employ women. 
Therefore, the impact of conscription on the British Home Front was significant due to 
the fact that it had ramifications beyond the drafting of manpower for the Military. 
 
This chapter will assess the county of Devon during 1916. Firstly, there will be an 
analysis of the MSA tribunals in Devon and the individuals from Devon’s civil society 
that constituted the county’s tribunal panels. However, the process of adjudicating the 
appeals for conscription from Devon’s men-folk provided the county’s elite with a new 
avenue to extend their campaign of superintendence of wartime behaviour, the social 
morality of wartime and the nature of patriotism in Devon. At the same time, Devon’s 
notables on the Devon Appeal Tribunal (DAT) encountered great difficulties in 
administering a system of conscription which was universally effective across Devon. It 
is clear that there was a tension between the priorities of the MSA tribunals in the 
periphery of Devon and the DAT in the centre.  
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Secondly, there will be a reflection on the subject of gender in Devon which will 
encompass an examination of the experiences of Devon’s men and women to claim 
citizenship on the Home Front during 1916. Previously, the county’s women were able 
to present their patriotism and claim humanitarian citizenship on the Home Front. Yet, 
Devonians who were outside the requirements of military service continued to view 
charitable endeavours during 1916 as an important form of mobilization and a vital 
means to support the war effort. Notwithstanding the introduction of conscription as an 
example of state driven totalization, the voluntary tradition continued to resonate with 
the humanitarian sensibilities of Devonians. It will also reveal that attitudes from 
Devon’s residents towards female labour in 1916 did not immediately change. Instead, 
female labour was met by various farmers and workers in Devon with a begrudging and 
hesitant reaction. Certain interest groups in Devon were primarily concerned about how 
to preserve their jobs through the War. These instances further emphasize the 
prevalence of the tension between individual priorities and national ones in Devon. 
Therefore, despite the introduction of conscription, Devonians understood the wider 
importance to maintain the local economy of Devon. 
 
Thirdly, there will be an examination of the threat that was perceived to be posed by 
some of Devon’s residents who were viewed as internal enemies. The rise of 
Germanophobia led to an obscuring of nationalities on the British Home Front. This 
was evident with Plymouth’s Jewish community who were suspected and targeted as 
Germans. The Franco-German community of Benedictine Monks at Buckfast Abbey 
were viewed with similar suspicions by Buckfastleigh’s population and the residents of 
surrounding area who alleged that the monks were German agents. This led to 
continued attempts by local councillors and MP’s to make requests to the Home Office 
(HO) for Buckfast’s monks to be relocated to an internment camp. Subsequently, the 
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strong anxieties felt by some local residents surrounding the Abbey gave members of 
Devon’s notables valid justification to commence a campaign of vigilance to monitor 
the wartime behaviour of Buckfast’s Monks.  
 
Focusing on 1916 provides an opportunity to examine how conscription changed the 
Home Front on a local level and show that the local elite did not just arbitrate upon the 
competing demands of the military and their respective localities when considering the 
appeals for exemption from military service. Through a critical exploration of Stephen 
Reynolds’s definition of Devon’s elite as the superintendents of patriotism, this chapter 
will instead argue that the county’s elite tried to extend their superintendence of the 
wartime behaviour of Devonians. Like an officer of law and order who would bring a 
lawbreaker to face justice, several local notables believed that the system of 
conscription would bring the shirkers into the public gaze through the semi-judicial 
proceedings of a local tribunal to account for their lacklustre attitude towards military 
service. They viewed their activities on the panels on local tribunals as a way to bring 
the men that they deemed to be shirkers in Devon to book in order to face justice before 
a tribunal board. Devon’s tribunals were a form of outreach for the police-men and 
women of patriotism in which they could attempt to enforce the social morality of 
wartime and as a platform to broadcast their prescriptions of ideal civilian behaviour to 
the county’s population. In fact, the process of adjudicating upon the verdicts of 
individual appeals meant that the ‘provincial patriots’ could attempt to police and 
control the discourses of patriotism by labelling what behaviour was patriotic and what 
was not. These value-judgments about the nature of the patriotism of Devon’s men from 
the ‘provincial patriots’ also reached a wider audience throughout the county with the 
commentaries of local correspondents being published in the local press. By 
understanding Devon’s tribunals and the local notables who comprised the tribunal 
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panels as the superintendents of patriotism in this manner, this will provide a deeper 
understanding of this complicated role for Devon’s elite. 
 
Yet despite the ‘provincial patriots’ ambitions for the effectiveness of conscription in 
the county, it was clear that the system of conscription was not a universally effective 
judiciary system for the arbitration of manpower. It became apparent that not all 
members of the local elite in the county shared the same aspiration to create a truly 
impartial system of manpower to balance the needs of the local and the military across 
Devon. Similarly, the efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ to prescribe how the county’s 
population should behave and respond to the consequences of conscription were not 
universally successful. Indeed, the ‘provincial patriots’ advocated for the monitoring of 
other individuals in Devon whose loyalty and patriotism they deemed to be in doubt. 
This chapter will also emphasize that the ‘provincial patriots’ attempted to resolve the 
tension between individual survival and national survival which was present in the 
responses of some Devonians. The evidence presented in this chapter emphasizes the 
ambiguity and hesitation of some Devonians towards the demands placed upon them in 
the name of the war effort. It also suggests that Devon’s population attempted to 
navigate through the challenges of 1916 and there people in the county who still did not 
regard the war effort as an all-embracing principle or consider the war effort to be the 
pre-eminent issue.  
 
Military Service Tribunals and the policing of patriotism in Devon 
When the MSA came into force on 20 February 1916, the system of conscription was 
primarily arbitrated on a local level. In Devon, appeals for exemption from military 
service were reviewed primarily through the county’s local Tribunals. It was these local 
tribunals across Devon’s rural and urban localities that conducted the hearings and 
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judgement of the appeals for exemption on a local level. This meant that the tribunals in 
Devon ‘provided a site, where agents of the state pursued military power in the face of 
individual opposition and local economic interests’.29 However, if an individual or the 
Military decided to appeal against the decision of a local tribunal in Devon, their appeal 
would be subject to a re-examination before a panel of the DAT. The right to appeal 
against these decisions was an important safeguard for individuals because it was 
implemented to ‘avoid doing needless damage to the economic fabric of localities, to 
protect families from unnecessary hardship and to allow the process of conscription to 
be fair and be seen as fair’.30 In fact, it was the members of these tribunal panels who 
had the heavy responsibility of applying the criteria of the MSA in order to decide ‘who 
should be exempted and who should go into the Army, and, as such decisions 
necessarily had to be based upon consideration of personal circumstances’.31 Gregory 
has argued that the Tribunals in specific localities operated in a very local context, to the 
extent that ‘tribunals constituted a site in which competing societal interests were 
weighed up’.32 This meant that Devon’s notables on the county’s local and Appeal 
Tribunals needed to weigh up in their adjudications competing priorities between the 
Front and the Home Front including the necessity of military service whilst maintaining 
food production and industrial output.  
 
The body that undertook the arbitration of appeals against the decisions made by local 
tribunals in Devon was the DAT which was established on 3 March 1916.
33
 The DAT 
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covered the county of Devon as well as the county boroughs of Exeter and Plymouth.
34
 
This meant that the appeals directed to the DAT were allocated between the sessions of 
three panels and would cover the administrative boundaries of Devon.
35
 The North 
Devon panel covered the ‘rural districts of Barnstaple, Bideford, Southmolton, and 
Torrington, and the urban districts and boroughs within and adjacent to them (sic)’.36 
This encompassed a population of about 30,000 with Barnstaple being the normal 
location where the North Panel of the DAT would meet.
37
 The South Devon panel 
consisted of the borough of Plymouth as well as the ‘rural districts of Kingsbridge, 
Plympton, Totnes, Tavistock, and Broadwoodwidger, within the boroughs and districts 
within them’.38 This district covered 300,000 of Devon’s populace with Plymouth the 
place to meet as it was on the border with the Southern District.
39
 Lastly, the Central 
panel contained the ‘city of Exeter, the borough of Torquay and the remainder of the 
county’.40  
 
Across the county, it was the men and women who were volunteers from Devon’s civil 
society which constituted the DAT and arbitrated upon these appeals. One of the DAT’s 
chairmen was the Tiverton industrialist, Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory.
41
 However, it is clear 
that with his new role as a chairman of the DAT, Heathcoat-Amory wanted to present 
himself in a more judicial light, despite the fact that he had earned a reputation as a 
benevolent employer towards his employees. This was evident in the description of him 
presented in the Western Times on 20 April 1916 to mark his birthday. It applauded the 
work of Heathcoat-Amory as one of ‘Devon’s busy men who yet find time to do a great 
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deal of work for the general community’.42 Yet, as the DAT’s Chairman, the 
correspondent for the newspaper argued that Heathcoat-Amory wielded a ‘power in the 
County that is truly formidable’.43 It was claimed that the impressive power he 
exercised across Devon as a Chairman of the DAT meant that it was with ‘fear and 
trembling that mere mortals dare to whisper his name’.44 The correspondent posited a 
rhetorical question that the reason for the apprehension of some residents in Devon was 
that Heathcoat-Amory held the ‘Sword of Damocles over the fates of men’.45 Through 
evoking classical mythology (the legend of the Sword of Damocles emphasized the 
sense of foreboding and inevitable tragedy that lingers over an individual’s fate) the 
correspondent arguably intended to instruct Devon’s men that they were all accountable 
under the system of conscription. In particular, the correspondent warned the 
newspaper’s readership that ‘let the trickster beware’ because when Heathcoat-Amory 
reviewed the appeal he would bring them to face justice and he was ‘not a man to be 
easily duped’.46 In fact, this portrayal of Heathcoat-Amory asserted that he possessed 
the ‘eye of a hawk for insecurity, and, when he has spotted it, all the tenderness will 
freeze to withering, but courteous, austerity’.47 At the same time, the correspondent 
reassured the newspaper’s readership that to a man standing before the Tribunal panel 
whose story was sincere they had ‘nothing to fear’ from Heathcoat-Amory.48 Gregory 
points out that the members of tribunals had to undertake a delicate balancing act to 
which they ‘needed to reflect popular opinion by not tolerating “shirking” whilst at the 
same time providing adequate benefit of the doubt in dealing with “genuine” cases’.49 
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To further reaffirm the sincerity of Heathcoat-Amory as a compassionate but judicious 
chairman, the correspondent provided a depiction of a typical hearing at the DAT to the 
readers of the newspaper. This characteristic portrayal was complete with an assessment 
from Heathcoat-Amory in which when an individual stood before him they would 
‘listen to that clear, deep resonate voice, telling you kindly and yet so firmly how urgent 
is your country’s need’.50 During the hearing, an individual would listen to the verdict 
‘with dread, and turn to leave the Court in a brain-whirl – your fortunes shattered, your 
very home, maybe crumbling to atoms around you’.51 After this realisation, the 
correspondent proposed that the appellant should accept Heathcoat-Amory’s verdict ‘as 
you would accept the inevitable’ because a ‘gentleman has truly spoken. Justice has 
been done. And, which counts more with your troubled soul, you feel that it has been 
tempered with compassion’.52 It could be argued that the Western Times columnist also 
intended to prescribe an expectation of how potential appellants should behave when 
they are confronted with the unavoidable prospect of military service and possibly even 
death. They were also presented with how tribunalists judged the rights of the individual 
against ‘the demands of the nation within a set of rules’.53 Moreover, this portrayal of 
Heathcoat-Amory was envisioned not only to proclaim the strength of his own abilities 
and sincerity as the DAT’s chairman but overall command the confidence of the 
county’s populace in the system of conscription.  
 
Another chairman of the DAT was the recorder of Tiverton, Sir Trehawke Kekewich. 
He travelled extensively across Devon and assiduously attended the sitting of the three 
panels of the DAT at Plymouth, Exeter and North Devon.
54
 Other members of the DAT 
included notable figures from the county, Sidney Redcliff Chope who was the Mayor of 
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Bideford.
55
 Furthermore, the DAT’s membership also included three women who were 
important local dignitaries: Mrs Jessie Rowell, Miss Mary Sylvia Calmady-Hamlyn and 
Miss Rosalie Caroline Chichester.
56
 It is apparent that these local notables were intent to 
act upon on commanding the confidence of Devon’s population in arbitrating the 
system of conscription in the county. This was evident in the review of the first session 
of the Exeter Panel of the DAT on 17 March 1916. The correspondent for the Devon 
and Exeter Gazette proposed that ‘it was felt that the gentlemen who had previously 
heard the evidence of the applicants had taken a fair view of the surrounding 
circumstances and meted out justice to those who appeared before them’.57 In fact, the 
correspondent placed an emphasis upon the abilities of one particular gentleman on the 
tribunal because he suggested that Heathcoat-Amory who presided over the first session 
‘proved himself [to be] an able chairman’.58 This first session led the columnist to 
deduce that all ‘appeals which come before the Panel will certainly receive a 
sympathetic and impartial hearing, but it is patent that sacrifices will have to be made 
by employers and employed’.59  
 
Yet, it is clear through the hearings of Devon’s local and Appeal Tribunals in that 
occurred during 1916 that the county’s elite used these tribunals as a platform to further 
extend their campaigns of superintendence. Upon the review of an individual’s appeal 
for exemption, the members of tribunals across Devon could also make exhortations and 
judgements about the character of this individual’s patriotism. For instance, during a 
session of the tribunal of the East Devon village of Culmstock on 23 February 1916, the 
tribunal members adjudicated upon the case of a local baker’s son. According to the 
coverage of the Western Times, the baker was given two weeks to find a replacement for 
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his son to which the baker replied that his son was quite ready to do his duty.
60
 In 
response to this statement, the Tribunal remarked that this ‘was a very patriotic attitude’ 
to take.
61
 Another example of this was the hearing that took place on 6 May 1916 at the 
Teignmouth Tribunal where the Military had made applications for four men to be 
unstarred. Out of these four applications, only one appealed against the draft. The 
members of the Tribunal proposed that considering the fact that the three men had 
agreed to be conscripted it had revealed the patriotic spirit of the men.
62
 Hence, it can be 
ventured that these examples of ‘patriotic’ responses from Devon’s Tribunals worked in 
a similar manner to ‘patriotic’ families. These were families who were praised by 
members of Devon’s elite and publicised in the local press as ‘patriotic’ examples due 
to the fact that they had more than one son who had more than one son that had 
enlisted.
63
 These patriotic examples were intended not only to educate individuals to 
aspire to these standards of patriotism but also to shame unpatriotic families whose son 
or sons had not volunteered.
64
 Similarly, the publication of ‘patriotic’ examples from 
Devon’s Tribunals in the local press was intended not only to inform Devon’s men-folk 
of the expectation of how they should respond to the verdict of the tribunal but also to 
shame ‘unpatriotic’ individuals.  
 
The same is also true of examples of what was considered to be, in the view of the 
‘provincial patriots’, to be ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour. This was especially apparent during 
the Exeter Panel of the DAT on 9 June 1916 with the case of Clement A. W. Carveth. 
The Military had appealed against the decision of the Okehampton Tribunal to grant 
Carveth exemption for six months. Carveth’s employer, Mr Blatchford stated in his 
defence that out of the 44 men at his furnishers and building merchants he had ‘only 
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appealed for this man’.65 Blatchford claimed that he was unfairly targeted by the 
military because there were other local businesses in the mid-Devon town that had ‘kept 
their apprentices and had come before the tribunal and scored’.66 In fact, Blatchford 
attempted to reaffirm the sincerity of his small request when he proclaimed that he did 
support equality of sacrifice and he had ‘only asked for this man for the summer out of 
the whole of the staff [of his business]’.67 In response to his defence, Heathcoat-Amory 
who chaired this session of the DAT stated that whilst the tribunal members regretted 
that there were ‘many young men left in unnecessary occupations’ in Okehampton, they 
were not prepared to overrule the Military’s appeal against Carveth’s exemption.68 As a 
direct result of the tribunal’s verdict, the correspondent for the Western Times observed 
that Blatchford was angry at the verdict because he intimated that in the future he would 
not offer his apprentices to the Army.
69
 After hearing this, Heathcoat-Amory replied to 
Blatchford that ‘I am sorry your patriotism is so thin’.70 This statement from Heathcoat-
Amory reveals how tribunal members could use the behaviour of the applicants or their 
employers to make pronouncements about the character of the patriotism that they 
exhibited during the hearing.  
 
Yet, the statements made by both Blatchford and Heathcoat-Amory present important 
points concerning the relationship between a tribunal member and the employer 
attempting to gain exemption for his employee. Firstly, Blatchford’s resentment towards 
the verdict of the tribunal seemed to reflect that there was a dichotomy between his 
priority to keep Carveth to help ensure the individual survival of his business and the 
priorities of Heathcoat-Amory as the DAT’s Chairman. The lack of consideration from 
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Heathcoat-Amory towards Carveth’s sincerity also reinforces McDermott’s suggestion 
that tribunalists were viewed with a degree of ‘otherness’ which ‘in relation to their 
wider communities emphasized the underlying anomaly of their role’.71 Decisions such 
as the uncompassionate response of the appeal panel towards an individual application 
for exemption or a businessman’s attempt to gain exemption for his workforce helped to 
imbue some of the tribunal panels with a quality of ‘otherness’ which ‘emphasized the 
underlying ambiguity of the tribunalists’ role and how it was perceived [on a local 
level]’.72 In the context of the campaigns of superintendence, it is clear that the 
‘provincial patriots’ who were members of tribunals came to judgements which were 
not necessarily popular or well understood with various Devonians. Similarly, Paul 
Rusiecki observes that in Essex there were similar attitudes towards tribunals in that 
although ‘many who came before tribunals were viewed with suspicion by tribunal 
members and by society in general, tribunals were not always seen as the dispensers of 
local injustice against unpatriotic shirkers’.73 Comparable dishevelled responses came 
from other employers in Devon who objected to the verdicts of Tribunals, as they felt 
threatened that the future of their business would suffer after the failure of the appeal of 
their employee. This also indicated the frustration that some Devonians felt towards the 
system of conscription. In addition, some Devonians resented the intervention of not 
only the Military in overruling the decision of the local tribunals but also the 
interference and judgement of the ‘provincial patriots’. Thus, some members of 
Devon’s elite through their elevated judicial status on the tribunals were perceived to 
possess this quality of ‘otherness’.  
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Nevertheless, Heathcoat-Amory’s response also shows how the ‘provincial patriots’ 
viewed their semi-judicial responsibilities on the tribunal panels as they sought to 
determine and oversee the nature of what could or could not be constituted as patriotic 
behaviour. A similar value-judgment of the patriotism of Devon’s population was 
echoed in the appeal of Preston Pugsley during the session of the Northern Panel of the 
DAT on 12 July 1916. The military had appealed against the decision of the tribunal at 
the North Devon village of Shirwell to grant Pugsley a final exemption for Preston until 
1 September 1916. Pugsley was a cattleman working for his father who was unattested. 
His father had gained a final extension on the period of his son’s exemption. Hitherto, 
Preston’s father was very concerned with the fact that the result for his son was final, so 
he declared that if this verdict was final then he would have little choice but to start ‘to 
sell up my stock’.74 This prompted Lieutenant Stirling, the tribunal’s military 
representative, to declare that the Pugsleys did not ‘seem to care a hang about the 
war’.75 Instead, it seemed to Stirling that the Pugsleys seemed to care about ‘only their 
stock’.76 This led Stirling to claim that there ‘doesn’t seem to be a pennyworth of 
patriotism going’.77 Stirling’s accusation prompted the correspondent for the Devon and 
Exeter Gazette to produce the sensational headline that there was a lack of patriotism 
‘alleged against appellants in North Devon’.78 However, it must be observed that the 
Pugsleys’ attempt to place the survival of the farm over the interests of the nation 
through the war years emphasizes how the ‘provincial patriots’ constituted this to be a 
dereliction of duty. This incident additionally underscores the challenging nature of the 
continued struggle that Devon’s elite faced to instil the necessity of conscription as a 
measure intended to ensure the survival of the nation into the minds of Devonians.  
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It could be argued the tribunals were more than solely the adjudication of manpower 
since these incidents were examples to inform and educate Devonians as to the 
expectations of what was, in the eyes of the ‘provincial patriots’, patriotic or not 
patriotic behaviour. Nicoletta F. Gullace’s observed that in a nation obsessed with the 
fear of spies and the enemy within, to volunteer to serve was ‘a symbolic act that could 
mark the will of the inner man’.79 This meant that, in the view of the ‘provincial 
patriots’, a man presented his patriotism through the act of enlistment. However, unlike 
volunteering, the conscription of an man could not act as a ‘mark of inner conversion, 
signifying the loyal sentiments of those who had joined and assuring observers that 
external actions were accompanied by inner transformation’.80 This was in spite of the 
exhortations from members of Devon’s tribunals that the county’s men-folk must accept 
the tribunal’s verdict as their conscription was in the national interest. Under the system 
of conscription, the patriotism of Devon’s men was not always self-evident when they 
presented appeals against military service before MST panels, due to the fact that 
masculinity was ‘still caught up if not always in the overt emblems of military 
service’.81 In light of this definition of patriotism as being an obligation to defend the 
nation, one group whose patriotism was in question was the male Conscientious 
Objector (CO).  
 
Susan R. Grayzel suggests that male war-resisters were perceived in the minds of 
contemporaries to be subversive of gender due to their objection to military service, 
which was defined as the traditional responsibility of male citizens.
82
 Through the 
system of tribunals, CO’s could appeal against their conscription. An example of this 
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was the appeal from Arthur Short Portbury a jobbing twenty-nine year old builder who 
appealed against conscription because he was a CO. The local tribunal had dismissed 
Portbury’s appeal for exemption on the grounds that he did not belong to a religious 
body and they considered his objection was based upon ‘reasons of cowardice than 
conscience’.83 However, Portbury was prepared to offer a compromise in which he 
would undertake ‘any work of national importance so long [as] it had nothing to do with 
the military machine’.84 Before the members of the Exeter Panel of the DAT on 31 
March 1916, Portbury protested against the decision of the local tribunal to dismiss his 
application because he believed that all war was wrong, he was a Christian and he 
objected to the taking of human life. In response to Portbury’s declaration, Kekewich 
enquired whether the applicant ate bread to which Portbury replied that he did.
85
 
Kekewich further asked whether Portbury was ‘aware that bread is a mass of life? And 
you eat cheese?’86 The applicant replied in the positive. Kekewich clarified that 
Portbury did take life when he ate because ‘Cheese is full of life. When you eat cheese 
you bite the maggots (laughter)’.87 Through a series of detailed questions, it can be 
ventured that Kekewich conducted an interrogation to test the integrity of Portbury’s 
pacifist principles. In fact, this was evident when he emphasized that the very air that 
Portbury was breathing was ‘full of animal life’.88 Portbury replied that ‘we are all here 
to get the facts and not to go off into fancies’.89 The presiding Chairman, Heathcoat-
Amory stated that it was no fancy at all and he had to ‘satisfy the Tribunal that he really 
did and always held a conscientious objection to war of all kinds, and to taking any part 
in it’.90 In his defence, Portbury suggested that his ‘past life was the only evidence he 
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could offer’ to prove the validity of his conscientious objection.91 Captain Vosper, the 
panel’s military representative, pointed out that despite the fact Portbury had an 
objection to killing, he was willing to ‘eat something that someone else kills for you?’92 
Portbury answered that he certainly would. Therefore, it could be observed that through 
these questions the members of the Tribunal emphasized Portbury’s selfish attitude 
towards any sense of obligation towards the war effort and Portbury had undermined the 
sincerity of his principles of conscientious objection. Eventually, Heathcoat-Amory 
decided that Portbury’s appeal for exemption on the grounds of conscientious objection 
had not satisfied the Exeter panel of the DAT ‘anymore than the local tribunal’.93 
Consequently, they upheld the verdict of the local Tribunal in that Portbury needed to 
serve in the armed forces. In a note of final defiance, Portbury uttered, ‘I shall not do 
that. I would rather face prosecution’.94 Through a critical review of his appeal at the 
DAT and the publicity of his conduct in the local press, it could be argued that the 
‘provincial patriots’ had brought him to justice, to account for his conscientious 
objection. Due to Portbury’s inconsistent answers to the tribunal panel questions, he 
was seen to be a shirker rather than a true pacifist. It could be argued that the 
humiliation of the supposed patriotism of CO’s was part of Devon’s elite wider 
campaigns of superintendence of not only the patriotism of Devon’s men-folk but also 
the social morality of wartime. Indeed, due to the dramatic nature of this session of the 
DAT, it was reported in a verbatim manner in the local press. McDermott points out that 
the local newspapers ‘naturally sought out the atypical or remarkable story’ in their 
coverage of Tribunals.
95
 The fact that the proceedings of this particular hearing of the 
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DAT were published in the local and international press also added to the sensation of 
Portbury’s appeal.96  
 
Alongside their attempts to superintend the patriotism of Devon’s men, it is also 
apparent that the ‘provincial patriots’, as self-appointed arbiters of the social morality of 
wartime, attempted to administer upon the wartime behaviour of  the county’s 
population. On 18 August 1916, the Northern Panel of the DAT adjudicated upon the 
military’s appeal against the temporary exemption of motor char-a-banc driver Albert 
Jas Baddick.
97
 The reason that the Ilfracombe Tribunal had granted exemption to 
Baddick was to give his employer Wm. Hy Robins the benefit of Baddick’s 
employment during a full holiday season. It is important to reflect that the Ilfracombe 
Tribunal who had granted exemption to Baddick were IUDC Councillors who were 
sympathetic to motor char-a-banc drivers who helped to support the town’s holiday 
industry.
98
 Hence, the decisions made by local tribunals often reflected the social and 
economic composition of the localities in which they adjudicated over.
99
  
 
Through the summer of 1916, the Devon resorts of ‘Seaton, Paignton, Lynmouth and 
Sidmouth were crowded as a result of the virtual closure of the east coast resorts’.100 
However, Ilfracombe’s holiday industry in 1915 had experienced great hardship 
compared to the South Devon resorts. IUDC Councillor Mr G. H. Batten proposed on 
10 April 1916 that ‘no place had suffered like Ilfracombe in the matter of fast trains 
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being discontinued, and they also had steamers running now’.101 Therefore, 
Ilfracombe’s Tribunal panel understood that Ilfracombe’s tourism industry had to make 
the most out of whatever fortunes the 1916 holiday season would bring. This helps to 
confirm McDermott’s point that the Government was often frustrated by local 
tribunalists because with their ‘idiosyncratic interpretations of legislation and 
instructions, they personified the inertial drag of local priorities’.102 Lieutenant Stirling, 
the military representative, remarked in a dismayed tone that ‘he rarely, if ever, had 
come across a more disgraceful case’.103 Stirling continued that whilst he ‘did not like 
saying things about tribunals’, he felt that the Ilfracombe Tribunal had ‘rather 
overstepped it in this case’.104 The acting chairman of the Northern Panel, H. N. G. 
Stucley enquired if this man was ‘driving round people enjoying themselves’.105 Mr 
Robins avoided elaborating on the arguably frivolous nature of Baddick’s occupation 
but instead stressed that Baddick drove a char-a-banc which was ‘exactly the same as 
other people’.106  
 
Stucley was horrified at the fact that Baddick had received exemption from the 
Ilfracombe Tribunal. Therefore, the unanimous view of the Northern Panel was that 
Baddick would join up immediately. Whilst he delivered the verdict, Stucley also made 
an important point about Baddick’s occupation in that he believed it was a ‘great pity 
that at a time when we have so many strongly worded protests appearing in the Press 
and official warnings against private motor-car owners using their cars more than 
necessary, these big cars [are] burning a large amount of petrol – supposed to be so 
                                                 
101
 Western Times, 12 April 1916, p. 3. 
102
 McDermott, ‘The Work of the Military Service Tribunals in Northamptonshire, 1916-1918’, p. 176. 
103
 Western Times, 18 August 1916, p. 3. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Ibid. 
228 
 
scarce at the present time’.107 This was endorsed when it was announced in the London 
Gazette on 25 August 1916 that petrol regulations would come into force on 1 
September 1916 that would prohibit petrol for char-a-banc cars.
108
 After hearing this 
news, Ilfracombe char-a-banc excursion proprietors complained against the measure 
which they claimed would devastate their livelihoods.
109
 Therefore, it is clear that these 
char-a-banc drivers were the subject of criticism not only because of their perceived 
frivolous occupation but also because their vehicles burned a large amount of petrol, 
which was supposed to be a scarce commodity. It was agreed by the Northern Panel that 
Baddick should not be ‘allowed to run simply for the purposes of giving joy rides to 
other people’.110 In light of the social morality of wartime, this was deemed to be 
wholly unacceptable and the Military’s appeal against Baddick’s exemption was upheld 
by the Northern Panel.
111
  
 
Nonetheless, it can be observed that the exemption of a man employed in the holiday 
industry went against the grain of the accepted norms of the social morality of wartime. 
During 1916, the British government intensified their efforts to campaign against leisure 
activities, with an advertising campaign promoting the message that people should 
reconsider their intention of taking a holiday during wartime. To add credibility to their 
appeals, the government gained the endorsement of General Sir Douglas Haig. On a 
poster entitled ‘Postpone Your Holidays’, Haig appealed: ‘Let the whole British Nation 
forego any idea of a general holiday until our goal is reached. A speedy and decisive 
victory will then be ours’.112 By suggesting that they should reconsider their priorities, 
the poster promoted the idea that their contributions could make the difference between 
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victory and defeat. This poster campaign was an appeal not only to munitions workers 
but also to the British population. Similarly, by using Haig, the high ranking and 
popular general, to act as a political spokesman for the policies of Britain’s wartime 
government,
 
the campaign helped to further militarise the Home Front and emphasize 
the behaviour deemed to be both virtuous and acceptable in the social morality of 
wartime.
113
 It is clear that conscription and the significance of civilian war energy as a 
resource helped to further damage the holiday industry in 1916.  
 
With the introduction of this network of tribunals in Devon, it became apparent that the 
relationship between the decision-makers in the tribunals in the specific localities of 
Devon and the DAT was fraught with difficulty. The exemption of Baddick by the 
Ilfracombe Tribunal and the evidence from Devon’s local and Appeal Tribunals confirm 
McDermott’s suggestion that the tribunal system of the MSA produced great 
‘inconsistencies from region to region and hindered a coordinated approach to 
manpower’.114 This was noted in the appeal of an unnamed tailor during a hearing of the 
Exeter Panel of the DAT on 10 June 1916. The applicant revealed that his brother was a 
cutter and had received exemption at the South Molton Tribunal.
115
 The correspondent 
of the Western Times who witnessed this appeal noticed that Heathcoat-Amory was 
surprised to hear this and asked the applicant whether he meant that the South Molton 
Tribunal ‘gave exemption to a cutter in these times?’116 Lieutenant Stirling, the military 
representative on the panel, replied to Heathcoat-Amory that they ‘give everybody 
exemption at Southmolton (sic)’.117 Subsequently, there were other cases that 
emphasized the inconsistent manner among the network of MST’s across Devon in how 
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they approached the arbitration of appeals for exemption. This was revealed in the 
appeal from L. A. Sayer, a licenced victualler from Tiverton who appealed against the 
‘no exemption’ decision of the local tribunal. However, Heathcoat-Amory suggested 
that Sayer’s family, in particular his sister, could continue the business in his stead.118 
After Heathcoat-Amory suggested this solution to the licenced victualler’s dilemma, 
Sayer alleged that favouritism was present at the Tiverton Tribunal because ‘certain 
others get exemption at Tiverton’.119 It is interesting that when prompted by Heathcoat-
Amory’s prescription, Sayer decided to vocalize the suggestion that there seemed to be 
favouritism present at the Tiverton Tribunal. This reveals Sayer’s grievances against the 
interference of Devon’s elite upon his business affairs and the perceived unequal 
implementation of conscription.  
 
Nevertheless, there may be some validity in Sayer’s allegation because the military 
representative for the Tiverton Tribunal, Colonel Couchman, admitted on 18 July 1916 
that ‘he must in future press hard for every man’.120 Couchman maintained that the 
members of the Tiverton Tribunal ‘must harden their hearts’ when they considered the 
appeals from the local farmers because there was now a greater ‘need for men than ever 
before’.121 Another reason why Couchman stressed that Tiverton Tribunal members 
should take a more impartial approach to farmers appeals for exemption was because 
agriculture would ‘be of no use if the Germans got the upper hand’.122 In addition, there 
was the observation that rural tribunals were not subjected to the same accountability as 
urban ones because there was a perceived ‘civilizational distinction’ between the 
behaviour of individuals in close-knit urban localities and those in sparsely populated 
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and far flung rural ones.
123
 Gregory suggests that there was a widespread urban 
suspicion that rural tribunals were ‘engaged in mutual back-scratching and corrupt deals 
over a glass of something’.124  
 
Consequently, it was this sovereignty over the exemption process at a local level which 
helped make the MSTs unpopular and viewed with apprehension. Nonetheless, it is 
important to consider that rural tribunals faced two equally strong and contradictory 
pressures during the later part of 1916.
125
 The BAF emphasized to the tribunals in rural 
localities that when considering the appeals of agriculturalists, domestic food 
production needed to be maintained or increased. At the same time, they received 
equally persistent demands from the WO to release more men for their industry which 
utilised a high proportion of the nation’s fittest manpower.126 This placed rural tribunals 
in a difficult position. Furthermore, this heightened the idiosyncratic nature of decision-
making by the local tribunals within a county. Some tribunals which covered rural areas 
were more compassionate towards the role of the ‘farmer in their communities, 
consistently applied their own understanding of the balance between these imperatives 
to the disadvantage of the recruitment officer’.127 The decisions made by the Calne 
tribunal in Wiltshire revealed that they tended ‘to be somewhat more generous towards 
agriculture than those employed in other areas’.128 At the same time, there were other 
rural tribunals that were more were conscious of the urgent requirement for men in the 
armed forces. Indeed, the local perceptions that farmers’ sons were avoiding military 
service could have been an important factor in the deliberation process of tribunal 
panels in the dilution of the male agricultural labour force in order to counter the 
                                                 
123
 The Times, 27 October 1916, p. 9. 
124
 Gregory, The Last Great War, p. 122. 
125
 McDermott, British Military Service Tribunals, pp. 124-126. 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 Ibid., p. 126. 
128
 Ibid., p. 184. 
232 
 
negative perception. Accordingly, members of some tribunals ‘showed little discernible 
sympathy for the unique circumstances of agricultural life until the impact of over-
dilution in their localities became marked’.129  
 
For this reason, McDermott suggests that in terms of tribunals there was certainly a 
‘contemporary public perception that the playing field was not level’.130 This is 
certainly true of Devon as the criticism of the decisions made by tribunals was not 
isolated to rural Tribunals because there were similar allegations were levelled at other 
tribunal bodies in the county. On 14 September 1916 the Mayor of Barnstaple, F. A. 
Jewell, spoke to the citizens of Barnstaple to reaffirm their confidence in and defend the 
actions of the North Devon town’s Tribunal.131 Jewell revealed to the audience that the 
Tribunal had ‘been looked upon as rather a harsh body, but he believed Col. Alexander 
would say it had done its duty as far as possible’.132 There was also criticism in the local 
press of the appeals that were granted by the Plymouth panel of the DAT because ‘many 
cases of far greater individual hardship have been turned down by Appeal Tribunals’.133 
One extreme example of vocalised criticism against the perceived unfairness of the 
DAT was evident on 18 August 1916. During the Exeter panel of the DAT, Mr Bond, a 
collector for an Insurance company, appeared to defend two individuals whose 
exemption by the Newton Abbot tribunal was appealed against by the Military. After 
heated passages between the respective parties, both appeals by the Military were 
upheld by the DAT. Bond responded with the accusation that Lieutenant Stirling was a 
bully and declared in a defiant tone that ‘I think it is nothing but bias; it is arranged 
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before-hand’.134 Kekewich warned him that he would be prosecuted if he was not 
careful and admitted that to be incarcerated was probably what Bond wanted. 
Lieutenant Stirling said that for Bond to ‘say that these matters are arranged is a 
reflection of the whole system, and he ought to be ashamed of himself’.135 A 
correspondent of the Devon and Exeter Gazette, who witnessed the spectacle, was 
sympathetic to the DAT members because he argued that they had to undertake 
‘sufficiently arduous work without being insulted by men of the Bond type’.136 
Consequently, the very fact that the tribunal system could not be centralized, 
contributed to fuel the criticism that was directed against the Tribunal system in Devon 
and helped to create an idiosyncratic system.  
 
At the same time as the MST’s administered over these applications for exemption, the 
Navy and the Royal Marines continued to appeal for volunteers from Devon. On 4 
January 1916, the Admiralty recruiting office in Exeter published a statement which 
declared to the residents of the city that there was ‘still opportunity for men to signify 
their willingness to enter the Navy or Royal Marines, and defer their actual service, to 
take advantage of the naval group system’.137 During 1916, the local press in Devon 
continued to publish these appeals from the Navy for men. An example of this was an 
article published in the Devon and Exeter Gazette on 19 June 1916 which emphasized 
that Devon’s men could choose to volunteer into the Navy or Royal Marines rather than 
be conscripted because the ‘naval system of recruiting was still open’.138 In fact, 
volunteering into the Navy was viewed by some Devonians as an alternative to 
conscription. This was evident in the application of Ralph Robinson Willott who had 
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appealed against compulsion on the grounds that he was a CO. However, on 18 April 
1916 he informed the Newton Abbot Tribunal that he had decided to withdraw his 
application because ‘he had offered himself to the Navy’.139 Similarly, another instance 
of how some Devonians attempted to avoid the system of conscription was revealed 
during the appeal of James Quance. According to the correspondent for the Western 
Times, Quance was a nineteen year old indentured apprentice to Messrs. J. Glass and 
Son, Agricultural Engineers based in Okehampton. The military had appealed against 
Okehampton Tribunal’s decision to grant exemption to Quance on the basis that he was 
solely engaged in work connected with agricultural machinery. Upon his review of his 
appeal in Exeter during the session of Central Panel of the DAT on 16 December 1916, 
Mr Glass Senior spoke in Quance’s defence arguing that Quance was ‘learning 
engineering fitting and turning [in his business], with a view to his entering the 
Navy’.140 In fact, Mr Glass revealed during this session of the DAT that he had ‘already 
trained 25 men in this way for the Navy and they all passed’.141 It could be observed 
that Glass’s testimony reveals that there were some employers in Devon who used the 
Navy system of recruitment as some businesses wanted to avoid any unwarranted 
criticism by the members of the DAT towards their business practices and the 
subsequent publicity of the hearing.  
 
Yet, the individuals who were primarily targeted to join the Navy were Devon’s 
fishermen. Under the conditions of the MSA of 1916, fishermen were exempt from 
conscription since the Admiralty had ‘exercised their right under the Military Service 
Act to have first call on the service of fishermen’.142 Accordingly, the WO carried out 
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the wishes of Admiralty.
143
 Fishermen were regarded as particularly useful for the Navy 
due to their maritime experience.
144
 Moreover, the fact that fishermen contributed to 
Britain’s food supplies reinforced the validity of their claim for exemption from 
conscription. This meant that they would not be ‘called up for service unless and until 
they are actually required for Naval Service’.145 The BAF advised that unattested 
fishermen of military age should apply for a ‘Fisherman’s Conditional Certificate of 
Exemption from Military Service’ which would confirm their contribution to the food 
supply.
146
 The fishermen who provided evidence that they are bona-fide fishermen were 
presented with the opportunity to offer themselves for immediate service in the Royal 
Naval Reserve (Trawler Section) or the Y Section of the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve (RNVR).
147
 For the fishermen who joined the RNVR, they could continue to 
fish during 1916 until they were needed to serve.
148
 However, the significance of the 
fishing industry as a certified occupation along with the arrangement made with the 
Admiralty for first refusal on the fishermen was contested by the escalating demands of 
the Army.  
 
This was apparent in a letter written by Stephen Reynolds, the ISWF, on 27 September 
1916 to H. G. Maurice, the fisheries’ secretary at the BAF. In this letter, Reynolds 
explained to Maurice that he had been severely shocked upon hearing that in London 
the WO had apparently concluded an arrangement ‘under which the fishermen who 
have the Naval Rejection Form, Y. 9, will lapse to the Army; or at all events those fit 
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for General Service’.149 It was evident that the expiration of the Y. 9 Scheme would be 
disastrous for Devon’s fishermen because the explicit condition of this scheme was that 
it allowed the county’s fisherman to continue to fish. According to Reynolds, this new 
arrangement would ‘seriously deplete [fishing] crews already short-handed and hard to 
find, but what is far worse is that the fishermen will certainly regard it as a breach of 
faith’.150 Reynolds believed that it was not good enough for the WO to argue that the Y. 
9 scheme should lapse if fishermen were taken out of the Certified Occupations List.
151
 
This meant that scores of Devon’s fishermen turned to Reynolds for his advice on what 
they should do in light of conscription. To Devon’s fishermen, he answered that he 
could not ‘make your mind up for you; but if you want to make yourself safe for Naval 
Service, if any, go for the R.N.V.R. (Y.), and if rejected, you’ll get Y.9’.152 As a result 
of these encounters, Reynolds revealed to Maurice that a lot of fishermen had taken on 
board his advice.  
 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Reynolds felt betrayed that the WO had decided without any 
consultation with him, that the Y. 9 scheme should expire and that fishing would not be 
recognised as a certified occupation. This lack of consideration and sense of 
indifference towards the position of Devon’s fishermen was evident when Reynolds 
declared in a tone of anger with a rhetorical question: ‘What are people on the coast, 
with feelings, prejudices if you like, and memories, are only names and figures in 
London’.153 He stressed that the both Devon’s and Cornwall’s fishermen would ‘bitterly 
resent being dropped overboard into the Army - and for little enough gain to the 
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Army’.154 Reynolds believed that this reversal of policy towards the recruitment of 
fishermen would mean he would lose the trust he had built with Devon’s and 
Cornwall’s fishermen. He confessed that he could not think of any ‘arrangement so 
disastrous to the growing confidence between us and the fishermen ought to be fixed up 
in your absence’.155 In fact, in a letter to Maurice dated 8 October 1916, Reynolds 
provides a hint to Maurice’s reaction towards the scrapping of the Y. 9 Scheme for 
fishermen because Maurice was apparently ‘on the warpath over the fishermen and the 
Y. 9’s’.156 Nevertheless, Reynolds presented a sense of conviction in his letter of 27 
September, in that his work with the fishing industry was at a critical point. Indeed, he 
suggested that ‘for a gain to the Army not balanced by diminished food, our relations 
with the fishermen will receive the severest set-back’.157 It is clear that Reynolds was 
furious at the lack of consideration for the position of Devon’s fishermen when the 
decision was made to remove the Y. 9 along with removing the fishing industry from 
the list of certified occupations.  
 
This lack of compassion towards the position of Devon’s fishermen was also evident 
during the proceedings of Brixham’s Tribunal on 13 October 1916 under the 
chairmanship of the local vicar, Reverend Steward Sim. The coverage of the hearing in 
the Western Times revealed that the recruiting officer for the tribunal, Captain Gorley, 
opposed each of the claims for exemption from all twelve apprentices of fishing 
industry because he did not regard any of the apprentices as indispensable ‘in view of 
the urgent demand for men’.158 It was decided that the apprentices would not be called 
up until 1 November 1916. Yet, all of the apprentices for the fishing industry wished to 
be classed as fishermen since, as far as the Army was concerned, they would be granted 
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conditional exemption.
159
 Reverend Sim considered that the Brixham Tribunal should 
act ‘under the agreement with the Admiralty as regards the fishermen until November 
1st when the certified occupation for the men would be withdrawn in accordance of the 
notice [that was] issued’.160 He went on to suggest that the tribunal panel were bound by 
the Admiralty agreement to which they could either defer their appeals until 1 
November or grant them conditional exemption.
161
 However, Gorley insisted that it was 
urgent that the appeals of the apprentices should not be adjourned for more than a week 
since some of them were away fishing.
162
 Eventually, the tribunal decided to adjourn the 
appeal until 1 November and that the appellants who were unfit must ‘join one of the 
Admiralty sections if they could not be taken by the Army’.163   
 
Yet, this particular hearing of the Brixham Tribunal had created anxieties amongst the 
management of the Brixham Fishing Smack Insurance Company. The Company’s 
President, Mr S. R. L. Johnson was concerned about what would happen to the fishing 
apprentices since the MSA did not apply to the Navy. In fact, he was concerned to such 
an extent that he had written to Sir John Towse, the National Fisheries Protection 
Association to inform him of the facts of the case and ask for his assistance in the 
matter. Nevertheless, as Reverend Sim clarified to the members of tribunal on 1 
November, the fishing industry would no longer be a certified occupation. However, 
when Brixham’s Tribunal reconvened to discuss the matter on 3 November 1916, the 
BAF intervened in the case of the fishing apprentices. On 25 October, the Assistant 
Secretary of the BAF, Mr A. W. Anstruther, wrote to Brixham’s Tribunal to say that 
they regarded an apprentice of the Sea Fishing Service as a ‘fisherman within the 
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application of the Military Service Acts and the regulations made there under’.164 
Anstruther recommended that if an apprentice was of military age, unless he wished to 
join the Army, he could either enrol in a Naval unit or ‘apply to a Tribunal for a 
certificate of exemption’ under the Regulations for Tribunals Section IV paragraph 1.165 
If an apprentice were to enrol in the Y Section of the RNVR, he could still continue to 
fish ‘until such time as he may be called up for service, which would only be with the 
concurrence of this department’.166 Anstruther advised that it was open to an apprentice 
to apply for exemption on the grounds that it was ‘expedient in the national interests 
that he should continue to be educated and trained in the Sea Fishing Service rather than 
he should be employed in the Naval or Military Service’.167 Moreover, if an apprentice 
was to enrol in the Y section of the RNVR it would be afforded to him ‘similar 
protection so far as it can be afforded without prejudicing the supply of men for the 
Navy’.168 Therefore, after the intervention of the BAF, the fishing apprentices had the 
opportunity to decide whether to enlist in the Navy or to enrol in the Y section of the 
RNVR.  
 
For the men who received a certificate of temporary exemption at the Brixham Tribunal 
in 1916, the members of the tribunal attached the condition that successful appellants 
had to ‘attest and attend [military] drill with the [Brixham] Volunteer Training Corps 
commanded by Dr Patton’.169 According to Samantha Little, exemption from the 
Brixham Tribunal could also require the exempt man to become a member of the Men’s 
VAD.
170
 It was hoped that through service in either the Men’s VAD or the Voluntary 
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Training Corps (VTC) it would become evident to individuals who were granted 
exemption that it did not provide a licence for themselves to excuse any participation in 
the war effort. The VTC was a paramilitary defence force comprised of volunteers who 
were usually outside the requirements of military service.
171
 The advent of conscription 
according to McDermott brought a new rationale to the VTC, beyond being a local 
volunteer force for the protection of specific localities. Indeed, for the men who were 
granted exemption, the corps provided them with military training which usefully 
reduced the time and resources that were required to ‘get a civilian to where he might 
best assist the war effort’.172 Yet, the evidence from Brixham’s Tribunal reveals that 
some exempted individuals did not adhere to this condition of their exemption. This was 
evident in the number of truants from Brixham’s VTC and the individuals who 
continued to be absent from the drills. An instance of this was on 3 November 1916, 
when the Tribunal Committee received a letter from the Secretary of Brixham’s VTC 
which revealed that J. Lawe and H. Tulley had not attended any drills of Brixham’s 
VTC. On the motion of this letter, the clerk of tribunal was instructed to write to Lawe 
and Tulley requesting them to attend the tribunal’s next meeting or provide an 
‘explanation why they have not attended any drills’.173 On 17 November 1916, both 
Lawe and Tulley attended the meeting of Brixham’s Tribunal and were both instructed 
to ‘attest and attend the drills as often as possible’.174 However, on 8 December 1916, 
Mr Morris reported that Tulley was still absent from Brixham’s VTC drills and 
marches. The tribunal members then instructed the clerk to write to Tulley to clarify that 
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unless he attested and attended the drill of Brixham’s VTC within a week the Tribunal 
would be ‘compelled to withdraw the certificate of conditional exemption’.175  
 
Similarly, the evidence from Northamptonshire’s tribunals that introduced the same 
prerequisite for those exempted reveals that many men found the commitment 
excessively difficult to fulfil which caused concern amongst members of tribunals.
176
  
Conversely, from the perspective of the members of Brixham’s Tribunal, the 
requirement for individuals to participate in Brixham’s VTC was a challenging 
commitment to superintend. Likewise, the members of tribunals in Northamptonshire 
who imposed this requirement upon exempt individuals ‘discovered that they were 
obliged to police the consequences’.177 Therefore, it could be ventured that the 
exempted men who were absent from Brixham’s VTC drills and marches had not, in the 
view of the members of Brixham’s Tribunal, fulfilled their obligation to the wartime 
social contract. In fact, the requirement provided the ‘provincial patriots’ with a further 
opportunity to extend their campaign of superintendence of the wartime behaviour and 
patriotism of those who had received exemption. Hence, the superintendence of the 
behaviour of exempted individuals was an integral part of not only the policing of the 
social morality of wartime but also of how Devon’s elite attempted to prescribe requests 
and acceptable behaviours for one section of the local population. This was also evident 
for other sections of Devon’s populace. 
 
Gender and citizenship in the wartime community 
The introduction of conscription for men from the ages of eighteen to forty-one in 1916 
was a challenge to the gendered division of labour and led to the consideration of 
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alternative sources of manpower for some of Britain’s industries. The process of 
substituting male labour with female labour, according to Gullace, was ‘facilitated 
greatly by the advent of conscription’.178 In fact, Grayzel suggests that the female 
worker became ‘emblematic of the wartime mobilization of women and of the alleged 
transformation of gender roles and even identities’.179 The MSA’s inauguration gave 
added impetus and importance to women from Devon’s civil society to launch a 
concerted campaign across the county to exhort and educate the county’s population of 
the necessity of female labour. This was evident in Devon’s farming industry as many 
of the county’s farmers were reluctant to resort to employing women on their farms. 
Instead, some agriculturalists in Devon went to great lengths to keep their sons for 
labour on their farms. The situation was made apparent during a public meeting 
convened by Countess Fortescue on 20 January 1916 at South Molton to discuss the 
subject. She said that the ‘want of labour had made itself less felt in North Devon than 
had been the case in most districts [of the county]’.180 By 1916, there were already 
shortages of labour in certain districts of Devon which would undoubtedly increase with 
the number of men who were to be conscripted. In her speech, the Countess argued that 
whilst it must be said that the wives of Devon’s farmers did work very hard on the land, 
it was chiefly the unmarried women to whom she wished to ‘appeal and also to the 
farmers who required persons to work on the farm’.181 Furthermore, she emphasized the 
necessity for the intervention of women in food production because Britain was 
‘suffering at present from the evil effects of the wait-and-see policy, and that was being 
brought home to us daily’.182 Therefore, the Countess insisted that the young women of 
Devon were the best alternative source of manpower for agriculture which was the main 
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industry of North Devon and hoped that she could change the perception of the county’s 
farmers towards female labour. 
 
Correspondingly, the Mayoress of Totnes, Mrs G. Symons, had organised a meeting to 
discuss the same objective in the South Devon town on 21 January 1916. In attendance 
at the meeting was Mrs Mildmay, the President of the Devon Women’s War Service 
Committee (DWWSC), who proposed that the women’s war-work movement in the 
county was vital not only for the war effort but also for Devon’s patriotic reputation. 
However, with a heavy heart she confessed that ‘Devon had been left behind’ in 
contrast to other counties in England who ‘already had a scheme afoot’ to employ 
women in agriculture.
183
 Mildmay claimed that in Northumberland, fifty six per cent of 
the county’s women were working on the land.184 For Devon’s women there was a 
‘great prejudice they would [have to] conquer’.185 One such incident of prejudice was 
evident in the testimony of Mrs. Easterbrook. She argued that since she undertook 
agricultural work whilst wearing breeches and leggings, she had been ‘blackguarded by 
the farmers around’.186  
 
Comparable problems in respect to attitudes of Devon’s farmers towards the 
introduction of inexperienced female labour into agriculture were revealed during a 
meeting of Women for Service in Agriculture at Barnstaple on 4 February 1916. Miss 
Sylvia Calmady-Hamlyn who worked for the BAF in Devon broadcasted to the 
meeting’s audience that since the appointment of Lord Selborne’s registration scheme, 
both she and a lady friend had started a register in ninety parishes from Plymouth to 
Exeter. According to Hamlyn, they had encountered complications to complete a 
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register of women who were willing to work on the land. One such difficulty was to 
find a lady in each parish who would keep a register.
187
 The experience of attempting to 
complete this register revealed to Hamyln that ‘although some parts of the county had 
not borne a very great reputation for patriotism, up to the present the results had 
exceeded their expectations in a remarkable way’.188 Notwithstanding these problems, 
Hamlyn was earnest in her appeal to all classes of Devon’s women and argued that 
women of leisure and position ‘had no right to ask working women to do their best 
unless they were prepared to do theirs’.189 However, hesitation continued to be prevalent 
amongst Devon’s farmers concerning the capabilities of the county’s women. She noted 
that two farmers, before they entered the meeting, said they were not going to stay long 
because ‘it will only be twaddle’.190 Hamlyn’s statement may refer to the fact that 
farmers were apprehensive about the contribution that women from Devon’s towns and 
cities could make to agriculture. This statement could also suggest that some farmers 
were sceptical about the prescriptions from the speakers at the meeting because they 
may deem these exhortations to be the interference of ladies of Devon’s elite who were 
inexperienced or unaccustomed to the farming way of life. Likewise, German farmers 
proved to be ‘unenthusiastic about taking on city women’ when faced with the 
exhortations from Germany’s War Office to consider the employment of women from 
urban areas.
191
 Instead, women from rural localities with agricultural experience such as 
peasant women and farm women were called upon to work on Germany’s farm land.192   
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It was at this point during the meeting that Hamlyn enthusiastically explained to the 
women in the hall that it rested upon them to ‘save the fair name of Devonshire women 
for patriotism’.193 She came to this conclusion because a slur had ‘been cast on the 
patriotism of some parts of Devonshire and Cornwall’.194 By using this evocation of 
county patriotism in this appeal, Hamyln attempted to spur the county’s women’s into 
action in order to restore the prestige of Devon and through their patriotism claim 
citizenship in the wartime community. She claimed that it was this slur which prompted 
the women of Cornwall to register their interest and as a result, their register of women 
was higher than other counties. Subsequently, she hoped that this would prompt the 
women of Devon who had registered their interest to express their patriotism by 
undertaking work on the land. To further encourage Devon’s women to commence this 
form of self-mobilization, Hamyln emphasized a sense of competition between the 
counties of Devon and Cornwall. It was her aspiration that the results from Devon 
could, if this were completed, put the county ‘ahead of even of Cornwall’.195 She 
believed that instead of accentuating the will to conquer through brutality she advocated 
that Devon’s women should ‘lead the way to victory and peace through self-
sacrifice’.196 In fact, the county’s women must be ‘willing to do things in which in 
ordinary times were disagreeable to them’.197 Accordingly, Devon’s women should 
recognise the wider significance of war-work whether it was large or small in order to 
‘retain the fair fame of their County, and to ensure the victory of their fatherland’.198  
 
Notwithstanding these exhortations and prescriptions by members of Devon’s elite to 
alter the perceptions of the gendered division of work, there were women in the county 
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who were sceptical about the success of this campaign. At the same meeting, Mr Fred 
Horne, a representative of Devon’s farmers, claimed that the county’s agriculturalists 
sought to work towards the national interest in that the ‘farmer and the labourer alike 
were expected to sink their differences, and to work for one object – not personal profit 
but national success’.199 In addition to upholding the introduction of Devon’s women 
into work on the land, Horne went on to emphasize that the elderly men of the county 
had their role to play in agriculture. It was undeniable to Horne that the old age 
pensioner could through working on the land become part of the wartime community. 
This would mean that the old man could take ‘up his task as a patriot and [present that 
he] was prepared to do all he could’.200 This became apparent to him when considering 
the number of men who lived in Devon’s seaside resorts: ‘These men certainly ought to 
be canvassed and when they were made to understand that there was a job they could do 
they would find that following the plough was quite as healthy as playing golf’.201 It is 
clear that Horne’s statement tapped into the obligations of the social morality of 
wartime because it was not expected of men to be enjoying frivolous activities. Instead, 
Horne prescribed that elderly men in wartime should undertake work which would be of 
benefit to the war effort. 
 
In a letter to the editor of the North Devon Journal, Mrs L. Morgan, a resident of the 
North Devon village of Newbridge, considered that the meetings organised by Countess 
Fortescue and other notable women of the county constituted an ‘agitation to induce the 
labourer’s wife to leave her household duties for work on the land’.202 Despite the fact 
that the Countess had appealed for young unmarried women to undertake agricultural 
work, she reckoned that the unemployed girls over school age could not be found in the 
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homes of labourers across Devon. Instead, they had to conduct their search through 
visits to ‘houses where domestic servants are kept and appeal to the patriotism of 
mistress and maids’.203 Nevertheless, Morgan was sceptical of the success of this search 
amongst the working and middle class women of Devon. To reinforce her point she 
argued that for these appeals to rely upon a woman’s patriotism and a wage of three 
pence per hour to pull turnips and undertake other agricultural activities would not 
provide a worthwhile inducement to convince cooks and house maids who were earning 
£20 to £30 per year.
204
 If the domestic servants in Devon, did exchange their jobs to 
make such a sacrifice they would be, in Morgan’s view, heroines and would certainly 
‘be entitled to a special decoration’.205 The scheme to work on the land Morgan 
emphasized focused primarily on unmarried women or women of leisure because all the 
difficulties should be ‘overcome before any mother is asked to leave her home’.206 
 
Morgan put forward an adamant protest against the mere possibility of a mother being 
asked to leave her home because it would lead to ‘neglected babies, [and] neglected 
homes [which] mean evil days for the Empire later on’.207 In fact, she hoped that 
Devon’s mothers possessed enough patriotism to understand that to neglect their 
families in favour of working on the land would do more harm than good. She went 
onto sarcastically suggest that: ‘Three pence per hour for efficient women! It is enough 
to make one blush to look at a cabbage’.208 She added with a further ironic tone that the 
Countess had achieved what would ‘set an excellent example to women of leisure by 
offering her services to the farmer. No doubt many will follow her lead. They can well 
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afford to do so’.209 To add further credibility to their appeals, both Earl and Countess 
Fortescue drew the attention to the ‘admirable conduct of the women of France, who are 
carrying on farm work while their men folk are fighting’.210 Margaret Darrow points out 
that the French peasant women who took to agriculture to produce food for the nation 
were acclaimed as the ‘heroines of the harvest’.211 This was evident in 1916 when the 
French novelist René Bazin placed the two figures of the diligent French soldier in the 
trenches and the resolute peasant woman farming in the fields ‘side by side in the 
patriotic pantheon’.212 Nonetheless, Morgan sought to clarify the arguments put forward 
by the Fortescues in that the ‘peasant proprietorship largely obtains in France is 
probably the explanation of the French woman’s greater enthusiasm’.213 Morgan 
believed that for the women of the upper classes in Devon it would be a ‘great pity for 
any lady to miss this great opportunity (which may never occur again) of showing her 
patriotism in this way’.214 However, various farmers of Devon responded to the sight of 
a woman undertaking certain agricultural tasks, which were usually completed by a 
man, with a sense of amazement. Mary Lees, the first member of the Women’s Land 
Army (WLA) in Devon, remembered that when she reversed a horse and cart into a 
shed, she inadvertently gained an audience. Four old farmers stood to witness how she 
would cope with reversing the horse and cart into the shed: ‘They were simply 
watching. No one helping, or dreaming of it. Just to see how I’d get that cart back’.215  
 
Yet, the promotion of female labour in agriculture was a subject which was an integral 
thread in the discourses of patriotism expressed by not solely notable women of the 
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county but also by other members of Devon’s elite. This was evident in the hearings of 
the DAT. An example of this was the session of the DAT held on 29 September 1916 
where Heathcoat-Amory made an appeal on behalf of the DAT ‘to the Women of 
Devonshire, particularly to the wives and daughters of men who were accustomed to 
work on the land, to realise that they could lend very valuable help by assisting farmers 
when they offered them a reasonable wage’.216 It can be argued that the DAT provided 
the ‘provincial patriots’ with a new platform, like meetings of various wartime 
organisations, to broadcast their entreaties to Devon’s population. In the case of women 
labour in agriculture, DAT’s members also advocated for and prescribed the necessity 
of the wartime measures. This was present during the same hearing of the DAT when 
Heathcoat-Amory brought attention to the fact that in Tiverton the delivery of milk for 
the town’s population was undertaken by a team of twenty farmers.217 He argued that 
the time that these twenty farmers could deliver the milk had past and their energies 
were better invested working on the land. As an Appeal Tribunal, he proposed that they 
‘no longer found themselves able to say it was in the nation’s interest that they should 
continue such [an] occupation’.218 Alternatively, the members of the DAT advocated 
that the work of delivering milk across the mid-Devon town could be accomplished by 
women. The explicit exhortative role of Devon’s elite was also noticeable in their 
verdicts towards the appeals for exemption. An example of this was an appeal from a 
farm labourer on 20 October 1916. During this session of the DAT, Heathcoat-Amory 
exhorted to the appellant’s representative Mr A. M. Alford that the DAT could not have 
‘men sitting down and telling them week after week that they could not get women to 
do the work. Devonshire women, he felt sure, were not less patriotic than other parts of 
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the country’.219 Alford disagreed with Heathcoat-Amory and replied that Devon’s 
women could not undertake work on a dairy farm during the winter. However, 
Heathcoat-Amory responded in an infuriated tone that it was ‘no good farmers coming 
here and telling us they won’t or can’t try to get them’.220 From the way in which 
Heathcoat-Amory replied to Alford’s protestation, it could be expressed that the 
sessions of the DAT provided the DAT’s members with an opportunity to convey not 
only what was expected of Devon’s men but also exhort the role that the county’s 
women should undertake. Therefore, Devon’s local and Appeal Tribunals became 
important sites in the campaigns of superintendence launched by the ‘provincial 
patriots’ to police the accepted norms of behaviour in wartime. In addition, the 
commentaries and prescriptions that were attached to these verdicts were disseminated 
to a wider audience across the county through the local press with the intention of 
adding significant endorsement to the appeals of Devon’s elite. 
 
The Liberal MP for Camborne, Sir Francis Acland, recalled a similar occurrence from 
the DWWSC to the House of Commons on 22 May 1916.
221
 A farmer had complained 
to the President of the DWWSC, Mrs Milday, that he could not find a single woman to 
spread manure on his farm. She responded to this challenge and organised her house 
party of ladies to the farm. After they had completed the task, the astonished farmer 
paid them for the work and they donated their wages to the Red Cross. Acland 
concluded that this display ‘ought to make a really considerable impression in that 
county’.222 Acland’s anecdote was intended to raise the patriotic merits of Mildmay’s 
party of ladies. Conversely, F. M. Dickinson, the secretary for the DWWSC, sought to 
clarify Acland’s anecdote to the House with a letter to The Times on 3 June 1916. This 
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was because she believed that Acland had scarcely given ‘due honour to the women of 
South Devon’.223 Actually, her house party of ladies comprised of women not just from 
the upper classes. Indeed, the women who took part with Mrs Mildmay were rich and 
poor: ‘I may add that the same women have continued to work ever since, pulling 
turnips, clearing stones off the land, and doing other jobs required of them’.224 
According to Dickinson, this group of women had undeniably set a precedent for the 
women of Devon to which they had ‘not been slow to follow’.225  
 
Despite the rhetoric which emphasized the success of these female endeavours in 
Devon, it was evident that these accomplishments did not alter the perception of some 
of Devon’s farmers towards the gendered division of work. This is confirmed in Sylvia 
Calmady Hamlyn’s letter to the editor of The Times on 28 April 1916. She recalled a 
conversation that she had with the wife of a Devon smallholder whose son was serving 
in the armed forces. During their discussion about the prospect of women working on 
the land, the wife asked her a rhetorical question: would farmers ‘ever employ women 
so long as they can keep back their sons? Why if they tried women and found they 
could really help, their sons might have to go!’226 Hence, the wife explained to Hamlyn 
that the employment of women was neither indicative of ignorance nor prejudice by 
farmers towards the capabilities of women working on the land. Instead, the utilisation 
of women labour in Devon’s agriculture was understood by some farmers as a threat to 
the survival of individual farms’ as family businesses. In fact, the appeals of Devon’s 
farmers against the conscription of their sons did stress that if their sons were 
conscripted this would mean that they would struggle to continue their businesses. In 
some worst case scenarios, these farmers would have little choice but to sell their herds. 
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Nevertheless, the effects of conscription had become evident in the declining 
availability of male agricultural labour in some districts of Devon. For instance, the 
Dartmouth Branch of the NFU had ‘reported a decline in production values on farms in 
South Devon’.227 The productivity of Devon’s agriculture had weakened to the extent 
that the members of the DCWAC were resolved on 6 May 1916 to petition the chairman 
of the local agricultural committees, and the Tribunals across Devon to consider the 
importance of the harvest. Accordingly, in the view of the serious scarcity of male 
labour on farms in Devon, this Committee viewed with ‘alarm any proposal to take 
more men from the land; and strongly deprecates the recruiting of any men who are 
only fit for home service’.228 In a similar move to help improve the harvest, Honiton 
Rural District Council (HRDC) on 21 May 1916 requested the surveyor of the district’s 
roads to ‘release as many men as possible during the harvest, in order to help the 
Farmers’.229 
 
The minutes of the DCWAC for 4 August 1916 reveal that there were approximately 
‘2472 women available for work on the land’.230 However, despite the number of 
women available to work in agriculture, DCC concluded in August 1916 that the 
response from Devon’s women and farmers ‘was not encouraging and the lists gathered 
by the Women’s War Agricultural Committee’s do not reflect the actual attitudes of the 
people of Devon’.231 In comparison, by June 1916 there were 5,000 women who had 
registered their names with the Women’s War Agricultural Committee in Kent.232 It was 
suggested that few of the 5,000 women who that registered themselves for agricultural 
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labour were available for continuous hard work on the land. The reason for this was that 
some women were distracted and ‘beguiled by high wages in the munitions works and 
others content with their separation allowances or income derived from billeting 
soldiers in their houses’.233 Moreover, Kent’s farmers also resorted to employing 1,668 
children for service in agriculture. A report from September 1916 conducted by the 
DWWSC also revealed that Devon’s farmers were still hesitant to employ women as 
substitute labour on their farms and instead were keeping their sons. In fact, the report 
stated that the women in the county were not ready to show any readiness to work on 
the land until ‘more of the farmers’ sons are gone’.234 A similar verdict was later 
professed by Kekewich during a meeting of the DAT Committee on 26 May 1916. He 
noted that women labour in Lancashire and other counties was being employed to a 
much greater extent when compared to the low numbers of women in Devon’s 
agricultural sector.
235
 This is apparent when viewing the statistics from Devon which 
confirm that in 1916 there were still 4,461 farmers’ sons working on the land.236 
Notwithstanding the number of women available to work on the land, the statistics 
reveal many of Devon’s farmers had resorted to other alternative sources of manpower. 
This included 1,786 soldiers as well as 225 Prisoners of War (POW).
237
 Accordingly, 
this confirms the suggestion that in September 1916, it was perceived that Devon’s 
farmers were managing to ‘carry on without the help of women’.238 At the same time, 
Bonnie White suggests that an ‘inadequate supply of horse harnesses and a deficiency 
of ploughmen made the problems in Devon even more acute’.239  
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A valuable point of comparison with the attempts to change the perceptions of the 
gendered division of labour in Devon’s farming industry was the experience of Sir Ian 
Heathcoat-Amory in his attempts to introduce female labour into the JHC lace factory at 
Tiverton. Gail Braybon points out that during the two decades before the First World 
War, the introduction of machinery had steadily eroded women’s dominance in the lace 
industry.
240
 However, the introduction of conscription meant that the male labour force 
of Heathcoat-Amory’s factory were in an increasingly vulnerable position as 
conscription posed a threat to the future of their jobs. In January 1916, the factory’s 
management proposed to introduce female labour in the factory in order to replace the 
male workers who could be called up to serve in the Army. These proposals by 
Heathcoat-Amory created a distinct tension between the factory’s male workforce and 
the factory’s management. On 27 January 1916, Heathcoat-Amory discussed with the 
Men’s Committee of Lacehands (MCL) the suggestion to employ women to work the 
lace machines. Only 27 members of the MCL voted in favour of Heathcoat-Amory’s 
proposal compared to the 36 who voted against women working the factory’s lace 
machines.
241
 The results of the vote reveal the reluctance to which the workforce 
responded to a scheme for the replacement of labour in the factory. With the impending 
introduction of the MSA, the lace-hands were concerned that this measure could have 
rendered them redundant and available for military service. When the chairman reported 
the MCL’s election result to Heathcoat-Amory, he stressed that to put women on the 
machines was purely a ‘wartime expedient and that if it took place it would cease when 
the war ended’.242 After a discussion among the MCL’s members, a second vote 
produced another majority vote that dismissed Heathcoat-Amory’s proposal by 44 
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members to 31.
243
 However, the MCL offered Heathcoat-Amory a compromise in 
which they would work until 10 pm which was one hour longer each day.
244
 According 
to their spokesman, this would mean that the existing male workforce would yield a 
better result ‘than if women had been employed to work the French machines’ to make 
lace.
245
 Notwithstanding this compromise, Heathcoat-Amory clarified in these 
discussions that he had not requested them to work longer hours and their offer to 
increase their working hours would mean that their working day would start at 6am and 
finish at 10pm.
246
 In his opinion, this was ‘really too long for men to work’.247   
 
The problem of employment was made ever more apparent to Heathcoat-Amory with 
the arrival of two factory inspectors in February 1916. During both inspections by Mr 
W. E. Harding and Mr J. H. Rogers, on 12 and 17 February respectively, it was 
emphasized to the factory’s management that they must ascertain the factory’s exact 
requirements which included ‘women night spinners, and to elicit information in regard 
to our Twisthands and their possible exemption from military service’.248 On 8 March 
1916, the factory’s management submitted applications to the Tiverton Tribunal for the 
exemption of six male lace-makers. Mr W. H. Huxtable represented the lace 
manufacturer and in their defence, argued that it was in the national interest that these 
six skilled men should stay in their present occupations.
249
 He explained the reasons for 
the indispensability of these six men was that lace-makers required years of training, 
there was only a limited number and they could not be replaced. According to Huxtable, 
it was crucial to maintain the Tiverton factory’s output because ninety per cent of the 
lace manufactured at Tiverton was exported to America and the return for this business 
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came in ‘the form of English gold’.250 Moreover, Huxtable assured the Tribunal of the 
JHC’s patriotic credentials in that they had done everything they could to encourage 
men to enlist and they had convinced fifty men. This was an evident factor because 
Heathcoat-Amory was a local notable who had been prolific in his efforts from August 
1914 to appeal to the factory’s employees and the men of Tiverton to volunteer for the 
Armed Forces.
251
 As a result, Huxtable assured the Tribunal that the business had 
reached the ‘irreducible minimum’ of workers in the factory, with one-third of the lace 
machines in the manufacturing works now idle.
252
 Huxtable argued that the Tribunal 
should consider that the firm was also engaged in a large capacity of government work 
manufacturing munitions for which men had been taken from the lacemaking 
department. Consequently, Huxtable warned the Tribunal panel that if these men were 
not granted exemption than there would be disastrous consequences for the business 
because if ‘any more machines were closed down there would not be sufficient output to 
provide work for the women and girls now employed’.253  
 
The Mayor of Tiverton, Alfred T. Gregory reflected upon the business that Heathcoat-
Amory was bringing to the local area. Despite the fact that lace was deemed to be a 
luxury item, to Gregory it was essential for the war effort to preserve the ‘level of 
exchange between this county and America’.254 The Tiverton Tribunal’s military 
representative, Captain Boles, argued that the Army required these six lace-makers to do 
their duty. A member of the Tiverton Tribunal, Mr Peters asked Huxtable whether the 
firm could employ retired lace-makers who were former employees of the factory to 
work the lace machines.
255
 However, Huxtable confessed that he had previously spoken 
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to two retired lace-makers but he felt that their very bad eyesight would render them 
unable to work on the factory’s machines. Another retired lace-maker was interested in 
the proposal to come out of retirement to make lace but Huxtable believed that the 
return of this man was very doubtful. After this, the Tribunal considered the application 
of the six lace-makers in private and granted exemption to all of them for three months 
in which they hoped that the business ‘would be able to make arrangements to fill the 
places of the men’.256 Subsequently, the Tribunal’s verdict and the scrutiny of the 
reviews that were continually conducted by the Superintendent Inspectors of Factories 
placed added emphasis and pressure upon Heathcoat-Amory to try to negotiate with the 
male employees to accept young women to work on the machines.  
 
On 27 March 1916, Heathcoat-Amory attempted to convince the MCL along with the 
lace foreman and the entire staff of lace-makers to accept the help of young women in 
the lace shops, in view of the fact that it ‘was highly probable that all eligible lace-
makers will be called up’.257 He also asked the men if they could teach the young 
women all that they possibly could. To clinch the proposal, the management promised 
to pay each man who volunteered an extra 5/- per week for a month to which they 
agreed to accept this proposal.
258
 However, the issue of conscription continued to linger 
over the reliability of production in the factory. On 5 May 1916, Heathcoat-Amory 
proposed another scheme to his workforce. He proposed for two lace-hands to work 
with the help of three young women ‘(or two boys & one young woman) as a strictly 
war measure’ in order to restart the machines that were stopped due to the loss of the 
lace-hands who had joined the Territorial’s or the Army.259 Indeed, the concern over the 
factory’s productivity in the light of the ‘almost certainty of more of the men being 
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“called up”’ was a factor that Heathcoat-Amory had to consider in his deliberations with 
the lace-hands.
260
 According to the secretary around a third or a quarter of the machines 
in the factory had stopped on this account and if this scheme was implemented they 
‘might be put to work again’.261 He explained that the four-machine scheme emphasized 
the benefits of using two men and three helpers on a single machine. However, during 
the discussion of his proposal on 8 May 1916, it was evident that ‘the men generally did 
not view the proposition with favour’.262 The lace-hands objected because the 
responsibility for this scheme was ‘too great to be undertaken by the men’ and women 
were, in their view, incapable physically of ‘doing much, or at least some, of the work 
connected with lacemaking’.263 Furthermore, they argued that it would take the 
replacement workforce a long time to ‘make anything like efficient helpers’ and there 
were times when ‘women were feeble and inert’.264 Some of lace-hands were primarily 
concerned that to ‘place young women with men and boys [was] hinting at the danger of 
possible indelicacy’.265 Finally, if sufficient information was placed before women they 
‘would not be able to judge if the pecuniary results of the scheme would sufficiently 
remunerate them if they undertook to try it’.266 It could be ventured that this list of 
reasons from the lace-hands were intended to reinforce the validity of their objection to 
Heathcoat-Amory’s proposal and to strengthen their case that they should keep their 
jobs.  
 
Yet, this compendium did not support the lace-hands objection and actually gave an 
impression that the lace-hands were prejudiced against the capabilities of female labour. 
According to the meeting’s note taker, Heathcoat-Amory fought against these 
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protestations from his workforce with considerable force and skill.
267
 After the meeting, 
Heathcoat-Amory confessed that he was ‘bitterly disappointed at the attitudes that the 
men had taken up’.268 He pleaded with his workforce to reconsider his proposals with a 
small trial and requested their answer in two to three days. The idea that the workforce 
was to lose more ground to young women could mean that they would inevitably 
become replaced with a female workforce.
269
 It should also be considered that the lace-
hands and the MCL were concerned that the introduction of women as a temporary 
wartime measure could become standard practice for the post-war period. Hence, the 
perseverance of the lace-hands to retain their jobs can underline how their resistance 
towards the employment of young women fed into not only the tension between 
individual priorities and those of the nation but also their suspicion of this measure 
deemed to be a necessary expedient in wartime. Despite the reservations of the lace-
hands, it would appear on 11 May 1916 with the arrival of Miss Slocock, HM Inspector 
of Factories from the HO, that the factory had started substituting male lace-makers. It 
was revealed during Slocock’s inspection that the Tiverton factory had taken on 23 
women to undertake work which had previously undertaken by men and that ‘out of the 
twenty of the 23 were in lace shops learning to become lace makers’.270 In light of the 
fact that there was an increasing number of machines in the lace factory that were no 
longer in the use, there was no doubt that Heathcoat-Amory as an employer had little to 
no choice in slowly introducing women lace-hands to keep lace in production. Upon 
hearing this development, Slocock was very pleased at which she compared the 
situation at Tiverton with the state of female labour in two lace factories in the 
Somerset.
271
 In Illminster, an anonymous lace factory was employing two women and 
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had made great efforts to engage women.
272
 By contrast, a lace factory in Chard had 
made no attempt to replace the male lace-makers with women.
273
 Simultaneously, lace-
makers in the lace making union based in Nottingham had ‘struck against the 
employment of women as twisthands’.274 However, Slocock stressed that there was a 
non-union lace factory that employed women as lace-makers as an experiment and she 
believed that they were making a success of it. Therefore, this helps to validate 
Braybon’s point that the substitution of male labour with female labour varied ‘not just 
from industry to industry but factory to factory’.275 
 
Nevertheless, even after Slocock’s inspection and commendation to the factory’s 
management of the employment of 23 women in the factory, another two inspectors 
visited the Tiverton factory to enquire ‘what was being done to introduce female labour 
into lace-making rooms’.276 Therefore, the effects of the HO Inspectors resolve to 
employ women were made ever more apparent to Amory. On 12 May 1916, Heathcoat-
Amory admitted in a letter to Earl Fortescue that due to the Inspectors insistence to 
employ women the exemptions of the lace-makers who were married were rejected.
277
 
Later on 15 May 1916, the workforce put forward a different scheme in which they 
suggested that ‘three men were to work four 6 yd. machines with the help of their boys 
and one young girl (about 15 years of age)’.278 They agreed that the girls should receive 
the same rate of pay as the boys employed at the factory. Heathcoat-Amory accepted 
their proposal and assigned that the trial would commence on 22 May 1916. As a point 
of comparison, six women also started working in the munitions room of the factory on 
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22 May 1916.
279
 It could be hazarded that Heathcoat-Amory was concerned that if his 
factory did not comply with the HO inspectors’ requests then the conduct of his 
business could receive additional criticism and they could have lost the contract to build 
shells for the British war effort. Similarly, French industrialists who produced shells 
faced pressure from bureaucrats in what was a tense relationship where the former 
fought ‘for the best interests of their firms, [and were] continually aware that their 
current prosperity could be instantly jeopardised by any one of the technical 
adjustments which bureaucrats constantly brought forward’.280 Therefore, like 
Heathcoat-Amory, the French industrialists had to balance the requests of various 
parties to ensure the financial survival of their business throughout the war.
281
 
 
There were other ways in which Devon’s women could also demonstrate their 
patriotism and claim citizenship in the wartime community. As mentioned previously, 
charitable efforts provided Devonians such as women, the elderly and children who 
were outside the requirements of military service an opportunity to claim moral 
citizenship in the wartime community on the Home Front. Rebecca Gill suggests that 
feminists presented the large scale involvement of women in humanitarian efforts as an 
‘act of patriotism meriting political representation’.282 Therefore, it is clear that the 
‘impression of independent actions was crucial to the functioning of charitable appeals 
and the policing of the shifting line between state and voluntary responsibility’.283 The 
manner of different types of war work which indicated a woman’s patriotism was 
manifest in an article in the North Devon Journal on 13 April 1916. This article 
concerned a sixteen year old girl working in Barnstaple who had ‘every reason to be 
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proud of her work for War causes’.284 In her spare time, she made eight pairs of socks 
and two pairs of knee caps. With one exception, she had paid for the material to make 
these goods and the transport of the material, out of her own finances. According to the 
newspaper, the girl’s efforts were ‘an example of patriotism worthy of the highest 
commendation’.285 In March 1916, the introduction of the War Charities Act (WCA) 
was intended to curtail cases of fraud and established a system of licensing.
286
 Many of 
the philanthropic organisations in Devon that were in financial difficulty appealed to 
escape this legislation and some were successful. For example, the Alphington Belgian 
Refugee Charity (ABRC) was created to assist in the maintenance of a single family of 
Belgian refugees. Nevertheless, since the ABRC focused their efforts on one family, 
they fell into difficulties possibly because of the ABRC’s limited appeal. As a result, the 
ABRC applied for exemption as the ‘amount of subscriptions and donations 
administered [was] very limited, and only devoted to support two members of one 
family’.287 This plight was not an exception as a significant number of charities in 
Devon were granted exemption from the regulations set out in the 1916 legislation for 
the same reason: ‘The amount of subscriptions and donations to be administered, and 
the area of collection, being very limited’.288 However, Gerard DeGroot argues that the 
introduction of this legislation by the state did not dampen the generosity from the 
general public because ‘so prolific were volunteers collecting donations on the streets 
that the public began to complain of the nuisance’.289 
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The experiences of minority groups in Devon during 1916 
At the same time as Devon’s notables superintended the patriotism of Devon’s men 
during appeals for exemption, there were members of Devon’s elite and the county’s 
population who were concerned about the patriotism and loyalty of certain minority 
groups in Devon. David Cesarani suggests that because the Jewish population in Britain 
was part of a supra-national group, it was unavoidably in wartime that their presence 
‘provoked questions of identity and allegiance’.290 This was also evident in Devon as 
suspicions were raised about the loyalty of the county’s Jewish communities. As a 
school-child during the war, F. Ashe Lincoln recalled in an interview that he, along with 
other Jews in Plymouth, had experienced a ‘tremendous amount of anti-Semitism’.291 In 
fact, he suggested that the anti-Semitism in the city was ‘very marked in the middle part 
of the war, and to some extent we suffered a great deal from it during the war, verbal 
attacks and physical attacks’.292 He remembered that, due to the depth of such intense 
anger against Germans in Plymouth, Jews were frequently bombarded with accusations 
that Jews were Germans and any Jew was ‘regarded as being good game’.293 Lincoln’s 
account goes on to mention that the physical attacks from other children at his school 
were ferocious in nature: 
 
Jews were attacked right, left and centre and all Jews were 
described as being “Germans”. I mean, my brother and I suffered 
many attack from schoolboys in Plymouth, being called “German 
Jews”, and we had at one time to get special protection from our 
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school, from the Head Master; because of the number of attacks 
that were made on us. Our clothes were torn, and so on.
294
  
 
Susanne Terwey argues that during the war there were serious concerns from Britain’s 
Jewish communities that anti-Semitism and Germanophobia were becoming blurred 
phenomena. This situation became worse after the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 
when there was increased Germanophobia and mob violence against Jews across the 
urban centres of Britain. The Jewish Weekly was adamant that the British press had 
played on the idea of the ‘alleged identity of Jews with Germans’.295 This was to the 
extent that ‘“Jew” and “German” were being used by many in Britain as synonymous 
terms’.296 However, Terwey points out that it is open for debate whether the Jewish 
Weekly was entirely correct in the assumption that all Jews were identified as Germans. 
However, what it does reveal is that as a contemporary source, the Jewish Weekly 
sensed that these prejudices were widespread enough for calls for peace to be published 
in the press.
297
 Furthermore, Lincoln’s testimony indicates that this was also the case in 
Plymouth. Yet, in spite of the occurrences of Germanophobia in Plymouth, it is also 
important to note that members of Plymouth’s Hebrew Congregation presented their 
allegiance to Britain and the war effort through the war.
298
 Similarly, despite the 
presentations of allegiance to the majority society evident in the self-mobilization of 
Germany’s Jews on the Home Front and the presence of Jewish soldiers in the German 
Army, Germany’s Jewish community continued to be perceived by many Germans as 
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the internal enemy.
299
 According to Stuart Dalley, concerns about the activities of 
German nationals were also present in Cornwall. In 1916, the novelist D. H. Lawrence 
and his German wife Frieda moved to Cornwall and became subjected to ‘constant 
police monitoring and were eventually hounded out on trumped up charges of spying 
and provisioning German submarines on the Cornish coast’.300 This led Lawrence to 
remark that these concerns were ‘a wave of criminal lust [which] rose and possessed 
England’.301  
 
Nevertheless, these attacks against Plymouth’s Jews and on Lawrence’s wife were not 
isolated occurrences. This was evident in the suspicion and accusations that were 
levelled against the German nationals who were a part of the Benedictine community of 
Monks at Buckfast Abbey. By 1916, the Buckfast Monks comprised mostly of French 
and German born monks who were dedicated towards the peaceful principles of the 
monk Benedict. Nevertheless, it was perceived by the local populations of 
Buckfastleigh and Ashburton that this community of religious holy men were the 
perfect cover for secret agents to carry out reconnaissance. A factor that may have 
contributed to the concerns of the local communities surrounding the Abbey was 
previously in August 1914 when the Abbot of the Abbey, Anscar Verner, was arrested 
whilst on holiday in Austria on accusations of being an English spy.
302
 It was the middle 
of October 1914 before the Abbot was released and only after the Abbot Primate of the 
Benedictine Order of Rome had made representations to the Austrian ambassador about 
his detention.
303
 Moreover, in 1915, a HO committee exempted the monks from 
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internment on the condition that they ‘retained residence at the Abbey and the Abbot 
undertook to give notice to the Police if anyone left’.304 This edict meant that the Abbey 
became a prohibited area to be watched by Special Constables and the monks were 
interned within the Abbey’s grounds. According to J. C. Bird, Buckfast Abbey became 
the most unusual ‘internment camp’ in Britain because, while the monks were confined 
to the Abbey’s grounds they were allowed to continue their activities uninterrupted.305 
As a consequence of their internment, the rumours and conjecture surrounding the 
loyalty of the German monks at Buckfast Abbey continued to create grave concerns on 
a local level.  
 
Tammy M. Proctor suggests that the internment of civilians who were deemed to be 
enemy aliens was problematic because it exposed the ambiguity of the civil/military 
divide which created ‘categories of people who did not fit neatly in either’.306 The 
German and Austrian monks were still perceived to be a threat to not only national 
security but also the stability of the surrounding area. The evidence of how Devonians 
perceived the Buckfast Monks reinforces Panikos Panayi’s point that the minority 
community of German Monks were ‘representatives of the enemy who have lived 
within the country at war with their land of origin for a prolonged period’.307 As a 
consequence of the blurring of the boundaries between civilian and combatant, serious 
suspicions were still expressed during 1916 by the local populations in the surrounding 
area around the Abbey. It was these suspicions which provided the impetus for a 
sustained campaign by members of Devon’s elite to advocate for the vigilance of the 
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Buckfast Monks. This is evident in Lord Fortescue’s wartime memoirs when he 
revealed that ‘some busy person at Buckfastleigh’ had written to him about the ‘fuss 
about possible spying by the Priests at Buckfast Abbey’.308 In response, Fortescue 
suggested that this would be ‘a nice job’ for the local VTC to keep Buckfast’s Monks 
under observation.
309
 
 
On 3 April 1916, Buckfastleigh Urban District Council (BUDC) received a letter from 
the HO that complained against the treatment of the interned monks by the local 
council. However, BUDC’s Councillors were resolved to see that the monks were taken 
from the Abbey and sent to an internment camp. They decided that BUDC’s clerk 
should attempt in the matter of the German monks to gain the assistance of the Liberal 
Unionist MP for Tavistock, Sir John Spear. In this letter, it was agreed that BUDC 
should not only lay before him the facts of the Monks’ internment but to implore him to 
‘ask a question of the Home Secretary in Parliament’.310 Nonetheless, it was not until 
the summer of 1916 that questions about the status of the Buckfast Monks were raised 
in Parliament. During the House of Commons debate on 16 August 1916, George 
Lambert, the Liberal MP for South Molton, put forward an enquiry about this matter to 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Herbert Samuel. Lambert queried 
whether the Buckfast Monks who were able to bear arms had been ‘allowed to return to 
Germany; whether the censorship of letters, etc., is exercised by a naturalised 
German’.311 Ultimately, Lambert asked Samuel whether he was satisfied that ‘national 
security is in no way jeopardised by the residence of these alien enemies under the 
conditions now imposed?’312 In response to these enquiries, the Home Secretary replied 
that there were only a small number of the Buckfast Monks who were enemy nationals. 
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Lambert revealed that an arrangement had been agreed for the monks, after consultation 
with the Chief Constable of Devonshire. It was deemed not necessary to ‘remove them 
from the Abbey, but strict conditions have been imposed in regards to their 
movements’.313 None of the monks of military age had left the Abbey and their 
correspondence was monitored by the Abbot of the Abbey who was a naturalised 
British subject.
314
 On 6 September 1916, both Lambert and Spear wrote to BUDC 
informing them of the questions that they had put forward in these Parliamentary 
debates. As a consequence of this, BUDC decided to write to the Home Secretary to ask 
to be ‘allowed to be represented at the inquiry proposed to be held’.315  
 
Conclusion 
The local and Appeal Tribunals introduced in Devon under the auspices of the MSA in 
1916 arbitrated ‘between the demands of the military and the interests of local 
communities, which were formulated in economic, moral or political terms’.316 These 
tribunals were intended to herald a more impartial approach towards the question of 
manpower. This was evident in how Devon’s elite wanted to command the confidence 
of the county’s population in the apparatus of conscription that managed the arbitration 
of the appeals. In fact, Heathcoat-Amory wanted to present himself in his role as the 
DAT’s Chairman not necessarily as a wise judge such as the Biblical King Solomon. 
Instead, he was portrayed as a virtuous sheriff who would not be fooled with excuses, in 
the enforcement of a regulated and equitable system of conscription, and bring 
individuals who they deemed to be shirkers to account for their selfish behaviour. The 
evidence from Devon in 1916 asserts that the county’s elite viewed the tribunals as a 
means to extend their remit in their campaigns of superintendence upon the wartime 
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behaviour of Devonians. The ‘provincial patriots’ who were the members of tribunal 
panels across Devon were given added gravitas in their authority since they had become 
agents of the state and possessed the power over life and death for many Devonians. 
Gregory has suggested that the regulations inaugurated in the MSA became ‘mediated 
through a tribunal system which was intimate, highly personal, and closely 
scrutinized’.317 Indeed, he has shown that the members of civic society who were 
members on the MST were not always benevolent.
318
 Many tribunalists believed that 
they had sincerely considered the applications for exemption in an impartial manner, 
and that their conclusions were guided by a ‘full regard for the national interests of the 
country’.319 However, the proceedings and decisions of the Tribunals were coloured by 
very human perspectives.
320
 This was true in Devon because the county’s tribunalists 
took a more active role on the tribunal panels in their adjudication of the appeals for 
exemption from Devon’s men. Instead, they took on an explicit exhortative role which 
provided them with an opportunity to extend their influence over local wartime politics 
and adjudicate upon the social morality of wartime.  
 
Under their responsibility as the ‘superintendents of patriotism’, Devon’s Tribunalists 
expressed their views on patriotism and made value-judgments about the patriotism of 
Devon’s men. This was based on the merit of the claims for exemption from Devon’s 
men-folk along with the behaviour of appellants or those representing the appellants, 
from which they formulated if this constituted patriotic behaviour. The fact that some 
Devonians were more absorbed with the survival of their livelihoods and local 
priorities, despite the tribunal panel’s entreaties to consider the national interest, led 
some of Devon’s elite to deem their behaviour to be unpatriotic. In particular, 
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individuals whose patriotism was clearly in doubt were CO’s, so the sincerity of their 
beliefs was tested. The commentaries that accompanied the DAT’s verdicts also reveal 
how the county’s notables used these rulings to exhort, prescribe and advocate wartime 
measures. It is important to observe that Devon’s elite were aware that the tribunal 
proceedings and in particular their comments, would reach a wider audience through the 
local press as the reporting of some sessions were intended to be both informative 
accounts and sensational news stories. This further strengthened the role of Devon’s 
elite as the self-appointed arbiters of the social morality of wartime to which they could 
make further judgements about the necessity or luxury of certain occupations in wartime 
and ultimately prescribe how Devon’s men-folk should behave. Yet, it must also be 
noted that some Devonians chose in 1916 to enlist in the Navy to escape the system of 
conscription and avoid the judgements of a Tribunal panel. This was also later evident 
in 1917 and 1918.
321
 The tribunal hearings also reflected the constant negotiation that 
the ‘provincial patriots’ faced to superintend the social morality of wartime.  
 
Yet, the task of adjudicating these applications for exemption was a trying one since the 
application of ‘fairness’ by these tribunals was ‘as inconsistent as any human quality, 
and as vulnerable to external stimuli’.322 Some decisions by tribunals in Devon, that 
placed an emphasis to dedicate manpower to military efficiency, there would be 
eventual criticism of an unsympathetic decision made by these agents of the state 
because ‘occasions of apparent favouritism or harshness might have been grounded as 
much upon an honest appreciation of the facts of a case as upon any subjective 
criteria’.323  The decisions that some tribunals made along with the attempts to prescribe 
models of wartime behaviour to Devon’s populace helped to accentuate a sense of 
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‘otherness’ about Devon’s elite on the tribunal panels. The men who stood before a 
tribunal panel saw these local notables as ‘members of the same mechanism that worked 
tirelessly to take men from civilian life and place them in Khaki’.324 This indirectly 
strengthened the tension between the priorities of Devon’s elite to exhort measures 
which were deemed to be necessary in the national interest and had manifested itself in 
the applications for exemption from the county’s men-folk. Consequently, this 
‘otherness’ was accentuated by the resentment of the interference to which the tribunals 
panels represented. Nevertheless, the paradoxical nature of the tribunal network in 
Devon helps to further emphasize the difficulties that the county’s notables faced in the 
process to organise Devon’s population to the needs of the war effort. The discretion of 
local tribunal panels to determine who could receive exemptions from conscription 
helped to create an inconsistent system of conscription. It was improbable that the men 
and women who sat as the tribunal panels across Devon did not subsume ‘their own 
opinions and preconceptions entirely to the needs either of state or locality’.325 
Therefore, individual tribunals in Devon, such as those in Ilfracombe, South Molton and 
Tiverton, were accused of favouritism towards applications for exemption. Hence, the 
idiosyncratic approach towards the processes of conscription underlines the fact that 
civil society in Devon was not united during 1916, because the war effort was not an 
all-encompassing principle.  
 
The advent of conscription gave added impetus to the attempts by the women of 
Devon’s elite to change perceptions surrounding the gendered division of labour. 
Despite the rhetoric of female volunteerism and attempts to enlighten Devon’s farmers 
about the benefits of female labour, many of the county’s agriculturalists were reluctant 
to employ women to work on the land. The persistence of traditional attitudes towards 
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the gendered division of labour should not be assumed necessarily to have been an 
example of male prejudice. Devon’s Farmers were concerned that women could not 
handle the practicalities of working on the land and this prompted them to employ 
soldiers, POW’s and the elderly. This was evident in the measures that were taken by 
some of Devon’s farmers to keep their sons on the farm in an attempt to preserve the 
individual survival and future of their family business. However, the tribunals provided 
the ‘provincial patriots’ with a platform to broadcast their judgements to the farmers and 
the industries of Devon displaying the necessity to employ alternative sources of 
manpower in their work practices. In fact, tribunals provided Devon’s elite the 
opportunity to express their expectations of the roles that women and men should 
undertake.
326
 At the same time, Devon’s women and other Devonians outside the 
requirements of military service continued to support charitable organisations and claim 
moral citizenship in wartime despite the regulation of the WCA. 
 
Nevertheless, the necessity for female labour was contested by the male lace-hands at 
JHC textile factory in Tiverton where Heathcoat-Amory faced a similar struggle to 
convince the MCL to employ women to make lace. As a manufacturer, Heathcoat-
Amory could not make purely economic choices because he ‘needed to think about 
political strategies to balance the different voices’.327 These voices were not only 
evident on his factory floor but were also apparent from the Inspectors of Factories and 
the members of the Tiverton Tribunal. The actions of Heathcoat-Amory emphasized the 
pressures that were felt by lace manufacturers in wartime to continue to produce lace 
and to also work with the war effort rather than against it. Resultantly, despite the 
problems that were experienced, the productivity achieved in the factory’s textile 
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segment in order to fulfil the American orders was extraordinary, whilst the factory’s 
employees were also working diligently to increase the production number of shells. 
There were also concerns raised by some of Devon’s residents towards the patriotism 
and loyalty of Plymouth’s Jews and the monks of Buckfast Abbey. The latter prompted 
MP’s along with local councillors to call upon the HO to remove the German monks 
from Buckfast Abbey since their patriotism was not easily ascertained and became the 
subject of campaigns of vigilance and surveillance by local authorities. 
 
The ‘provincial patriots’ continued in their attempts to exhort and convince some men 
and women in Devon of the necessity of the measures introduced by the State in the 
national interest. As agents who were the police-men and women of patriotism, they 
saw that their work of administering these tribunals was not a popular mechanism of 
wartime intervention. Its enforcement through MST’s was dependent upon the abilities 
of the individual members of Devon’s elite since they administered and represented the 
system of conscription on a local level. The constant negotiation between the 
‘provincial patriots’ and appellants exhibited at tribunal hearings, revealed that they still 
struggled to reconcile the tension between individual and national priorities. In fact, the 
tension between the prescriptions of Devon’s elite and the criticism and responses of 
various Devonians that emerged during the tribunal hearings in 1916 were echoed in the 
subsequent hearings that occurred in 1917 and 1918. The failure of the harvest of 1916, 
as well as the fall of Asquith’s Coalition Government helped pave the way to 
remobilization for complete victory in 1917-1918. 
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Chapter 4: 
The effects of remobilization 
1917-1918 
 
Introduction 
In Devon, despite the successes that were achieved through the mechanisms of ‘self-
mobilization’, the county’s notables came to the realisation through the experiences of 
1914 to 1916 had shown that ‘self-mobilization for the war was a differentiated, uneven 
process’.1 By the spring of 1917, it became evident that the casualties incurred by the 
military offensives of 1914, 1915 and 1916, had shaken the resolve of the belligerent 
nations. The military casualties, the tension between the fighting front and the home 
front, food shortages and other factors all helped to undermine the resolve of 
populations on national and local levels in their support for the war. This was evident in 
Russia because both the Tsarist regime and the Provisional Government had collapsed 
in February and October 1917, respectively, as a result of war-weariness, food riots and 
the tensions between the Eastern Front and the Russian Home Front.
2
  According to 
John Horne, what the states of the combatant nations understood as ‘“morale” and 
“loyalty” was in fact a public opinion that grew in complexity as the war turned into a 
test of endurance’.3 It was clear that by 1917 some Devonians were weary of the war 
and its duration. This was evident in the journal entry of Plymouth preacher James 
Thomas Rogers on 13 June 1917. After he had heard the news of the carnage caused by 
the most serious air raid on London yet, he questioned in a tone of disbelief and 
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exhaustion how much longer could the war continue: ‘How long O Lord? How long!’4 
Similarly, when Teignmouth resident, Albert Best, reflected on the third anniversary of 
the declaration of war on 4 August 1917, he admitted in his diary that ‘no one expected 
it [the war] was going to be such a big thing lasting so long. It is not finished yet, nor is 
the end in sight, but all round they are anxiously talking of peace’.5  
 
The spectre of war-weariness was present on both the fighting front and the home front 
and posed a significant threat to the test of endurance of the belligerent nations. The 
concerns over war-weariness were felt in France during the spring of 1917 because the 
morale of civilian and soldier was a factor that ‘could no longer be safely ignored’ by 
the state.
6
 The French army mutinies in May and June 1917, the failure of the 
Champagne offensive in June, and manifestations of war-weariness during that year had 
inevitable repercussions upon the French war effort because this combination of factors 
appeared to ‘seriously question continued French participation in the war’.7 Similarly, 
there were concerns in Britain as to whether the country could continue its participation 
in the war during 1917. The faded resolve was apparent in the Liberal Prime Minister, 
Herbert Asquith, who could no longer endure the escalating responsibilities of directing 
the British war effort.
8
 This led to David Lloyd George, the Secretary of State for War, 
becoming Prime Minister in December 1916.
9
 Upon hearing this news, Edrica de la 
Pole was hopeful that under Lloyd George’s premiership that ‘now perhaps we shall 
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“get a move on” with the War’.10 In addition, the significant causalities incurred during 
the offensives of 1916 and 1917 had contributed to weakening the confidence and 
resolve of the British to support the war through the course of 1917.
11
 Consequently, 
during 1917 and 1918, the most immediate dangers perceived in both Britain and 
France seemed to be ‘from war-weariness, from a detachment of sections of the 
population from the national effort, rather than from political opposition to war’.12 
 
Leonard V. Smith suggests that the war had become transformed by 1917 into a 
‘struggle between the irresistible force of total mobilization, sustained by consent, and 
the immoveable object of the lines of the trenches themselves’.13 Horne argues that the 
crisis of the home front morale in France and Britain during 1917 challenged the very 
process of self-mobilization.
14
 Indeed, Adrian Gregory suggests that the low point in 
British public confidence was between October 1917 and February 1918 because to 
contemporaries the ‘prospects never seemed bleaker’.15 In Britain and France, the state 
faced the ‘problem for the remainder of the war of how to restore and maintain support 
for military victory and of whether to change the balance between coercion and 
persuasion’.16 It was under these circumstances in 1917 that the belligerent nations were 
faced with the choice between remobilization in order to secure victory or to face the 
grave consequences of internal unrest.
17
 On 9 March 1917, Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory 
advocated that across Devon it was the time that ‘co-operation must be resorted to in 
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business nowadays, and we cannot any longer consider so much the need of any 
individual business as the needs of the whole country which have to come first and we 
must all try and do the best for the country’.18 
 
Jean-Jacques Becker suggests that 1917 should be understood as the ‘impossible year’ 
which entailed the recognition within all the belligerent nations of the need for 
previously unimaginable sacrifices in order to ensure victory.
19
 According to Horne, it 
was these concerns over war-weariness that gave added impetus in Britain and France to 
undertake a second mobilization in order to maintain the fighting spirit of their 
combatants and the morale of their civilian populations. In both countries, the state 
discreetly supported the ‘social and political elites as they sought to remobilize support 
for the war from the spring of 1917’.20 This was evident in March 1917 when the 
French state established the umbrella organisation of the Union des Grandes 
Associations contre la Propagande Ennemie (Union of Great Associations against 
Enemy Propaganda, UGACPE) to undertake a campaign of remobilization and boost 
morale on the French Home Front.
21
 Similarly, in Britain, Lloyd George’s war cabinet 
created the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) in July 1917. This Committee was, 
like its French counterpart, intended to ‘strengthen national morale and consolidate the 
national war aims as outlined by the executive government and endorsed by the great 
majority of the people’.22 As nominally independent umbrella organisations, both the 
NWAC and the UGACPE represented a ‘major attempt to remobilize opinion behind 
the war which drew on the underlying legitimizing values of nation and regime’.23 
Consequently, the British and French states during 1917 and 1918 became ‘involved in 
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a broad-fronted campaign to sustain civilian morale for outright military victory’.24 
There were also parallel efforts in Germany and Italy, in August and October 1917 
respectively, to undertake this second ‘patriotic’ mobilization and boost national morale 
with the establishment of the Vaterlandspartei (Fatherland Party) and the Opere 
Federate di Assistenza e di Propaganda Nazionale (Federated Society for Assistance 
and National Propaganda).
25
 At the same time, the United States of America entered 
into the war in April 1917 to which the Federal Government encouraged voluntary 
associations, civil society and other organisations which constituted civil volunteerism 
to assist in the mobilization of America’s citizens for war.26  
 
This chapter examines the county of Devon from January 1917 until November 1918. 
Firstly, there will be an examination of the interventionist measures of remobilization 
that were introduced. One of these was the introduction of the Corn Production Act of 
1917, which placed a greater emphasis upon farmers across Britain to grow arable food 
stuffs. However, the measures introduced to increase domestic food production were 
contested by Devon’s farmers. In some cases, some of Devon’s agriculturalists ignored 
the DWAC’s entreaties and there were many who were reluctant to tolerate any 
intervention that they interpreted as an unnecessary interference in their working 
practices. Similarly, the increased demand for food was also placed upon the county’s 
fishermen. The introduction of a system of rationing in 1917 evoked the politics of 
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sacrifice and was a form of intervention into the practices of food consumption. 
Nevertheless, the situation in respect to food supplies strengthened sentiments of war-
weariness in Devon alongside how Devonians undertook campaigns of vigilance against 
perceived internal enemies in the county. In addition, the NWAC’s campaign of 
remobilization in Devon was used by the county’s elite as another means by which they 
could conduct and extend their superintendence of the social morality of wartime.  
 
Secondly, there will be a consideration of the escalating demands of the MST’s in 
Devon during 1917 and 1918. The MSA faced continual amendments which reduced 
the number of registered occupations in a process of ‘combing out’ the remaining male 
manpower. However, Devon’s notables on the MST’s faced increased criticism from 
the county’s population and the local press. These critics main argument was that 
Devon’s elite only paid only lip service to the war effort through their self-appointed 
elevated status as tribunalists. Yet, simultaneously, there was some resentment of the 
men and women on Devon’s tribunals because they possessed an influence and 
authority over the life and death of many of the county’s population. Consequently, 
Devon’s tribunalists faced constant struggles to convince Devonians to sacrifice their 
own interests for the nation. Finally, there will be a critical investigation of local 
government and welfare in Devon during 1917 to 1918. Some local government bodies 
in Devon were hesitant over the measures that were introduced as part of remobilization 
and vocalized their concerns about the threat of internal upheaval. These concerns 
extended to the war’s influence upon the socio-economic fabric of Devon which 
emphasized the hesitation that was felt by Devonians towards the calls for manpower 
and state driven totalization. Moreover, this critical investigation will also take into 
account how this process of remobilization affected welfare in Devon. In the light of a 
declining number of people located in the Devon County Asylum and the Church of 
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England Temperance Society for Female Inebriates at Temple Lodge in Torquay, both 
institutions were concerned as to how to survive during 1917 and 1918, and to navigate 
through the challenges of the last two years of the war.  
 
The reason to examine both 1917 and 1918 together is that it provides an opportunity to 
examine the responses in Devon to the remobilization of the British war effort. Keith 
Grieves suggests that in 1917 ‘tractors and agricultural implements became 
accoutrements of national defence and “farm soldiers” were deployed as adaptable 
labour in total war’.27 Grieves proposes it was the war preparation during both 1917 and 
1918 ‘for the “end game” [that] had brought a truly mobilised home front into being’.28 
However, despite the apparent urgency and necessity of the measures which constituted 
remobilization, this chapter questions whether a truly mobilised home front came into 
being in Devon during this period. Instead, it is clear there were some Devonians who 
were oblivious of the importance of this remobilization for the ‘end game’ of victory. 
This suggests continuing constraints upon remobilization and the degree of friction that 
persisted in the relationship between Devon’s elite and the county’s population. Some 
of Devon’s notables struggled to convince Devonians of the necessity to accept the 
heightened demands of remobilization. They were self-consciously concerned for their 
own position and the state of the county. Instead, they advocated a multitude of ‘logics’ 
of mobilization to the population of Devon which were not part of the dizzying 
escalation of a ‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization. Moreover, the farmers of the county 
resented the introduction of tractors, agricultural implements and other forms of 
intervention in their working practices. Indeed, the disinclination of some of Devon’s 
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farmers to adopt these measures was because they suspected these were an unnecessary 
intrusion.  
 
It can be ventured that the ‘provincial patriots’ were not wholly successful in the 
campaigns to convince Devonians of the necessity of the measures that were part of this 
second mobilization for victory. The exhortations from Devon’s elites underlined the 
importance of the county’s populace to undertake sacrifices that were previously 
unacceptable in order to achieve victory. Yet, despite these entreaties and exhortations, 
individual priorities modified the results of measures followed in the national interest. 
For some Devonians, the demands of remobilization in the pursuit of victory were in 
tension with the survival of their businesses and livelihoods. It is clear from the 
evidence from Devon’s notables that there were some who were deeply concerned about 
how the demands of this remobilization – including manpower and food production, 
were taking their toll upon Devon’s population in 1917 and 1918. As a result, some of 
the ‘provincial patriots’ intervened to negate the full impact of some of the decisions 
taken in the name of the war effort because of their concerns for the stability of the 
socio-economic fabric of Devon.  
 
Interventionist measures of remobilization 
According to Grieves, the Home Front in Britain during 1917 faced the test of 
endurance which at ‘its most obvious expression throughout the year was the “food 
question”’.29 By the spring of 1917, George Robb suggests that Britain had reached 
breaking point due to shortages of food.
30
 There was also an ‘acute shortage of basic 
foods’ in Devon by 1917.31 This was as a result of the combined factors of the poor 
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harvest of 1916 in the Americas, France and Great Britain, along with the campaign of 
unrestricted submarine warfare across the Atlantic which restarted in 1917 and took a 
heavy toll upon the importation of overseas food supplies into the Britain.
32
 Therefore, 
it was this food question that prompted one of the key avenues of this campaign of 
remobilization to increase domestic food production by Devon’s agriculturalists and by 
the county’s population. Peter Dewey suggests that the measures introduced during 
1917 and 1918 to improve productivity included financial inducements for cereal crops, 
tractors and agricultural machinery making farming a controlled industry.
33
 On 8 
January 1917, the DWAC decided to encourage Devon’s landowners to increase 
domestic food production efforts in the county.
34
 At the same time, they also urged the 
civilian population to participate in this campaign to increase domestic food production. 
During their meeting, the DWAC saw a valuable opportunity to promote growing 
potatoes and keeping pigs in Devon’s remotest areas. To this end, DWAC members 
suggested that the ‘services of school masters and mistresses could be utilised for 
encouraging villagers in this’.35 In addition, the DWAC decided to take steps ‘to 
ascertain through the Women’s Registrar the probable demand for seed potatoes’.36  
 
The hope of encouraging Devonians to work together and grow more food was later 
expressed by the Bishop of Exeter during his 1917 Lent address. He believed that 
because Devon was a great agricultural county it was obvious to him that ‘a great deal 
can be done to increase the production of food’.37 Across Devon, he believed that every 
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‘village could, if it minded, enlarge its garden ground’.38 It was clear to Robertson that 
domestic food production could have a transcendent appeal across Devon’s population 
in that ‘Landlords should be ready during the war to give ground rent free for garden 
purposes; farmers, and especially large farmers, should make it easy for men to get 
manure and seed; women, yes, even children, could turn to and do a bit of digging’.39 
Furthermore, the educated members of the community could also become involved 
through the study of agriculture and with advice for the ‘cultivation of plants little used 
in this part of the country’ which would help the food supply to be increased.40  
Accordingly, under the auspices of this collective spirit, the Bishop intended to translate 
‘national interest into local action’.41  
 
Yet, it was also revealed on 8 January 1917 during a DWAC meeting that women were 
still only employed on a ‘small scale’ in Devon’s agriculture.42 Accordingly, this 
prompted the DWWSC to urge ‘all farmers the importance of utilising to the fullest 
extent all the services of all women willing to work’.43 Similarly, the conclusion of the 
DWAC towards women in Devon’s Agriculture was shared by Olive Hockin, a member 
of the WLA. She suggested in January 1917 that the reaction of the farmers on 
Dartmoor to the prospect of female labour was indeed one of extreme apprehension. In 
fact, she suggests that Devon’s farmers were extremely old-fashioned, as the sight of 
female farm workers had become a commonplace sight in the Home Counties.
44
 Hockin 
underlines a possible reason for this deep condescension towards the employment of 
women in farming, suggesting that Devon was out of sync with the changes that were 
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evident in counties which enjoyed a closer geographical proximity to London. Indeed, 
she suggested that the very idea of women in agriculture was ‘greeted with sceptical and 
derisive laughter by the slow-moving Old farmers of Devon’.45 White also suggests 
some of Devon’s farmers were ‘motivated by gender presumptions and dictates of 
tradition, rather than arguments based on rational efficiency’.46  
 
The evidence from Devon confirms this conclusion because there was both 
apprehension and wonder towards the prospect of women undertaking agricultural work 
in the county. Yet, Arthur Marwick made the suggestion that the reason as to why 
farmers would not employ women labour was because of their deep conservatism which 
made them more likely to employ school children as a substitute for manual labour 
rather than adult women. This, along with the scrupulous sense of finance, was the main 
driving force behind the decision to hire the ‘cheap labour of school children rather than 
pay an adult wage to women workers’.47 However, when de la Pole heard that the 
farmers of the Kingsbridge Union decided that they would employ German POW’s on 
the land she expressed her opposition to this in her diary on 1 January 1917.
48
 She 
believed that Kingsbridge’s farmers were ‘selfish’ for accepting the labour of POW’s 
and argued it would be, a ‘fatal mistake’ for these farmers as they had taken work away 
from local men and wages would be sent out of the country.
49
 Hockin came to the 
conclusion that Dartmoor’s farmers were reluctant to grant a substantial wage to either 
male or female labour because the idea that it could be ‘anything but a favour to allow 
anyone, be it man, woman or child to work for ten or twelve or fourteen hours a day for 
the munificent daily dole of two shillings and six pence had never yet occurred to the 
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Devonshire agricultural potentate’.50 Consequently, it was clear by the beginning of 
1917 that the ‘provincial patriots’ had not convinced many of the county’s farmers of 
the necessity to take on female labour. Rather, there were still some local notables who 
were critical of the conscription of farmers’ sons from Devon. 
 
During a House of Commons debate on the topic of Food Production on 8 February 
1917, the Liberal MP for South Molton, George Lambert, criticised the continual 
requests for additional manpower by Andrew Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. He asked Bonar Law that when he made these requests to withdraw 
agriculturalists from the land was he certain that this actually strengthened the ‘food 
resources of the country?’51 To emphasize to the House that the Chancellor should re-
evaluate his priorities towards the requisitioning of manpower, he referred to a recent 
incident that took place in his own parish. Two young farmers had been conscripted into 
the Army and were to be sent to India via Mesopotamia. Lambert was adamant that this 
decision to take these two men from the land was counter-productive, because in his 
opinion ‘these two young fellows would be doing far more good by ploughing up land 
in Devonshire than in trying to recapture Kut el Amara’.52 The surrender of the British 
Army during the siege of Kut el Amara against the armies of the Ottoman Empire 
during 1915 to 1916 became regarded as a notorious failure. The fact that Lambert had 
evoked this event in his House of Commons speech meant that he had provided a subtle 
criticism of the WO’s demands.53 This was done to further reinforce his argument 
against the conscription of these two farmers, Lambert employed a stark comparison 
between definitive local productivity and embarrassing defeat. Indeed, this criticism was 
reinforced by stating that it was in the national interest for these two men to continue 
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farming in Devon. The reason for this is that Lambert believed that these men would be 
wasted in attempting to recapture Kut to make up for a previous defeat. Equally, 
Lambert argued that it was the uncertainty as to whether agriculturalists would be called 
up that had hampered the productivity of Devon’s farmers as you ‘cannot expect any 
man to plant or till crops if he has not a reasonable opportunity to be able to harvest 
them’.54  
 
Lambert revealed during the debate that the capacity of the DWAC to influence and 
convince the county’s farmers was in doubt. He had received a letter from a very active 
DWAC member who was the agricultural representative of Devon and who, in 
Lambert’s view, was one of the most practical farmers in the county. Lambert believed 
that the War Agricultural Committees’ were ‘doing admirable work with the material at 
their command’.55 Indeed, he applauded the DWAC because he believed that it was ‘as 
patriotic, as well-intentioned, and earnest as any War Committee’.56 Nonetheless, 
Lambert told the House that the letter had conveyed to him the serious doubts of the 
DWAC member about the effectiveness of the organisation in Devon: ‘The War 
Agricultural Committee of this county will, I fear, accomplish very little, first on 
account of the absurdly small assistance the Board of Agriculture are in a position to 
render to the farmer’.57 Although the DWAC had prearranged many meetings and had 
appointed committees it was clear to him that ‘in these days the walls of Jericho do not 
fall down by marching round them’.58 However, through the use of the biblical analogy 
from Hebrews, it became clear that, unlike the walls of Jericho which fell by the faith 
and the marching feet of the people of Israel, the situation would not improve by faith 
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and walking around the problem. Instead, the DWAC needed to take decisive action to 
succeed in its advisory role to Devon’s farmers.  
 
Lambert confessed to his fellow members of the House of Commons that the DWAC 
member could ‘have used a more agricultural metaphor by saying that plants do not 
spring up by walking round fields or placing advertisements on walls’.59 Nevertheless, 
this conclusion had serious consequences upon the DWAC’s authority to encourage 
Devon’s farmers to dedicate more acreage to arable crops. Lambert revealed that he had 
asked the DWAC member what amount of corn had been tilled in Devon. He replied 
that Devon’s farmers were not enthusiastic about increasing the amount of acreage 
dedicated to wheat as there was ‘less wheat sown round here to-day than I ever 
remember, and from verbal representations, I believe, that is the case generally in the 
county’.60 Certainly, he was hesitant to predict whether in the spring the acreage of corn 
would be made up because it was ‘problematical!’61 Nevertheless, the BAF’s statistics 
reveal that the acreage of corn that was harvested in Devon during 1917 was 47,892 
acres.
62
 In comparison, the corn acreage in Devon recorded for 1916 was 49,032 acres, a 
reduction of 1,140 acres.
63
 However, this does not represent a significant reduction in 
the amount of wheat that was grown in Devon especially when the acreage for 1917 is 
cross-examined against the 45,182 wheat acres that were grown in Devon in 1914.
64
 It 
is probable that Devon’s farmers had sown wheat during the spring of 1917 to make up 
for the shortfall from the bad harvest of 1916.  
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Yet, in early 1917 there were clear difficulties in acquiring food in Devon’s urban 
localities. This was reflected in a letter to Dollie Hammond from Mabel Hammond 
dated 27 February 1917. Mabel confessed that it was such ‘an awful trouble to get food’ 
in Exeter.
65
 She went on to clarify this by saying that the ‘only thing that we have a 
trouble to get is meat’.66 These difficulties to gain food were also evident in Plymouth. 
F. Ashe Lincoln recounted that the situation surrounding rationing and food supplies in 
the city was ‘quite drastic’.67 However, Lincoln’s grandfather was a ‘fortunate 
possessor’ of farms on Dartmoor which meant that Lincoln could go to Dartmoor and 
‘get ample supplies of dairy products and so on’.68 Similarly, during early 1917 the 
populations of London, Paris and Berlin experienced significant difficulties to gain 
food. The lack of availability of meat in Paris prompted the price for meat (steak) to 
significantly rise from 132 Francs in the previous year to 210 Francs.
69
 Thierry Bonzon 
and Belinda Davis reveal in the spring of 1917 that ‘Parisian workers, particularly 
women workers, expressed their growing anger at the newly introduced policy of 
freeing prices from controls’.70 They suggest that the evolution of food prices in London 
confirm that ‘meat prices rose more steeply than any item except sugar’.71 
Consequently, the progressive introduction of rationing in Paris was ‘intended to deflect 
open revolt over the surge in prices’.72 Mabel recorded in the letter her belief that the 
food situation in Exeter would ‘be a lot better when this rationing comes in next 
month’.73 However, she suggested that the difficulties of getting meat into Exeter would 
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not be immediately resolved because the amount of meat that they would receive ‘won’t 
be very much when we do get it next month’.74 In his diary entry for 12 April 1917, 
Arthur Thompson, the Vicar of the mid-Devon village of Ide revealed that food prices 
generally had increased by 50%. Thus, under the newly introduced system of rationing 
each person was allowed ‘4lbs of bread, ¾lb sugar & 2½lbs of meat a week’.75  
 
Subsequently, other Devonians decided to take matters into their own hands in order to 
attempt to increase domestic food production. On 2 March 1917, the Western Morning 
News reported upon the efforts of Mrs Symons, a Totnes resident, who proposed to 
grow potatoes in the unused plots of the consecrated ground in the cemeteries of Totnes 
and Tiverton.
76
 This move was controversial from the outset, but the group decided to 
take matters into their own hands and grew potatoes in every plot of land including 
consecrated ground. It was reported by the correspondent that the Burial Board of 
Totnes had supported Mrs Symons’ application to grow potatoes in the cemetery 
because of the serious shortage of potatoes. The Board believed that these potatoes 
should be sold at ‘such prices as may help the local market and assist the poor who 
lately have had few and altogether may go without in future’.77 Consequently, the 
Bishop of Exeter had reluctantly to concede to Mrs Symons request, for which he made 
this exception on the grounds that ‘David ate shrew-bread’.78 He emphasized that for 
Mrs Symons to grow these potatoes, they needed to be used to feed the underprivileged 
in Devon: ‘I think that [in this] case all the food that is grown must be given away to the 
poor, but I would much rather that it should not be cultivated’.79 Therefore, through this 
emphasis, the Bishop took the opportunity to use this concession to extend his authority 
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as an arbiter of morality in Devon. Previously, on 22 February 1917, a Brixham 
inhabitant had put forward a similar unorthodox solution to the problems of food supply 
in the Western Guardian. He suggested that there should be widespread collection of 
seagulls’ eggs as a worthwhile alternative source of food.80 Nevertheless, despite the 
ingenuous responses of some Devonians to the crisis of food supply, there were other 
residents of Devon who sought to exploit the crisis of food supplies.  
 
During a meeting of Okehampton Town Council on 7 April 1917, Colonel E. H. Holley, 
the Mayor, revealed that he was concerned about the town market. It had become 
swamped with an increased number of traders who purchased these goods and sent them 
to Britain’s urban centres in order to take advantage of the increased demand for and the 
higher price for food in these locations. Holley was resolute that it was the wealth and 
war bonuses present in Britain’s cities that had enticed and enabled these traders to sell 
the local produce at large profits.
81
 This meant that the traders who bought these local 
food stuffs reaped the large profits of selling them at higher prices and the producers 
who brought their goods to the town market were short changed in this lucrative but 
immoral business. The comments made by Okehampton’s Mayor tapped into the 
representations of the profiteer which, as Jean-Louis Robert has revealed, stressed a 
critical and ethical opposition between the profiteer and the consumer that tapped into 
the cultural codes of the wartime morality.
82
 Consequently, Holley was adamant that 
these traders had reduced the food supplies on offer at Okehampton’s market which had 
consequently meant that the town’s population faced the decision to either go without 
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food or ‘pay through the nose [for food]’.83 This anger against these profiteers was 
motivated by hunger but they were also appalled by the greed of these individuals.  
 
Nevertheless, there were other depictions which focused the blame for the food crisis 
against farmers for selling their products to the highest bidder. For instance, The Herald 
on 6 February 1917 published a caricature which presented a ‘young worker feeding 
“war profits” to British farmers, under the title “A little child shall feed them”’.84 It was 
these representations of traders and farmers alike, stories published in the local press 
and rumours disseminated on a local level which fuelled the popular attacks on the 
farming community.
85
 Hockin states that the food shortages in Devon during 1917 had 
meant that the hungry were finding targets to blame for their lack of food. Farmers were 
repeatedly targeted and allegedly accused of hoarding food for themselves and their 
families. However, Hockin reveals that if ‘all farms were like ours, and had, owing to 
the shortage of labour, reduced their potato acreage to less than half, and with disease 
rampant in addition, it is little wonder there was scarcity’.86 It was also suggested that 
Devon’s food sellers, such as butchers, made fantastic profits from the scarcity of food 
items.  
 
A food producer group who were very important in the supply of meat were the rabbit 
trappers of Devon. The shortage of meat across the belligerent nations had meant that 
there was a dramatic rise in the price of meat.
87
 Hence, the large quantities of rabbit 
meat proved to be an effective solution to the decrease in the amount of meat in Devon 
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during 1917 and 1918. At the Torquay Tribunal on 16 November 1917, a Brixham 
rabbit trapper claimed that he had trapped over 2,000 acres and caught 19,000 rabbits’.88 
This appeal by the Military was rejected.
89
 However, during the hearing for farm hand, 
pig keeper and slaughterer Wm. Norman at the Northern Panel of the DAT on 29 
November 1917, Norman revealed to the tribunal panel that he also ‘caught rabbits for 
the farmers at £1 a hundred’.90 This prompted Stirling to reply that under this 
arrangement Norman received a shilling for every five rabbits that he caught. Yet, the 
consumer had to pay a significantly increased price. It was suggested that some retailers 
in the North Devon town of Barnstaple charged up to 4s. 2d. for two rabbits.
91
 It was 
also revealed by other members of the Northern Panel that other men in the district were 
paid 27 s. 6d. for a hundred whilst others received 30 shillings for the same quantity.
92
 It 
became clear that some butchers and rabbit catchers in Devon saw an opportunity to 
charge rabbit meat at a similar high price as other meat products. Captain Stirling 
tapped into these comments when he argued, that what the public had to pay for rabbits 
was ‘iniquitous’.93 Moreover, he claimed that in Barnstaple ‘rabbits were as plentiful as 
mulberries when the prices were high’.94 However, since the price for rabbit meat by 25 
January 1917 was fixed the supply had subsequently gone down and rabbit meat was 
‘practically unobtainable’.95 He then asked where these rabbits had gone. In response, 
the chairman suggested that some Devonians had caught these rabbits and placed them 
into cold storage. This is a plausible suggestion as there were some individuals who 
wanted to store rabbits in cold storage and wait until the price of rabbits increased. 
                                                 
88
 Imperial War Museum: Documents. 17014, Private Papers of C L Stirling OBE CBE QC, 1916, 
Western Daily Mercury, 16 October 1917. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 IWM: Documents. 17014, Private Papers of C L Stirling OBE CBE QC, 1916, Western Morning News, 
29 November 1917. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 IWM: Documents. 17014, Private Papers of C L Stirling OBE CBE QC, 1916, Western Morning News, 
25 January 1918. 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Ibid. 
293 
 
 
The issue of food provoked a sense of discord and, in part, contributed to manifestations 
of war-weariness in Devon. An example of how the prices of food had helped to create 
instances of war-weariness was when Cecil Torr spoke to an elderly resident from the 
Dartmoor village of Lustleigh about the war in 1917. He complained that it ‘be a 
terrible thing, this war. Proper terrible it be’.96 Indeed, the reason behind this was that he 
had never ‘knowed the price of bacon to be so high’.97 This discussion about the war, 
prompted another elderly resident nearby to add his opinion, what ‘be the sense of their 
contendin? Why us in Lustleigh don’t wage war on they in Bovey [Tracey], and 
wherefore should the nations fight?’98 Consequently, the increase in food prices and the 
shortage of certain food items did contribute to a sense of weariness about the war and 
in this case undermined the validity of the conflict. A similar manifestation of war-
weariness was noted by Hockin in June 1917 in the conversation between four local 
notable figures. When Hockin’s employer, Maester (sic), was asked by Billy 
Withecombe about his opinion on the war, Maester replied in a profound comment that 
‘“O-o-oh—ay. … Well. … They’m fightin’ !”’99 Peter Whidd’n, a local thatcher, added 
to the conversation that ‘“They du tell as they Germans be a-sinkin’ all our ships,”’.100 
Yet, Arry ‘Ickey (sic) chimed into the conversation to state that ‘‘“’Tis toime it stopped, 
that it be,”’ and ‘“Let them as made the war go out and fight, that’s what I says. It bain’t 
no workin’ man’s warr.”’.101 At this Peter Whidd’n (sic) answered to agree with 
‘Ickey’s point that ‘“Let them as wants it goo an’ fight.”’.102 After Whidd’n gave this 
contribution, Withecombe then enquired from Maester whether it was true “that you 
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beant allowed to sell your wool?’.103 When Maester confirmed that this was indeed the 
case because of the prohibition of the selling of wool in 1916, it prompted Withecombe 
to reply that it was time that the war ‘“wur stopped, so it be, [because it was] interferin’ 
on a man’s own farm”.104 Indeed, Hockin offers an interesting reflection upon the nature 
of the isolated nature of the communities on Dartmoor; incidents such as these were 
typical of the ‘war echoes that reach our Dartmoor uplands’.105 However, Hockin makes 
a bold statement that builds upon this reflection to which she suggests that some of 
Dartmoor’s farmers were oblivious to Britain’s participation in the war due to the 
remoteness of this particular part of Devon. Instead, these Dartmoor agriculturalists 
were more concerned with their own individual survival: ‘Verily, until the famous 
prohibition of wool-selling in 1916, I believe the farmers hardly knew their own country 
was involved’.106  
 
The trapping of rabbits also proved to be a convenient arrangement for Devon’s arable 
farmers who complained that they were a pest and destroyed their crops. This was 
reflected in the application by rabbit trapper Alfred John Nicholls on 25 January 1918 at 
the Northern Panel of the DAT. According to the Western Morning News, there were 
several famers in the North Devon district of Berrynarbour who supported Nicholls 
appeal because without his intervention to trap rabbits it would be ‘useless planting 
corn’.107 In an interesting turn of events, Captain Stirling the military representative for 
the northern panel suggested that if the tribunal could not ‘help the Army it could at 
least help the people by seeing that the rabbits were put on the market’.108 During the 
proceedings, Mr Metherell revealed that the District’s Food Production Committee had 
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‘sent him special instructions to support the cases of trappers where he thought they 
were needed’.109 Accordingly, Metherell considered that this man, who had caught 
nearly 5,000 rabbits on four farms last season, was ‘absolutely indispensable’.110 The 
chairman of the DAT delivered the verdict that Nicholls would be granted exemption 
until 15 May 1918 when they would review what he was catching around that time. 
Accordingly, Nicholls was instructed that he must bring before the tribunal on 15 May a 
‘statement of his monthly catches’.111  
 
Another appeal by a rabbit trapper was submitted to the DAT on 26 January. In this 
appeal it was claimed that ‘rabbit trapping was urgently necessary in this man’s district 
at present, and while dismissing the appeal they would ask the military not to call him 
until March 15’.112 However, one of the tribunal panel replied back that he should 
refocus his energies for rabbit catching to use in the military,  as after the rabbit trapper 
was called up he hoped that the ‘man would take his traps with him and go and catch 
Germans’.113 However, there were other tribunals in Devon who considered rabbit 
trapping to be a skilled occupation that should not be stopped.
114
  This was reflected in 
the appeal of Wm Tucker on 21 February 1918 who had his exemption until June 1 
upheld by Northern Panel of the DAT when he revealed that he caught an average of 
‘200 to 500 rabbits a week’.115 Nevertheless, the dilemma of the competing demands of 
the Home Front and the military created a tension amongst Devon’s elite on the DAT. 
During the appeal of Albert Piper, rabbit trapper and smallholder of Dowland on 27 
March 1918, the Chairman of the Tribunal argued that Piper should not be granted 
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exemption because the military position was ‘far more serious than it was 12 months 
ago’.116 However, Mr J. M. Metherell argued that Piper should be granted exemption 
because the food position was also at that present time more serious.
117
 After Piper’s 
exemption was upheld, Captain Stirling reacted to the verdict in a bitter and 
disappointed tone, that no ‘other country would think of leaving a general service man 
to trap rabbits’.118 
 
At the same time, Devon’s farmers and rabbit trappers were not the only ones to 
experience difficulties during 1917. In November 1916, the Brixham fishing fleet was 
attacked by German U-Boats in Lyme Bay which resulted in the sinking of two fishing 
vessels.
119
 On 4 January 1917, the threat of attack by U-Boats lingered in the minds of 
the DSFC. Mr Windeatt enquired about the issue of compensation for those who had 
lost their vessels in the attack. The DSFC’s Clerk responded that this was a question 
related to war risk to which ‘all the inhabitants of the country were liable’.120 Viewed in 
this light, it is difficult to calculate what claim could have been made legally on behalf 
of Brixham’s fishermen. Mr Windeatt retorted that he did not specifically use the word 
legally. He felt that money was being taken from the local insurance society’s fund for 
cases which ‘surely the Government in some way ought to meet’.121 Capt. Manley 
argued that it was a question as to whether the Brixham society could take the war risk. 
Mr Sanders revealed that the insurance at Brixham covered ‘75 per cent of the value of 
the vessels lost, the owners having to bear the other 25 per cent’.122 Sanders tried to 
reassure the DSFC in order to gain a perspective in that ‘their losses, however, in 
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connection with the war were as nothing compared with those at Lowestoft’.123 Finally, 
it was decided on 23 August 1917 that compensation was to be offered by the BT to 
‘merchant crews who lose their effects through vessels being torpedoed or otherwise 
sunk as an act of war’.124 This was also offered at a fixed rate to fishing vessels.125 
However, the issue of compensation and insurance continued to be an important issue 
for Brixham’s fishermen. Samantha Little suggests that every Brixham fishing vessel 
sunk by German submarines further ‘diminished the contributory capital and increased 
monetary responsibility for remaining members of the Fishing Smack Insurance 
Society, whose director faced serious monetary loss’.126  
 
After the attack, the Admiralty re-imposed strict regulations upon Start Bay. Despite 
this, some fishermen continued to break the Admiralty’s regulations by trawling in the 
area. By fishing in these prohibited waters, these fishermen were accused of illegal 
fishing and were perceived to be breaking the law for their own profit. This meant that 
both fish buyers and sellers were accused of being unhelpful to the war effort and 
reaping large profits.
127
 Indeed, whilst this practice was taking place, the Western 
Guardian reported that at Brixham fish market in May 1917 ‘business was held as 
usual’.128 Lt. Turnor appreciated the necessity to provide food for Devon’s population 
but this was not a justification for ‘breaking the law’.129 This led to several members of 
the DSFC to argue that: 
 
                                                 
123
 Ibid. 
124
 DHC: R2360Aadd2/Z14, Devon Sea Fisheries Newspaper Cuttings, The Western Guardian, 23 August 
1917, p. 87. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Samantha Little, Through cloud and sunshine: Brixham and the Great War (Brixham: Brixham 
Heritage Museum, 2008) p. 43. 
127
 DHC: R2360Aadd2/Z14, Devon Sea Fisheries Newspaper Cuttings, Western Morning News, 22 
September 1917, p. 89. 
128
 Western Guardian, 31 May 1917. 
129
 DHC: R2360Aadd2/Z14, Devon Sea Fisheries Newspaper Cuttings, Western Morning News, 22 
September 1917, p. 89. 
298 
 
We had an enemy all around our coasts seriously interfering with 
the food of the nation … The cumulative effect of all this justified 
the magistrates in taking a different view of the cases to what they 
would [do] under ordinary conditions.
130
 
 
Subsequently, several civil litigation cases were brought to the courts against the 
fishermen who had broken the Admiralty’s regulations. In their defence, they 
complained that they were misled by a notice posted in Brixham which stated that 
fishermen were allowed to fish in Start Bay and had misinterpreted the new 
regulations.
131
 They argued that the lifting and reintroduction of measures in Start Bay 
were unclear and confusing. The chairman said that the Bench of the Totnes Magistrates 
Court had ‘great sympathy with the fishermen on the coast, who had done an enormous 
amount of good by their pluck’.132 However, as Magistrates they had to reluctantly 
come down on the Admiralty’s side and inflict fines upon ‘those who had broken those 
regulations’.133 Although these fines would not be heavy in this instance, the Admiralty 
threatened and then issued heavier fines in the hope that this would deter illegal fishing 
in Start Bay. However, it can be argued that as the war threatened the survival of their 
livelihoods as fishermen, a fine was not a sufficient deterrent to change their fishing 
practices. This argument is supported in that through 1917, the numbers of prosecutions 
against Brixham’s fishermen continued at a steady pace and indicates that they intended 
to take advantage of the wartime prices of fish and capitalise upon these difficult times. 
However, it is clear that outside of Devon’s fishing communities there was little 
patience for their plight.  
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When the Corn Production Act (CPA) received Royal Assent on 21 August 1917, it 
represented a significant turning point for Agriculture and the domestic food supply of 
Great Britain. The act stipulated that there would be a guaranteed price for wheat and 
oat yields which was hoped to be an incentive for British farmers to grow more arable 
crops. In addition, the Agricultural Wages Board was established to supervise increased 
wages for Agricultural workers. However, this attempt to induce Britain’s farmers to 
increase their acreage of arable food stuffs was not always welcomed by agriculturalists. 
The CPA’s implementation across Great Britain raised serious questions concerning the 
complications of implementing the changes put forth in the legislation. It was revealed 
during a meeting of the Executive Committee for the NFU on 18 September 1917 that 
the DFU had received several complaints from farmers in Devon against the 
implementation of the CPA. DFU representative, Mr Willing called attention to a 
circular which had been issued in Devon, which appealed the county’s farmers to 
plough up 30 per cent of their grass land acreage for the production of corn or potatoes. 
He revealed that Devon’s farmers considered this request was a ‘drastic measure, and 
not exactly in order, and wished to know whether agricultural committees had such 
power’.134  
 
Willing went on to stress that the legislation would not find much support amongst the 
county’s farmers because ‘Devonshire was not exactly a corn-growing county, but more 
a pastoral and milk-raising county’.135 This meant that due to the nature of farming 
within the county it was ‘quite impracticable [for Devon’s farmers] to comply with the 
order’.136 This would indicate that, despite the intention of creating connections between 
the local and the national levels, in the hope to increase productivity, there was great 
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confusion between the two. During the meeting, Willing revealed that he had received 
two replies from other NFU Executive Committee members who stressed that the 
DWAC had no authority to ensure Devon’s farmers’ total compliance with the order.137 
This supports the statements made by Lambert in the House of Commons in February 
1917 about the DWAC’s authority to ensure the involvement and conformity of 
Devon’s farmers with wartime directives. Bonnie White has also revealed that whilst 
the ‘conditions of war eventually necessitated the coordination of local and national 
efforts, such cooperation was slow to materialize in Devon’.138 Furthermore, Lambert’s 
statement reinforces Jonathan Brown’s suggestion that many of Britain’s farmers 
resented the ‘government’s efforts to increase the arable acreage’.139  
 
Christopher Scoble states that it became evident to Reynolds that the unending process 
of recruitment of fishermen into the Navy provided him with a ‘continuing source of 
anxiety and criticism’.140 This is reflected in a letter to Maurice dated 8 December 1917 
where Reynolds put forward his belief that people in London did not understand the 
sacrifices that had been made by Westcountry fishermen. Reynolds asked Maurice to 
recall the misery that he had experienced when he witnessed the fishing fleets in the 
South West under his jurisdiction ‘whittled away from below’.141 Despite this, Reynolds 
went to great lengths to emphasize that he was an important mediator able to calm the 
tension between the fishermen, and the authorities: ‘you know how I have intervened to 
ease the trouble down, and how I have fought for men to man Westcountry boats’.142 
This statement also presents the fact that Reynolds was a keen advocate to protect the 
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interests and livelihoods of Devon’s and Cornwall’s fishermen. However, this work to 
preserve Devon’s fishing industry had not gone un-criticised. Reynolds revealed that he 
had been the ‘target of cheap gibes’ which had been ‘flung at me the London end, with 
its invisible ignorance of what things mean to country people’s and family’s lives’.143 In 
addition, Reynolds believed that this criticism of him was not confined to London and 
government policy makers.  
 
The status of Reynolds as the ISWF had made him the ‘most powerful person in the 
fisheries of the west [which had] put him in the firing line of the inevitable resentment 
as if he had been the recruiting master himself’.144 He claimed that he had become 
deeply unpopular in Devon due to the unfairness of the Naval system of recruiting and 
his support for the county’s fishermen. Conversely, he asserted that he had carried out 
government instructions for Devon’s fishermen with the greatest of efficiency. 
Subsequently, he was treated with great suspicion and thereby ‘earned the enmity of the 
provincial patriots’.145 This accusation indicates that there were some local notables in 
the county who viewed with hostility Reynolds’ efforts to protect the manpower of 
Devon’s fishing industry. Notwithstanding his efforts to defend the interests of 
fishermen as a special interest group, Reynolds believed that he had also become an 
ostracised figure even amongst Devon’s fishermen. This was because of the fact that he 
had not ‘escaped the opprobrium of the people in whose interests I was acting’.146 
According to Reynolds, both Devon’s and Cornwall’s fishermen had ‘not been able to 
see the rationale of the calling up’.147 He further confessed in this letter that he often 
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was unable to ‘find no rationale’ for the calling up of fishermen and that the unbalanced 
process was at its best ‘bound to be a clumsy process’.148  
 
It was this emphasis upon domestic food supply during 1917 that led to requests from 
both Barnstaple and Bideford town councils to extend the fishing season of the river 
Taw as a wartime measure. Sir John Fryer, the superintendent of fisheries within the 
BAF, opposed the scheme. He thought that to fish during the Salmon close season for 
rough fish even as an emergency measure, with the plea of increasing the local food 
supply during the War, was not one which in his view ‘should be entertained’.149 
Nevertheless, it appears that Fryer was in the minority because other members of the 
Board of Conservators (BC) of the river Taw defended the case to extend the season. W. 
P. Martin believed that the BC’s should firstly understand that the extension was ‘purely 
as a Wartime measure’.150 Secondly, Martin advised that they should consider the 
importance of the ‘present National Emergency with regard to food supplies’.151 
Another member, J. S. C. Davis, seconded Martin’s resolution on account of the food 
shortage which had been referred to in ‘two letters which the Board had received from 
the Barnstaple Rural and Barnstaple Urban Food Control Committees, which, he 
contended, were sufficient justification for the resolution’.152 Davis emphasized that it 
was the ‘duty of every public body and individual to do everything possible to increase 
the food supply of the country’.153 However, not all of the BC agreed to extend the 
season under the auspices that this wartime measure would increase food supplies.
154
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Nevertheless, fellow member of the BC, W. C. D. Jurnall opposed the proposal to 
extend the fishing season on the grounds that it would be not increase the ‘food supply 
to those who needed it’.155 Jurnall stressed that this suggested measure would severely 
damage the river Taw and would only increase a surplus of Salmon, which at 4/- a 
pound would only ‘be a luxury for the well-to-do and probably be an addition to their 
usual rations’.156 Therefore, this would suggest that in the name of increased food 
production, the increased fishing quotas would not benefit the general food supply for 
the country. It is clear that some BC members intended to profit from the inflated 
wartime prices for meat in a time of austerity. However, Jurnall argued that whilst he 
would support the resolution from a personal standpoint he intended to ‘oppose it from 
the point of food supply’.157 Nonetheless, the BC’s Chairman pointed out that if ‘food 
supply was as bad as some of the speakers had intimated, drastic action should be taken 
by those in authority’.158 Furthermore, the Chairman claimed that salmon stocks could 
be as easily ‘replenished as Pheasants could be’.159 The resolution was passed 13 to 7.160 
As a consequence of extending the fishing season, the board members decided to 
increase the number of patrols to watch the river at night.
161
 On 12 April 1918, the BAF 
accepted the BC’s resolution. 
 
Nonetheless, the BC stressed that the fishermen who fished the river Taw should be 
‘duly warned that the relaxations in enforcement of the existing regulations were to be 
regarded only as a special measure to meet war conditions’.162 For the fishermen, this 
relaxation could not be considered as a justification for the ‘alteration of statutory 
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regulations’.163 This was to be a similar case with Devon’s sea fishermen and the 
regulations regarding Start Bay. The BC did not want river fishermen to use the wartime 
measures as a pretext to permanently alter the existing regulations for fishing. In 
addition, the BAF expressed a great sense of appreciation to the BC’s for taking this 
step to ‘increase the nation’s food supply’.164 However, the BC’s decision to extend the 
season did not increase the quota of salmon. It was recorded in Gregory’s quarterly 
report for 12 July 1918 that in spite of the earlier season there ‘were poor catches of 
salmon both with rods and nets up to May and even up to the present time the season 
was much poorer than previous years’165   
 
After the winter of 1917, the situation surrounding the supplies of food became worse 
with food shortages and a further escalation of food prices. The Vicar of Ide described 
in his diary entry for 10 May 1918 that the situation for meat had worsened in the 
village. This was due to the fact in 1918 meat was purchased with coupons issued by the 
Food Controller, Lord Rhondda.
166
 He also revealed that he was able to buy 10d. worth 
of meat and the same of bacon. Indeed, he stressed that as prices were high this was a 
‘very small quantity’.167 Notwithstanding these food shortages, the Reverend suggested 
that with the village’s population there appeared to be no famine or want because ‘all 
get an equal share, from the highest to the lowest’.168 The vicar believed that it was 
important for Devonians to continue to endure the great burdens of the war. However, 
this attitude was on the condition that as long as these burdens were equal and applied 
to everyone.
169
 Nevertheless, the food shortages and high food prices in Britain did 
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heighten ‘working-class resentment and disenchantment with the war effort, especially 
when this hardship was coupled with an awareness of social contrasts’.170  
 
Although the donation of individual food stuffs continued to be a popular form of 
philanthropy amongst many of Devon’s residents, the introduction of rationing had 
changed the politics of food donations. This was evident in February 1918 when the 
Devon County Horticulture Committee (DCHC) proposed to create the Devon Garden 
Produce Society (DGPS). The DCHC intended that the DGPS should deliver the 
donated agricultural produce of Devon towards the war effort. Its founders believed that 
the productivity of Devon’s gardens could provide a reliable source of extra produce 
across the country. However, despite the understandable appeal of the DGPS’s 
activities, its formation provoked a number of different issues. The second point of the 
notes for the formation of the DGPS, revealed the members natural concerns about its 
focus. One anonymous member was cautioned that there should not be an assumption 
that there would be a ‘surplus of vegetable produce this year?’171 Indeed, he believed 
that both bread and meat were going to be short in Devon, so would ‘not those who 
have vegetables be glad to eke out their rations with them?’172 In light of the austerity 
created by the war, the situation in respect to food supplies in Devon was in a constant 
state of flux. The society’s critics considered that past experience was not ‘a reliable 
guide as to what [food] there may be to spare in [the county in] the future’.173  
 
It became apparent that some Devonians considered the donation of food to the armed 
forces as counter-productive, not only to the war effort but also to the county’s food 
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requirements. This is evident in another point that was raised in that the DGPS ought to 
have been closed because food items which included fruit had ‘been a great boon to the 
seamen, but they are really a luxury’.174 The member claimed that the Admiralty could 
surely oversee that rations were ‘adequate for health and physique’.175 Certainly, to 
consider that since rolling stock was in short supply, it would be wasteful in his view to 
‘send green stuff from the West of England to the North when a few gallons of 
limejuice would for medical purposes be [as] equally effective’.176 This reveals that 
there was a distinct tension between the dual needs of the Home Front and the military, 
especially in light of the hardships that Devonians were experiencing in obtaining food. 
This reveals that the Devon populace felt a sense of priority for the needs of Devon and 
the Home Front rather than the military. This observation was shared by the DCHC. 
They noted that Devon during 1918 had benefitted from a surplus of produce and the 
DCHC stressed that other parts of Britain were ‘in need of such produce, notably the 
consuming centres of South Wales’.177 After a period of negotiation in April 1918, it 
was decided that the DGPS should be formed with Fortescue as its President. 
 
According to Dewey, the supply of potatoes expanded considerably during the last two 
years of the war as the ‘new food production policy got into its stride’.178 The 
introduction of the Potato Order of 1917 in September 1917 was intended to 
dramatically increase potato production across Great Britain. Certainly, this did 
contribute in part to the boost towards potato production in Devon from 1917 into 1918. 
In 1918 there were 19,892 acres dedicated to potatoes in the county when compared to 
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13,496 acres of potatoes recorded in 1917.
179
 This 6,396 acre increase was represented 
through the efforts of Devon’s farmers to increase potato acreage. Indeed, local 
government bodies in Devon also responded to the calls for increased potato production. 
One example of this was when West Alvington Parish Council (WAPC) decided to 
increase potato production in the parish on 30 May 1917.
180
 In order to accomplish this, 
WAPC believed that they should purchase a potato sprayer upon the recommendation 
by the BAF.
181
 However, by April 1918, there were strong indications that WAPC had 
suffered bad experiences with the potatoes. As a result, WAPC unanimously decided to 
‘send a strong protest to Earl Fortescue on the manner the Parish has been treated with 
reference to Seed Potatoes’.182 Nevertheless, in light of the fact that potato disease was 
rampant during 1918 it was understandable that there were problems to grow potatoes 
not just in West Alvington. Similarly, Paignton Urban District Council (PUDC) had 
‘instituted a drive for the cultivation of allotment gardens and seed potatoes’ in early 
1918.
183
 In March 1918, there were 285 allotments in 12 fields across Paignton when 
compared with 98 allotments before 1914.
184
 However, due to the fact that there was 
potato disease in 1918, PUDC instituted a spraying drive in the town’s allotments and 
private gardens. Subsequently, by May 1918, PUDC had cultivated land which totalled 
100 poles planted with potatoes and 2 ¼ acres of corn.
185
 Notwithstanding the efforts 
made by local authorities and the endeavours of individual Devonians to increase the 
amount of arable food stuffs, in 1918 it was mainly up to Devon’s farmers to dedicate 
more of their permanent grass for the growth of arable crops. However, the evidence 
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from Devon’s archives, it would suggest that the productivity of Devon’s farmers was 
compromised due to a shortfall in both manpower and the number of plough horses 
which had been commandeered for use in the Army. 
 
By 1918, according to Alan Armstrong, there were 127 WLA girls in Devon compared 
to 3,801 part time/full time women workers on Devon’s farms.186 This diminished from 
176 in 1917 to 122 in 1918.
187
 From a review of the statistics, it is clear that the 
county’s farmers during 1917 and 1918 did turn, more often than not, to other sources 
of manpower to work on the land apart from the WLA. Instead, farmers employed large 
numbers of POW’s and soldiers. The numbers of the former increased dramatically 
from 375 in 1917 to 1,175 in 1918.
188
 Furthermore, a substantial number of soldiers 
were employed by farmers during these two years. Indeed, there were 2,433 and 2, 593 
soldiers for 1917 and 1918 respectively.
189
 This, along with White’s research on the 
WLA in Devon, indicates that the county’s farmers were more concerned about the 
reliability of labour to work on all the necessary but gruelling tasks of farming.
190
 In 
1918, there were only 707 plough horses remaining in Devon compared with the 1,325 
plough horses in 1917.
191
 The only alternative open to Devon’s farmers to replace this 
lost horse power was with the introduction of the tractor and to embrace the 
mechanisation of their work practices. Nevertheless, the introduction of tractor ploughs 
provided the county’s farmers with ‘no end of trouble’.192 However, Earl Fortescue 
suggests in his memoirs that it was the tractor’s novelty which meant that it was 
unsuccessful with Devon’s farmers because ‘no one really knew how to build them and 
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they had to learn how to manage them when built’.193 Hence, he concluded that these 
tractors ‘cost much money and were a doubtful success’ to Devon’s agriculturalists.194 It 
could be argued that the county’s farmers did not intend to use the tractor to replace the 
labour that they had fought so hard to keep. Devon’s Farmers remained unconvinced by 
the introduction of a new piece of machinery, the benefits of which appeared to be 
outweighed by the negatives. These sentiments were encapsulated in a poem by 
Catherine Whetham entitled ‘The Tractor’. In the poem, she presented the arrival of 
tractor as a troublesome piece of machinery which was greeted with despair in the 
county to the extent that its technical experts would like to have placed a ban on it.
195
 
She centred the guilt for all the continued problems that were associated with the tractor 
on Rowland Prothero, the BAF’s President from 1916 to 1919, whom she believed was 
vain and deluded in attempting to introduce the tractor in Devon.
196
  
 
Before 1914, Great Britain imported 93% of Britain’s lumber requirements from nations 
such as Russia and Canada. It was calculated that timber ‘occupied between one-
seventh and one-eighth of the total shipping entering the country’ for 1914 and 1915 
respectively.
197
 Britain required substantial quantities of timber for fuel and the 
maintenance of the vast network of trenches on the Western Front. However, due to 
both unrestricted submarine warfare and the continual loss of shipping by German U-
Boats, these shipping routes for imported lumber were cut off and thereby the British 
war effort, suffered a severe shortage of timber. In his study of English forestry, N. D. 
G. James argues that lumber in fact held the same importance as coal and iron for the 
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economic survival of the country through the conflict.
198
 It became clear that Britain had 
to fulfil its timber requirements from Britain and the wood from Devon’s forests was 
harvested for the war effort. From 6 May 1915 until February 1917, the EDC had an 
agreement with the WO to ferry fuel wood from Exmouth dock onto vessels that would 
then ship this lumber to Boulogne.
199
 However, to fulfil these lumber requirements for 
the war effort, it was evident that there needed to be a large workforce to fell and 
process the timber.  
 
The workforce comprised many different agencies and individuals. Included in this was 
the Canadian Forestry Corps which comprised of Canadian lumberjacks across four 
camps in Devon.
200
 A subdivision of the WLA known as the Women’s Timber Corps 
(WTC) was also involved in the felling and transportation of wood in the county. In 
particular, the activities of this organisation were heavily promoted in both the local and 
national press as examples of women’s work for the war effort. The Illustrated War 
News published an article on 15 August 1917 which promoted the activities of the 
WTC. The two illustrations in this article presented the members of the WTC in Devon 
as supervisors of the work of Portuguese tree fellers, which included measuring the 
timber for the fellers to cut.
201
 Likewise, The Daily Mirror presented a similar article on 
17 September 1918 about the WTC felling timber in Devon.
202
 This discussion of 
forestry was understood as a prime example of war-work and displays the 
transformation of labour from previously male dominated industries. Hence, the 
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promotion of felling timber in organisations such as the WTC helped to further present 
the patriotism of Devon’s women and claim wartime citizenship on the Home Front.  
 
The task of felling timber in Devon was also undertaken by Portuguese nationals.
203
 
During the war, the British Army turned to thousands of foreign nationals for 
employment in Britain and France on tasks related to the war effort.
204
 These included 
the felling of trees, digging of trenches and the repair of the road networks.
205
 In Devon, 
after 10 May 1917, Portuguese nationals were employed as a labour force by the Army 
Council at a lumber camp in the West Devon village of Halwill. Subsequently, a case 
was brought against 15 Portuguese timber fellers at the camp by the BT. They were 
charged with breaking regulation 2b of DORA. All of the fifteen workers pleaded not 
guilty to the accusations charged against them.
206
 According to BT inspector, Thomas 
Crown, the defendants had refused to work at the camp and had done no work for 
several weeks.
207
 In addition, they had also threatened other men who were willing to 
work. In their defence, the Portuguese labourers argued that they were taken away from 
their usual work because some of them were carpenters they did not enjoy felling 
timber.
208
 However, their main grievances against working in the camp were that they 
did not have sufficient food within the camp and they did not enjoy working under the 
Portuguese foreman.
209
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Yet, it would appear that the defendants did not exaggerate the working conditions in 
the camp. In the solicitor’s case notes, he reported that in January 1918, there were 98 
people working at the lumber camp and 94 men in the camp’s workforce had fallen 
ill.
210
 Moreover, it was revealed that the camp outside Halwill was quite expensive to 
operate. It actually cost fifty per cent more to run than some of the other lumber camps 
in England. As a consequence of this set-back in productivity, it was estimated that 100 
tons of timber were delayed.
211
 At the hearing’s conclusion, each man was fined £2 and 
sentenced to fourteen days hard labour. However, it would appear that the cold 
treatment of Portuguese labourers working on timber sites in Devon was not 
uncommon. Later in 1919, the BT paid compensation to Portuguese labourers employed 
at a lumber camp in the North Devon village of Filleigh.
212
 
 
As mentioned previously, the management of the JHC textile factory negotiated with 
the lacemakers over the introduction of female labour. Another factor that prompted a 
series of negotiations between the factory’s management and workforce was the issue of 
war bonuses. On 2 April 1917, the factory’s management decided to double the existing 
war bonus for the factory’s employees. In addition, the company created a war bonus 
for pensioners working at the factory. This provided ‘1/6 a week to men and 1/- to 
women’.213 It was these difficult conditions that led to an application from the MCL on 
16 January 1918 requesting an increase of 3/- per 100 racks advance in their rate of 
pay.
214
 The reasons for this request included, the ‘present high prices of food and other 
commodities; and alleging inter alia that they had had no rise in the last fifty years 
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(sic)’.215 On 21 January 1918, Ian and Ludovic Heathcoat-Amory presided over a 
meeting with the lace-hands. According to the secretary taking the notes of the meeting, 
Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory’s speech alluded, in a very sympathetic way to the 
‘difficulties of living owing to [the] high prices and [the] shortage of food’.216  Thus, the 
management granted the ‘3/- per 100 racks in advance which the men had asked for, as 
“a temporary way of getting over a temporary difficulty”’.217At the same time as this, 
the lace foreman received an advance of 10/- per week as well.
218
 However, these 
advances subsequently had an effect upon the sum that was to be divided equally 
amongst the JHC’s partners.  
 
During the 1918 co-partners meeting, the sum that was divided amongst the partners 
was £16,060.
219
 According to Heathcoat-Amory, this sum had been reduced because of 
the money the firm had to provide following the requests for increases of pay from the 
workforce.
220
 However, the original sum had been a lot better than they had expected 
for that year. Therefore, Heathcoat-Amory remained optimistic. In his speech for the co-
partnership meeting, he stated that the factory’s workforce had ‘put a spirit of cheeriness 
and joy into their work that carried them from an output of 1100 a week into an output 
of 2,000 a week’.221 It was this productivity that had made the ‘Government inspectors 
wonder why the people in other shops they inspected couldn't be as cheery’.222 In fact, 
Heathcoat-Amory stressed that through ‘anxious and difficult times we have remained a 
happy little family in this factory’.223 Furthermore, he advocated that both the 
management and the workforce should go on ‘working and hoping - and let us as 
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prudent people practice every reasonable economy now in the National Interest as well 
as our own’.224 Hence, through an association of the broader picture of the national 
interest with their efforts in the factory, the local output of the factory’s workforce and 
the national interest were presented as one. 
 
In his study of the NWAC, David Monger suggests that the NWAC’s propagandists 
deployed ‘a complex and flexible narrative informed by pre-war patriotic motifs but 
adapted to the requirements of a war-weary civilian society’.225 During the last fifteen 
months of the war, the NWAC’s work to remobilize morale in Britain was extensive. 
Under its remit, the NWAC ‘held thousands of meetings and distributed over one 
hundred million publications, propagating a wide-ranging and flexible patriotic message 
reflective of the total-war environment in which civilians found themselves’.226 During 
1917 to 1918, a torrent of government-backed advocacy in Britain through the NWAC’s 
activities ‘reinforced the efforts of private societies and war-loans campaigns to resist a 
premature peace, while authorities inhibited expressions of dissent’.227 In Devon, like 
other parts of England and Wales, Monger revealed that various speakers for the 
NWAC often dwelt on the special qualities or achievements of a locality in the hope 
that this would stimulate communal pride.
228
 For instance, during a War Aims 
Committee (WAC) meeting in the North Devon town of Combe Martin the 
Conservative candidate for Barnstaple, C. S. Parker, promoted Combe Martin’s 
accomplishments both in terms of recruiting and war-work. At the same time, Liberal 
candidate for Barnstaple, Lieutenant Tudor-Rees stressed to members of the audience 
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that he was with the ‘grandeur of the scenery’.229 He went on to praise the unique 
beauty of the North Devon coastline with a comparison to the landscape of Australia. 
To an Australian co-speaker at the same meeting, Tudor-Rees argued that if ‘all the 
scenery of Australia could be rolled up and gathered into one it would not compare for a 
moment with the beauty of the scenery between Combe Martin and Ilfracombe’.230 This 
statement was received with applause and laughter. Furthermore, this evocation of the 
idyllic qualities of English landscape which represented Devon’s countryside as a green 
and pleasant land was also used in the North Devon village of Woolfardisworthy by 
Bryan O’Donnell the Conservative speaker who was a replacement for C. S. Parker. In 
O’Donnell’s speech, he said that all Britons ‘would rise with indignation at the thought 
that the hordes of Germans should ever ruin the fair lands of Devonshire or any other 
county’.231 According to Monger, O’Donnell also provided a similarly gendered image 
of Britain which tapped into the sentiments which were part of the atrocity propaganda. 
He advocated to the audience that they should be prepared, whatever the cost, to protect 
the women of Britain so that they should be ‘spared the sufferings of the women of 
Northern France, Belgium, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro’.232 
 
In this complex and flexible narrative there were continual references to ‘an expanding 
community extending through the family, workplace, locality, nation and beyond, 
linked by the willing acceptance of duty’.233 Another example of this was evident at a 
WAC meeting in Exeter on 14 December 1917 when James Owen claimed that 
patriotism in Exeter was evident because the old city ‘was firm for the war, and meant 
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to go on with it’.234 Despite the fact that it was not a WAC meeting, Sir Auckland 
Geddes, the Minister of National Service visited Plymouth on 13 November 1917 with a 
similar appeal to the patriotism of Devon and the county’s Naval tradition. He 
addressed the crowd to state that if he were a Devon man, he would be ‘proud of 
Devon’s soldiermen and I know I would be prouder still of Devon’s sailors’.235 
However, the NWAC’s activities in Devon also provided an extension of the authority 
of Devon’s elites to superintend the patriotism of other Devonians. The meetings of the 
WAC in Devon also gave the ‘provincial patriots’ licence to enhance their roles as 
moral arbiters of the social morality of wartime with the dissemination of specific 
representations and ideas. During the WAC meeting in Exeter on 14 December 1917, 
the Conservative MP for Exeter, Henry Duke, argued that people of Exeter should 
continue to remember that the war was a spiritual conflict, ‘a war from which there was 
no deliverance till it is through’.236 The moral imperative of Britain’s position on the 
side of Right against German Might was an important factor in Duke’s rhetoric to 
persuade the Exeter audience that they should be steadfast in and ready to make greater 
sacrifices for the support of the war. Indeed, Duke stressed that the great challenge that 
Exonians had to overcome was the fact that the ‘German people had raised for 
themselves – raised it deliberately – a Frankenstein. Either they must be delivered from 
it, or the Allies must come under its heel’.237 By referring to Mary Shelley’s novel 
Frankenstein, Duke intended to depict the German military machine as a monstrous 
creature which like Doctor Frankenstein’s creation would bring untold and rampant 
destruction upon the world. Moreover, the fact that Duke had chosen to characterise the 
military machine of Germany in this manner helped to strengthen the idea that it was an 
aberration of nature that needed to be vanquished. Similarly, the monstrous nature of the 
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enemy evident in depictions of the German was also noted in the Vicar of Ide’s diary 
entry for 12 April 1917 where he describes a recent item of news which stated that the 
Germans were using the corpses of their own men and enemies to provide ‘fat for 
glycerine for munitions’.238 The Vicar believed that this action was ‘“thoroughness” 
with a vengeance’.239 Paul Fussell suggests that this supposed dreadful act along with 
the conjecture that there was a German Corpse-Rendering Works were devised as 
atrocity rumours to further accentuate the despicable nature of the enemy.
240
 It was the 
suggestion of this sinister act that helped to reassure the Vicar that he had to endure 
great pains to stop acts such as these which epitomised German tyranny.  
 
The application of a diabolical overtone to the image of the German was also evident in 
a WAC meeting in Barnstaple on 26 October 1917 when Lord Fortescue addressed the 
crowd regarding the topic of pacifists. He believed that there were three classes of 
pacifist in the country. Firstly, there were pacifists who were simply fools. Secondly, 
some pacifists were secretly in league with the Germans and received German pay.
241
 
Thirdly, there were pacifists who were degenerates. It is important to note that 
Fortescue employed the use of immoral characteristics to define the despicable nature of 
the wicked pacifist. According to Monger, this was a point that was further ‘endorsed 
by the town’s prospective parliamentary candidates, C. S. Parker and the Liberal 
Lieutenant J. T. Tudor-Rees’.242 Both of the men made it clear to the Barnstaple crowd 
that the pacifist had a hidden hand which was tarnished with blood. They were resolute 
that if any British man had anything to do with that blood-stained hand then he ought to 
be stripped of his citizenship in the wartime community and ‘not to be allowed to enjoy 
                                                 
238
 DHC: 1857Aadd5/PI8, Diary of Arthur Thompson, vicar, 1908-1996, 12 April 1917, p. 48. 
239
 Ibid. 
240
 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 116-
117, Punch, Vol. 152, 25 April 1917, p. 267. 
241
 North Devon Herald, 1 November 1917, p. 1 as cited in Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First 
World War Britain, p. 133. 
242
 Ibid. 
318 
 
British rule and [its] privileges’.243 Accordingly, they should become ostracised figures 
to which they should be immediately deported to where they would be treated as 
‘Germans had always been’.244 The comments of Fortescue, Parker and Tudor-Rees 
tapped into the criticisms that had been launched against pacifists’ in the county.  
 
In light of the moral codes of the wartime social morality, both the pacifist and the CO, 
seemed to represent a significant threat to the war effort. Indeed, like the instances of 
war-weariness, they seemed to represent an insidious threat to not only the war effort 
but also to the stability in the county. This was evident with the political CO’s housed in 
Dartmoor prison at Princetown. The upheaval of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 added 
new and significant credibility to the idea that war-weariness threatened the stability and 
progress of the war effort of all the belligerent nations.
245
 In fact, both the February and 
October Revolutions in Russia had given the British state significant concerns because 
the political discontent with the war and industrial unrest present in Britain could also 
produce similar internal upheavals.
246
 In his letter to The Times on 8 October 1917, 
Archibald Robertson, the Bishop of Exeter, warned that Dartmoor prison had become a 
‘hotbed of malcontents’.247 He extended his criticism of the government in their 
decision to imprison a large number of CO’s, both political and religious, in one 
location. In his opinion, this was a foolish decision because it enabled a political CO to 
convert a religious CO to ‘his revolutionary ideas, or, at least, to get from him the 
countenance and support that comes of his religious character’.248 From this inferential 
reading, it was clear that the spread of these individuals’ revolutionary ideals had the 
potential to cause a rise in radical anti-war sentiment in Devon. 
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Yet, in his letter to The Times, Robertson defended those who had decided that they 
would not fight or participate in the war effort for religious reasons. He believed that the 
religious CO should ‘be sought out wherever he is, whether in prison or in the 
settlement, and treated as a good citizen with fanatic views’.249 To Robertson, it seemed 
unjustifiable to ask religiously minded individuals to undertake activities which would 
go against their religious principles. No man or woman had requested the ‘Mahomedan 
to eat pork, or the Hindu to kill the sacred cow, and so no sane man would suggest that 
either a Quaker or a Christadelphian or any other Nonconformist pacificist should have 
anything to do with the war’.250 Consequently, they should be released from their 
incarceration. He proposed that for individuals to treat a political CO and a religious CO 
as both one and the same was unmerited. Indeed, in Cecil’s words there was nothing so 
unjust as to treat ‘Marat and John Bunyan as people of similar opinions’.251  
 
It is clear that the Bishop thought the best way to emphasize the differences within the 
dual nature of CO’s was through the reference to specific historical precedents. The 
comparison of the religious CO to John Bunyan, the author of The Pilgrim’s Progress, 
helped to accentuate the peaceful and religious character of these individuals. However, 
the association of the political CO with the French revolutionary, Jean Paul Marat 
provided a more dangerous evocation and suggests that the French Revolution was now 
haunting the minds of contemporaries. This event, like the October revolution in 1917 
in Russia, had uncontrollably escalated into widespread anarchy and civil disorder 
throughout France. However, the title of Robertson’s letter ‘Anarchic Dartmoor’ also 
provided a more sinister evocation of the anarchist. By labelling the political CO’s as 
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anarchists, the Bishop played upon the fears associated with the destruction and amoral 
activities of anarchist groups and individual anarchists during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.
252
 Anarchists and anarchist groups had become seen as a 
dangerous phantom which lurked in the shadows to overturn and destroy law and order. 
Thus, within the framework of this representation, the individuals who were political 
CO’s seemed to possess a chaotic intent which threatened to destabilise the war-effort. 
This meant that the Bishop argued that the political CO should ‘surely deserve a 
different treatment’.253 In fact, the Bishop suggested that political CO’s should be 
relocated from Dartmoor to other areas of England which were regularly visited by 
German aircraft.
254
 Consequently, political CO’s should be treated and understood in a 
revolutionary context because they were ‘enemies to our commonwealth, and they 
should be required, like enemy aliens to report at the police stations of those districts 
where their labour would prove profitable to the community’.255  
 
Nevertheless, it was clear to Robertson that the labour of these individuals should be 
harnessed for the good of the war effort. Accordingly, he believed that the feeling 
towards these individuals was extremely bitter throughout Devonshire’s agricultural 
sector: ‘the Government are feeding these men, who refuse to do even the primary 
duties of a peaceful citizen, namely, to secure the food supply of the nation’.256 
Moreover, the Bishop was suggesting that the CO’s incarceration in Dartmoor Prison 
was not a prison sentence but instead a pleasant holiday. They could enjoy Dartmoor’s 
beautiful scenery without ‘even a khaki man to reproach them or a wounded man to 
shame them, while the poor farmer tries in vain with the few men that are left to garner 
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the sheaves which the constantly returning rain is causing to rot’.257 In order to place a 
greater emphasis upon the selfishness of CO’s, he said that the reason that they decided 
to refuse to help with the bad harvest of 1917 was because of the fact that ‘their rations 
are safe, and they only need to do the comparatively light task that they are set’.258 
Accordingly, the Bishop claimed that their idleness at Princetown had contributed to the 
failure of the harvest which was ‘rotting in the fields and which could have been saved 
had there been an adequate supply of labour to profit by the few hours of sunshine 
which we have had’.259  
 
It would seem that the Bishop was not alone in his opinions on this matter. A. E. Clarke, 
the President of the Bible Brotherhood, sent a letter on 13 October 1917 to The Times in 
reply to the Bishop’s letter. Indeed, he went further than the Bishop and suggested that 
all CO’s housed in Dartmoor prison were ‘would-be fomenters of revolution’.260 To the 
CO’s and their sympathisers, Clarke ventured forth with the wisdom in that: 
‘“Philosophers and world-menders are too apt to forget this. Their plans are laid for a 
race of logical, reasonable, faultless creatures, but they must be worked out by a 
seething, struggling rabble capricious, weak, and roguish schemers and dreamers, 
whose principles are wax, whose blood is hot, and whose very breath of life is 
folly”’.261 In his letter, he also compared the political CO’s incarcerated in Dartmoor 
Prison to the French political radical Jean-Paul Marat as well as the Bolshevik 
revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin.
262
 Clarke continues to reference the important 
relevance of the situation in Russia. Clarke employed Russia’s revolutionary situation to 
influence the reader that this would place the war effort and the Home Front into a 
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perilous situation. He questions whether one could describe political CO’s as being 
conscientious at all. In fact, they were the destructive disciples of Marat or Lenin, who 
followed the defiant creed that: ‘“Our lips are our own. Who is lord over us.”’.263 In his 
concluding statement, Clarke directly quoted from the Bishop’s letter, to offer a 
rhetorical question to his reader: ‘incidentally, might not these striking words be 
engraven also, now, in every coign of vantage in Russia?’264 Consequently this 
incarceration of CO’s brought problems and aroused powerful emotions, within 
patriotic and sympathetic audiences. 
 
Tribunals under strain 
Despite the calls for remobilization from Devon’s elite there were some Devonians who 
continued to place their own priorities above those of the nation. This was evident 
during the deliberations of the tribunals in Devon during 1917 and 1918. Sir Ian 
Heathcoat-Amory, a DAT Chairman, suggested on 14 April 1917 that Devon’s 
tribunalists must take this opportunity to issue a ‘serious warning to the county that the 
national need was so great that individuals must be prepared to forget themselves to 
remember only what the country required’.265 However, as documented in chapter 3, the 
members of Devon’s elite who made up the tribunal panels in Devon faced some 
criticism of their conclusions. During 1917 and 1918, the criticism of the tribunalists 
over their decisions concerning the distribution of manpower in Devon became more 
fervently expressed. An example of this was after the failed appeal against military 
service of Leopold Blackmore, a twenty-two year old cattleman on 10 April 1917. 
According to the correspondent for the Western Morning News, the father of Leopold 
who disapproved of the Tribunal’s verdict to deny his son exemption sought to upset the 
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tribunalists when he declared his hope that ‘after that England would starve’.266 The 
Tribunal’s Clerk replied back to this defiant statement on behalf of the tribunal saying 
that ‘we hope you will be here to starve with us’.267  
 
Nevertheless, tribunalists in Devon had to experience continued disaffection from 
residents in the county due to the fact that the priority of some Devonians was to 
preserve their own businesses in wartime. This was reflected in the appeal of Harold 
Tucker, a director of Tucker & Sons Jam Manufacturers at the Plymouth Panel of the 
DAT on 7 May 1917. Despite the fact that Tucker was granted an exemption until 1 
June 1917, Tucker stated that the business was ‘in the middle of our annual stock 
taking’.268 This statement from Tucker which emphasized the inconvenience that this 
temporary exemption would cause to his business prompted the recorder of Tiverton, 
Sir Trehawke Kekewich, to reply that ‘we are in the middle of the biggest war ever 
known’.269 It is clear that the survival of the jam manufacturers through 1917 was of 
greater urgency to Tucker than military service. This is not say that Tucker was 
unpatriotic but rather that for him to be called up would be an inconvenience to the 
manufacturer’s priorities during stock taking and further jeopardise his future in the 
firm. A similar conflict of interest of trade versus the army arose during a meeting of the 
Plymouth Appeal Tribunal at the appeal of tailor’s presser William John Mitchell. 
Lieutenant Stirling agreed that ‘from the local point of view the business was important, 
but from the national point of view Mitchell should have gone into the army long 
ago’.270  
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Yet, there were also accusations that the proceedings of Devon’s tribunals were not 
conducted in a solely judicial manner. In the appeal of Percy Glanfield on 24 August 
1917, the solicitor who represented Percy appealed to the Central Tribunal because he 
claimed that he could not gain exemption from military service until September 30 
1917. The chairman of the Torquay Tribunal, F. J. Crocker had noted in the newspaper 
reports that a substitute was offered but this had not been mentioned at the tribunal. Mr 
J. Glanfield complained that ‘so far as the offer of a substitute was concerned, this was 
not done until after the appeal had been sent forward to the Central Tribunal’.271 It 
seemed to him to be unprecedented that additional evidence was ‘put forward after a 
case had been once sent up for appeal’.272 Indeed, whilst J. Glanfield had nothing to say 
against Percy, he suggested that it ‘ought to be known that he only passed his final 
examination in June last, and that his only experience had been as an article clerk to a 
solicitor’.273 Therefore, he argued that the ‘methods adopted by the military authorities 
in this case were improper and unEnglish’.274 In fact, J. Glanfield was certain that the 
Tribunal had ‘not only exceeded their duty, but had dealt with the business in a manner 
that was absolutely unconstitutional’.275 This criticism also extended into the 
proceedings of CO, Sidney Linscott. According to the correspondent for the Western 
Morning News, Linscott did not attend the proceedings of the Exeter Panel of the DAT 
to defend himself. Instead of appearing before the tribunal panel, he had written a letter 
to explain the reason behind his absence. The letter contained a declaration from 
Linscott which expressed his consideration that ‘local men are more competent to deal 
with local applicants and their affairs than a conglomeration of agrarian gentlemen’.276 
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Indeed, he argued that this was especially true of the Exeter County Tribunal because 
they were incapable to provide an impartial and unbiased judgment in cases brought 
before them concerning CO’s.277 It would be disingenuous to suggest that Devon’s 
tribunalists, like those of Northamptonshire, possessed the innate wisdom of the Biblical 
King Solomon.
278
 The reason for this was that human perspectives and the social 
morality of wartime did influence the consideration of the appeals of CO’s in Devon.279 
It is important to note that the correspondent for the Western Morning News judged 
Linscott’s accusation to be a slur against the Central Panel. Therefore, the perception of 
the tribunals in the county and in particular the perceived prejudices of tribunalists were 
hard phenomena to ignore. In addition to this criticism, there was also condemnation of 
the Plymouth Appeal Tribunal (PAT). On 3 July 1918, the Tavistock branch of the DAT 
passed a resolution which declared that the composition of the PAT was such that 
‘agricultural cases did not receive proper consideration, the majority of the members 
having no practical knowledge of agriculture’.280 Whilst the Tavistock branch did not 
want to impeach the general character of the individuals on the PAT, they were 
concerned when one tribunalist enquired the difference between arable and pasture land.  
 
The PAT consisted of ‘one solicitor, one barrister (not in practice), one lady, one draper, 
one printer, one clay-worker, one retired draper, one parson’s son, and one farmer’.281  
The Tavistock Tribunal believed that the PAT should include one extra farmer and Mr 
Abbott the agricultural member of the PAT seconded this idea because he ‘had a very 
hard time in opposing his colleagues, who thought any old man could do the work on a 
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farm’.282 In most decisions, the PAT had sided with their military representative ‘who, 
being a smart man, drew them to his side’.283 Abbott confessed that the previous 
decisions of the PAT were ‘shameful’.284 He had endeavoured without success to 
‘impress his colleagues that farmers could not afford to spare every able-bodied man’ 
and there were other criticisms against the PAT.
285
 Previously, on 24 April 1917, 
Lieutenant Stirling had regarded the 31 appeals at the PAT during the previous week as 
an ‘indication that the tribunal system in this part of the country had failed’.286 He 
hoped that in the course of the day they ‘would wipe out the black mark against the 
tribunal system in the district that so many young men should be left in civilian 
employment’.287 Similar criticisms about the exemptions granted by the Barnstaple 
Tribunal and the Okehampton Tribunal were also addressed in the local press.
288
  
 
In the case for Okehampton’s Tribunal, the Exeter panel of the DAT decided on 3 May 
1918 to reverse the decisions of Okehampton’s Tribunal for the previous week. Captain 
Stirling remarked that he was ‘sorry to have to appeal against so many decisions of this 
Tribunal, but they did not seem to realize the importance of men to the Army’.289 
However, it was this idiosyncratic approach towards appealing for exemption from the 
conscription process that tested the patience of some tribunalists in Devon. This was 
evident after a meeting of Bampton Tribunal on 30 July 1918 when the members of the 
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tribunal panel resigned en Bloc.
290
 The Chairman of Bampton Tribunal, Mr. Tucker, 
intimated that he could no longer serve on the Tribunal because the work of the 
Tribunal ‘seemed to be completely nullified by other agencies’.291 In his defence, he put 
forward several cases as instances where ‘both the Local and Appeal Tribunals had 
ordered men to serve on certain dates but these men were still in civil life, with either 
vouchers or protection certificate’.292 As a consequence of the inconsistent approach 
towards exemption, Tucker felt that he could ‘no longer be a party to such 
proceedings’.293 Other members of the Tribunal endorsed the views of the chairman on 
this principle and it was decided that they tendered their ‘resignations forthwith’.294 It 
was evident that Tucker’s resignation and the other tribunalists of the Bampton Tribunal 
touched upon a dilemma that many local tribunals in Devon had to encounter. The fact 
that the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the decisions made by these local tribunals was 
continually contested by the other agencies helped to undermine the authority of 
Devon’s elite in their specific localities.  
 
It is clear that the sensitive nature of the appeal cases which were reviewed had taken its 
toll upon the members of Devon’s elite, who were on the tribunal panels. Kekewich 
revealed on 31 May 1918 that it was an ‘unpleasant duty they had to do on the 
Tribunal’.295 In the 6,500 cases that the DAT had considered, he confessed he had never 
come ‘across a farmer’s case without going away with an aching heart’.296 At the same 
time, he expressed the fact that their hearts ‘also ached for the boys at the front, and he 
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knew the farmers of Devon would do their best to support the lads at the front’.297 
Earlier on 14 April 1917, Heathcoat-Amory declared a similar admission about the 
emotional burden of the public duty and the jurisdictional responsibilities as the DAT’s 
Chairman. He believed that in the consideration of cases on the DAT it was ‘so difficult 
to do what was right to the country and at the same time to do what was fair to 
individuals’.298 Yet, there were some Devonians who argued that the tribunals provided 
the county’s elite with a means to extend their status as notable citizens in the county.  
 
On 1 February 1918, a letter was published in the Western Morning News on the subject 
of the members of the PAT. It was written under the synonym of ‘Plymothian’ and he 
suggested that ‘what an exceptional opportunity this war has afforded to so-called 
public men to conclusively show their claim to such a title by simple example, which in 
these days is worth so much more than any precept, of which we hear far too much’.299 
However, ‘Plymothian’ asserted that if the war is to be won, it ‘must be by individual 
self-sacrifice and not mere lip service’.300 This suggestion emphasises how Devon’s 
public men could authenticate their influence upon local affairs and expressively display 
their patriotism through the meetings of local tribunals. Moreover, these comments were 
in a similar vein to the observation made by Reynolds about the nature of Devon’s elite 
in wartime. Indeed, Reynolds defined them as the ‘provincial patriots’ who were the 
self-appointed judicators of patriotism in the county, measuring the patriotism of others 
against their own patriotism.
301
 The Plymothian’s statement could equally be read as a 
vindication of how the county’s elite sought to superintend the patriotism of others 
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through the deliberations of reviewing individual cases for exemption against military 
service.  
 
Nevertheless, the criticism of the tribunals and tribunalists in Devon continued. The 
Western Morning News published a lengthy note on 22 August 1918 as a response to the 
torrent of criticism of the DAT and the Cornwall Appeal Tribunal. According to the 
anonymous author, some of this condemnation against the Appeal Tribunals was 
unjustified. However, he believed that the ‘temper which provokes it has 
unquestionably been aroused by the Appeal Tribunals themselves’.302 He made the 
assertion that the women and men of the DAT were in fact forced to undertake this task 
because of the ‘haphazard way in which the Appeal Tribunals were constituted’.303  
Therefore, this meant that these local notables were ‘pitchforked on to a bench and told 
to hear appeals’.304 Notwithstanding all the faults of the local Tribunals in Devon, the 
author claimed that at least they did have ‘some sort of representative status’ of their 
respective communities.
305
 Yet, by contrast, he declared that the DAT had no 
representative status at all. Despite the fact that many of the county’s elite on the DAT 
felt that their role as tribunalists gave them a sense of public duty, the author claimed 
that there was no authority to which the DAT owed any responsibility. In fact, they 
were ‘dealing with a vaguely worded instrument of law, complicated by a discord of 
constantly varying “instructions”’.306   
 
He went on to propose that Devon’s prominent citizens on the DAT were ‘often utterly 
out of touch with the realities of industrial and domestic life in the districts whose fate 
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they settle’.307 In his view, these men and women on the DAT only paid lip service to 
the war effort as part of their duty as tribunalists, because they were only required to ‘sit 
for an hour in one of their sessions to perceive that in many cases they are utterly 
unsuited by knowledge or temperament for this exceedingly difficult and delicate 
work’.308 Accordingly, this meant that the men or women who ‘really do know 
something of the matters with which they are dealing are easily outnumbered’.309 The 
author argued that Tribunal members could be effortlessly swayed in their 
considerations because some stubborn or aggressive person would dominate the rest.
310
 
Such was the case with Linscott’s suggestion of the PAT, where it was ‘bombarded by 
pertinacious “military representatives” whose discretion is infrequently equal to their 
valour’.311 Although they were not excessively un-judicial in their judgments and their 
comments, he claimed the DAT had ‘created an atmosphere of resentment and hostility’ 
which was not a benefit for the public.
312
 Consequently, he suggested that for future 
reference the tribunalists on the DAT should be a ‘good deal more modest and very 
much more consideration of the judgements of the local tribunals whose work they 
review’.313  
 
Local Government and Welfare 
Local government was the conduit and arbitrator of the British state in the Edwardian 
period.
314
 For those who administered the machinery of local government, its various 
services carried notions of individual duty and social progress for the liberal 
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intelligentsia to advance ‘civilisation’.315 During the war, the responsibilities of local 
government were heightened.
316
 Alongside the public duty of municipal housekeeping, 
local government agencies were also responsible for implementing directives which 
were intended to assist in the war effort. Devon’s local authorities were also encouraged 
to invest in War Loans which were ‘less onerous than taxation for the donors who could 
expect their money back in time at a satisfactory rate of interest’.317 The third War 
Loan, otherwise known as the 5 per cent War Loan, was launched in February 1917. 
However, there were local government authorities in Devon who were not convinced to 
invest in a war loan in 1917. For example, HRDC on 10 February 1917 voted by a 
majority of five members to two not to invest any money in a War Loan.
318
 
Notwithstanding this decision of HRDC, these investments proved to be a popular form 
of economic mobilization in the county. The Town Clerk for Exeter, Mr Lloyd Parry, 
noted that the 5 per cent War Loan was very popular amongst the city’s population. In 
fact, Parry recorded that the ‘enthusiasm with which this was received and taken up in 
the City exceeded all expectations’.319 
 
According to the Clerk, a great campaign was started that was intended to educate the 
general public ‘concerning this loan and to influence subscriptions to it’.320 This 
campaign was concise across Exeter ‘information bureaus were set up and several 
public meetings were held addressed by the Mayor and other influential citizens’.321 
Indeed, a personal appeal from James Owen was distributed to around ‘1,000 residents 
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and literature was distributed from house to house through the agency of the Boy Scouts 
and elementary schools’.322 This strategy reflected the deep level of investment of the 
civil society of the county in this type of mobilization. Gregory argues that the reasons 
why contemporaries invested in war loans were evident in that these investments were 
intended to ‘speed victory and therefore relieve suffering, both of their soldiers and their 
relatives’.323 Simultaneously, Gregory argues that it should be observed that for some 
individuals the War Loan was a convenient and comfortable means to present their 
solidarity and commitment to the war effort: ‘In effect the war loan subscriber is being 
asked to make a sacrifice, which is no sacrifice, or rather one which leads to certain 
redemption, both spiritual and financial’.324 In Edinborough, shop keepers were 
motivated to invest in war loans which were, in Gregory’s view, a self-evident mixture 
of patriotism and self interest. In fact, these shopkeepers benefited from ‘self-
advertisement and also perhaps deflecting charges of unpatriotic profiteering’.325 
 
Another example of this deep investment and co-ordination of local civil society in 
Exeter was the Tank Week ending December 15 1917. During this ‘Tank Week’, a 
model Tank was used in a procession through the streets of Exeter to which it became ‘a 
centre of attraction where subscribers could make application for War Bonds’.326 Parry 
revealed that £40,400 was subscripted during the week.
327
 Similarly, in February 1918, 
the town of Northampton held a ‘Tank Week’ which was dedicated to raise 
subscriptions for War Loans. According to Pierre Purseigle, the local elite of 
Northampton were also active when they ‘weighed in with the organisation of [this] 
“Tank Week” dedicated to war loans, the chairman of the organizing committee spelled 
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out the call to civic pride’.328 Moreover, the ‘Tank Week’ at Northampton had ‘conjured 
up a national competition with the other towns holding a “Tank Week” at the same 
time’.329 Purseigle suggests that the very success of patriotic days and events such as 
these ‘underlined the potency of local identities in the involvement of the populations’ 
with the war effort.
330
 Another example of the success of these events in Devon was 
noted in the summer of 1918 by the Ashburton War Charities Committee when it was 
revealed that the sum of money that was raised during the ‘hut week effort amounted to 
£359 15s. 7d.’.331  
 
Nevertheless, some charitable undertakings that were made by local government 
officials in the county were not universally well received. An example of this was in 
1918 when the Mayor of Tiverton, Alfred T. Gregory, sacrificed his car, by selling it in 
order to buy war bonds and then subsequently using a horse and cart for his travel 
needs. When news of Gregory’s donation was heard in the capital, it was received with 
humour, bewilderment and even outright disgust. One soldier overseas wrote to Gregory 
and called him a damned liar because he claimed he had found ‘happiness in the 
humblest of vehicles’.332 Despite the scepticism and incomprehension that accompanied 
Gregory’s actions to buy war bonds, the deed was intended to show his commitment to 
the war effort and present this patriotic sacrifice as an example for other members of the 
local elite to follow suit. At the same time, Devon’s local government authorities faced 
difficult challenges to overcome in order to maintain stability in 1917 and 1918. In 
1917, HRDC had experienced a crisis with the district’s roads. From 1914 to 1917, the 
state of the district’s roads had progressively worsened with the haulage of timber for 
                                                 
328
 Pierre Purseigle, ‘Beyond and Below the Nations: Towards a Comparative History of Local 
Communities at War’ in J. Macleod and P. Purseigle eds., Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World 
War Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p. 103. 
329
 Ibid. 
330
 Ibid. 
331
 Western Times, 19 June 1918, p. 3. 
332
 Alfred T. Gregory, Recollections of a country editor (Tiverton: Tiverton Gazette, 1932) p. 68. 
334 
 
the war effort. Moreover, after 1916 the workforce who maintained these roads 
continually faced conscription. As a result of the constant demands of conscription and 
the prospect of better wages in the Army, the workforce continued to decline into 1917. 
This prompted HRDC to submit on 7 January 1917 a request to DCC for 20 German 
POW’s as an alternative source of labour for the maintenance of the district’s 
Highways.
333
 However, DCC informed HRDC on 24 February 1917 that they should be 
wary about this request because the work of POW’s on Road Maintenance ‘could not be 
relied upon’.334 Therefore, despite the prospect that POW’s seemed to present a 
convenient and effective workforce to maintain the roads, this quick solution seemed to 
be more troublesome than it was worth. This prompted HRDC during their meeting on 
24 February 1917 to advise the surveyor to make the best arrangements he could to 
obtain and keep fresh labour at a wage that did not exceed 20/- per week.
335
  
 
Nevertheless, during 1917, the situation with the district’s roads and their labour force 
had become more serious. It had worsened to the extent that on 14 July 1917, HRDC 
instructed the Surveyor that ‘in order to keep the men who were threatening to leave, to 
offer them 2/6 per week [as a] war bonus’.336 However, despite HRDC’s best efforts to 
appease the workmen, they continued to leave or threaten to leave. On 29 December 
1917, the situation with the roads reached breaking point to the extent that the 
supervisor had brought up the necessity to increase the wages in ‘consequence of other 
employers giving higher wages and the men leaving him’.337 This prompted HRDC to 
grant the Surveyor permission to use his discretion to ‘grant increases of 2/6 a week 
where he thought fit’.338 HRDC also decided that for the exceptional requests that went 
                                                 
333
 DHC: R7/9/C7, Minutes of Honiton Rural District Council, 1915 – 1920, 27 January 1917, p. 104. 
334
 DHC: R7/9/C7, Minutes of Honiton Rural District Council, 1915 – 1920, 24 February 1917, p. 108. 
335
 Ibid., p. 109. 
336
 DHC: R7/9/C7, Minutes of Honiton Rural District Council, 1915 – 1920, 14 July 1917, p. 127. 
337
 DHC: R7/9/C7, Minutes of Honiton Rural District Council, 1915 – 1920, 29 December 1917, p. 147. 
338
 Ibid. 
335 
 
beyond the 2/6 a week increase, they instructed the Surveyor that these claims would be 
brought before a sub-Committee for further review.
339
  
 
Notwithstanding HRDC measures which they hoped would appease the highways 
workforce grievances, the number of men employed on the maintenance of the district’s 
highways continued to decline. On 18 May 1918, HRDC took matters into their own 
hands and instructed the Surveyor of the district’s roads to claim exemption for any of 
his men if they were called up for service.
340
 This action demonstrates that the situation 
with the district’s roads had become so drastic that HRDC were in a difficult position. 
Due to the deteriorated state of the roads and urgent requirements of the highways for 
the war effort, HRDC were left with little alternative but to relent to the workforce’s 
demands because they needed to save every workman on the roads from conscription. 
At the same time, workmen for the district’s roads were given an opportunity to press 
their demands. The evidence of the road workers in the Honiton district verifies the 
argument made by Bernard Waites that there was a growth in the ‘collective bargaining 
power of the less skilled [workforce] between 1914 and 1920’.341   
 
Similarly, there were concerns raised by local government officials about the state of the 
county in 1918. During the spring of 1918, Lord Fortescue and other DCC members 
were concerned that if any more men were removed from agriculture, fishing and 
forestry it would hamper their production in Devon.
342
 On 25 February 1918, Fortescue 
was of the opinion that too many skilled men had been taken from the county. This was 
to such an extent that he was certain that ‘our local industries cannot afford to be 
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deprived of essential labourers’.343 It was clear that other councillors in DCC agreed 
with Fortescue’s assessment of the mood in the county in 1918. White reveals that there 
were some local notables in the county who were ‘actively working against the military 
authorities and hindering the recruitment process’.344 In a letter from Earl Fortescue to 
Hughes-Buller from March 1918 he conveyed the fact that there seemed to be a ‘fair 
degree of contradiction between the needs of the armed forces and the needs of the 
county’.345 Fortescue was adamant that the National Service Department would 
understand his point of view ‘once the dizziness of war has past’.346 He revealed in his 
memoirs that there ‘were endless struggles about men’ to which the WO ‘very properly 
claimed all able bodied men for the Army’.347 In return, they offered men who were 
‘only fit for Home Service’ along with released men who were still in training ‘on 
Agricultural Furlough at busy times’.348 It led Fortescue to conclude that though ‘even 
in the atmosphere of good will that prevailed between us and the Recruiting Authorities 
in Devon there was some friction and a good many hard cases; in which the truthful and 
patriotic man was more likely to suffer than the plausible shirker’.349  
 
After the failure of the Spring Offensives in 1918, the Agricultural Executive 
Committee (AEC) was set the task of finding an additional 30,000 men for the Army. In 
April 1918, the policy that was intended to achieve this task was known as the ‘clean-
cut’. According to Fortescue’s memoirs, this was the worst task that was set to the AEC. 
Indeed, he reveals that it was cruel to go through the list of the 2,500 men employed on 
all the farms in the county.
350
 The quota of men that Devon had to provide was 1,000 
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farmers to which 250 farmers had to be supplied ‘by the Northern Division’ of the 
county.
351
 Nearly all of the members of the DWAC were farmers who played up well to 
the task.
352
 However, Fortescue also suggests that one member whose son had been 
forced to join up because of the insistent efforts of Fortescue the member responded in a 
sweeping manner that ‘on the principle of the Fox who had lost his tail was thereafter 
all for drastic measures with other people’.353 Yet, there were agriculturalists in Devon 
who were not supportive of this combing out process. One farmer wrote to the Devon 
and Exeter Gazette on 10 May 1918 before the harvest to complain that Devon’s 
Tribunals should not draw further on men ‘engaged in agriculture at such a critical 
time’.354 Instead of calling up agriculturalists at this important time, the farmer 
suggested that a ‘great many men could be taken from the Devonport Dockyard, where 
thousands have flocked since the war began to avoid fighting and to receive a wage out 
of all proportion to that paid to the boys who are fighting either in the Army or 
Navy’.355 During the harvest of 1918, HRDC accepted a request from the Eastern 
Division of the DWAC to ‘release all suitable Road Men for the corn harvest’.356 In 
addition to these efforts, Fortescue also encouraged military tribunals across Devon to 
be more compassionate towards awarding exemptions. His justification for this request 
was that he believed that the mood of the county would ‘continue to decline if the 
populace were not “properly cared for”’.357 Therefore, despite the new demands that the 
war brought to the fore, the stability of the county in 1917 and 1918 was an important 
priority of the local government authorities in Devon. 
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As previously mentioned, the presence of the Benedictine fraternity of Monks at 
Buckfast Abbey had caused great concern amongst populations of the surrounding 
district. This was evident in a letter to DCC dated 26 February 1917 from all of the 
Buckfast Monks. They believed that the continued agitation in spite of the HO’s 
decision was ‘naturally distressing to all of us and to allay it we hope the special 
constables will be appointed that we may continue our life in peace’.358 According to 
the author of the HO report, he believed that reading through its contents, forced one to 
the conclusion that the ‘inmates of this Abbey have in the past done good charitable 
work in the neighbourhood and are no danger to the Community at large’.359 
Nevertheless, these concerns continued to be apparent during 1917 and 1918. On 27 
February 1917, Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, the Conservative MP for Devonport, made 
further enquires about the monks to Sir George Cave, the Home Secretary under the 
Lloyd George Coalition, during a House of Commons debate. Kinloch-Cooke believed 
that it was ‘undesirable that the abbey and grounds should be guarded locally, as they 
are within a few miles of the coast and close to a town doing government work’.360 
Hence, he was of the opinion that the ‘duty of watching alien enemies was not a local 
but a national one’.361 The Home Secretary replied that the Buckfast Monks were 
exempted from internment as a result of a recommendation from the Advisory 
Committee.
362
 Cave did reveal in his response some of what had been discussed at the 
special inquiry that was held at Buckfast Abbey in October 1916. It was agreed at this 
meeting that the Abbey might be watched by some special constables. This meant that 
they were taking steps that they had been ‘asked to take in the public interest’.363 It was 
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revealed during the Commons debate on 18 April 1917 that this surveillance by special 
constables did not quell the strong unease from the local residents towards the monks. 
 
William Joynson-Hicks, the Conservative MP for Brentford asked the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, William Brace, if he was going to ‘do anything with regard to 
the very strong feeling in the locality that these people ought to be interned instead of 
watched by special constables?’364 Brace replied that the monks could ‘claim their 
repatriation because they were priests’.365 However, Joynson-Hicks was adamant that 
due to the ‘very strong feeling in the locality that these people ought to be interned 
instead of watched by special constables’.366 Yet, Brace defended the HO’s actions and 
argued that Buckfast’s Monks were doing ‘very serviceable work for this nation’.367 On 
4 May 1917, Brace said that the monks pursued gardening, farming and bee-keeping 
alongside their religious activities.
368
 Nonetheless, it is evident that the attempt by the 
HO to quell the unease caused by allegations that Buckfast’s Monks were German spies 
was unsuccessful. Hence, the response of the BUDC revealed the nature of paranoia 
surrounding the Benedictine Monks had fuelled in the minds of the communities around 
the Abbey.  
 
Yet, the concerns over stability and war-weariness also created an ‘unfriendly climate 
for all foreigners, including friendly aliens’.369 In September 1918, the Clerk of the 
Parish Council of the East Devon village of Dunkeswell wrote to the Superintendent of 
Police at Honiton to request for an increased police supervision in the Parish due to a 
large number of Portuguese labourers living in the Parish, especially considering that 
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the ‘Licensee [of the local public house] is a woman’.370 The reason why a woman had 
become the Licensee of the Royal Oak public house by September 1918 was because 
the original Licensee, George Hornsey, had been called up on 17 May 1918.
371
 This 
meant that his wife had stepped into the breach to take over the management of the 
business. However, this move raised significant concerns amongst the members of 
Dunkeswell Parish Council (DPC) because they held serious reservations as to whether 
a woman had the capability to manage the behaviour of the regular customers who 
frequented a public house. As Stella Moss has suggested there were serious fears over 
the subject of women’s drinking in wartime. Despite the lack of credibility in these 
fears, it was these claims and concerns about women’s drinking that constituted ‘one 
strand of a richly woven tapestry of social critique about the changing place of women 
in wartime civil society’.372 However, the situation with a woman who was liable for the 
moral conduct of those who frequented the public house of the village raised anxieties 
amongst the male members of DPC. In particular, they questioned whether she would 
be able to control any problems concerning the public behaviour of the Portuguese 
labourers in the locality. Hence, they requested an additional police presence in the 
village. It was hoped that, through the effective surveillance and monitoring from the 
local constabulary, the Royal Oak’s Woman Licensee would adhere to the requests for 
responsible moral behaviour and moderation in serving alcohol to the labourers as well 
as to her local patrons.  
 
A welfare institution that was attempted to preserve the standards of provision despite 
the challenges of war was the Devon County Asylum (DCA). Based at Exminster 
Hospital, the DCA was responsible for the rehabilitation of mainly working-class 
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patients in Devon who suffered from mental health issues. It was noted within the 1917 
yearly report that the members of the medical staff had ‘evidently been toiling under 
considerable strain’.373 This was also due to the fact that many of the DCA’s male staff 
members had been conscripted into the army.
374
 Moreover, the conscription of these 
men was made even more apparent when considering the fact that many of the DCA’s 
male staff members were former soldiers.
375
 Joesph Melling and Bill Forsythe show that 
there had been a clear deterioration in the relations between the staff, attendants and 
Doctors of the DCA before the Great War.
376
 However, according to the author of the 
DCA’s report of 1917, he believed that the staff members were entitled to ‘much credit 
for the manner in which the work of the Asylum has been carried out’.377 In the yearly 
report for 1919, it was revealed that, within the period under review which included 
eight and a half months of 1918, a ‘very high death rate prevailed here, as in other 
institutions of the kind, due mainly to war conditions and insufficient nutrition’.378 
Although the inspectors noted that there had been an extremely satisfactory fall in the 
death rate ‘shown by a comparison of that of 1918 with that from the 1st January to 7th 
December 1919’.379  
 
Susan Pedersen argues that ‘welfare work’ for women during the First World War did 
not become a state service but was instead ‘left to benevolent organizations like the 
YWCA’.380 Based in the South Devon seaside resort of Torquay, one such benevolent 
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institution that provided assistance with the welfare of women was the Church of 
England Temperance Society for Female Inebriates at Temple Lodge (CoETSFITL). 
However, the CoETSFITL’s future from 1914 to 1917 was in doubt as the number of 
women stationed at the CoETSFITL continued to drop. By 10 August 1917, there were 
only 6 patients in the home and the shortage of patients had ‘become most serious’.381 
The CoETSFITL’s Committee considered whether they should accept any other cases 
rather than solely inebriates in an attempted to find alternative sources of income. This 
led the CoETSFITL’s Committee to propose that an advertisement should be placed in 
the Church Times offering ladies a sanctuary from their suffering. The advertisement 
read: ‘disturbed nerves or threatened breakdown & requiring rest can be received at 
Temple Lodge for 21/- weekly’.382 There were no responses to this particular advert. 
Nevertheless, the CoETSFITL’s Committee were not perturbed by the lack of responses 
and drafted a new advertisement which they inserted into both The Church Times and 
The Guardian. The notice was designed to inform readers that Temple Lodge was a 
home of rest in which ladies who experienced ‘alcoholic or Drug Excess’.383 In fact, the 
advertisement promoted the CoETSFITL as an ideal retreat to ladies who needed a rest 
or cure from air raids.
384
 The presentation of this advertisement is interesting to note. 
The second advert offers an experience which was a holiday retreat from the conditions 
of war rather than a sanctuary for individuals with an addiction to alcohol.  
 
Conversely, an individual could interpret that the CoETSFITL’s proposal was more 
akin to a tourist advertisement. Indeed, the CoETSFITL’s location on a key resort on 
the English Riviera meant that this appeared to enhance the proposal’s possibility for 
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success. The CoETSFITL’s Committee were so confident that the advert would bring in 
new trade they authorised the ‘Superintendent & the Hon. Secretary to purchase a few 
cheap rugs – should rest-care visitors come’.385 However, by 6 December 1917, despite 
their confidence in this venture, the CoETSFITL received no replies to the advert.
386
 
The suggestion to partake in the luxurious past-time of taking a holiday in a period of 
wartime austerity was perceived to be a counterproductive activity towards the war-
effort. The CoETSFITL decided to endorse a different approach to tourism through the 
promotion of escapism which was a key part of the holiday experience. Yet, despite the 
potential business benefits that could be gained through this venture, it can be observed 
that their advertisement was perceived in light of the social morality of wartime to be 
inappropriate.  
 
As a consequence of the failure of the scheme to rebrand the CoETSFITL as a retreat 
for women, whether they were inebriates or not, the question of the CoETSFITL’s 
future was again in jeopardy. One proposal put forward during the CoETSFITL 
Committee’s meeting on 11 January 1918, was to follow the example of the hotels in 
Devon’s holiday resorts. This meant that the CoETSFITL would be used by the Red 
Cross as a hospital for the wounded. Subsequently, Mr Hoskins reported during the 
following meeting that ‘the Red Cross Hospital nurses would not be able to avail 
themselves of the offered facilities’.387 However, the CoETSFITL’s superintendent 
received an application on 7 June 1918 from the Red Cross nurses to ask if they could 
use the sitting room upstairs with gas stove fittings.
388
 The CoETSFITL’s Committee 
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responded that owing to the restriction on gas consumption they could not ‘see its way 
to accede to the application’.389 Therefore, despite the intention of the CoETSFITL’s 
Committee to take advantage of the war’s opportunities, they were unable to 
accommodate the Red Cross nurses due to the war’s restrictions. Nevertheless, on 12 
July 1918, the CoETSFITL’s fortunes seemed to change, as the CoETSFITL’s 
Committee discussed whether to appoint a chaplain to present regular services since 
‘now that [new] patients were coming in’.390 Alcohol, like tourism, was perceived by 
many contemporaries to be counter-productive to the war effort. Hence, the language of 
temperance promoted by the abstinence groups became dovetailed within the lexicon of 
war and sacrifice.
391
  
 
Conclusion 
The initiatives taken in Devon were part of the larger project to reinvigorate the support 
of the British population for the war until victory could be secured.
392
 It must be said 
that the NWAC’s efforts to remobilize national efforts during 1917 and 1918 were ‘by 
no means completely successful’.393 Yet, the NWAC’s work did help in the 
remobilization of the British population’s resolve to ‘support the war to the end’.394 The 
work of the NWAC in Devon provided a further opportunity for Devon’s elite to appeal 
to the county’s citizens to reinvigorate themselves in the war effort. As Horne suggests 
the remobilization that the NWAC advocated did entail a ‘substantial voluntary 
participation by notables and dignitaries and by the cadres of the political and 
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administrative systems down to a very local level’.395 It is clear that the NWAC’s 
meetings in Devon also gave the ‘provincial patriots’ another avenue to disseminate and 
exhort the ideals of the social morality of wartime. Undeniably, the meetings of the 
NWAC gave the ‘provincial patriots’ another avenue to extend their wartime authority, 
exhort their views on what constituted patriotism and prescribe to Devon’s population 
acceptable behaviours. At a meeting of the NWAC in Okehampton on 5 January 1918, 
George Lambert advocated to the audience that ‘they were all for the State to-day, and 
they must sink their personal grievances. He wanted every one to realise the seriousness 
of the crisis we were passing through’.396 Yet, the success of these projects in Devon 
was dependent on the involvement of local populations and how the local elite educated 
and convinced their respective communities of the importance of the directives that 
constituted remobilization.  
 
In Devon, the local elites and civic society struggled to convince the people of Devon of 
the importance of engaging with all of these measures which were part of the 
remobilization of the British war effort. To suggest that a truly mobilized Home Front 
existed in Devon is disingenuous as this chapter has shown that remobilization, like 
self-mobilization, had distinct constraints. This was evident in Devon with the appeals 
from civic society, including Devon’s elite and clergy, for the county’s farmers to 
increase the domestic food production of wheat, potatoes and other arable food stuffs. 
The drive to expand productivity during 1917 and 1918 meant that a ‘large area of 
permanent grass was ploughed up’ across Britain.397 However, in Devon these calls to 
dedicate more acreage to grow more potatoes and cereals failed to persuade many of the 
county’s farmers change their working practices. Indeed, some of Devon’s farmers 
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argued that legislation such as the CPA and the introduction of tractors were ill-suited to 
the nature of farming in the county. This opposition was evident when during a meeting 
in South Molton on 6 September 1918 it was announced that an Executive Officer had 
been appointed to encourage increased food production in the district, two 
agriculturalists ‘voiced their objections with considerable warmth’.398 However, a 
correspondent of the Devon and Exeter Gazette revealed that if these farmers had been 
provided with a better picture of the experience of the Executive Officer with food 
production, this hostility could have been avoided. Yet, it prompted the correspondent 
to venture that the ‘North Devon farmer will not brook unnecessary interference with 
the conduct of his business, even in wartime, and there is no reason he should’.399 These 
calls to grow more cereals were in fact better received by the public and private 
agencies than the agriculturalists. The timber that was yielded from Devon’s forests was 
of vital significance to the war effort. Similarly, the process of harvesting this wood 
proved to be a problematic one as the Portuguese labourers hired to undertake the 
feeling and cutting of this wood worked in difficult conditions. As a result of this, the 
productivity of these men suffered. 
 
The crisis in the supply of food resulted in the introduction of rationing across Britain. 
In Devon, rationing was accepted but only on the condition that it would apply across 
all segments of county’s population. In addition, the crisis in food supply meant that 
endeavours were made by Devonians to translate ‘national interest into local action’ 
through an increase in domestic food production in the county.
400
 This also prompted 
Devonians to devise alternative strategies for food supplies in Devon which included 
the collection of seagulls’ eggs, using unused plots in graveyards for the cultivated of 
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potatoes and catching rabbits as an alternative sources of meat. Nevertheless, there were 
some Devonians who ignored the requests to increase domestic food production. An 
example of this was in a letter published in the Western Morning News in 1917 which 
criticised four men who had constructed a pleasure garden in the Dartmoor town of 
Okehampton when they could be better employed setting potatoes’.401 By using the 
social morality of wartime, the letter’s author emphasized the juxtaposition in the 
actions of patriotic and unpatriotic individuals. He revealed that there was a tennis court 
being constructed in the town whilst ‘patriotic people were digging up’ their gardens.402 
At the same time, it must be observed that the construction of a pleasure garden in 
Okehampton revealed that there were individuals who believed that it would be more 
profitable to run a pleasure garden than transforming the land to food production. 
Therefore, despite the appeals of Devon’s elite for the county’s population to undertake 
actions for the national interest, there were some Devonians who placed their own self-
interest above those of the nation. This was evident in the protests made against the 
formation of the DGPS and profiteers who both took food from Devon. Similarly, 
Devon’s fishermen had to travel a very fine line between being accused of selfishly 
pilfering fish or being praised for fishing within war conditions in the name of domestic 
food production. As the correspondence and the comments of Reynolds reveal the 
county’s fishermen had to also persevere in their fishing practices against the possibility 
of continued recruitment efforts by the Navy.  
 
The nature of how individuals in Devon attempted to navigate through the uncertainty 
of 1917 and 1918 was also evident in the challenges that faced the businessmen of the 
EDC. After the EDC had lost their lathe in 1917, the Company could not conduct any 
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further repairs on the Admiralty’s vessels.403 This jeopardised a valued source of 
income for the EDC and prompted one of the board members, Mr Aiken, to ask on 7 
June 1917 whether Exmouth’s dock could be developed from a ‘shipbuilding point of 
view’.404 Through the adaptation of the dock to become a shipbuilding yard, Mr Aikin 
sensed a financially viable business opportunity. As a result, the members of the EDC’s 
Board agreed to advertise the development of Exmouth’s dock for this purpose in the 
Shipping Gazette and other newspapers. Yet, despite two responses to the 
announcement which expressed interest in their proposal, there was no further reference 
within the EDC’s minutes to this promising enterprise. It must be considered that, 
despite the potential financial incentive to transform the docks into a ship building yard, 
the venture was not deemed entirely worthwhile. 
 
Throughout 1917 and 1918 some farmers in Devon were concerned about the survival 
of their farms. Therefore, there were agriculturalists in county who sought to preserve 
the future of their farms as a family business against the threat of conscription. The 
report for the Agricultural Wage Board of 1918 had praised Devon along with Cornwall 
and Somerset for outstanding levels of female employment in farming. Nonetheless, the 
evidence of this chapter strengthens the conclusion that Devon’s farmers were deeply 
apprehensive to employ women who were not experienced in agriculture. Indeed, the 
3,801 women workers in the county’s agricultural sector were typically family relations 
employed on the farm.
405
 This was evident on 10 March 1917 when Heathcoat-Amory 
complained that Devon’s farmers were not readily applying for substitute labour due to 
the fact that many of them did not know that ‘these substitutes are here and 
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available’.406 He warned Devon’s agriculturalists that if they did not apply for substitute 
labour quickly the ‘substitutes will be sent off to another county’.407 In Devon, 
remobilization was more successful in economic terms as was evident in the general 
popularity and appeal of war loan campaigns amongst many Devonians. Indeed, Devon 
was listed as one of the ten counties in England and Wales which contained the largest 
number of War Savings Associations (WSA) with Devon possessing 31.
408
 Gregory 
acknowledges that whilst the number of local WSA’s is a crude measure to indicate 
their popularity ‘it does give some idea of the depth of involvement of local 
communities’.409  
 
In Britain, France and Germany, the politics of food stoked the fires of war-weariness 
and fuelled accusations of profiteering.
410
 In Devon, the crisis of food supplies had 
amplified vocalised accusations of profiteering against farmers and food suppliers. The 
increase in the price of food stuffs also directly contributed to expressions of war-
weariness in the county. However, the concerns of stability in Devon did manifest 
themselves in attacks against the CO’s incarcerated in Dartmoor Prison and other 
individuals such as the Buckfast Monks who were deemed to embody the threat to 
internal security in the county. At the same time, that the local elite were the mediators 
of the war effort on a local level, there were also some local notables in Devon were 
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deeply concerned about the state of the county during 1917 and 1918. The escalation of 
conscription had taken its toll upon the socio-economic fabric of Devon. Consequently, 
whilst voluntary recruitment had brought the ‘provincial patriots’ together, the continual 
mounting demands of conscription and the war effort had raised significant doubts 
amongst Devon’s elite. Previously, Earl Fortescue, who was one of the most dedicated 
campaigners of war effort in Devon, raised concerns in 1918 that any additional call of 
men by the military authorities could create irreversible damage to the county. 
Throughout 1917 and 1918, in the applications for exemption, it became evident that 
individual priorities in Devon did overrule many appeals for Devonians to consider the 
national interest over their own interests. Meanwhile, the criticism against Devon’s 
notables on the tribunal panels and the escalating demands of the military in the county 
grew during 1917 and 1918.  
 
The perception that tribunalists on the DAT served with a sense of public duty in their 
deliberations was not universally shared. The prominent citizens of Devon who were on 
these tribunal panels were frustrated by the conflicting demands of the Army and the 
Home Front. In one instance, the patience of some members of Devon’s elite with the 
idiosyncratic system of exemption was tested to breaking point. This was reflected in 
how the sovereignty and authority of the decisions made by some local tribunals was 
continually challenged. It is clear that authorities on a local level sensed the importance 
to maintain stability in Devon and this was evident in the challenge to maintain the 
standards of welfare on offer in some of the county’s institutions. At the same time, 
welfare institutions were concerned about their survival in 1917 and 1918. The DCA 
and the CoETSFITL faced a decline in the number of individuals’ housed in these 
institutions and sought solutions on how to overcome the challenging years of 1917 and 
1918.  
351 
 
 
The news that the First World War had ended with the signing of the Armistice on 11 
November 1918 was received by Devon’s population with a mixture of celebration and 
relief. The correspondent for the Devon and Exeter Gazette described that, ‘naturally’, 
the prevailing mood in the minds of most of the citizens of Exeter was ‘of heartfelt 
thanksgiving’.411 Exeter had, according to the correspondent, become engulfed in a 
‘wave of thankfulness, relief and enthusiasm’.412 Shortly after the news of the Armistice 
had been confirmed, he had seen thousands of people from all parts of Exeter display 
‘the greatest enthusiasm’.413 Correspondingly in Exwick, once the news of the 
Armistice had reached the village’s population, they ‘all went wild with excitement and 
delight’.414 There were similar reactions of enthusiasm and excitement towards the news 
of the Armistice across Devon amongst the populations of Crediton, Dawlish, Exmouth, 
Tavistock, Tiverton and Newton Abbot.
415
 In addition, there was a similar echo of the 
urgent need for news during early August 1914 with thousands of Exonians who had 
swarmed in front of the newspaper offices to read the declaration of war. This was seen 
outside the offices of the Western Times in Exeter’s High Street where it was reported 
that once the news of the Armistice had been posted in the window, the crowd 
‘immediately transformed into a jubilant, cheering mass of citizens of all ages [and], all 
conditions’.416 Subsequently, the news of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 meant 
that the religious intercession services at Exeter’s churches for that day ‘were turned 
into services of thanksgiving’.417 The Bishop of Exeter suggested to the crowd who 
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gathered outside Exeter Cathedral that the Armistice was not only a time of 
thanksgiving but also a time to realize the ‘majesty of their God’.418  
 
Similarly, the Mayor of Exeter, Sir James Owen, used the Armistice to offer a short 
address which underscored the spiritual dimensions of the conflict. After the Cathedral 
service, a military and civic parade processed through the streets of the city which came 
to a halt at the statue of one of the county’s military heroes, Sir Redvers Buller. Owen 
declared to the audience who assembled there that the hearts of the citizens of Exeter 
were not boastful but were instead filled with thankfulness. They had all done their best 
to help to secure victory but he was certain that it was the divine authority of God which 
had guaranteed Britain’s victory against the Germans. In Owen’s address, it was God to 
whom they should offer their thanks because ‘we could never have smashed the German 
Army unless God had been with us’.419 A spiritual token of appreciation was also 
offered by Sir Ian Heathcoat-Amory. On 11 November 1918, he called upon all of his 
employees at his Textile factory in Tiverton to gather in the yard of the factory. Once 
they were all assembled, he informed them that they were to ‘cease work for the day, 
and to go home and say “Thank you” to God’.420 A correspondent for the Western 
Morning News came to the conclusion that across Devon there were surely never 
‘thanksgiving services so widely held more fervent and sincere’.421 Adrian Gregory and 
Annette Becker suggest that with the arrival of the Armistices, the churches of London 
and Paris ‘sought to extend their spiritual war effort’.422 These perspectives from Devon 
offer a valuable point that just as many of the British and French populations turned to 
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various “sacred unions” which were continuous interactions between the political and 
the spiritual throughout the war, Devon’s notables turned to the idea of a sacred union 
as a means to provide an explanation to Devonians for victory.
423
 The idea of a sacred 
union between God and the English people was deeply rooted in English history 
according to H. L. Bickersteth, the Reverend of Tavistock Parish Church. In 
Bickersteth’s sermon, he claimed the people of Tavistock had congregated to thank God 
for the Armistice in a solemn way in the six-hundred year old Church just as the ‘men 
had come to thank God for victory at Agincourt, the Armada victory and also for the 
result of the wars in the time of Napoleon’.424 Through the evocation of these victories, 
Bickersteth linked the Armistice into a historical narrative of the righteousness of 
Britain’s cause. 
 
In Plymouth, a correspondent for the Western Morning News reported that in some 
crowds in the city there was ‘in some respect boisterous rejoicing but there was a happy 
absence of the wild and unrestrained behaviour which, from its state of origin has 
received the name “Mafficking”’.425 In this correspondent’s opinion, the reason as to 
why there was an absence of unrestrained behaviour was due to the restrictions in the 
opening hours of public houses and the sale of alcohol. Consequently, he argued that 
whilst there was plenty of noise and jubilation amongst the crowds there was ‘very little 
to which reasonable objection could be taken’.426 He explained to most people that he 
saw on 11 November, the sense of relief that they felt was ‘too deep for light 
manifestations of joy’.427 Simultaneously, Edrica De La Pole recorded in her diary on 
11 November that one of the residents of the village decided to celebrate the Armistice 
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by getting drunk.
428
 Yet, James Thomas Rodgers chronicled in his journal that in 
Plymouth the ‘whole population seemed to be expressing their joy, everyone in his own 
way’ to which they were all ‘unmolested and all in good humour’.429 The columnist for 
the Western Morning News went on to stress that, on the whole, the way in which the 
people of Plymouth had received the news of the Armistice did ‘them credit from the 
personal and patriotic point of view’.430 Meanwhile, Teignmouth resident Albert Best 
did not know how to document the reactions of the people who crowded the streets of 
the South Devon town. According to Best, the crowds of people along with children 
who were carrying flags were ‘making some sort of noise’.431 However, the noise that 
emanated from the crowd was not of euphoric celebration. In its place, Best suggests 
that the celebrations were conducted in an orderly manner because of the presence of 
soldiers and sailors in the crowd.
432
  
 
In a letter to Henry Maurice, Stephen Reynolds described the intense sense of relief the 
news of the Armistice had provided him.
433
 However, this feeling seemed for him to be 
swamped with ‘a kind of backwash’.434 He clarified that this backwash was his 
reflection upon the human cost of the war in the ‘thought of who and what will never be 
any more’.435 In a contemplative tone, he revealed that his primary focus was upon the 
‘inadequacy of the end compared with the horror of getting there’.436 Indeed, he 
suggested that to witness the festivity of the people in Sidmouth’s streets who 
celebrated the Armistice gave him ‘the feeling of witnessing an orgie in a graveyard 
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(sic)’.437 A Western Morning News correspondent made a similar observation that in 
many homes across Plymouth, the Armistice was saddened by the losses incurred by the 
War.
438
 Yet, as the response of Reynolds shows, the arrival of the Armistice was 
perceived by some of Devon’s population as a poignant occasion not only for 
celebration but also reflection.  
 
The responses of some Devonians during 1917 and 1918 to appeals from Devon’s elite 
to make greater sacrifices for the war effort reaffirmed the tension between individual 
priorities and those of the nation. Yet, the remobilization campaign to reinvigorate the 
determination of Devon’s population support the war effort had many successes. The 
negotiation by Devon’s notables with the county’s population to undertake this second 
mobilization through war-loan campaigns and charitable activities was one such 
success. This success was due to the deep-rooted strength of humanitarian patriotism in 
Devon. The voluntary ethos still underpinned support for the war effort through grants 
and other financial incentives. However, Devon’s population were increasingly hesitant 
about and often vocally opposed to the greater demands of the military and the 
requirements of the war economy. Although the demands of the war effort were 
important, for many Devonians their individual priorities and the preservation of the 
social-economic fabric of the county through 1917 and 1918 were of equally vital 
significance.  
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Conclusion 
  
This microhistory of Devon from August 1914 to November 1918 suggests that the 
tension between individual and national survival underscores the fact that the war effort 
in the county was not understood as an all-encompassing phenomenon. When writing 
his memoirs for the war years in 1924, Earl Fortescue recalled that the conflict to him 
was mainly as a ‘confused mass of perpetual correspondence, committee meetings and 
anxiety’.1 The Western Morning News noted that during the ‘trying period [of the war] 
not only recruiting but the agricultural organisation of the county occupied much of his 
[Fortescue’s] attention’.2 An example of the pressure of Fortescue’s wartime 
responsibilities was when he concluded that the Belgian refugees in Devon were ‘not a 
very nice lot’.3 Fortescue had come to this conclusion because they were ‘exacting and 
tiresome, and a proportion were criminal and amoral’.4 By contrast, Alfred T. Gregory, 
Tiverton’s Mayor, recollected that there were some individuals in Tiverton to whom the 
war was considered as a ‘source of pecuniary profit’.5 Gregory suggests these unnamed 
profiteers had little consideration to hasten the duration of the war. Instead, they 
observed the ‘prolongation of the struggle with complacency’ due to the fact that they 
did not have any near relatives at the front.
6
 Therefore, Fortescue’s and Gregory’s 
suggestions underscore how the war brought great challenges to Devon’s elite as the 
county’s intermediaries of the war effort. This role of Devon’s notables and their 
relationship with the county’s population is one of the main analytical threads of this 
thesis. 
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Prominent figures of Devon’s civil society, such as Lord and Lady Fortescue, Sir Ian 
and Lady Heathcoat-Amory, and the Mayor and Mayoress of Exeter, became arbiters of 
the war effort in the county. They cemented and extended their influence as 
intermediaries of the war effort upon wartime society in Devon through the activities of 
committees and organisations that were part of the war effort. In his account of 
Tavistock during the Great War, Ralph Richardson contended that Devon’s elite should 
be applauded for how they administered their wartime responsibilities. These men, in 
his view, required a considerable amount of patience and diplomacy for the ‘smooth 
working of the orders received, which were sometimes contradictory and not always as 
simple to carry out as the Authorities supposed’.7 Hence, Richardson proposed that 
Devon was well served by the county’s elite who volunteered their ‘services on these 
Committees for nothing, but the honour of doing something to help win the victory’.8 
Yet, the arbitration of the war effort on a local level also provided Devon’s notables 
with an opportunity to extend their influence and authority upon wartime society in 
Devon. Stephen Reynolds described Devon’s elite as the ‘provincial patriots’ based on 
the fact they judged the patriotism of Devon’s population against the strength of their 
own patriotism and superintended the ‘patriotism of those who aren’t [exempt from 
military service]’.9 
 
A critical exploration of Reynolds’s description of Devon’s notables as the 
‘superintendents of patriotism’ has shown that they did seek to superintend the nature of 
patriotism of Devon’s population. The role of Devon’s elite as self-appointed police-
men and women of patriotism provides a valuable perspective on their activities to 
maintain order in the county and police against anti-patriotic behaviour. This was 
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achieved both formally and informally which included undertakings such as the 
formation of wartime charities, the organisation of recruitment efforts, sitting on the 
MST’s and making pronouncements at meetings of various wartime organisations. 
Examples of this are evident in Devon’s recruitment efforts as shown in Chapters 1 and 
2. In many cases, patriotism was a contested value and as a result the patriotism of 
Devon’s population was not solely driven by militaristic sentiment. Hence, this 
microhistory of Devon during the First World War has shown how Devonians 
demonstrated their patriotism in many forms, enabling the county’s population outside 
the requirements of military service to present their patriotism and claim citizenship in 
the wartime community. Devon’s notables even presented their patriotism through 
lending of parts of their stately homes to become hospitals for the wounded. The nature 
of patriotism in Devon also raises awareness of war cultures in rural districts. The fact 
that Devonians understood and defined patriotism in more than one context reaffirms 
this notion and helps to explain why attempts by the ‘provincial patriots’ to control the 
discourses and nature of patriotism in Devon were not always effective. As shown in 
Chapters 1 and 2, Devon’s farmers believed that to join the Army was not the only way 
to present their patriotism. Many Devonians in rural areas revealed the humanitarian 
nature of their patriotism through the charitable donation of food. Therefore, the 
definition of what constituted patriotism was a significantly contested notion in Devon. 
Hence, Devon’s elites went to great lengths to influence and control the wartime 
discourses of patriotism through public addresses and encounters with the county’s 
populace. Similarly, Devonshire’s network of tribunals created under the auspices of the 
MSA provided another way in which Devon’s elite could superintend over the 
patriotism of the county’s men-folk. As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the ‘provincial 
patriots’ on Devon’s tribunals became self-appointed judicators and arbitrated not only 
359 
 
upon the appeals against conscription from Devon’s men-folk but also the nature of 
their patriotism. 
 
Devon’s notables broadcast through speeches and publications in the local press 
definitions of what constituted ‘patriotic’ behaviour. This was defined with the use of 
examples from Devon that were deemed to be patriotic. Accordingly, the policing of 
patriotism in Devon neatly weaved into the dissemination of the language and 
representations of the social morality of wartime on a local level. Devon’s elite 
attempted to promote and control their definition of patriotism through the projection of 
an idealised civilian identity and the advocacy of the language of sacrifice. 
Simultaneously, Devon’s elite broadcast what they deemed to be unpatriotic examples 
from Devon to shame the misdemeanours of certain Devonians. This was evident in the 
coverage of Devon’s Tribunals in local newspapers, which further propagated the 
‘provincial patriots’ assessments of the ‘patriotism’ of those claiming exemption. 
Hence, the superintendence of patriotic behaviour in Devon fed into notions of public 
duty and the preservation of local stability. Moreover, it was an important part of the 
responsibilities of Devon’s elite to educate the county’s citizens of the socially and 
morally acceptable codes of conduct in wartime. Therefore, the attempt to monitor and 
police the patriotism of Devon’s population was a natural extension of the 
responsibilities of the county’s notables to administer the social morality of wartime 
based upon sacrifice and solidarity.  
 
Upon reflection, it is clear that Devon’s ‘provincial patriots’ were similar to the 
American volunteers who joined the APL because they too were above military age or 
exempt from military service and were zealous in their ‘pursuit of 100 percent 
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Americanism’.10 Similarly, the patriotism and loyalty of specific groups were brought 
into question by the self-directed surveillance of Devon’s elite in the pursuit to 
superintend the nature of patriotism in Devon. The increased levels of Germanophobia 
led to some of Plymouth’s Jewish community being suspected of being German 
nationals. At the same time, the presence of the Franco-German monks at Buckfast 
Abbey raised significant concerns by some Devonians who alleged that Buckfast’s 
monks were a risk to national security. Hence, Buckfast’s monks were confined to the 
Abbey’s grounds and subject to surveillance by special constables. Comparable 
concerns were raised about the presence of political CO’s at Dartmoor Prison. 
Concurrently, an additional police presence was requested by DPC to control the 
behaviour of Portuguese labourers in Dunkeswell due to the fact that the local public 
house was managed by a woman. 
 
An example of how the members of civil society in Britain perceived themselves as 
self-appointed policemen of wartime law and order was also noted in Dorset with the 
recollection of novelist and local notable Thomas Hardy. He recalled in a conversation 
with poet Robert Graves that he relished his experiences as Chairman of Dorchester’s 
Anti-Profiteering Committee where he ‘succeeded in bringing a number of rascally 
Dorchester tradesmen to book’.11 It is interesting to note that Hardy recognized himself 
as a sheriff who brought perceived profiteers to account. However, Dorchester’s 
population did not all support Hardy’s enthusiasm for administering upon the affairs of 
Dorchester’s traders. Hardy admitted that his attempts to clamp down on the 
profiteering in Dorchester and round up these unscrupulous tradesmen to face justice 
had made him ‘unpopular, of course’.12 As an anti-authoritarian perception of the police 
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would present them as intrusive arbitrators of law and order, Hardy understood how 
some would obviously resent his efforts to adjudicate the social morality of wartime.  
 
The ‘provincial patriots’ encountered similar responses from some Devonians in their 
attempts to mediate the war effort in Devon and continually negotiated with the 
county’s population to place the national interest above self-interest. In some instances, 
Devon’s elite struggled to convince some Devonians that this was everybody’s war. 
Some dissonant responses from Devon as put forward in Chapters 1 and 4 reveal that 
there were some individuals who considered that the war was not a priority. Various 
Devonians interpreted the efforts of the local notables to mediate upon the processes of 
mobilization as forms of imposition. The testimonials from some Devonians reveal that 
the efforts of the ‘provincial patriots’ were perceived to be a meddling influence upon 
their lives in wartime. It could be ventured that Reynolds’s description of Devon’s elite 
was also an observation that some Devonians saw them as armchair patriots that evoked 
a negative Home Front alongside the representation of the ‘shirker’ and the ‘profiteer’.13 
This explains the hesitation and indifference expressed by some Devonians when faced 
with the appeals for mobilization. Furthermore, the ambiguity present in some Devonian 
responses proved it was difficult for the county’s elite to superintend the nature of 
patriotism in Devon. As arbiters of the war effort, the ‘provincial patriots’ understood 
that their self-appointed authority had distinct limitations. In several cases, their 
jurisdiction was the subject of criticism from some Devonians. Upon review of the 
cases on the Tiverton Tribunal, Tiverton’s Mayor revealed that the Tribunal’s decisions, 
‘though often unpalatable, were generally accepted without murmur’.14  
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This thesis examining the wartime experiences of Devon’s elite to mobilize Devonians 
reveals the deep frustration they encountered in their attempts to reconcile the tension 
between individual and national survival. This tension was, in many cases, an 
unresolved dilemma throughout the war despite the best efforts of the ‘provincial 
patriots’. They struggled to convince some Devonians to accept the wartime necessity to 
sacrifice individual priorities for the national interest. In many cases, the engagement of 
Devon’s population with some forms of wartime mobilization was not easily acquired. 
The evidence from Devon generates enquiries about the effectiveness of Devon’s elite 
as intermediaries of the war effort across the county. The displays of support for the 
Devonshire Regiments and the accomplishments of Devon’s war charities do not 
indicate a general disaffection towards the war effort from Devonians. However, the 
lack of effective co-ordination amongst Devon’s elite helps to explain the varied success 
in recruitment efforts in some parishes and districts inside the county’s administrative 
boundaries. Another explanation as to why Devon’s notables were not universally 
successful across Devon was that they were not a co-ordinated group. A reading of 
Reynolds’s definition of Devon’s elite as the ‘superintendents of patriotism’ would 
suggest they were a homogenous group similar to a local police force. However, to 
presume this of Devon’s elite is to impose upon them an artificial cohesion. Instead, 
Devon’s elite were a diverse assembly of individuals that did not continuously work 
under a spirit of wartime co-operation. There has been significant doubt cast upon how 
united the civilian populations of the belligerent nations were in wartime.
15
 Some of 
Devon’s elite possessed a degree of independence from other members of the county’s 
elite concerning how to manage the demands of war in Devon.  
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One of the important themes of this thesis is that there did not appear to be a singular 
‘totalizing logic’ of mobilization disseminated by Devon’s elite. Similarly, Jay Winter 
and Antoine Prost remark that that there was no singular war culture.
16
 Instead, they 
argue that there were war cultures and that there was a different colouration to war 
cultures in rural settings than urban settings.
17
 Therefore, with a few exceptions, the 
trans-national historiography of the Home Front has not taken into account the variation 
between urban and rural localities.
18
 Instead, there is a focus on the wartime experiences 
of urban communities and their responses to the processes of mobilization.
19
 However, 
this study of Devon’s rural and urban localities during the First World War is sceptical 
of the understanding of a singular ‘totalizing logic’ that supposedly permeated 
mobilization efforts. Just as there were different war cultures, there appeared to be 
multiple ‘logics’ of mobilization in Devon. Devon’s elite were agents of a multitude of 
‘logics’ of mobilization, which were also contested in a variety of ways by parts of 
Devon’s population, who often developed their own rationalisations for abstaining from 
the behaviours that the ‘provincial patriots’ prescribed for them. 
 
It is equally important to remember that these self-appointed agents of the war effort 
possessed individual opinions, agendas, concerns and varied senses of authority. 
However, the authority of Devon’s elite was challenged because they were perceived to 
be representatives of the state. This was reflected in the idiosyncratic manner that 
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Devon’s tribunals approached appeals for exemption and the challenges that Sir Ian 
Heathcoat-Amory, the DAT’s Chairman, faced when adjudicating upon the claims for 
exemption. However, Heathcoat-Amory was also in a difficult position with his 
responsibilities at JHC’s factory, balancing his own interests, the priorities of his 
workforce and those of the WO. Some of Devon’s elite did not support all the measures 
introduced in the name of the war effort. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Beer Parish 
Council did not support the intensification of voluntary recruitment efforts which was 
advocated by Devon’s elite. This was also reflected in Hardy’s recollection when he 
contended that to be the Anti-Profiteering Committee’s Chairman was ‘a hundred times 
better than sitting on a Military Tribunal and sending young men to war who did not 
want to go’.20 It is clear Hardy believed that he should not hold the responsibility to 
administer over the applications for appeal. Instead, he undertook an alternative but 
recognised form of war work. In Devon, the mosaic of diverse responses to different 
schemas of mobilization indicates that Devonians employed alternative strategies to 
manoeuvre through the challenges of wartime.  
 
This thesis has provided a critical reflection upon local power dynamics in Devon 
between the county’s elite and Devon’s population during the war. The way in which 
Devon’s populace participated in the war effort was more ambiguous than previous 
histories of Devon during the Great War have acknowledged. The members of Devon’s 
civic society were aware of the effects of mobilization upon the social and economic 
composition of Devon. For instance, Chapter 4 reveals that Fortescue along with other 
notables had serious concerns about the state of Devon during 1917 and 1918. Devon’s 
elite carefully navigated the contradictions that existed between the requirements of the 
Home Front in Devon and those of the military. Consequently, this thesis shows that 
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Devon’s elite were not unified under all the calls for mobilization and the wartime 
measures introduced by the state. Maureen Healy’s study of Vienna during the Great 
War illustrates the stark contrast of the ‘home front of the 1914 imagination with the 
reality of the home front as it evolved over four and a half years’.21 The same stark 
contrast can be said of the campaigns of the ‘provincial patriots’ to mobilize the people 
of Devon because the elite were not always clearly understood and did not 
comprehensively unify the county’s populace under shared wartime responsibilities. 
Chapters 1 and 2 emphasized the distinct limitations of the processes of self-
mobilization in Devon and confirm that self-mobilization was an uneven process.
22
 
Likewise, the heightened demands of remobilization during 1917 and 1918 were neither 
unanimously well received by Devon’s population nor endorsed by all of the county’s 
notables. Undeniably, the success of mobilizing Devonians across the county was more 
complex than Bonnie White suggests. This thesis reveals that Devon’s elite had to trim 
their high ambitions and expectations of what some forms of mobilization would 
achieve in the county. From 1914 to 1918, the striking contrast between the aspirations 
of mobilization expressed in the appeals of Devon’s elite and the reality of how 
Devonians responded to these appeals are a major thread in this thesis.  
 
The chronological structure employed in this thesis has helped to distinguish the 
effectiveness of different forms of mobilization across Devon’s rural and urban districts. 
The nature of urban mobilization in Devon was not necessarily mirrored in the success 
of mobilization in the county’s rural localities. Through understanding mobilization as a 
system of projects and processes, the evidence from Devon reveals the strengths and 
limitations of different forms of mobilization amongst Devonians. A benefit of applying 
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a chronological approach in this study is that it identifies not only the evolutions on the 
Home Front in Devon during the First World War but also the continuations from 1914 
to 1918. The success of charitable efforts in Devon presented in this thesis reinforces 
the strength of the humanitarian nature of Devon’s patriotism. There were many 
Devonians who were more prepared to give to the war effort in the form of charitable 
efforts rather than give their lives. This demonstrates that throughout 1914 to 1918, a 
voluntary ethos continued to resonate amongst Devonians and the appeals for self-
mobilization. Chapter 4 revealed how the success of War Loan and War Bond 
campaigns in Devon helped to underscore the willingness of Devonians to support the 
war effort through charitable efforts and economic mobilization. Accordingly, some 
schematics of mobilization were more successful than others in Devon during the First 
World War. A further continuity across this chronological structure which also acts as 
one of the analytical threads of this thesis is the tension between individual priorities 
and national ones. Individual priorities in many instances did undermine the importance 
of national survival. Devon’s fishermen were concerned about the survival of their 
livelihoods through the war. This was also noticeable in Ilfracombe where attempts to 
preserve an atmosphere of ‘Business as Usual’ achieved mixed success and went against 
the grain of this social morality of wartime which condemned the holiday industry as a 
frivolous distraction. Yet, the persistence of individual survival was evident with the 
compensation cases from various agencies in Devon.  
 
Jean-Louis Robert and Winter suggest that ‘there is a clear chronological divide’ in the 
history of London, Paris and Berlin during the war.
23
 From 1916 until the Armistice, the 
populations of London and Paris had the ‘capacity, both material and administrative, to 
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respond to wartime tensions and conflicts’.24 However, Berlin’s authorities were not as 
fortunate as those in Paris and London.
25
 The same was also true of Vienna.
26
 The 
successes that Devon’s elite achieved to resolve the tension between individual 
priorities and national ones through continued negotiation underscores the fact that 
Devon and its population was not a monolithic structure. This is reflected in 
Richardson’s suggestion that a surprise of the war years was the way that Devon’s 
population ‘adapted to the altered circumstances and put up with anything and 
everything so long as we thought it helped to win us the victory’.27 This is not to say 
that the war did not bring significant social changes to Devon because the war ushered 
in some social changes that were advocated by the county’s elite on a local level. 
However, to Devonians, the Great War was a period of uncertainty where continuity 
outweighed change to which they were concerned about how to navigate and survive 
the war.  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that the ‘provincial patriots’ struggled to convey to 
Devon’s population the importance of wartime directives whilst superintending 
patriotism on a local level. As the Home Front evolved in Devon from 1914 to 1918, the 
wartime experience of Devon’s elites was characterized by the constant negotiation to 
convince Devonians to place the national interest above self-interest. The perspectives 
and evidence presented in this microhistory of Devon during the First World War is part 
of the historiographical move away from the illusionary veil of a unitary national 
experience. Moreover, it is an addition to the trans-national historiography on the nature 
of mobilization in specific localities beyond and below the nations. By scrutinising the 
effectiveness of mobilization and analysing mobilization as a process in Devon, this 
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examination stresses that the war effort in Devon was neither an effective unifying 
principle nor a cohesive phenomenon. The involvement of Devonians with the war 
effort was informed, in many instances, by what was considered to be an appropriate 
contribution. This thesis has shown there were some corners of Devon from 1914 to 
1918 that were at least partially resistant to the logic of modern industrial war. 
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